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This dissertation compares ethnically-based identity politics in two constitutionally-
defined multi-ethnic states, China and Russia, by focusing upon one type of prescriptive 
institution, territorially-based formal autonomy designated at the sub-national levels for 
ethnic minorities. Intriguingly, some of these ethno-regions have been more capable of 
actually exercising the formally promulgated autonomy than others. What can explain the 
variations across different ethno-regions in terms of implemented autonomy outcome? 
This dissertation develops an analytical framework that consists of a response variable, 
an ethno-region’s implemented autonomy outcome, an explanatory variable, an ethno-
region’s inter-ethnic boundary-makings, an intervening variable, titular elites’ bargaining 
capacity, and two condition variables, formal arrangements of center-periphery relations 
and party-state relations. An ethno-region’s implemented autonomy outcome is assessed 
in terms of compliance with the corresponding autonomy-establishing legal document(s) 
on three dimensions, political participation, economic development, and cultural 
promotion among the ethno-region’s titular ethnic population. 
Based upon fieldworks that combined elite interviews, participant observations, 
and oral history, a controlled comparison is conducted of two ethno-regions with 
strikingly contrasted autonomy outcomes for the first six years of the 2010s, the more 
autonomous Republic of Tatarstan in Russia and the less autonomous Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region in China, by tracing the process of how three dimensions of inter-
ethnic boundary-making processes, acculturation, social integration, and psychological 
identification, mold three dimensions of titular elites’ capacity, elite-level inter-ethnic 





structure, which jointly shape a fourth dimension, titular elites’ representation in the 
ethno-regional state’s most powerful positions. Four additional ethno-regions, Tibet and 
Inner Mongolia of China, Bashkortostan and Yakutia of Russia, are used as shadow 
cases.  
It is argued that greater inter-ethnic integration, when combined with robust 
consciousness of inter-ethnic distinction, is conducive to building the capacity both for 
elites of the titular ethnic category to bargain with the central state and for intra-ethnic 
cohesion, which in turn can lead to greater autonomy outcome for the ethno-region. In 
such processes, the key to socio-economic development in ethnically heterogeneous 
societies is to strike the balance between the mutually competing but not necessarily 
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İ tugan tel, i matur tel, ətkəm-ənkəmneng tele! Dönyada küp nərsə beldem sin tugan tel arkılı. 
İng elek bu tel belən ənkəm bishektə köyləgən. Annarı tönnər buyı əbkəm xikəyət söyləgən. 
İ tugan tel, hərwakıtta yərdəmeng berlən sineng. Kechkenədən anglashılgan shatlıgım-kaygım minem. 
İ tugal tel, sində bulgan ing elek kılgan dogam. Yarlıkagıl, dip, üzem həm ətkəm-ənkəmne, xodam. 
Gabdulla Tukay, 1909 
Mother Tongue 
O mother tongue, o beautiful tongue, the tongue of my parents; through you, mother tongue, I discovered a 
lot in this world. 
In the earliest days, my mother was singing me lullabies, in this tongue; then during the nights, my 
grandmother was telling me stories, in this tongue. 
O mother tongue, always together with your help, have my joys and sorrows been expressed since 
childhood. 
O mother tongue, in you came my first prayer, “please absolve my parents and myself of our sins, my 
Lord.” 
Gabdulla Tukay, 19091  
                                                          





In this poem, the author emotionally personifies his mother tongue. Written in literary 
Tatar of the early 20th century by a high revered poet of Tatar/Bashkir heritage, Gabdulla 
Tukay (1886-1913), the poem was recited during the opening ceremony2 of the 2013 
Summer Universiade held in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan (hereafter 
RT), an ethnically-defined territory of Russia. It was on this occasion that the peculiar 
identity of Tatarstan and the Tatar language, the second largest language of Russia and 
one of the two official languages of Tatarstan, was vividly showcased to an international 
audience. Two years later, during the opening ceremony3 of the 2015 FINA World 
Aquatics Championships held in Kazan, a Tatar folk song, Tugan Yak (Birthplace), again 
was sung in Tatar.  
Six years earlier, in the early July of 2009, troops were dispatched from all over China to 
Ürümqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (hereafter XUAR), an 
ethnically-defined territory of China, to crack down upon days of inter-ethnic violent 
clashes most of whose “targets” were either ethnic Uyghurs or ethnic Han. Internet access 
was largely cut off for non-governmental users throughout XUAR for almost a year. Ever 
since, heavy police presence has become a routinized scene in the streets of not only 
Ürümqi but also other urban centers of Xinjiang. Many local residents, irrespective of 
their ethnicity, tend to believe that the Uyghur-Han relationship in Ürümqi has in general 
grown tenser and tenser since the 1990s. Stereotypical association of Xinjiang with being 
“restive” has become conventional in China.  
                                                          
2 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wYATqdHSVZ4 (accessed February 28, 2017). 





Both China and Russia are constitutionally defined as multi-ethnic4, where a series of 
ethnic territorially-based autonomous entities have been formally designated for various 
ethnic minorities (hereafter referred to as “ethno-regions”). Intriguingly, some of these 
ethno-regions have been more effectively promoting inter-ethnic cooperation, local 
economic development, and the cultural interests of the titular ethnic populations5 and 
achieving higher actual degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the central state than others. The 
empirical records of XUAR in China and RT in Russia may conspicuously illustrate the 
varying degree of actually exercised autonomy. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of ethnic populations indigenous 
to Central Eurasia have reached their eponymous independent statehood. Nevertheless, 
two among the most populous of such populations, Tatars6 and Uyghurs7, remain ethnic 
minorities in Russia and China respectively. Ethnic Tatars constitute the largest ethnic 
minority in Russia (5,310,649 as of 2010) and are the titular ethnic population of the RT. 
Uyghur, the most commonly used language among ethnic Uyghurs (10,069,346 as of 
2010), the titular population of the XUAR, is arguably the largest non-Sinitic language in 
China. Throughout the 1990s, both populations saw an increase of ethnically-based 
                                                          
4 The NPC of PRC, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [in Chinese], 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/node_505.htm (accessed February 28, 2017); President of Russia, 
Constitution of the Russian Federation [in Russian], http://constitution.kremlin.ru (accessed February 28, 
2017). 
5 “Titular ethnic population” here simply refers to citizens of the ethno-region’s titular ethnic category 
according to official categorizations. In China and Russia, ethnically-based categorizations are not 
coterminous with territorially-based categorizations. Citizens of an ethno-region’s titular ethnic category 
are not necessarily native to or originally from that ethno-region. However, such citizens are still counted 
as “titular” as long as their ethnic category is the titular one. 
6 Ethnic Tatars officially categorized as such in Russia who trace their ancestry from what are today’s 
Federal Districts of Volga and Ural of Russia (or İdel-Ural) and identify Tatarstan as their titular ethno-
region. 





mobilizations with demands ranging from greater regional autonomy to self-
determination. However, by the beginning of the 2010s, Tatar ethno-national movement 
has largely faded away, while the profile of Uyghur dissent and resistance has attracted 
unprecedented attention both inside and outside China.   
Flourishing autonomy-building initiatives have enabled Tatarstan to attain the most 
privileged status of all the constituent entities8 of Russia: ethnic Tatar elites were able to 
flexibly and ambiguously couch their demands in terms of “sovereignty” (Slocum 1999), 
to pursue developmental strategies that differ from Moscow’s, to promote the once-
declining Tatar language, and to actively build trade and diplomatic relations with other 
regions of the Russian Federation and with international parties. In terms of official 
historiography, the state-sponsored Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of 
Sciences9 has been actively promoting a post-Soviet discourse that debunks the narratives 
of “Tatar yoke”10 while arguing that the foundation of the multi-ethnic Russian statehood 
was rather laid under the Golden Horde whose cultural and linguistic heritages underpin 
the shared identity of ethnic Tatars. 
By contrast, among ethnic Uyghurs, resentment towards what is perceived as the central 
state’s overwhelming control brews to varying extent. The Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps (hereafter XPCC)11 dominates the use of land and natural resources, 
while issues like urban unemployment and rural poverty12 beleaguer ethnic Uyghurs. 
                                                          
8 Russian: sub’yekty Rossiskoi Federatsii. 
9 Russian: Institut Istorii imeni Shigabutdin Mardzhani Akademii Nauk Respubliki Tatarstan. 
10 Russian: Tataro-mongol’skoe igo. 
11 Chinese: Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan. 
12 Ethnic Uyghurs tend to be most disadvantaged in terms of “earnings in urban labor markets,” according 






With regard to knowledge-production, contested issues include, but are not confined to, 
the massive curtailing of Uyghur as language of instruction with the introduction of 
“bilingual education” aimed at strengthening ethnic Uyghur schoolchildren’s Mandarin 
Chinese skills, restricted public space for religious practices, and a strict control upon the 
official historiography in which the historical trajectory of how the shared identity of 
being “Uyghur” emerged is largely understated.  
In Russia, a classic counter-example of Tatarstan’s conspicuous autonomy-building can 
be Chechnya, where two episodes of bloody wars spanning the 1990s and the 2000s 
between the central-state’s armed forces and ethno-regional militants (Stoner-Weiss 
2004, 304-307) ended in the installation of highly autocratic and coercive rule by a 
central-state-backed clan. In China, a counter-example of Xinjiang’s stereotypical image 
of being “restive” can be Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, where expression of Muslim 
identities has been relatively blossoming, and the China-Arab States Expo has been held 
annually since 2013. Meanwhile, throughout the first six years of the 2010s, Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region (hereafter NMAR) has consistently been the only 
autonomous region ranking among the top ten province-level units of China by GDP per 
capita13. In this sense, Inner Mongolia has become the economically most developed 
ethno-region of China.  
Beyond China and Russia, examples of fruitful autonomy-buildings also abound. In 
Canada, Québec has attained an asymmetrically high level of political, economic, and 
cultural autonomy, and the disparities in terms of political and economic power between 
                                                          





French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians have been considerably reduced since 
the 1960s (Simeon 2004, 98). In Spain, the Basque Country under the leadership of the 
Basque Nationalist Party has achieved a level of political and fiscal autonomy higher than 
most of the other regions (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 134-136). In Great Britain, 
Scotland’s building of political and fiscal autonomy since the late 1990s culminated in 
the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. 
How can we make sense of the starkly contrasted autonomy outcomes of Tatarstan and 
Xinjiang despite similar trends of ethnic mobilization about two decades earlier? This 
puzzle ushers in a broader research question for the dissertation: Why have certain 
subnational-level regions designated for ethnic minorities to practice territorially-based 
autonomy been able to exercise more autonomy vis-à-vis the central state than have 
others of the kind? What may explain the variation across different ethno-regions in 
terms of the extent to which they actually exercise the formally promulgated autonomy? 
Simply put, why have some ethno-regions in China and Russia been more 
autonomous than others?  
I define my response variable, an ethno-region’s degree of actually exercised autonomy, 
in terms of how much of what is stipulated in the legally binding documents establishing 
the formal autonomy for the ethno-region has been empirically implemented in 
compliance. Such legally binding documents embody the formal institutions14 that 
officially promulgate territorially-based autonomy for a territorially-concentrated ethnic 
                                                          
14 I subscribe to Kellee S. Tsai’s definition of formal institutions as “rules, regulations, policies, and 
procedures that are promulgated and meant to be enforced by entities and agents generally recognized 





minority15 on matters crucial (Treisman 2007, 238) to the ontological security16 (Kinnvall 
2004) of their ethnic identity and are meant to be implemented. These formal institutions 
constitute the baseline (Tsai 2007, 38) according to which I score17 ethno-regions’ degree 
of compliance. In this sense, an ethno-region’s autonomy outcome, as I construe, is not 
conceptually synonymous with either policies, or institutions, or events, but corresponds 
instead to the outcome of a capacity to implement.  
Aside from the respective constitutions of China and Russia, for ethno-regions in China, 
one of the most relevant legal documents is the Law of Ethnic Regional Autonomy of the 
People’s Republic of China18, while specific to ethno-regions in Russia, other legally 
binding covenants include constitutions of various ethnic republics and treaties19 signed 
between the federal government and ethno-regional states. Using what is stipulated in 
respective documents as benchmark, I assess an ethno-region’s degree of actually 
implemented autonomy in terms of compliance with the corresponding legal documents 
for a specific time frame in which such legal documents possess legal force. Compliance 
is evaluated on three dimensions, political participation, economic development, and 
cultural promotion among the ethno-region’s titular ethnic group20. 
                                                          
15 I determine who are members of such ethnic minorities in accordance with both self-identifications at 
the individual and group levels and official categorization at the state level. 
16 “Ontological security” is defined as a security of being, a sense of confidence and trust that the world is 
what it appears to be (Kinnvall 2004, 762). This concept pertains to the stability of individuals’ shared 
worldviews and self-understandings.  
17 In terms of its design, similar to how Freedom House scores and rates countries’ degree of “freedom.” 
18 Passed in 1984 and most recently revised in 2001. 
19 For example, the Treaty on Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Powers between Bodies of Public 
Authority of the Russian Federation and Bodies of Public Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan signed into 
force on June 26, 2007, and valid for ten years. 





The way I conceptualize an ethno-region’s implemented autonomy outcome is based 
upon the consideration that the formal connotations of “ethno-regional autonomy” vary 
across different national contexts (e.g. China and Russia). In other words, it is almost 
impossible to construct, independent of such contexts, an “objective”, universally 
applicable definition for autonomy as implemented outcome. The formal connotations of 
ethnic territorially-based autonomy are usually enshrined in the relevant autonomy-
establishing, legally-binding documents and shape the meaning of “autonomy” in 
different contexts. If we acknowledge this, then an implication can be derived: the key to 
effectively putting formally promulgated autonomy into practice resides in ethnic 
minority elites’ adequate knowledge of the rules of the game for not only autonomy-
building but also politics in general of the multi-ethnic states. Such knowledge can not 
only be useful for ethnic minority elites to capture more political, economic, and cultural 
resources but also make it possible for them to incrementally alter or transform the rules 
of the game. The building of such knowledge among ethnic minority elites, as I argue, 
requires social integration, or rather, a balance between ethnic minorities’ concerns to 
maintain their distinct identities and their capacity to more effectively participate in the 
political, economic, and cultural developments of multi-ethnic states. 
 
WHY STUDY ETHNIC TERRITORIALLY-BASED AUTONOMY? 
For multi-ethnic states, ethnic territorially-based autonomous arrangements were 
established in order to achieve three implicit goals: to keep minorities in the state, to 
constrain majorities, as well as to build a capable state that promotes inter-ethnic 





outcomes can vary considerably across ethno-regions, an important corollary can be 
derived: merely formal arrangement of ethnic territorially-based autonomy that is meant 
to accommodate ethnically or territorially-based cleavages (Amoretti 2004, 11) cannot 
adequately avert such cleavages from growing into rigid ethnic divides or even ethnic 
conflicts. This corollary directs us back to the empirical puzzle of the dissertation, framed 
in another way: why have some ethno-regions been so powerless towards central-
state’s coercive policies, while other ethno-regions have been more capable of 
negotiating autonomy privileges with the central-state? 
Then what is the elephant in the room? Largely, the management of such pre-existing 
ethnically or territorially-based cleavages does not stop at installing formal institutions 
but rather requires continued efforts to build the capacity of titular elites to put 
autonomy into practice and to make formal autonomy live up to its name. How can titular 
elites’ political, economic, and cultural power be strengthened without their having to 
challenge outright the existing regime? Such efforts hinge upon input from and 
interactions between not only the titular elites and the multiethnic state’s ethnic majority 
elites, not only the titular populace and the ethnic majority populace, but also the titular 
elites and the masses regardless of ethnicity. In this sense, the primary rationale for the 
study of ethnic territorially-based autonomy resides in its relevance to our understandings 
of more sustainable ways to prevent or to manage ethnic conflicts.  
A second rationale is more specific, concerning the semiotic significance of an ethnic 
territorially-based autonomous arrangement and its implementation to both the titular 
ethnic population and the central state. For individuals of the titular ethnic category, 





maintaining the ontological security (Kinnvall 2004) of the ethnic minority’s distinct 
identity, or rather, the confidence and trust (2004) that their common points of reference 
to the social world (Hale 2008, 47) remain stable. An ethno-region able to effectively 
practice autonomy can convey a picture of “home” (Kinnvall 2004, 762-763) to its titular 
ethnic population and boost the sense of ontological security among the titular 
population. Inversely, an ethno-region perceived as not practicing “genuine” autonomy 
can exacerbate the anxiety among the titular population about their ontological security.  
For the multi-ethnic central state, ethnic territorially-based autonomous arrangements can 
be interpreted as a “maximally tolerable compromise” that can be made to reconcile 
distinct, entrenched ethnic identities and the state’s territorial integrity. Ethno-regions that 
effectively build their autonomy can convey to the central state a picture of “such ethno-
regions’ snugly blending in and contributing to a big family” while reducing the central 
state’s paranoia about the ontological security of its territorial integrity.  
 
THE ARGUMENT 
Of the existing approaches across social sciences to the study of ethnic politics, major 
types of phenomena explained include ethnic conflicts (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Gurr 2000; 
Gagnon 2004), ethnic co-operations (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 1996), ethnic political 
mobilizations (e.g. Beissinger 2002; Gorenburg 2003), ethnicity regimes and their 
changes (e.g. Aktürk 2011), ethnic secessions (e.g. Hale 2008), ethnic bargainings (e.g. 
Jenne 2007), and ethnic boundary-makings (e.g. Wimmer 2013). Compared to the study 





autonomy figures marginally, which mostly analyzes it either as a dichotomous outcome 
variable of having reached the institutional arrangement of autonomy or not, an 
independent variable impacting the likelihood of ethnic conflicts (Bunce and Watts 2005; 
Cederman et al. 2015), or as a prescriptive category to manage ethnic conflicts (Lake and 
Rothchild 1996; Lapidoth 1997; Shaykhutdinov 2010; Hannum 2011) rather than as an 
empirical and quantifiable fact (Sambanis and Milanovic 2014). In response, I study 
ethnic territorially-based autonomy as a quantifiable dependent variable, and my study is 
intended to contribute to our understanding of ethnic politics by proposing a new 
approach tailored to the study of implemented autonomy outcomes of ethno-regions. 
Nevertheless, useful insights can be distilled from an assessment of whether and how the 
analytical frameworks proposed and tested in the explaining of other orders of 
phenomena can be suitable for explaining the differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-
regions. Some of the frameworks display partial fit since some of the key variables used 
represent either structural or agency-based factors and are varying across the selected 
ethno-regions of this study. Before introducing my argument, I briefly discuss the ways 
in which the existing approaches to the study of ethnic politics can partially, but not 
adequately, explain the differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-regions, as 
summarized in Table I.1. Three macro-approaches, groupness as exogenous, groupness 
as endogenous to historically-determined structure, and groupness as endogenous to elite 
agency, can be summarized to the study of ethnic politics according to the ways they 
address the following question: are ethnic groups the natural agents of ethnic politics? A 
more detailed critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches is 





The groupness as exogenous macro-approach tends to assume groupness, or collective 
consciousness, as exogenous and conceptually presupposed to the processes of ethnic 
politics. Represented by the comparative disadvantage theory (Gurr 2000), the positional 
group psychology theory (Horowitz 1985), and the value rationality theory (Varshney 
2003), this approach is more focused upon common characteristics to various contexts of 
inter-ethnic relations. It poses itself as an unfit alternative explanation, as both Xinjiang 
and Tatarstan feature salient but largely settled ethnic categories, and the ethnic divide in 
both ethno-regions approximates an “unranked system”21 (Horowitz 1985, 22).  
The groupness as endogenous to historically-determined structure macro-approach treats 
groupness as contingent and tends to follow the tenet that ethnic groups are processual 
products of social interactions. According to the posited sources of groupness, this 
approach can largely be organized in three sub-approaches: groupness as endogenous to 
institutions, groupness as endogenous to interactions between institutionally defined 
actors, and groupness as endogenous to group-making processes.  
The first sub-approach, groupness as endogenous to institutions, focuses upon the role of 
the state and formal institutions in terms of standardizing ethnic categories and shaping 
the ways people identify themselves ethnically (e.g. ethnic mobilizations, Gorenburg 
2003). This approach fits partially to explain differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-
regions, as certain types of institutions, such as federalism versus unitarism, do vary 
between Xinjiang and Tatarstan. However, this approach downplays the agency of elites 
                                                          
21 Structure in which ethnically-based cleavages crosscuts class-based cleavages, and the position of an 





and may not suffice to construct a general argument applicable both to cases with 
differing institutional contexts and to cases with similar institutional contexts.  
The groupness as endogenous to interactions between institutionally defined actors 
approach discerns interactive dynamics between ethnic minorities, between ethnic 
groups, or between periphery and center in terms of how group consciousness forms 
according to relevant actors’ mutual perceptions. It is characterized by the conception of 
ethnicity as cognitive device, according to which ethnic categories can constitute 
perspectives of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the social world (Brubaker 
2004, 17). Frameworks in this approach displays partial fit to explain autonomy 
outcomes. 
For example, Mark Beissinger’s event-centered study highlights the processes of 
mutually transforming agency and structure in which earlier nationalist events making 
claims to the state and associated with some minorities can structure subsequent 
nationalist mobilizations associated with other minorities (2002) but is nevertheless 
developed largely to account for a unique outcome, the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, it does not travel easily to the explaining of other orders of phenomena such as 
differing autonomy outcomes which are, by no means, events. The collective-fear-under-
weak-state theory (Lake and Rothchild 1996), for its part, can barely travel to the 
explaining of differing autonomy outcomes, as the group-wide level of collective fear 
could be an outcome of lower level of actually exercised autonomy, while central-state 
capacity is not varying significantly across China and Russia. The “ethno-regional titular 
elites’ perception of the center” theory (Hale 2008), on the other hand, is more suitable 





outcomes, implicit in which is the central state’s tolerance of territorially-concentrated 
minorities to access the ethno-regional state and to share power with the central state, 
center’s perception of the region seems a more suitable category for explaining autonomy 
outcomes. 
The third sub-approach, groupness as endogenous to group-making processes, has the 
merit of highlighting the processual and relational nature of the processes in which ethnic 
categories can translate into contested group consciousness and inter-ethnic boundaries. It 
acknowledges the concurrent tendencies towards assimilation and differentiation while 
assuming that contestation over categories and boundaries can take on different outlooks 
across cultural, social, and psychological dimensions (Rumbaut 2005; Wimmer 2008). 
This approach presents itself as a partial fit, considering that dynamic inter-ethnic 
relations is a vital non-institutional factor and varies across Xinjiang and Tatarstan. 
However, to explain differing autonomy outcomes, what may need to be explored is how 
inter-ethnic relations could shape elite agency, while the typology of ethnic boundary-
making strategies treats elite agency as an explanatory factor (Wimmer 2008). Another 
framework, integration trade-offs theory (Maxwell 2012), posits that social segregation is 
conducive to political representation, but evidence from Xinjiang and Tatarstan tends to 
indicate the negation of the proposition. 
The third macro-approach, groupness as endogenous to elite agency, tends to use elite-
level political struggles to explain, for instance, violent conflicts (Gagnon 2004) or 
changes in ethnicity regimes (Aktürk 2011). Harris Mylonas’ “host state’s perception of 
non-core groups in relation to external powers” framework (2012) furnishes some 





nation-state. Nevertheless, for the cases of Xinjiang and Tatarstan, it can be difficult to 
accurately determine who are the external powers. If any external power can be 
identified, there can be more than one, and such powers can be simultaneously interfering 
in both cases. This macro-approach is partially suitable for explaining differing autonomy 
outcomes across ethno-regions, as elites are the most relevant types of actors in the 
exercising of formally promulgated autonomy, and their capacity varies across ethno-
regions. Nevertheless, such agency-based explanations do not adequately address the 
question as regards the source of elite capacity, for instance, how such structural 
conditions as ethnic institutions or ethnic boundary-makings may shape the building of 
elite capacity to exercise autonomy. 
 
Table I.1. Approaches to the study of ethnic politics and their applicability to explaining 
differing autonomy outcomes 
Approaches Key variables, either as 
explanan or as 
explanandum 
Fit to explain 
differing autonomy 
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My argument builds upon the foregoing approaches by appropriating and reframing 
certain variables to develop an analytical framework specifically tailored to explaining 
the differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-regions. The analytical framework may 
constitute an example of what I call groupness as endogenous iteratively to structure and 
agency approach, in that it integrates both structural and agential factors by trying to 
pinpoint how inter-ethnic boundary-making processes and titular elites’ bargaining 
capacity22 may have been mutually shaping in an iterative manner. That said, considering 
that the degree of actually exercised autonomy is by definition an outcome of human 
agency, the analytical framework will focus more upon how inter-ethnic boundary-
making processes can fashion titular elites’ bargaining capacity than upon the opposite 
direction of interactions. This framework possesses the explanatory potential to account 
for cross-case variations of implemented autonomy, not only because empirically both 
                                                          
22 I subscribe to the conception of agency as “capacity to appropriate and potentially transform structural 





inter-ethnic boundary-making processes and titular elites’ bargaining capacity vary 
patently across Xinjiang and Tatarstan, but also because it highlights a causal mechanism 
that allows one to trace the process that flows from differing inter-ethnic boundary-
makings to differing autonomy outcomes. 
I argue that an integration-distinction balance, or rather, greater inter-ethnic 
integration combined with robust consciousness of inter-ethnic distinction, is 
conducive to building the capacity both for elites of the titular ethnic category to 
bargain with the central state and for intra-ethnic cohesion, which in turn can lead 
to greater autonomy outcome for the ethno-region. Inversely, a lack of inter-ethnic 
integration, coupled with sticky inter-ethnic divide, can be detrimental to building 
the capacity both for elites of the titular ethnic category to bargain with the central 
state and for intra-ethnic cohesion, which in turn can lead to more subdued 
autonomy outcome for the ethno-region. The mechanism behind the foregoing 
arguments is predicated upon an analytical framework consisting of a response variable, a 
major explanatory variable, a major intervening variable, and two condition variables, as 
illustrated in Figures I.1. and I.2. 
 
Components of the analytical framework 







a A←B signifies that A is a necessary condition for B. 
b A→B signifies that A is a sufficient condition for B. 
 






a A←B signifies that A is a necessary condition for B. 
b A→B signifies that A is a sufficient condition for B. 
 
The major explanatory variable, inter-ethnic boundary-makings, characterizes the 
relations between populations of an ethno-region’s titular ethnic category and the central 
state’s ethnic majority category and features ethno-region-level variation. I define inter-
ethnic boundary-makings of an ethno-region as processes in which actors of both the 
ethno-region’s titular category and the central state’s majority category relate to existing 
boundaries by trying either to maintain them or to change them, either to reinforce them 
or to de-emphasize them in a historical context characterized by previous processes of 
ethnic group formation. Inter-ethnic boundary-making processes entail both tendencies 
towards integration and tendencies towards differentiation, and such processes are related 
to both demographic patterns and impact from prior regimes. This major explanatory 
variable is analyzed on three dimensions, i.e. acculturation, social integration, and 
psychological identification (Rumbaut 2005, 166-168).  
Acculturation connotes the processes of linguistic/cultural diffusions or changes that 
result in greater linguistic and cultural similarity (167), or continuum, between 
populations of the titular ethnic category of the ethno-region and the central state’s ethnic 
majority category. This dimension is operationalized in terms of actual and perceived 
level of fluency in the multiethnic state’s lingua franca among the population of the 
titular ethnic category. For example, ethnic Koreans in the former Soviet Union are 
considered highly acculturated, since almost all adult-age Soviet Koreans are fluent in 





Social integration is associated with aggregating the processes of interpersonal, 
socioeconomic, and spatial interactions relevant to the economy, the polity, and the 
community among the populations of both an ethno-region’s titular ethnic category and 
the central state’s ethnic majority category. Questions pertinent to this dimension include 
whether there tends to be more crosscutting cleavages (Lipset 1960; Ahuja & Varshney 
2005, 259-264) or more overlapping cleavages in the ways the titular ethnic minority and 
the central state’s ethnic majority relate to each other. The degree of such social 
integration of an ethnic group can be assessed according to such demographic indicators 
as levels of urbanization, education attainments, intermarriage rates with the majority 
ethnic group, as well as residential patterns (Rumbaut 2005, 166-168; Maxwell 2012, 13). 
For example, ethnic Mongols in China tend to be overall socially well-integrated in terms 
of level of urbanization, education, intermarriages and mixed residential patterns with 
ethnic Han, the ethnic majority of China. 
Psychological identification lays the micro-foundation for group consciousness. This 
dimension is further disaggregated into two aspects, the degree of thickness (Wimmer 
2013, 104, or “stickiness,” Chandra 2009, 378) and the salience of an ethno-region’s 
titular ethnic category against massive identity shift into the central state’s ethnic 
majority category (Rumbaut 2005). The aspect “degree of thickness” is associated with 
the level of ethnic consciousness among individuals of the titular ethnic category. It 
reflects the contestations on whether and how ethnic cleavages are supposed to overlap, 
or to cumulate (Ahuja and Varshney 2005, 259-264), with other dimensions of cleavages 
associated with such cultural attributes (Chandra and Laitin 2002) as language, religion, 





align with ethnically-based cleavages in the construction of group consciousness, the 
thicker ethnic categories tend to be. For example, for an individual to be perceived as an 
“authentic” ethnic Uyghur and respected among “co-ethnics,” she or he needs to have an 
officially registered “Uyghur-style” name, to speak Uyghur fluently, to follow a Halal 
diet, and to claim to be Muslim. In this example, different dimensions of cultural 
attributes align with one another and thicken the ethnic category of “being Uyghur.” 
Meanwhile, the aspect of salience is intended to capture how contested the meanings and 
implications of an ethno-region’s titular ethnic category tend to be in various issue areas 
of daily social interactions. For instance, in Xinjiang, the category “Uyghur” marked on 
governmentally-issued identification card often is associated with extra inspection at 
security checkpoints or with extra wait time in passport applications. 
The major intervening variable activating the link flowing from pattern of inter-ethnic 
boundary-makings to autonomy outcome is titular elites’ capacity to bargain with the 
central state. I define elite agency in terms of capacity to appropriate and to potentially 
transform structural resources in a self-conscious, reflexive manner (Mahoney and 
Snyder 1999, 24). The bargaining capacity of an ethno-region’s elites of the titular ethnic 
category is their ability to employ both material and discursive resources to participate in 
and to influence decision-makings at both the central and ethno-regional states. Such 
ability is constituted by four dimensions, i.e. elite-level inter-ethnic relations, central 
state’s perception of the titular population, intra-ethnic cleavage structure, and titular 
elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state and its most powerful positions.  
Elite-level inter-ethnic relations is analyzed on two aspects, nature of elite-level 





whether titular elites at the ethno-regional level are more horizontally collusive or more 
hierarchically related to ethnic majority elites at both the ethno-regional and central 
states. For example, the relations between ethnic Tatar and Russian elites at the ethno-
regional state of Tatarstan are characterized more by horizontal collusion than by 
hierarchy. Meanwhile, the latter aspect is conceptualized in terms of whether titular elites 
tend to build their personal and political networks beyond their own ethnic category, in 
particular, into the central-state-defined ethnic majority category, or within their own 
ethnic category. Central state’s perception of the titular population refers to the largely 
consistent patterns in the central state’s perception of both the elites and the masses of the 
titular ethnic category, while the dimension of intra-ethnic cleavage structure entails the 
political, economic, and cultural divides between the elites and the masses of the titular 
ethnic group and addresses the questions as regard what dimensions of cleavages exist 
and how salient they can be (Greif and Laitin 2004, 645). Intra-ethnic cleavage structure 
is an inherent component of the inter-ethnic cleavage structure between populations of 
the titular ethnic category and the ethnic majority category. Titular elites’ potential to 
mobilize masses irrespective of ethnic categories derives from such a structure. For 
example, in Tatarstan, a significantly broad spectrum of mostly urban-based Tatars and a 
minority of rural Tatars, who shared similar socio-economic profiles with one another, 
were mobilized in the ethno-national movement leading to RT’s declaration of 
“sovereignty” in 1990.  
The fourth dimension, level of titular elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state 
and its most powerful positions, is operationalized by means of calculating and weighting 





state apparatuses divided by the percentage of the population of the titular ethnic category 
in the ethno-regional population for a time frame relevant to the implemented autonomy 
outcome under study. Such apparatuses may include the formally designated executive, 
legislature, judiciary, incumbent political party, and coercive organs such as police and 
military. The representation quotients of each of such apparatuses will be assigned a 
weight according to the decision-making power they wield. 
The two condition variables, formal arrangements of center-periphery relations and party-
state relations, are binary ones constituting institutional constraints and opportunities. The 
former is associated with formally federal or unitary structures governing the relationship 
between the central state and various ethno-regions and is examined on two dimensions, 
fiscal federalism or not and political federalism or not. The latter pertains to whether the 
governmental apparatus at the ethno-regional level is formally designed to be subordinate 
to an incumbent political party directed from the central-state level in terms of personnel, 
decision-making, and ideology. These two types of formal institutions are designated as 
“condition variables” because they do not “produce” autonomy outcome but only either 
amplify or inhibit the impact of titular elites’ bargaining capacity upon the actually 
exercised autonomy outcome. 
 
Scope conditions 
The class of cases to which my proposed analytical framework may be applicable 





titular23 ethnic population is usually implied for an ethno-region. Accordingly, the level 
of analysis is subnational, while the unit of analysis is subnational-level ethno-regions 
under sovereign states. In this sense, the analytical framework leaves out of its scope 
those ethnic minorities for whom no autonomy territories have been formally designated 
by the central states (e.g. Kurds in Turkey, Turks in Germany, ethnic Russians in 
Kazakhstan, ethnic Koreans in Japan, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, ethnic Igbos in 
Nigeria, etc.), irrespective of their being considered “indigenous” or “immigrants”. Also 
outside its scope are quasi-states such as Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Somaliland, etc., since they have been sustained largely outside of the control of those 
states either claiming or disputing sovereignty over them. Nor does its scope encompass 
autonomous entities established not on ethnic lines such as Hong Kong SAR, Mount 
Athos, etc. 
Some quintessential examples of cases meeting the scope conditions of my argument 
include the Basque country (Spain), Catalonia (Spain), Nunavut (Canada), Iraqi 
Kurdistan, Åland Islands/Ahvenanmaa (Finland), Vojvodina (Serbia), even Québec 
(Canada) and Scotland (United Kingdom). Aside from these ethno-regions, the Russian 
Federation (hereafter RF) and the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC) boast of 
the largest concentration of territorially-based autonomous entities formally established 
for ethnic minorities. In Russia, 27 of its 85 constituent entities are constitutionally 
autonomous entities (Russian: respublika, avtonomnyi oblast’, avtonomnyi okrug) 
designated for ethnic minorities, while in China, five of its 34 provincial-level 
                                                          
23 Referring to the ethnic minority for which a particular territorially-based autonomous arrangement has 





administrative divisions are autonomous regions (Chinese: zizhiqu). In this sense, the 
ethno-regions of China and Russia may constitute an ideal set of cases to which to apply 
my proposed analytical framework. 
 
CASE SELECTION 
In tandem with the scope conditions, case selection approximates Mill’s method of 
difference, or rather, the principle of “most similar” cases that may require the selected 
cases to be comparable in most aspects except for the key explanatory variables, whose 
variance may be used to account for the different outcomes on the response variables 
(George and Bennett 2005, 81). In this spirit, I conduct two explanatory case studies24 in 
parallel by applying my analytical framework to a controlled comparison (George and 
Bennett 2005, 81) of actually exercised autonomy outcomes of the two ethno-regions that 
have inspired my puzzle: The Republic of Tatarstan in Russia and the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region in China. RT and XUAR can be viewed as “most similar” cases in 
terms of many similar characteristics of the respective central states, ethno-regions, and 
titular ethnic populations that can be controlled for, while the response variable, actually 
exercised autonomy outcome, varies across the two ethno-regions. Instead of a within-
country compassion, the cross-country, Russia-China comparison as entailed by the cases 
of RT and XUAR is intended to allow for greater variation on the response variable as 
well as for broader applicability of my analytical framework. 
                                                          
24 According to James Mahoney at the 2014 Institute for Qualitative and Multi-method Research, 
“explanatory case studies” are characterized by the effort to explain a specific outcome in a particular 
case, history of the case, a focus on processes over time, considering a wide range of explanatory factors 






Respective central states 
As summarized in Table I.2., both China and Russia are quintessential multi-ethnic states, 
where the respective ethnic majorities, ethnic Han and ethnic Russians, make up more 
than three quarters of the total populations, while non-Han and non-Russian ethnic 
minorities feature significantly sizable total populations of close to 112 and 30 million 
respectively25. In terms of residential patterns, ethnic minorities in both China and Russia 
tend to be territorially concentrated while also increasingly dispersed beyond what they 
may traditionally call homelands. Both PRC and RF’s institutionalized managements of 
ethnic politics follow the Soviet model, which was devised combining both territorial and 
personal conceptions of ethnicity (Gorenburg 2003, 31). This model features official 
categorization of populations in ethnic terms, tiers of territorially-based formal 
autonomous entities designated for ethnic minorities26, massive recruitment and trainings 
of ethnic-minority cadres, and the promotion and diffusion of the overarching citizenship-
based identity categories of being Zhongguoren in PRC or being 
Rossiyanin27/Rossiyanka28 in RF.  
In both China and Russia, state-sponsored expression of ethnic diversity has been 
allowed and under certain circumstances encouraged, while ethnic minorities are 
                                                          
25 Calculated from PRC National Bureau of Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation 
on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2013); All Russia 
Population Census 2010, http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed February 28, 2017). 
26 June Teufel Dreyer calls the tiered autonomous entities “system of autonomous areas” (1976, 262-263), 
under the names of republic, autonomous region, autonomous okrug, autonomous oblast’, autonomous 
prefecture, autonomous county, autonomous banner, etc. 
27 Masculine form in Russian. 





constitutionally guaranteed with equal citizenship as are the ethnic Han and ethnic 
Russian populations. In terms of levels of economic and political development, China and 
Russia’s respective levels of Human Development Index are quite close to each other, 
while neither is counted as “free” according to Freedom House’s 2016 report, even if 
some scholars would typologize the contemporary political regime in Russia as 
“competitive authoritarian” (Levitsky and Way 2002). 
 
Table I.2. Characteristics of China and Russia compared 
 People’s Republic of China Russian Federation 
Constitutionally defined as 
multi-ethnic or not 
 
Yes  Yes 
Population officially 
categorized ethnically or not 
(e.g. in censuses) 
 
Yes Yes 
% of those categorized as 
ethnic majority (2010) 
 
91.6%b 80.9%d 
% of those categorized as 
ethnic minority (2010) 
 
8.4%c 19.1%e 
Ethnicity indicated on 
governmentally-issued 
identification paper or not 
 
Yes No 
Citizenship restricted to one 
ethnic category or not 
 
No No 
Ethnic territorially based 
autonomy designated for 
certain ethnic minorities or 
not 
 
Yes (5 autonomous regions, 
30 autonomous prefectures, 
117 autonomous counties, 3 
autonomous banners) 
 
Yes (22 republics, including 
Crimeaf, 4 autonomous 
okrug, 1 autonomous oblast’) 
Ethno-federalisma or not 
 
No Yes 
More than one language 
accorded with official status 








action in practice or not 
 
Yes Yes 
Freedom status Not free  Not free (2005-present) 
 
Human Development Index 
(HDI) (2015) 
0.738 0.804 
a Henry E. Hale defines an ethno-federal state as “a federal state in which at least one constituent territorial governance 
unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category” (2014, 167-168). 
b c Not counting the 2.3 million active duty military personnel and 4.65 million whose locality of permanent residence 
was difficult to determine. Not counting those holding non-PRC citizenship. 
d e Counting those who indicated their ethnicity in the 2010 census, including those holding non-RF citizenship. 
f In the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Crimea has been included as a constituent entity of the Russian 
Federation since March 21, 2014. 
Sources: PRC National Bureau of Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on Nationalities of 
2010 Population Census of China (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2013); All Russia Population Census 2010, 
http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed February 28, 2017); Dominique Arel, Fixing Ethnicity in Identity Documents: 
the Rise and Fall of Passport Nationality in Russia (National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2001); 
The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/node_505.htm (accessed February 28, 2017); President of Russia, Constitution of 
the Russian Federation, http://constitution.kremlin.ru (accessed February 28, 2017); United Nations Development 
Program, International Human Development Indicators, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries (accessed February 28, 
2017); Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2016 (accessed February 28, 2017); Chen, Chao, and Hongling Chen, Atlas of the Continuity and Change in the 
Territorial Administrative Arrangements of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Zhongguo Ditu Chubanshe, 
2012). 
 






Source of the base map: http://d-maps.com/m/asia/china/chine/chine78.gif (accessed May 31, 2017). 
Notes: Ethno-region filled in green is discussed in Chapter 4; Ethno-regions filled in blue are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 










Source of the base map: http://d-maps.com/m/europa/russia/russie/russie66.gif (accessed May 31, 2017). 
Notes: Ethno-region filled in green is discussed in Chapter 5; Ethno-regions filled in blue are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Respective ethno-regions and titular ethnic populations 
Officially two populations of “Tatars” are categorized in the population censuses of the 
RF, Tatars (Russian: Tatary) and Crimean Tatars (Russian: Krymskie Tatary). They differ 
in terms of linguistic and cultural attributes and tend to psychologically identify 
themselves separately. Tatars (Tatar: Tatarlar) include those who identify themselves 
simply as “Tatars” and those who identify with such sub-categories as Kerəshens 
(Russian: Kryasheni), Siberian Tatars (Russian: Sibirskie Tatary, Tatar: Seber Tatarları) 
and Mishars (Russian: Mishari, Tatar: Mishər). Tatars constitute the largest non-Russian 
ethnic category in Russia. In China, Uyghurs’ (Uyghur: Uyghurlar, Chinese: 
Weiwu’erzu) ethnic language is the most spoken non-Sinitic language29 in China. Hence, 
the Tatar-Russian and Uyghur-Han relations can be of country-wide political significance 
or repercussion.  
Both Tatars and Uyghurs are among the most populous Turkic-speaking populations of 
the world, yet neither of them has attained independent statehood where they would 
constitute the majority categories, especially in contrast with the eponymous ethnic 
categories of five former Soviet republics30. Meanwhile, self-perception and perception 
of both ethnic minorities by the ethnic majorities of respective multi-ethnic states as 
                                                          
29 The largest ethnic minority of China, ethnic Zhuang, have yet to develop a common ethnic language. 
Three types of linguistic situations exist among ethnic Zhuang in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
(GZAR) and Yunnan Province: 1. Speaking only Tai-Kadai dialects; 2. Speaking only Jiazhuang, Sinitic 
dialects mixed with Tai-Kadai morphemes; 3. Speaking only Sinitic dialects. Mandarin Chinese has largely 
become the lingua franca for ethnic Zhuang in China. 





linguistically (non-Slavic or non-Sinitic) and religiously31 (traditionally Muslim majority 
with minorities of atheists, Christians, etc.) distinct constitute another similarity. 
Nonetheless, the degree of distinction does vary, and I capture that in terms of the key 
explanatory variable “inter-ethnic boundary-makings.” 
The bulk of both populations reside within the territories of Russia and China and are 
citizens of the respective multi-ethnic states and have their respective subnational-level 
“autonomous” ethno-regions in which to claim titular status. Among both populations, 
the rise of ethno-national consciousness translates at times into ethnically-based 
mobilizations. In terms of relative demographic weight, both the Tatar-Russian 
population ratio in Tatarstan and Uyghur-Han population ratio in Xinjiang are close to 
1:1. Both ethno-regions are resource-rich, especially in terms of oil and gas, even though 
the level of industrialization is much higher in Tatarstan than in Xinjiang, which 
nevertheless has also seen rapid industrialization in recent years. 
 
Table I.3. Characteristics of Xinjiang and Tatarstan compared 
 Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region 
Republic of Tatarstan 
Area (sq. km) 
 
1,664,897km2 67,836km2 
Population according to 
official census (2010) (% of 
the total population of the 
respective country) 
 
21,815,815 (1.64%) 3,786,488 (2.65%) 
% of titular population (2010) 
 




                                                          






% of urban population (2010) 
 
39.9% 75.4% 
Distance and direction from 




northwest of Beijing 
Approximately 716km east of 
Moscow 
Form and date of 
incorporation into the multi-
ethnic state or its 
predecessors 
Conquest of Altishahr and 
Dzungariaa by the Qing 
Empire in the 1760s; 
Xinjiang Province founded in 
1884; 
Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region founded 
in 1955 
Conquest of the Kazan 
Khanate by the Tsardom of 
Muscovy in 1552;  
Tatar Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (hereafter 
TASSR) founded in 1920;  
Treaty between the Republic 
of Tatarstan and the Russian 
Federation first signed in 
1994 
 




Tatar (Turkic), Russian (Indo-
European) 
Major religions Muslim, Han Buddhism, 
Taoism, Tibetan Buddhism, 
Orthodox Christianity, 
various folk religions, others 
 
Muslim, Orthodox 
Christianity, folk religions, 
others 
 
GDP per capita (2014) 
 
40,648 Yuan (≈$6643b) 434,509.1 Rubles (≈$7723c) 
Sectoral composition of 
ethno-regional GDP (2010) 
primary sector 19.8%, 
secondary sector 47.7%, 
tertiary sector 32.5% 
agriculture 7.9%, industry 
42.2%, construction 9.5%, 
transportation 5.0%, service 
sector 28.5% 
a Prior to the expansion of Oirat (Kalmyk) tribal federations into the area north of the Tianshan Mountains, Dzungaria 
was called Moghulistan ruled by Muslim Chaghatayids, whose descendants today are mostly found among ethnic 
Uyghurs or ethnic Kazakhs. 
b Converted according to the exchange rate of December 31, 2014, from PRC State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/sy/tjsj_hlzjj_inquire (accessed February 28, 2017) 
c Converted according to the exchange rate of December 31, 2014, from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 
http://cbr.ru/currency_base/daily.aspx?date_req=31.12.2014 (accessed February 28, 2017) 
Sources: Calculated from the following census publications and statistical yearbooks, 2015 Xinjiang Statistical 
Yearbook (Statistical Bureau of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region); The Republic of Tatarstan: A Brief 
Geographical Guide (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 2013); Amount and Changes of Tatarstan’s GDP in 
Base Prices (Kazan: Republic of Tatarstan Branch of the Federal Statistical Service, 2016); PRC National Bureau of 
Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China 
(Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2013); All Russia Population Census 2010. http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed 






Table I.4. Characteristics of ethnic Uyghurs and ethnic Tatars compared 
 Ethnic Uyghurs  
in the People’s Republic of 
China 
Ethnic Tatars  
in the Russian Federation  
Population according to 
official census (2010) 
10,069,346 (the fifth largest 
group of China after ethnic 
Han, Zhuang, Hui, and 
Manchu) 
 
5,310,649b (the second largest 
group of Russia after ethnic 
Russians) 
Who are they according to the 
official censuses? 
Name of the ethnic category 
in Chinese: Weiwu’erzu, 
including the Chinese-
speaking Hunan Uyghurs 
(Hunan Weiwu’erzu) 
Name of the ethnic category 
in Russian: Tatary, including 
Kerəshensc (Kryasheni), 
Siberian Tatars (Sibirskie 
Tatary) and Mishars 
(Mishari) but not Crimean 
Tatars (Krymskie Tatary) 
 
Eponymous independent state 
present or absent 
 
Absent Absent 
Type of ethnic language 
 
Turkic Turkic 
% of those speaking or 
claiming to speak the 
eponymous ethnic language 
and/or its variants 
 
>90%a  
(the largest non-Sinitic 
language of China)  
69%  
(2010, the second largest 
language of Russia) 
Religion Traditionally Muslim Traditionally Muslim 
(minority of Orthodox 
Christians, e.g. Kerəshens) 
 
Subnational-level ethnically 
and territorially based 
autonomous units designated 




Autonomous Region  
(provincial-level 
administrative unit) 
Republic of Tatarstan  
(constituent entity of the RF) 






administrative units where 
significant populations of 
individuals of the ethnic 
category live 
 





Ulyanovsk, City of Moscow, 
Sverdlovsk, Samara, Perm, 






Other countries where 
significant populations of 
perceived co-ethnics are 
found 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 





a Ethnic Uyghurs who do not know the Uyghur language are rare and mostly found among ethnic Uyghurs in Beijing 
and Hunan Province. Hunan Uyghurs use local Sinitic dialect as their mother tongue.  
b Close to 2,000 people throughout Russia (in Tatarstan in particular) identified themselves as ethnically “Bulgar” in the 
2010 population census. These people would otherwise be conventionally categorized as ethnic Tatars.  
c Some of the Kerəshens do not consider themselves ethnic Tatars but rather constituting a separate ethnic group. 
Sources: PRC National Bureau of Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on Nationalities of 
2010 Population Census of China (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2013); All Russia Population Census 2010. 
http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed February 28, 2017). 
Despite the foregoing similarities, the degree of actually practiced autonomy differs 
dramatically between RT and XUAR. RT has not only been the major champion of 
ethno-federalism but also attained the most political, economic, and cultural autonomy of 
all the ethnic republics in Russia. By contrast, resentment among the Uyghur population 
towards the limited autonomy XUAR has been practicing vis-à-vis the central state 
persists. Sporadic eruptions of violent inter-ethnic clashes have been reported. 
Empirically, Tatarstan is illustrative of the maximal autonomy an ethno-region has thus 
far been able to attain in Russia and tend to epitomize the more negotiation-oriented than 
coercive nature of Moscow’s control over its ethnic republics. Meanwhile, Xinjiang is 
exemplary of the minimal autonomy an ethno-region has thus far attained in China and 
tend to epitomize the less negotiation-oriented than coercive nature of Beijing’s control 
over its autonomous regions. Therefore, the comparison of Xinjiang and Tatarstan may 
inform us of not only cross-case patterns of variations but also how certain general 
characteristics of inter-ethnic and center-periphery relations differ across Russia and 
China.   
Although not selected as the cases my research is intended to study in-depth, other ethno-





El, North-Ossetia-Alania, Buryatia, etc. in Russia and Tibet (Xizang), Inner Mongolia 
(Nei Mongol), Ningxia Hui, Guangxi Zhuang in China can be regarded as the “shadow 
cases” for my argument. My argument abducted from the Xinjiang-Tatarstan comparison 
will be succinctly tested to four additional ethno-regions in order to evaluate its 
applicability to the broader constellation of inter-ethnic and center-periphery relations in 
Russia and China. The four additional ethno-regions are the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region (Nei Mongol) and the Tibet Autonomous Region (Xizang, hereafter XAR) of 
China as well as the Republic of Bashkortostan (hereafter RB) and the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia, hereafter RS) of Russia. 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Primary data was collected both to accumulate causal-process observations (CPOs) 
(Collier 2011, 823) and data-set observations (DSOs) (823). The CPOs are used to trace 
the process of how the three dimensions of inter-ethnic boundary-makings, acculturation, 
social integration, and psychological identification, mold the three dimensions of titular 
elites’ capacity, elite-level inter-ethnic relations, central state’s perception of the titular 
population, and intra-ethnic cleavage structure, which jointly shape a fourth dimension, 
titular elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state’s most powerful positions. The 
DSOs are used to generate data that enables cross-case comparison on dimensions of the 
response variable, the explanatory variable, the intervening variable, and the condition 
variables. The actual analysis of data is reliant upon a combination of primary and 





on the response, explanatory, and intervening variables as well as to establish causal links 
between these variables. 
The collection of primary data is based upon extensive fieldworks that combined 
interviews, participant observations, and oral history conducted mostly in Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan of Russia as well as in Xinjiang and Beijing of China. Field trips took 
place between the summer of 2015 and the summer of 2017, whose combined duration 
reached six months. In Russia, localities I reached include Kazan, Arsk/Archa, Bolgar, 
Yelabuga/Alabuga, Naberezhnye Chelny/Yar Challı of Tatarstan and Ufa of 
Bashkortostan; in China, localities I reached include Ürümqi, Hami/Qumul, Karamay, 
Yining/Ghulja, Kashi/Kashgar, Artush, and Korla. In total, 83 interviews were 
conducted32, of which 37 interviews were conducted in China and 46 interviews were 
conducted in Russia. A variety of site-specific documents were also gathered, such as 
census data, yearbooks, journals, policy guidelines, elites’ biographies, scholarly works, 
internally circulated materials, etc.  
In-depth interviews were used to compare the nature of the relationship between 
Tatarstan-based ethnic Tatar elites and the Russian central-state and that between 
Xinjiang-based ethnic Uyghur elites and the Chinese central state. I also employed 
interviews to identify patterns of inter-ethnic boundary-makings among ethnic Tatar 
elites and among ethnic Uyghur elites. Ethnographic participant observation was used to 
assess the compliance of implemented autonomy with formally stipulated autonomy in 
                                                          
32 Respondents were selected out of “snowball sampling,” which allows the respondents I have already 
secured to further refer respondents, since random sampling was not feasible in either Xinjiang or 
Tatarstan. To the extent possible, I diversified my initial set of respondents according to ethnicity, place of 





Tatarstan and Xinjiang. Participant observations were also utilized to identify the 
differing patterns across Uyghur-Han boundary-makings in Xinjiang and Tatar-Russian 
boundary-makings in Tatarstan. Oral history, as integrated part of some interview 
sessions, was used to collect perspectives on ethnic Tatar or Uyghur elites’ respective 
relations to ethnic Tatar or Uyghur masses. It was also employed to capture the respective 
perceptions among ethnic Tatar and Uyghur elites as regards whether they have been 
well-represented in respective ethno-regional state authorities. To ameliorate credibility 
of respondents’ accounts, I strive to tease out converging patterns of respondents’ 
knowledge from relatively idiosyncratically-based perspectives. To facilitate more 
spontaneity in respondents’ statements and to mitigate the effect of respondents being 
directed by my questions or aware of being observed, I tended to use open-ended 
interviews with improvised questions and to cross-verify different respondents’ 
perspectives while triangulating them with participant observations. 
In Russia, the languages used in the gathering of primary data are Russian and Tatar. I 
was able to develop solid knowledge of and skills in the Tatar language during the 
fieldwork in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, which enabled me to extensively access the 
worldviews vibrantly grounded in the Tatar language. In China, the languages used are 
mostly Mandarin Chinese, but Uyghur was also used to the extent possible, especially in 
the scenarios where the respondents either had very limited knowledge of Mandarin 
Chinese or felt more comfortable using the Uyghur language. I strived to the extent 
possible not to bias one language against the other in my accessing of respondents’ 





To measure and to compare the response variable, an ethno-region’s implemented 
autonomy outcome, I use both state-generated data and respondents’ perspectives while 
cross-verifying them with my personal observations. I analyze these data by proposing an 
instrument that scores an ethno-region’s implemented autonomy outcome and enables 
cross-case comparison and by applying it to both the two focused and the four shadow 
cases. To capture and to compare the explanatory variable, an ethno-region’s inter-ethnic 
boundary-makings, I also rely upon state-generated data, in particular census data, and 
respondents’ perspectives while cross-verifying them with my personal observations. 
These data are analyzed by means of an instrument that scores an ethnic population’s 
level of integration and enables cross-case comparison. This instrument is also applied to 
both the focused and shadow cases. To capture and to compare the intervening variable, 
titular elites’ bargaining capacity, I employ a combination of respondents’ perspectives, 
state-generated data, media coverage, and previous scholarly works while cross-verifying 
them with my personal observations. Specifically, to compare different ethno-regions on 
the dimension “titular elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state’s most powerful 
positions,” I also develop an instrument that calculates the representation-per-population 
quotient for the titular population of an ethno-region. This quotient signals 
underrepresentation, proportional representation, or overrepresentation of titular elites in 
the ethno-regional state. The two condition variables, formal arrangements of center-
periphery relations and party-state relations, vary at the national level and are discussed 
mostly based upon secondary data such as state-generated data, media coverage, and 







PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation consists of seven chapters in total. 
Chapter 2 mostly situates my argument and analytical framework in the existing 
literature. The first part of the chapter traces the conceptual origin in the existing 
scholarship of several key concepts of the dissertation, namely, ethnicity, ethnic minority 
and ethnic majority, ethnic institutions, and ethnic territorially-based autonomy as a type 
of ethnic institution. In this part, I also delineate my conceptualization of these concepts 
in relation to the existing literature. The second part critically and comparatively assess, 
in more details, the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches found in the 
existing literature to the explaining of differing autonomy outcomes in terms of both why 
they may not adequately be suitable and why my analytical framework, by building upon 
and synthesizing existing approaches, may possess greater explanatory potential.  
Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter. It establishes differing autonomy outcomes across 
Xinjiang and Tatarstan as observable facts. In this chapter, I both conceptualize and 
operationalize the response variable, actually exercised autonomy outcome. The chapter 
begins with briefly reviewing the respective historical trajectories of institutionalized 
ethnicity in China and Russia. Then I compare ethnic territorially-based autonomy as 
prescriptive institution in China and Russia. The chapter culminates with the introduction 
of a conceptual framework with which to measure and to compare, based upon collected 
data, the differing degrees of actually-exercised autonomy of Xinjiang and Tatarstan. 





for a specific time frame are scored, weighted and aggregated to create a score of 
compliance for that ethno-region. I argue that compliance of implemented autonomy with 
formally stipulated autonomy has been much higher in Tatarstan than in Xinjiang for the 
first six years of the 2010s. 
The next two empirical chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, comprehensively employ my 
proposed analytical framework to explain the differing autonomy outcomes across 
Xinjiang and Tatarstan. The two chapters trace the process that leads to differing 
autonomy outcomes in both ethno-regions of how patterns of inter-ethnic boundary-
makings, analyzed on the dimensions of acculturation, social integration, and 
psychological identification, shape titular elites’ bargaining capacity, analyzed on the 
dimensions of elite-level inter-ethnic relations, central-state’s perception of the titular 
population, intra-ethnic cleavage structure, and titular elites’ representation in the ethno-
regional state and its most powerful positions.  
Chapter 4 examines in details the most recent trends in Uyghur-Han inter-ethnic 
boundary-makings and ethnic Uyghur elites’ bargaining capacity in Xinjiang. Based upon 
both primary and secondary data, I first demonstrate how ethnic Uyghurs’ low level of 
linguistic Sinicization tends to hamper ethnic Uyghur elites’ capacity to build cross-
ethnic political networks and more collusive, less hierarchical types of relationships with 
the majority elites. Then I proceed to demonstrate how ethnic Uyghurs’ lack of social 
integration tends not only to exacerbate perceptions of ethnic Uyghurs by the PRC central 
state but also to translate into internally more differentiated, more polarized intra-ethnic 
socio-economic and cultural contour. Such a contour can obstruct upward social mobility 





which in turn undermines intra-Uyghur cohesion and ethnic Uyghur elites’ mobilizing 
capacity. I conclude the chapter by arguing that ethnic Uyghur elites’ less solid 
relationships with both the central state and their co-ethnics, coupled with a less-than-
positive image of ethnic Uyghurs in the eyes of the central state, have been jointly 
sufficient for under-representation of ethnic Uyghur elites in the XUAR state organs and 
their most powerful positions. 
Chapter 5 examines in details the most recent trends in Tatar-Russian inter-ethnic 
boundary-makings and ethnic Tatar elites’ bargaining capacity in Tatarstan. Based upon 
both primary and secondary data, I first demonstrate how ethnic Tatars’ high level of 
linguistic Russification tends to promote ethnic Tatar elites’ capacity to build cross-ethnic 
political networks and more collusive, less hierarchical types of relationships with the 
majority elites. Then I demonstrate how ethnic Tatars’ more solid social integration tends 
not only to cultivate positive perceptions of ethnic Tatars by the RF central state but also 
to translate into internally less differentiated, less polarized intra-ethnic socio-economic 
and cultural contour. Such a contour is conducive to upward social mobility encouraging 
ethnic Tatar populace to identify with or to become themselves elites, which in turn 
contributes to intra-Tatar cohesion and ethnic Tatar elites’ mobilizing capacity. I 
conclude the chapter by arguing that ethnic Tatar elites’ more solid relationships with 
both the central state and their co-ethnics, coupled with a positive image of ethnic Tatars 
in the eyes of the central state, have been jointly sufficient for heightened representation 
of ethnic Tatar elites in the RT state organs and their most powerful positions.  
The first part of Chapter 6 discusses institutional constraints and opportunities upon 





national level, i.e. formal arrangements of center-periphery relations and party-state 
relations, focused upon ethno-federalism in Russia and Leninist party-state relations in 
China. The second part tests whether the argument can travel to the study of other ethno-
regions in China and Russia. I succinctly evaluate the applicability of my argument to 
explaining the autonomy outcomes in Inner Mongolia and Tibet of China as well as in 
Bashkortostan and Yakutia of Russia.  
In Conclusion, I first recapitulate my empirical findings and theoretical arguments. Then 
I revisit the caveats laid out in Chapter 2 and delineate an agenda for future research on 
the issue of endogeneity between autonomy outcomes and inter-ethnic boundary-
makings. Towards the end of the dissertation, I summarily consider the policy 
implications of my argument. I argue that, by means of effectively building the capacity 
to exercise ethnic territorially-based autonomy, it is possible to strike the balance 







2. SITUATING THE ARGUMENT IN THE 
EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP 
 
This chapter situates my argument and analytical framework in the existing literature. 
The first two sections trace the conceptual origin in the existing scholarship of such key 
concepts as ethnicity, ethnic minority and ethnic majority, ethnic institutions, and ethnic 
territorially-based autonomy as a type of ethnic institution, while delineating how I 
conceptualize these key concepts in relation to the existing literature. The third section 
critically and comparatively assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the alternative 
approaches found in the existing literature to explaining differing autonomy outcomes. 
This section addresses the questions as regard why those approaches may not adequately 
be suitable. The last section introduces in detail a set of assumptions and qualifications 
for my proposed analytical framework, which I argue that, by synthesizing existing 
approaches, may possess greater explanatory potential.  
 
ETHNICITY, ETHNIC MAJORITY, ETHNIC MINORITIES, ETHNIC 
INSTITUTIONS 
Ethnicity and its change 
Ethnic territorially-base autonomy is first and foremost “ethnic.” What is unique about 





conceptualized in the existing literature on ethnic politics? How is “ethnicity” 
conceptualized for the dissertation?  
Kanchan Chandra classifies existing conceptions of “ethnicity” into two camps, i.e. 
primordialist and constructivist paradigms (2009, 379; 2012, 19). The primordialist 
paradigm is characterized by three fundamental assumptions: individuals have a single 
ethnic identity; this ethnic identity is fixed; this ethnic identity is exogenous to social 
processes (19). By contrast, constructivist paradigm consists of three counter-
assumptions: individuals have multiple (levels of) ethnic identities; these identities, 
though usually stable, can change; such changes are endogenous to social processes (19). 
A further disaggregated summary of existing conceptions of “ethnicity” comes from 
Katherine P. Kaup (2000). She compares and contrasts four “approaches”, primordial, 
instrumental, structural, and hegemonic ones (16). Similar to Chandra’s summarization, 
Kaup’s “primordialist” approach views ethnic identity as emanating from something 
predetermined and exogenous to social processes, whereas the rest of the approaches 
largely can all be subsumed under Chandra’s constructivist paradigm. Specifically, the 
“instrumental” approach reckons “ethnicity” as product of instrumental rationality and 
utilized as means to various political or economic ends (17-18). Meanwhile, the 
“structural” approach tends to emphasize the socialized processes of identity formation. 
Exemplified by Benedict Anderson and Karl Deutsch, it sees ethnic identity as contingent 
upon “changing cultural environments and communication networks” (19) that allows for 
new modes of “political imagining” (19). Her fourth approach, the “hegemonic” one, 





especially of the state sui generis in its imposing of ethnic categories upon the population 
it rules. 
Like Chandra, Henry Hale also organizes existing literature on ethnicity into two camps. 
Of them, the “ethnicity-as-conflictual” (Hale 2008, 58) approach holds the assumption 
that ethnicity inherently reflects motivations that tend to put groups in conflict, while the 
“ethnicity-as-epiphenomenal” (60) approach tends to reject the notion that ethnicity 
possesses its own intrinsic value and to view both ethnicity and ethnic politics as 
functions of other pursuits. As opposed to the foregoing two paradigms, Hale introduces 
his alternative “ethnicity-as-relational” (56) approach, according to which an individual’s 
“ethnicity” is defined in relation to the social world. In this conceptualization, ethnicity is 
posited as a cognitive device for both the understanding of the social world and 
uncertainty reduction. On such a basis, Hale defines “ethnic group” as “a set of people” 
(47) who have a common point of reference, or category33, to at least one ethnic 
dimension of the social world, share the view that they indeed have this in common, and 
capture this similarity at least in the ethnic group’s name (47). In the same sense, 
“ethnicity” refers to the “corresponding subset” (47) of the “ethnic points of reference 
that define any given individual” (47). Such “ethnic” points of reference are usually 
visible/or relatively unchangeable (29). 
Nevertheless, the “ethnicity-as-cognitive-device” conceptualization of ethnicity does not 
make it explicit what distinguishes the “ethnic” dimension of the social world from other 
                                                          
33 According to Henry Hale, such categories can be distinguished by the following four properties: 1) 
associated with a sense of commonality of fate; 2) with intrinsic importance, especially those involving 
barriers to communications; 3) able to serve as rules of thumb for interpreting and guiding social 





dimensions, or rather, what can be the source of “visibility” or “stability” of ethnic traits. 
Nor does it address the question as regards how such points of reference can change. In 
these regards, scholars like Donald Horowitz and Kanchan Chandra believe that some 
element is uniquely characterizing “ethnically-based” identities. For instance, according 
to Donald Horowitz, ethnicity is based on “a myth of collective ancestry” (1985, 52) and 
usually associated with traits perceived as “innate” (52). Moreover, ethnicity is by nature 
sustained by “strong family ties”34 (61). Resonant with Horowitz, Kanchan Chandra 
emphasizes “descent-based attributes” (2009, 377). What distinguishes Chandra’s 
conception from Horowitz’s is her strictly defining ethnicity as “categories”, defined by 
attribute-values and attribute-dimensions (2012, 19). 
Specifically, she defines ethnicity as “arbitrary subset of categories in which descent-
based attributes are necessary for membership” (Chandra 2009, 377). Such attributes 
provide the source of two of what she calls “intrinsic properties” associable with ethnic 
identities, i.e. “constrained change” (or “stickiness”) and “visibility” (378). As she 
argues, whether analyzed as independent or dependent variables, stickiness (401) and 
visibility are two of the properties35 unique to ethnicity that may enable the construction 
of causal links between ethnicity and other variables (409).  
Although such “descent-based” attributes tend to be visible and sticky, ethnic categories, 
according to Chandra, can change. Appropriating theories from combinatorics, she 
captures the mechanism of changes in ethnic categories by looking at how the following 
                                                          
34 For example, in Tatar, the noun tugan (meaning “relative”) is constantly used by ethnic Tatars to 
address fellow ethnic Tatars (co-ethnics). 
35 Probably in the same order of what David Waldner calls “invariant causal properties” actualized by 





three types of components interact with one another: categories, attribute-values, and 
attribute-dimensions. A category36 is a classificatory tool consisting of a specific 
combination of attribute-value(s) on certain attribute-dimension(s) according to which 
membership in a set of people is assigned to individuals (2012, 19). Attribute-dimensions 
are families of cultural markers consisting of either ordered (e.g. castes) or unordered 
categorical units (e.g. languages), while attribute-values are mutually exclusive (19) 
categorical units of a family of cultural markers (e.g. Ismai’li Muslim, Tibetan Buddhist, 
Syriac Christian, etc. in the dimension of “religious affiliation”). 
Ethnic categories, regardless of those used by the state or those used by non-state actors, 
may change when the combination of attribute-dimensions and attribute-values behind a 
category changes37, the repertoire of attribute-dimensions and attribute-values held 
constant. They may also change when the very repertoire changes due to either new 
attribute-dimension(s) added or previous attribute-dimension(s) eliminated38, or due to 
either new attribute-value(s) added39 to or previous attribute-value(s) eliminated from a 
dimension, or due to a combination of both (26). 
As opposed to Chandra’s constructivist paradigm, the primordialist paradigm usually is 
associated with the assumption that an ethnic category automatically represents and is 
                                                          
36 Examples of “categories”: ethnic Udmurt, Russian, Tatar, Ukrainian, Jew in Udmurtia, Russia; ethnic Hui, 
Han, Dongxiang, Bonan, Salar in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province, China. 
37 For example, the merging of “Mishar” (Kipchak Turkic-speakers found to both the west and the east of 
what was the Kazan Khanate), “Teptiar” (Kipchak Turkic-speakers found to the east of what was the Kazan 
Khanate), “Kerəshen” (Tatar-speaking Orthodox Christians) into “Tatars” and the dichotomization of 
“Bashkirs” (Kipchak Turkic-speaking tribally-based landed class, historically associated with the Nogai 
Horde while found between what was the Kazan Khanate and the Siberian Khanate) versus “Tatars” in the 
early decades of the USSR. 
38 For example, “Qumulluq” (Turkic-speakers in what is today’s Yizhou District of Hami Municipality, XUAR, 
China) became “Uyghurs” as a result of the attribute-dimension of “place of origin” dropped. 
39 The separation of “Pakistani immigrants” from “Indian immigrants” as a result of a new value “Pakistan” 





conceptually co-extensive with collective consciousness and clear-cut boundaries of an 
ethnic group. This assumption has been vehemently critiqued in Rogers Brubaker’s 
(2004) discussion of how ethnic groups can be socially constructed. Instead of assuming 
that an ethnic category always implies an internally homogeneous, externally bounded 
ethnic group, which are more often than not treated as fundamental units of analysis (8), 
Brubaker suggests the need to investigate the processes in which agents contrive to bound 
groups up with regard to shared ethnic categories. He refers to such processes as “group-
making” (13), a social, cultural, and political project intended for “transforming 
categories into groups or increasing levels of groupness” (13). In this regard, he proposes 
three clusters of concepts with which to disaggregate the connotation of the overloaded 
term “(ethnic) identity”:  
The processes of identification or categorization, which place emphasis upon specifying 
the agents that do the identifying. Such identifying does not necessarily result in the 
internal homogeneity and the external boundedness of groups. The agents of 
identification can be either oneself or others, wherein self-identification and identification 
by others proceed in dialectical interplays (41). Two distinct types of identification are 
mentioned by Brubaker: formalized, codified, objectified systems of categorization 
developed and maintained by such powerful, authoritative institutions as the state (42) 
and psychodynamic identification that entails “identifying oneself emotionally with 
another person, category, collectivity” (44). 
The cognitive device framing self-understanding and social location, pertaining to the 
ways individual and collective actions can be governed by particularistic understandings 





interests (44). If the processes of identification and categorization are related to borders 
between “self” and “others,” then self-understanding and social location can be related to 
order or hierarchy on which “self” and “others” are arranged. 
Leaping across the levels of analysis from individual to group, collective identities are 
contingent upon the notions of commonality, connectedness, and groupness. A collective 
identity is an emotionally-laden sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, 
connoting both a felt solidarity with co-ethnics and a felt difference from or even 
antipathy to specified outsiders (46). Commonality is about the sharing of some common 
attribute, while connectedness is said of the relational ties linking people. Commonality 
and connectedness are jointly sufficient for developing groupness, which refers to the 
feeling of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidary group (47). 
To avoid falling into the trap of reification, which Brubaker defines as uncritically 
adopting categories of ethno-political practices as categories of analysis (10), I subscribe 
to Brubaker’s “ethnicity-without-group” (2004) conception of ethnic identities while 
incorporating elements from Hale’s “ethnicity-as-cognitive-device” and Chandra’s 
“ethnicity-as-categories” approaches. In this sense, my conceptualization of ethnicity 
does not imply groupness behind specific ethnic categories. Concretely, I define ethnicity 
as categories developed in the processes of either self-identifications or identification by 
other agents, distinguished by descent-based attributes, characterized by varying degrees 
of stickiness and visibility, while providing shared cognitive points of reference to the 
social world. By “descent-based attributes,” I am not saying that an ethnic category is or 





immemorial. I am simply saying that parents transmit or are supposed to transmit their 
assumed ethnic categories in the contemporary repertoire to their children. 
 
Ethnic majority versus ethnic minorities 
Ethnic territorially-based autonomous entities are by definition designated for “ethnic 
minorities.” Then who are ethnic minorities? Who are ethnic majorities? This section 
addresses the following questions: How has the dichotomy between majority and 
minority been conceptualized in the existing literature? How are they conceptualized for 
the dissertation? 
According to Andreas Wimmer, “ethnic majority” and “ethnic minority” are two types of 
ethnic categories. In line with Brubaker’s “ethnicity-without-group” approach, Wimmer 
argues that the distinction between majority and minorities emerges not because ethnic 
“minorities” try to maintain a pre-existing separate identity, culture, and community from 
ethnic “majorities” (2013b, 27) but rather because the groupness of both minorities and 
majorities is actuated by means of drawing and contesting the boundaries between them. 
Such boundary-making processes are often associated with power struggles with regard 
to the state and feature simultaneously social closures and social openings (27). Two 
modes of ethnic boundary-making can spawn and sustain the distinction between 
majority and minority, i.e. nation-building and ethnogenesis (50-53), contingent upon the 
state’s agency. 
In the “nation-building” mode, state-building elites can elevate an existing ethnic 





can construct a new national category by amalgamating a variety of ethnic categories 
(e.g. mestizo in Mexico), or can emphasize a higher level of overarching category while 
retaining pre-existing ethnic categories (e.g. the sovietskii narod, or Soviet nation, in the 
USSR, the zhonghua minzu, or Chinese nation, in China) (50-52). The “ethnogenesis” 
mode is intended to conceptually capture elites’ agency in terms of separating minorities 
from the majority. The bounding of majorities, however inclusive it might seem, can 
rarely reach an all-encompassing level, and state-building elites often categorize those 
whom they perceive as either too “alien” or “politically unreliable for incorporation” as 
“minorities” (52). The creation of minority categories often entails a process in which 
certain categories are merged into “larger” categories40 (53), and such expanded 
categories of “minority” may be inscribed in the administrative routines of the state and 
be accepted gradually by minority individuals themselves (53). 
Of a similar vein, Harris Mylonas also points to the central agency of the state in the 
creation of the majority-minority dichotomy. His notion of the “ruling political elites”, 
who, in control of the state, possess the military and administrative capacity to enforce its 
decisions within the territory of a state (2012, 23), can be viewed as synonymous with 
Wimmer’s notion of the “state-building elites” (2013b). According to Mylonas, the 
dominant sections of such elites (2012, 23-24) play the crucial role of determining who 
are members of the “core group” and who are members of the “non-core group.” A “core 
group” is defined if there are inhabitants of a country who share a common national type 
in whose name the ruling political elites can govern the state (23-24), whether 
                                                          
40 For instance, the merging of Mishar, Teptiar, some Bashkirs into “Tatars” in the BASSR of the Soviet 
Union, the merging of Khorchin, Kharchin, Chakhar, Tümet, Khalkha, Ordos, Bargu, Urad, some Han, some 





demographically such a “core group” constitutes a majority or a minority of the state’s 
population (24). A “non-core group” is an aggregation of individuals perceived by the 
ruling political elites as “unassimilated” in terms of languages, religions, phenotypical or 
cultural attributes (26). Overall, by using the core/non-core dichotomy, Mylonas 
conceives of the majority-minority distinction strictly in a political sense in terms of their 
relations to the state rather than in a demographic sense. In this regard, he shares with 
Wimmer the understanding that state categorizes and reifies majority and minorities. 
Once the distinction between majorities and minorities has gradually become a social 
reality, the focus of boundary-making processes will shift to the challenging or 
maintaining of the dichotomous distinction. In such processes, the agency of the elite and 
masses of both minorities and majority also comes to the fore. According to Valerie 
Bunce and Stephen Watts, majorities are those who tend to interpret the idea of nation-
state in such a way that each state should be inhabited by only one nation coterminous 
with the territorial boundary of the state (2005, 134). By this definition, representatives of 
the majorities tend to promote the homogenization of the population in their own image 
(134), resulting often in the psychological alienation of minorities (134). Such alienation 
can be expressed in terms of minorities interpreting the idea of nation-state in such a way 
that each nation is entitled to its own state (134). In this sense, majorities may contrive 
for a nation co-extensive with the existing state, whereas minorities may call for a state 
representing their ethno-national aspirations and corresponding to the perceived territory 
of their ethnic homelands. These two countervailing modes of interpretation correspond 
largely to two macro-processes, assimilation and differentiation, as Donald Horowitz 





assimilation and differentiation can be empirically observed in majorities and minorities 
alike, since “semiotic communities” (Wedeen 2002, 722) may never become completely 
bounded.  
In this sense, the majority-minority lines that certain non-state actors (e.g. counter-elites, 
activists, intellectuals, organizations) perceive and try to draw may not necessarily 
coincide empirically with the lines drawn by the state. Fully aware of the contested 
boundaries between ethnic majorities and minorities, I define a state’s ethnic majority 
and minorities as merely categories and refer to the state’s official schemes of 
categorization to determine who are assigned with which categories. Although 
individuals sharing such categories constitute separate populations, I do not assume 
groupness as implicit behind a category. Instead, I problematize how elite and masses of 
ethnic majority and ethnic minorities challenge or maintain the boundaries set initially by 
the state as well as how patterns of boundary-making may vary across pairs41 of majority-
minority distinctions, across different ethno-regions. 
For the contexts of China and Russia, I subscribe to state-defined categories and use 
state-generated census data tabulated along these categories for the following 
considerations. First, while admitting that these categories were constructed to render 
more legible the ethnically, linguistically, and culturally perceivedly heterogenous 
populations, they were formulated and adopted also in consultation with ethno-
nationally-minded elites who tended to emphasize inter-ethnic distinctions while 
claiming to be representing various “ethnic minorities.” In other words, state-defined 
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categories were not simply imposed ones but rather products of elite-level negotiations42. 
Second, ethnic territorially-based autonomy arrangements are designated for specific 
state-defined ethnic categories, and the overlapping of ethnically-based categories with 
territorially-based categories can create a sense of “being titular” among individuals of an 
ethno-region’s titular categorie(s). This can in turn reinforce acceptance and 
consciousness of state-defined categories among the categorized populations. Third, 
affirmative action programs or other preferential treatments by the state can encourage 
individuals, especially those undecided about whether to register with the majority 
cateogry or a minority category, to align with state-defined minority categories. This in 
turn contributes to constructing a milieu where state-defined categories start being taken 
for granted and where individuals themselves start actively reproducing these categories. 
Fourth, in China and Russia, individuals in general register their ethnic categories based 
upon their self-identifications. Options are open for them to shift across categories, either 
within the state-defined repertoire of ethnic categories or allowing the registration of a 
category outside the state-defined repertoire (e.g. a self-reported category in Russia or a 
yet-to-be-classified category in China43). 
 
State and institutionalized ethnicity 
If the state plays the central role in categorizing majority and minorities, how does the 
state strive to maintain the binary distinctions within the population it rules? Rogers 
                                                          
42 For instance, the dichotomization of “Bashkir” versus “Tatar” by Bolsheviks in the 1910s and 1920s in 
response to elites claiming to represent “Bashkirs” or “Tatars.” The separation of “Daur” from “Mongol” 
by CCP in the 1950s in response to elites claiming to represent “Daurs.” 





Brubaker would invite us to examine how state institutionalizes its monopoly on the use 
of legitimate symbolic force (2004, 42). This section addresses the following questions: 
How have ethnic institutions been conceptualized in the existing literature? How are they 
conceptualized for the dissertation? 
The state’s “legitimate symbolic force” refers to the power and resources with which to 
formally name, to formally identify, to formally categorize, and to formally state what is 
what and who is who (42). The state imposes the “modes of social counting and 
accounting” (42) to which various state and non-state actors must refer. Such modes 
include official censuses that tabulate the population across categories and a variety of 
institutions that sort out individuals in relation to the categories. One of such categories, 
according to Brubaker, is ethnic category, as he views the “national struggle” in the 
former Soviet Union as “the struggle of institutionally constituted (ethno-)national elites” 
(1994, 48).  
Dmitry Gorenburg introduces the concept of “ethnic institutions” (2003) to account for 
the variations in terms of ethnic mobilization in the final years of the Soviet Union and 
the initial years of the post-Soviet Russian Federation. To elaborate, Gorenburg 
conceives of “ethnic institutions” as conduct-structuring formal and informal 
organizations, rules, or procedures “established to oversee a state’s interactions with 
ethnic groups living on its territory” (3). In the context of the former Soviet Union, 
components of such institutions can include, but may not necessarily be confined to, 
territorial homelands for ethnic minorities, tiered ethno-federal territorial hierarchy, 





censuses and identity papers, affirmative action programs for ethnic minorities, titular 
representation at the ethno-regional government (3, 258), and so forth.  
What Gorenburg’s “ethnic institutions” connote largely overlaps with the connotation of 
Şener Aktürk’s concept of “ethnicity regimes” (2011, 118). Such regimes refer to the 
formal institutional orders associated with how the state categorizes its population in 
ethnically-couched terms as well as how the state contrives to manage the use of ethnic 
symbols among the population. He disaggregates “ethnicity regimes” on two dimensions, 
i.e. “membership” and “expression” (118-119). “Membership” pertains to whether the 
citizenship as defined by the relevant state authority is restricted to people of certain 
ethnic categories or not. This dimension reflects the desired ethnic contours of the nation 
the relevant state authority strives to build. The other dimension, “expression,” revolves 
around the relevant state’s attitude towards both the official categorization and self-
expression of ethnic diversity among its population. According to the different values 
taken on the two dimensions, regimes of ethnicity can largely be classified into three 
types, mono-ethnic (citizenship restricted ethnically), anti-ethnic (official recognition and 
self-expression of ethnic categories disallowed), and multi-ethnic (citizenship not 
restricted ethnically while the state actively regulating official recognition and self-
expression of ethnic categories, 118-119).  
To operationalize the concept of “ethnicity regimes,” Aktürk further breaks down the 
membership dimension into three questions: is citizenship restricted to only one ethnic 
group? is there ethnic-priority immigration? are there officially codified ethnic 
minorities? (121) Likewise, the expression dimension is disaggregated into the following 





key official documents, ethnic territorially based autonomy (121) or ethnic federalism 
(123), multiple official languages, and ethnically-based affirmative action (121).  
Nevertheless, with regard to the “ethnic territorially-based autonomy or ethnic 
federalism” sub-dimension, Aktürk stops short of further conceptual clarification, 
apparently lumping “ethnic territorially-based autonomy” and “ethno-federalism” 
together without making the distinction between these two types of institutional 
arrangements. If “territorial autonomy” refers to how specific regional governments 
relate to the central state, then “federalism” may speak of how the collectivity of all the 
regional governments relate to the central state in general. Empirically, “ethnic 
territorially-based autonomy” and “ethno-federalism” may not always come in pairs. 
China and Italy may provide two of the examples in which “ethnic territorially-based 
autonomy” has been designated for certain minorities (e.g. Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region in China, Autonomous Province of Bolzano and South Tyrol in Italy), but the 
state is unitarily organized rather than federated. In this regard, my conceptualization of 
ethnic institutions will be based upon both Gorenburg’s and Aktürk’s but further 
categorize “multi-ethnic” states into two types, i.e. formally federal state and formally 
unitary state.  
Accordingly, I define “ethnic institution(s)” as any type(s) of formal institutional orders 
associated with either how the state categorizes its population in ethnically-couched 
terms or how the state contrives to manage the use of ethnic categories and symbols 
among its population. Two dimensions and eleven sub-dimensions of ethnic institutions 
are summarized in the table below. The dimension of “category-defining institutions” 





and citizenship eligibility. It consists of four sub-dimensions. The dimension of 
“category-managing institutions”, on the other hand, connotes how the state manages the 
use of ethnic categories and symbols in relation to the defined ethnic contours and 
consists of seven sub-dimensions. An “ethnicity regime” is an attribute of a given state, 
and I conceptualize a state’s type of “ethnicity regime” in terms of the combination of 
values taken on dimensions and sub-dimensions of ethnic institutions. Four ideal types of 
ethnicity regimes, federally multi-ethnic, unitarily multi-ethnic, mono-ethnic, and anti-
ethnic ones, represent the varying degrees of receptivity among states towards ethnically-
based categorization of population. 
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d Recruitment and trainings of cadres of immigrant minorities (e.g. in Germany). 
e Recruitment and trainings of cadres of religious minorities (e.g. in Turkey). 
 
ETHNO-FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC TERRITORIALLY-BASED 
AUTONOMY AS TYPES OF ETHNIC INSTITUTIONS 
As types of ethnic institutions, how have ethnically and territorially-based autonomy and 
ethno-federalism been conceptualized in the existing literature? How are the two types of 
institutions conceptualized for the dissertation? This section addresses these questions. 
 
Ethno-federalism 
Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder consider ethno-federalism as a type of formal 
power-sharing institutions (2005, 31). Such power-sharing institutions distribute 
decision-making rights within the state in terms of who are entitled to decision-makings 
and define decision-making procedures (30). In ethnically diverse societies, power-
sharing institutions are intended to guarantee four modes of decision-makings: inclusive 
decision-making, partitioned decision-making, predetermined decisions, or some 
combination of these (30). Partitioned mode of decision-makings tends to decentralize the 
central-state’s decision-making powers according to territorial divisions and policy 
realms while allocating such powers among mutually independent governmental agencies 
where elites of specific ethnic categories can have greater influence on decision-makings 
(33).   
Ethnically-based allocation of executive and legislative posts constitutes an example of 





partitioned decision-makings (31). Ethnic territorially-based autonomy is usually a 
component feature of ethno-federalism by assigning jurisdiction according to the 
principle of “territoriality”, which can be viewed as a proxy for ethnic categories (33). 
For instance, in the former Soviet Union, ethnically-defined territorial units were 
formally supposed to act in the name of eponymous ethnic populations, but in practice, as 
Rothchild and Roeder note, ethno-regional administrations tended to include not only 
titular elites44, but also substantial non-titular elites. At times, non-titular elites could 
even make up the majority of the functionaries of ethno-regional states (33).  
In addition to being a type of ethnic institutions, ethno-federalism is also a type of 
federations governing center-periphery relations. In this regard, Daniel Elazar makes the 
distinction between federations and federal arrangements: federations may refer to a 
“defined constitutional structure under which the state is divided into regions that assume 
different names in various countries” (Lapidoth 1997, 50), while federal arrangements 
may be said of a “form of political organization uniting separate polities within an 
overarching political system so that all maintain their fundamental political integrity” 
(50). According to how federations are originally crafted, three ideal types can be 
summarized, i.e. coming-together federations in which parts create the whole, holding-
together federations in which the whole creates the parts through elite consensus, putting-
together federations where the whole creates the parts by imposing will rather than 
through elite consensus (Keller and Smith 2005, 269). Nevertheless, it would not be 
surprising if the empirical picture of federation-creating seems to be rather a hybrid of 
these types. Particular to ethno-federalism, Henry Hale defines it as a “federal system of 
                                                          





government in which federal regions are invested with ethnic content” (2008, 64), and in 
such a system, regional administrative boundaries usually provide the crucial lines along 
which coordination occurs for issues of center-periphery relations (68). 
Another type of partitioned decision-makings as opposed to ethno-federalism is ethno-
corporatism45. Such arrangements are not based upon territory, thus territories do not tend 
to become a semiotic equivalent to ethnic categories in ethno-corporatism, since the 
jurisdictions extend to members sharing the ethnic category alone and not to the entire 
population within a given territory (Rothchild and Roeder 2005, 33). 
Valerie Bunce and Stephen Watts, in their study of the differing effects of ethno-
federalism and unitary structure governing the formal relationship between the central 
state and various sub-national-level states upon inter-ethnic relations and democratic 
transition (2005, 135), characterize a unitary state with “indivisible sovereignty” (135). 
Meanwhile, they distinguish ethno-federalism in terms of the following attributes: 
territorially-defined subunits, dual sovereignty according to which the center and the 
subunits have both overlapping and separate spheres of responsibilities, a relationship 
between the center and the subunits combining autonomy and coordination unlike the 
subordination of subunits to the center in unitary structures, and most distinctively, many 
subunits inhabited by and imputed to represent geographically-concentrated ethnic 
minorities (135).  
As regards arguments both favorable and unfavorable for the establishing of ethno-
federal institutional design, proponents of ethno-federalism points to the benefits of 
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legitimating difference and empowering ethnic minorities (136) inherent in ethno-federal 
design, where trust can be fostered, while ethnic minorities are provided with a stake in 
both the practice of democracy and the conduct of the state. Ethno-federalism also has the 
built-in potential of inhibiting the center from overly expanding its powers, and in this 
sense, it is conducive to countering two temptations: of minorities to defect and of 
majorities to dominate (136). 
Opponents of ethno-federalism tend to emphasize the “fine line” (136) between 
legitimating difference and undermining commonality. They argue, as summarized by 
Bunce and Watts, that ethno-federalism can lock in differences and identities by 
prompting ethnic categories, territories, and political power to overlap, which may not be 
conducive to the promotion of interaction and cooperation among ethnic communities 
(136). Ethno-federalism also runs the risk of constituting the resources and leadership 
with which for ethno-regions to press for independence from the central state (136), 
which can in turn stimulate the central-state to become paranoiac and to expand powers, 
resulting in a spiral of center-periphery power build-ups. 
Bunce and Watts conclude that, in the post-Soviet contexts, when communist party 
hegemony and the state were dwindling, ethno-federal republics were more likely to 
feature growing conflicts between majority and minority populations than unitary 
republics (138). Even after these republics became independent states, ethno-federal 
states were more likely to be weak. However, adding a flavor of ethno-federal features to 
a unitary state is recommended, for it can improve strained majority-minority relations 
and facilitate democratic governance (138). Although unitary states can be institutionally 





system due to considerable institutional constraints (157-158). Overall, Bunce and Watts 
suggest that the effect of center-periphery institutional design upon governance hinges on 
three key issues: keeping ethnic minorities in the state, constraining ethnic majorities, and 
building a state capable of creating incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation and supports 
democratic governance (158). 
Of a similar vein, Amit Ahuja and Ashutosh Varshney also investigate the effect of 
formal ethno-federal design upon stability and peace. They argue that three variables can 
condition such effect: how far the sense of nationhood has been cultivated before federal 
arrangements are formally negotiated and established, whether the ethnic structure of a 
state is bipolar46 or multipolar47, whether identities are cumulative or crosscutting (2005, 
243). For instance, in the case of India, ethno-federal arrangements have demonstrated 
stabilizing effect, since a shared sense of nationhood has been fostered even predating 
India’s independence, while the ethnic composition is multipolar, and attributes of 
ethnicity, language, religion, caste, and tribe (261) constitute competing dimensions of 
cleavages while not overlapping with one another. The unique combination of historical 
and structural endowments has been orienting the diverse population of India more 
towards integration than towards differentiation, thus distinguishing India’s ethno-
federalism as more stabilizing than disruptive. 
Despite that Bunce and Watts’ depiction of the outcome of ethno-federalism seems to 
contrast with that of Ahuja and Varshney, both pairs of scholars would agree on the 
understanding that the effectiveness of ethno-federalism is contingent upon largely 
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be concentrated territorially. 





structural factors. Such intervening variables can include history of center-periphery 
interaction (Amoretti 2004, 11), structural differences (e.g. economic, cultural, etc. 12), 
and international factors (13). What is also common to their studies are their treating of 
the dichotomy of ethno-federal versus unitary design as an independent variable and their 
assuming of groups behind categorical distinctions. In this manner, both pairs of scholars 
downplay the role of elites’ agency in the very process of practicing ethno-federal 
institutions in their impact upon inter-ethnic relations and governance.  
As an alternative, I construct formally ethno-federal versus unitary design of center-
periphery relations merely as a condition variable rather than an independent variable. 
Moreover, institutional design of center-periphery relations cannot appropriately explain 
the differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-regions found in the same institutional 
context, that is, under the same multi-ethnic state. Integrating Henry Hale’s (2014), 
Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder’s (2005), and Valerie Bunce and Stephen Watts’ 
(2005) conception of ethno-federalism, I define ethno-federalism as formal institutional 
design, often enshrined constitutionally, according to which the central-state and its 
constituent territorially-based administrative units share sovereignty and have both 
overlapping and separate spheres of jurisdictions, and in which at least one constituent 
unit is formally associated with a specific ethnic category.  
 
Ethnic territorially-based autonomy 
Ethnic territorially-based autonomy, as a type of ethnic institutions, is a built-in feature of 
ethno-federalism, but it can also be found in unitarily multi-ethnic regimes. If “ethno-





units, then “ethnic territorially-based autonomy” may connote how those individual 
constituent units that can be called “ethno-regions” relate to the central state. 
Most of the existing conceptualizations of ethnic territorially-based autonomy tend to 
assume groupness behind ethnic categories, and the agents who are both entitled to and 
practicing “autonomy” are “ethnic minorities.” According to Hurst Hannum, “autonomy” 
entails the “right to be different and to be left alone, to preserve, protect, and promote 
values that are beyond the legitimate reach of the rest of the society” (2011), whereas 
Ruth Lapidoth defines “territorial political autonomy” as arrangement aimed at granting 
to a group a means by which it can express its distinct identity that differs from the 
majority of the population in the state and can constitute the majority in a specific region 
(1997, 33). Similarly, Yash Ghai views “autonomy” as a device to allow ethnic or other 
groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special 
concern to them while allowing the larger entity those power which cover common 
interests (2000, 8), while Renat Shaykhutdinov defines “autonomy” as institutional 
arrangements that “allow ethnic groups to express their distinct identities while keeping 
the borders of host states intact” (2010, 179). Such arrangements usually feature 
bilaterally-approved legal covenant that formally demarcates the center-periphery 
relationships and fiscal/budgetary authority reserved for the autonomous region (179-
180).  
Conceptualization of “autonomy” can also be broader so as to be associated with 
concepts like “decentralization” or “federation.” According to Ruth Lapidoth, 
“autonomy” may be understood as a range of referents such as 1) right to act upon one’s 





with exclusive powers of administration, legislation, and adjudication in specific areas 
enabling limited self-rule for minorities (1997, 33). If “autonomy” is understood not only 
as a device with which to strike the balance between assimilation and differentiation but 
also as requiring power-sharing between the national/central and the subnational/regional 
state authorities, the analytical category of “autonomy” may also imply decentralization 
in terms of center-periphery relations.  
As regards how regional autonomy and decentralization may be conceptually related, 
Daniel Treisman argues that political decentralization may possess such merits as 
satisfying the moderate demands for autonomy of geographically concentrated ethnic 
minorities while also disincentivizing them from escalating their objective to outright 
secession, assisting ethnic minorities in terms of resisting discriminatory central policies 
by controlling subnational governments, and serving as a “training ground” for inter-
ethnic cooperation and compromise (2007, 245). The mechanism linking decentralization 
of political power to increased local autonomy and mitigated ethnic conflicts consists in 
such a logic that ethnic conflict will be reduced by a measure of 
disengagement/separation, while ethnic harmony will be enhanced in a system in which 
territorially concentrated minorities are able to exercise autonomy on matters crucial to 
their distinct identity without fear of being overridden by the majority (238). In other 
words, ethnic territorially-based autonomy has normative value. 
A possible way to summarize the existing modes of conceptualizing “autonomy” is to use 
the dichotomy between the nominal/formal conception of “autonomy” treating it as 
normative ideal/prescriptive institution and the practical/empirical conception of 





to conceptualize “autonomy” more as normative ideal or prescriptive category and 
usually subscribes to the binary framework of the presence of autonomous institutions 
versus its absence by treating it as a nominal variable (Siroky & Cuffe 2014; Cederman et 
al. 2015). 
Despite that, some scholars do indicate that “autonomy” can also be analyzed in terms of 
its degree, or quantitatively. I start from Hurst Hannum and Richard Lillich’s 
understanding of autonomy as primarily determined “by the degree of actual and formal 
independence enjoyed by the autonomous entities in its political decision-making 
process” (Lapidoth 1997, 32). I also deviate from the tendency in the existing literature to 
assume groupness behind ethnic categories by emphasizing that the agents who exercise 
autonomy are ethno-regional states and those elites associated with them rather than 
ethnic minorities per se. In this regard, there tends to be a dearth of frameworks in the 
existing literature that discuss how to measure and to explain the varying degrees of 
actual autonomy outcome across ethno-regions.  
To address this dearth, I analyze autonomy as a quantifiable response variable that can be 
measured in reference to the baseline set in the formal institutions of ethnic territorially-
based autonomy, which I define as territorially-based power-sharing arrangements 
distinguishing an ethno-regional state from the central-state, in which a specific territory 
is formally attached to and designated for a specific ethnic category, usually a minority 
category, and in which elites of that ethic category are supposed to be adequately 







It has become a truism that ethnic politics entail interactions between groups. However, 
are groups truly the appropriate agents in ethnic politics? According to how this question 
is answered, I compartmentalize the existing literature into three approaches, groupness 
as exogenous, groupness as endogenous to historically-determined structure, and 
groupness as endogenous to elite agency. By “groupness,” I subscribe to Rogers 
Brubaker’s conceptualization of it as the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, 
solidary group (2004, 47). According to this conception, groupness is variable and 
contingent rather than fixed and given (12), while actors involved in ethnic conflicts are 
in fact not ethnic groups but rather various kinds of organizations (14) and elites. In this 
section, I provide a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
approaches to the study of ethnic politics in terms of their explanatory potential for cross-
ethno-region comparison of actually exercised autonomy outcomes.  
 
Groupness as exogenous 
What characterizes the groupness as exogenous approach is the underlying assumption of 
groupness as exogenous and conceptually presupposed to the processes of ethnic politics. 
Examples of scholarly works following this approach tend to use what is common to 
different contexts of inter-ethnic politics to explain similar outcomes. Such commonality 
is predicated upon the following assumptions. First, the world is made up of ethnic 
groups. Second, each ethnic category inherently suggests behind it internally 
homogenous, externally bounded group consciousness. Third, such groupness is ancient 





also deviates slightly from a primordialist conception of ethnicity, as it does acknowledge 
that ethnic categories can change. It simply is not concerned with studying how group 
consciousness is historically and socially constructed or how ethnic categories can 
change. Meanwhile, it also tends to treat groupness as an independent variable or an 
antecedent condition.  
A quintessential example of scholarly works that assume internally homogenous, 
externally bounded group consciousness behind an ethnic category as a pre-existing 
condition can be Enze Han’s comparative case studies of five ethnic minorities in China 
explaining why some of them have been politically more challenging of the existing 
ethnicity regimes than others (2013). Nicholas Sambanis and Branko Milanovic’s (2014) 
examination of the correlation between political autonomy of a sub-national-level region 
and its economic power can be another example, wherein regions, ethnic groups, and 
ethnic categories are implicitly assumed as mutually synonymous concepts. Based upon 
their statistical analysis of the data collected from sub-national-level regions in 48 
countries (10), they argue that a region’s “policy autonomy” tends to be positively 
correlated to relative regional income, a region’s interpersonal income inequality, and its 
ethnic distinctiveness (20). The scope condition of their study is so broad as to include 
not only ethno-regions but also administrative units without formal autonomy designated.  
Sambanis and Milanovic’s study pioneers in terms of measuring a region’s level of 
actually-exercised autonomy by employing the “share of regional expenditures that can 
be financed out of regional revenues” (11) as a proxy for policy autonomy. Obviously, 
such an economically-based conception of a region’s implemented autonomy outcome is 





sufficient condition for political autonomy. However, formal institutional constraints may 
also need to be taken into account, since certain regions with relatively high level of 
financial self-sufficiency can be vested with quite limited formal political autonomy (e.g. 
the Southeastern coastal provinces in China). Moreover, financial self-sufficiency tends 
to be no more than a component aspect of actually-exercised autonomy of a region, 
especially if inter-budgetary revenue redistribution is also considered, since the ability to 
procure more financial transfers from the central-state can also be suggestive of a 
region’s level of political autonomy. 
In addition, Sambanis and Milanovic’s use of relative regional income as an independent 
variable to account for the political autonomy of regions is also problematic, especially if 
we conceptualize regional income level as another component aspect of a region’s 
autonomy outcome rather than its cause. Two of the other explanatory variables they use 
and find significantly correlated to regional autonomy outcomes are a region’s levels of 
ethnic distinctiveness as well as interpersonal economic inequality. A region is counted 
as ethnically more distinct if most of its inhabitants share a specific ethnic category and 
most of those of that category live in that region (15). It is posited that the more 
ethnically distinct and the more economically unequal a region, the more likely for it to 
be more autonomous (20). Nevertheless, the empirical records of Xinjiang and Tatarstan 
point to the negation of the claim, as Xinjiang tends to ethnically more distinct and 
economically more unequal than Tatarstan while not actually being more autonomous 
than Tatarstan. 
In Ted Gurr’s exploration of why individuals may engage in ethno-political actions, 





groups are supposed to be an unchanging given. He argues that the “root cause” of ethnic 
conflicts is the perception of comparative disadvantage among members of different 
“ethnic groups” (2000). According to his “etiology of ethno-political conflict” (65-95), 
salience of ethnic identity and shared incentives are necessary conditions for ethno-
political actions to occur, while together with group capacity and domestic opportunities, 
they are conditions jointly sufficient for ethno-political actions to emerge. This “etiology” 
strives to delineate an explanatory framework as comprehensive as possible, and 
inevitably, it appears cumbersome and suffers from a lack of parsimony. Moreover, the 
framework does not address the question as regards the source of perceived group-level 
comparative advantages.  
That question is centrally addressed in Donald Horowitz’s positional group psychology 
theory. He argues that source of ethnic conflicts primarily resides in the psychology of 
group juxtapositions that often involve the “emotional concomitant of group traits and 
interactions” (1985, 181-182). Such juxtapositions can give rise to the feeling of 
antipathy, all the more since imputed traits characterizing groups are usually arrayed on a 
backward-advanced dichotomy. Resulting from such a dichotomy, a polarity-style of 
intergroup relations rather than a plurality-style often emerges (182). Horowitz notes that 
group-level psychological processes are distinct from individual-level processes due to 
collective elements at work in intergroup psychology. Consequently, groups situated in a 
similar position on the backward-advanced dichotomy, as Horowitz asserts, would 
respond similarly despite differing socio-political contexts (184). 
Then can it be contended that as long as there are juxtapositions of groups, conflicts will 





alone is not sufficient for conflicts to occur unless power relations of dominance, either 
physical or discursive, are present, where subordination or differentiated worth are built 
into inter-ethnic interactions (86). Concept-wise, he makes the distinction between 
nationalism of exclusion and nationalism of resistance. According to the former 
conception of nation, the dominant group within a society either seeks to impose its own 
values on other groups within that society or seeks to exclude, at times violently, other 
groups from access to the state (86). Meanwhile, the latter conception of nation speaks of 
a dominated group opposing exclusions and seeking to preserve its cultural identity and 
resist the hegemony of the dominant group (86). Varshney also distinguishes instrumental 
rationality, which refers to changing means or altering ends according to cost-benefit 
calculations (87) from value rationality, which is related to the pursuit of dignity and self-
respect in contexts either structurally or discursive hierarchical. Value rationality pertains 
to a conscious “ethical, esthetic, religious or other belief” independent of its prospect of 
success (86) and constitutes, as he contends, the micro-foundations for ethnically-based 
mobilization of a critical mass by the intermediary of historically inherited attitudes and 
power relations among groups (93). In this sense, Varshney argues that origins of ethnic 
mobilization tend to be value-rational (86), but its sustenance (95) can be more strategic 
and instrumental. 
Varshney’s proposed concepts of “nationalism of resistance” and “value rationality” 
possess considerable explanatory power in comparing contexts in which both perceived 
inter-group physical or discursive hierarchy and ethnic mobilization are present with 
contexts in which inter-group relations are more symmetric and ethnic mobilization is 





communities. Then why do ethnic mobilizations tend to emerge empirically at certain 
historical junctures rather than others? Why has the critical mass been more easily 
reached in certain contexts than in others? Why do only certain individuals decide to 
participate in highly risky, contentious activities, while most of the time, the majority of 
the masses do not? These questions are not adequately addressed in Varshney’s value-
rationality-based, groupness-as-exogenous approach to the study of ethnic mobilization. 
To sum up, the explanatory factors proposed in the groupness as exogenous approach 
such as comparative disadvantage (Gurr 2000), positional group psychology (Horowitz 
1985), value rationality (Varshney 2003) and so forth, all tend to uncover common 
characteristics to various contexts of inter-ethnic relations in order to explain similar 
outcomes. In other words, useful as the approach is, these factors are not varying 
significantly across ethno-regions in China and Russia, which all feature ethnically-based 
group-making and inter-group dynamics, and thus not able to adequately account for 
differing autonomy outcomes. 
 
Groupness as endogenous to historically-determined structure 
The groupness as endogenous to historically-determined structure approach predicates 
itself upon the assumption that groups are processual products of social interactions 
(Gagnon 2004, 13). Conceptually, group consciousness is problematized, and 
frameworks that can be classified into this approach usually discuss the following 
question: how can group consciousness emanate from and be shaped by historically-
determined structural factors? Depending on the type of such structural factors, 





sub-approaches: groupness as endogenous to institutions approach that views group 
consciousness as constituted by state institutions, groupness as endogenous to 
interactions between institutionally defined actors approach that posits group 
consciousness as coagulating at specific junctures of strategic interactions, and groupness 
as endogenous to group-making processes. This macro-approach tends to treat groupness 
as a dependent variable. 
 
Groupness as endogenous to institutions 
The fundamental assumption of this sub-approach posits that the ways group 
consciousness form are defined and constituted by institutions, of which ethnic 
categorization is among the most consequential. Institutions hereby can connote conduct-
structuring formal and informal organizations, rules, or procedures (Gorenburg 2003, 3) 
that constrain or shape group-makings. 
Intended to challenge elite-centric explanations for nationalist mobilization among ethnic 
minorities, Dmitry Gorenburg proposes his institutionalist explanation. Applying an 
analytical framework abducted from the empirical evidence in four ethno-regions of the 
Russian Federation, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, and Khakassia, he argues that 
“ethnic institutions” may shape the preferences and tactics of cultural elites (such as 
intellectuals and students, 2003, 2, as opposed to political elites, 2003, 3) usually found 
pivotal in the emergence (7) of ethno-nationalist movements. Such institutions may also 
condition the ways cultural elites convince the populace of sustaining their support of the 
movements (3) as well as the capacity of such cultural elites’ persuasive attempts to 





were also critical in creating the social ties and networks of communication through 
which the nationalist message was spread and new activists were recruited (3). 
To account for the cross-case variations in terms of the ways ethno-national mobilizations 
emerge and develop, Gorenburg concludes that state institutions structure the interactions 
between political elites and the rest of the population by influencing the sources from 
which nationalist appeals emerged, the forms nationalist movements took, and the 
reactions of both the elites and the masses to nationalism (3). For instance, such 
movements’ trajectories in their later stages is contingent upon the political opportunity 
structures fashioned in their early stages (260): in ethno-regions where ethno-nationalists 
gained influence in government, movements tend to transform into interest group 
organizations shifting their focus to lobbying; in ethno-regions where access to 
government was blocked but electoral competition was open, movements tend to turn 
into political parties aimed at accessing power through elections; in ethno-regions where 
neither access to government nor electoral competition is available, movements turn 
themselves into grass-roots organizations engaged in regular public protests against the 
government (260). 
This sub-approach has the merit of using institutional opportunities and constraints as 
condition variables for elite agency. Nonetheless, it tends to subscribe to a generative 
model of structure and an over-socialized conception of agency (Mahoney and Snyder 
1999, 5-6) thus downplays elite agency. Last but not least, institutional opportunities and 
constraints would wield little explanatory power if they are not varying across those 






Groupness as endogenous to interactions between institutionally defined actors 
This sub-approach focuses upon interactive dynamics between groups, groups and state 
in terms of how group consciousness forms according to mutual perceptions of relevant 
actors. Such actors are defined and constituted by ethnic institutions. Meanwhile, this 
approach is also characterized by the conception of ethnicity as a cognitive device. 
According to this conception, ethnicities can refer to perspectives of perceiving, 
interpreting, and representing the social world, which can encompass ethnically-oriented 
frames, schemas, narratives, situational cues, systems of 
classification/categorization/identification, taken-for-granted knowledge embedded in 
institutionalized routines and practices, etc. (Brubaker 2004, 17). Through the 
frameworks of such perspectives, objects, places, actions, situations can be recognized 
and experienced ethnically (17). Common to studies following this approach, group 
consciousness emerges according to how elite and non-elite actors’ frame and interpret at 
certain junctures their own position in the social world vis-à-vis the state and other actors 
in ethnically categorical terms. I further divide the sub-approach into two camps, one 
represented by Mark Beissinger, David Lake & Donald Rothchild and focused upon 
dynamics between ethnically-defined social forces, the other represented by Henry Hale 
and Erin Jenne and focused upon ethnic secessions. 
Mark Beissinger, in his investigation of the processes in which nationalist mobilizations 
led to the downfall of the once-powerful Soviet Union (2002), depicts a picture of events 
unfolding in certain ethno-regions creating contingencies for events elsewhere. For 
example, challenging events started from the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, 





eventually to Volga-Ural republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. According to 
Beissinger, events are critical categories to study, because they are “sites” where we 
would expect to see most visibly the impact of structural influences on nationalism (21). 
The spectacle-like quality of the event makes it an important site of cultural transaction at 
which national identities are potentially formed (22), whereas the outcome of the 
contention is strongly constitutive of identities (23). Group-making processes are marked 
with what Beissinger calls “punctuated and irregular plebiscites” (25), whose group 
consciousness is strongly shaped by the cumulating of events. 
Beissinger focuses upon how acts challenging existing ethnic institutions were clustered 
temporally and spatially as well as how they were linked sequentially to one another 
across time and space (17). He argues that linkages and clusterings of events constitute 
the contingencies that preceding events can introduce for subsequent events, because 
what begins as a challenging act induced and heavily constrained by pre-existing 
structure possesses the potential to become itself a causal variable in a subsequent chain 
of actions (17). A series of events can grow to the point that the initial structural 
influences that played a prominent role in unleashing the series seem buried in the distant 
past and relatively impotent (17). This is what Beissinger calls “thickened” history: a 
period in which the pace of challenging events quickens to the point that it becomes 
practically impossible to comprehend them and they come to constitute an increasingly 
significant part of their own causal structure (27). In such a “thickened” history, the 
example of successful challenge set by some ethnically-defined actors creates 
expectations of potential success for further challenges by the same actors or by others 





If Beissinger’s event analysis uncovers how some peripheral ethno-national movements 
make claims to the central-state in reference to what other ethno-national movements 
have achieved, then David Lake & Donald Rothchild’s framework is intended to 
approximate how peripheral ethno-national movements would interact with one another 
in reference to their perceptions of the central-state’s ability to monopolize the use of 
violence (1996). 
David Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that collective uncertainty about future 
maintenance of distinct group identity in combination with a weakened state authority 
can lead to growing inter-ethnic violence (1996, 43-44). Although not explicitly, they 
define “collective fear of future” and “state capacity” in a mutually constitutive way. 
“Collective fear of future” arises when neighboring ethnic groups find themselves in an 
increasingly anarchic situation in which they perceive as increasingly weakened the 
ability of the overarching multi-ethnic sovereign state to provide order and security from 
other ethnic groups and perceive it as increasingly necessary to fend for their own 
security. State capacity hereby consists mainly in two dimensions, coercive capacity and 
perceived legitimacy (43). In this sense, Lake and Rothchild indeed apply Barry Posen’s 
framing of inter-ethnic relations after the collapse of a previously overarching state as 
“security dilemma” (1993) to the scenario in which state capacity may not necessarily 
collapse but only is perceived as weakening or biased towards certain groups. Although 
Lake and Rothchild believe that ethnic actors’ “physical (in)security” (1996, 44) would 
be at stake, the forward-looking nature (44) of such “physical (in)security” may also 





“Ontological security,” as opposed to “physical security,” is a security of being, a sense 
of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be, as conceptualized by 
Catarina Kinnvall (2004). In response to threatened “ontological security,” individuals 
may tend to strengthen their attachment to any collective perceived as being able to 
reduce insecurity and existential anxiety. The combination of religion and nationalism, 
according to Kinnvall, is a particularly powerful response in that, by providing a thick 
“identity-signifier,” it furnishes particularly powerful stories and beliefs/discourses 
through their ability to convey a picture of security, a “home” safe from intruder/abject-
other. Therefore, the religion-nationalism combination is more likely than other modes of 
identity constructions to arise during crises of ontological insecurity (762-763).   
In Lake and Rothchild’s study of ethnic conflicts, individuals resort to ethnically-oriented 
frames as cognitive devices to identify the collective for insecurity-reduction. Groups are 
made as elites and masses frame and interpret their future in ethnic terms, and a polarized 
dynamic between groups produces and reproduces itself through the mechanisms of 
intergroup security dilemma, intra-group power struggle between radical and moderate 
political elites, and perceived declining state capacity (1996, 44). 
However, relevant to the puzzle of this dissertation, Lake and Rothchild’s explanation 
may suffer from the following concerns. First, their units of analysis are ethnic groups 
rather than ethno-regions. Second, even if one deliberately conflates the concepts of 
ethnic groups and ethno-regions, despite similar anxieties about ontological insecurity 





Xinjiang, even though both the Russian48 and Chinese states as of most recently can be 
regarded as strong in terms of their coercive capability. Third, “collective fear” is more 
likely to have resulted from discontent with subdued autonomy outcome. If that is the 
case, it is implied that implemented autonomy outcomes need to be treated as explanatory 
variable rather than response variable. Fourth, although the perceived legitimacy can be 
limited of the Russian and Chinese states in the eyes of certain ethnically-defined actors, 
it is difficult to capture the elusive extent to which the respective central-states enjoy 
legitimacy among both ethnic Tatars and ethnic Uyghurs as well as how such an extent 
may change over time. Fifth, categorical distinction does not necessarily translate into 
group polarization. The “fears-under-weak-state” approach barely explains not only why 
mobilization among ethnic Tatars has dwindled in Tatarstan despite the initially weak 
post-Soviet Russian state but also why Uyghur-Han tension grows despite the 
increasingly strong (in terms of both “despotic” and “infrastructural” powers, Mann 
1984) Chinese state. Sixth, Lake and Rothchild do not make the distinction between 
central-state authorities and subnational-level state authorities in their discussion of state 
capacity. For an alternative, my framework clearly distinguishes ethno-regional states 
from central states and scrutinizes the capacity of ethno-regional states. 
In Henry Hale’s study of ethnic secessions, the institutionally-defined actors are the 
pairing of an ethno-region and its corresponding central-state (2008). He builds a stylized 
rational-choice model for predicting when ethno-regions will choose to secede from the 
central-state, in which he defines ethnic secession as encompassing two scenarios: either 
                                                          
48 Especially since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 1999 and the military pacification of insurgencies in 





a regional government has opted for secession, or secessionist movements have taken 
over the ethno-regional government (72). He argues that the key factor determining 
whether a given ethno-region will secede or not is whether or not the central-state is 
perceived as exploitative and readily violent (72). In other words, ethno-regions play the 
initiating role in the politics of ethnic secessions, which is fundamentally about shaping 
ethno-regional perceptions regarding the nature of the potential of central government. 
Such perceptions are conditioned by four factors, ethnicity, central state policies, 
framing, and institutionally mediated interests (77).  
As regards ethnicity, Hale notes that thick ethnic divides can heighten the degree of risk 
that an ethno-region’s political elites and masses attach to being in a union state, whereas 
central state policies can powerfully alter both ethno-regional political elites’ and masses’ 
perceptions concerning the likelihood of experiencing exploitation or cooperation if 
staying together with the central-state. Framing, on the other hand, refers to how ethno-
regional political elites, through agenda-setting and media, can influence mass 
perceptions of central-state. Institutionally mediated interests connote how the interests of 
the masses as constituted by institutional rules can influence the potential mobilizing 
power of all the various “frames” that ethno-regional political elites might employ (77). 
A central assumption underlying Hale’s model can be phrased as such: ethno-regional 
states are internally homogenous actors, possess certain level of freedom of choice, while 
being rational, even if the empirical evidence of secessionism may not necessarily be as 
simplex. 
Erin Jenne’s study of ethnic secessions focuses upon center-periphery interactions in 





minorities are assumed to be backed by certain external powers. Minority elites do not try 
to mobilize minority masses into a group unless the perceptions of their own increased 
leverage vis-à-vis the central-state foment collective desires for more radical demands to 
bargain for greater concessions from the central-state (2007, 10). Desires for 
radicalization emanate from two types of opportunity structures: institutional opportunity 
structure, which connotes a transient political environment that emerges, often 
unexpectedly, to alter the balance of power between the minority and the central-state 
(10-11), and discursive opportunity structure, which provides the normative toolbox and 
ideational resource pool that can be deployed in pursuit of political objectives (11). To 
sum up Jenne’s “ethnic bargaining” theory, group radicalization is driven by shifting 
perceptions of relative power against the center (11) while informed both by changes in 
the opportunity structures and by the actions of the group’s external patron (11). 
Overall, analytical frameworks in this approach tend to view groupness as forming at 
certain junctures, and such junctures are defined according to ethnically-constituted 
actors’ perceptions and interpretations of events, other actors, the central state, or external 
powers. With regard to their explanatory power for varying autonomy outcomes across 
ethno-regions, these frameworks may not be adequate for the following reasons. 
First, Mark Beissinger’s clusterings and linkages of events do feature processes of 
mutually transforming agency and structure, yet the framework is not intended for cross-
case comparison, since it is a single-case study of regime change. Second, Lake & 
Rothchild’s collective fear is difficult to measure and more likely to have resulted from 
subdued autonomy outcome, while central-state capacity is not varying significantly 





Hale’s model, tends to be more suitable for explaining secessionist attempts, whereas 
central-state’s perception of the ethno-region tends to be more suitable for explaining 
autonomy outcomes. After all, to explain differing autonomy outcomes implicit in which 
is the central state’s tolerance of the elites of territorially-concentrated minorities to 
access the ethno-regional state and to share power with the central state, central-state’s 
perception of the region seems a more relevant factor for explaining autonomy outcomes. 
Fourth, external patrons for the ethnic minority categories can be difficult to identify for 
both the focused and shadow case ethno-regions of this dissertation. 
 
Groupness as endogenous to group-making processes 
Frameworks that can be classified into this sub-approach view group boundaries as ever-
changing and group consciousness as ever-forming in uninterrupted, everlasting group-
making processes. Defined as a social, cultural, and political project intended for 
“transforming categories into groups or increasing levels of groupness” (Brubaker 2004, 
13), group-making processes pertain to how groupness forms with regard to contested 
and competing understanding of categories, or rather, boundaries of such categories as 
regard where their denotation starts and ends. 
Andreas Wimmer conceptualizes ethnic boundary makings as processes in which actors 
relate to existing boundaries by trying to change them or to de-emphasize them and to 
enforce new modes of categorization in a historical context characterized by previous 
processes of ethnic group formation (2013b, 49). In his comparative analytic delineated 
for a comprehensive theorization of inter-ethnic boundary-making processes, he provides 





not confined to, boundary features, boundary stability (104-105), boundary changes (105-
112), mechanisms of boundary changes (32-38), modes (49-63) and means of boundary-
makings (63-72), etc.  
In his critique of the primordialist conception of ethnicity, Wimmer traces the assumption 
that ethnic categories necessarily imply groupness and shared culture to Johann Gottfried 
Herder’s three assumptions in his studies of the emergence and disappearance of different 
“peoples”: each “people” forms a close-knit community; shared sense of identity is based 
upon shared historical destiny; each “people” is endowed with shared language and 
culture (16). As Wimmer characterizes, Herder’s essentialist assumptions of the world 
made up of culturally-bounded ethnic groups (20) have impact upon at least two of the 
subsequent schools of thought: “assimilation theories”, which prescribe that ethnically-
defined communities should homogenize into “mainstream” culture (18-19), and the 
antithetical “multiculturalism”, which advocates for minorities’ right to maintain cultural 
boundaries from majorities (19-20). 
For an alternative conception of ethnicity, Wimmer builds upon Fredrik Barth’s notion of 
ethnic boundaries while integrating the situationist schools’ conceptualization. As 
summarized by Wimmer, Fredrik Barth argues that ethnic distinctions result from 
marking and maintaining a boundary regardless of perceived cultural differences (23). In 
other words, ethnically-based distinctions derive from how the ethnic boundary between 
ethnic categories is inscribed49 onto a landscape of continuous cultural transitions (23). 
                                                          
49 For instance, in the Volga-Ural regions of the Russian Federation, Tatars and Bashkirs are two ethnic 
categories corresponding largely to a shared landscape of continuous cultural and linguistic transitions. 
Similar cases include ethnic Bouyei and Zhuang in the Southwest of China, and ethnic Han, Manchu, 





The situationist schools, for its part, view ethnic categories as arranged in a hierarchy of 
levels of differentiation (24). Such categories are not synonymous with distinct groups 
with mutually exclusive collective identities (23). Rather, the question as to which levels 
of differentiation can appear more salient than others is contingent upon the logic of 
situation and upon the characteristics of the persons mutually interacting (81). For 
instance, race tends to be the relevant type of categories in the U.S. while ethnicity tends 
to be relevant type of categories in China and Russia. The propensity to see the world as 
composed of ethnic groups is called “ethnicization”, a self-reinforcing process of 
focusing upon and reacting to the ethnic dimension of social reality, thus creating 
“minority problems” in various issue-areas (27).  
Inherent in Wimmer’s conception of inter-ethnic boundary-making processes are the 
social classification and collective representation in ethnic terms. Such boundaries are 
realized through everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of 
“connecting and distancing” (2008a, 975), which can be examined on four macro-level 
features, cultural differentiation, social closure, political salience, and stability (976-985; 
1001-1003). 
Then how would inter-ethnic boundaries remain stable? How would inter-ethnic 
boundaries change? Wimmer attributes boundary stability to political salience, social 
closure, and cultural differentiation (2013b, 104). When political networks are aligned 
along ethnic boundaries, it can be difficult to establish crosscutting alliances with which 
to create possibility for alternative modes of classification (104). When ethnic boundaries 
overlap with cultural differences, they represent a strengthened empirical landscape with 





closure rigidify ethnic hierarchy, a crosscutting mode of ethnic boundaries can be 
advocated as an alternative only by actors who wield considerable political power and 
legitimacy. Under certain circumstances, stable boundaries create thick identities (104), 
wherein many dimensions of cleavages align with one another, reducing the range of 
strategic options that actors can have at their proposals (104-105). 
To account for why inter-ethnic boundaries may change, Wimmer notes that when 
political salience, social closure, and cultural differentiation are not overly high, 
boundaries tend to be more susceptible to changes (104). In these regards, their changes 
can be fashioned by exogenous shift (the introduction of new institutions, resources, 
actors), endogenous shift (cumulative consequences of strategies), exogenous drift 
(diffusions of new strategies), or a combination of these mechanisms. Wimmer 
summarizes three macro-level elements that structure the struggles over established inter-
ethnic boundaries and influence the outcomes of such struggles: (1) institutional rules that 
provide incentives to pursue certain types of boundary-making strategies rather than 
others; (2) distribution of resources that influences the capacity of actors to shape the 
outcome, to have their mode of categorization respected, to make their strategies of social 
closure consequential for others, and to gain recognition of their own identity; (3) already 
established networks of political alliances whose contours ethnic boundaries are expected 
to follow (32). 
By “modes” of boundary makings, Wimmer refers to two types of boundary-making 
strategies at the individual level, or rather, what actors may do to the existing boundaries: 
strategies to change the location of existing boundaries by expanding or contracting the 





boundaries, either by challenging the hierarchical ordering of ethnic categories, or by de-
emphasizing ethnicity and emphasizing other social cleavages, or by changing one’s own 
position vis-à-vis the boundary (49). By “means” of boundary-makings, Wimmer speaks 
of actors’ approaches to making their preferred mode of boundary-making consequential 
for others and thus inscribing it into social reality (49). Major types of means of 
boundary-makings include discursive categorization (official discourse, everyday 
discourse), symbolic identification (behaviors, visible cues, documents), discrimination 
(legalized, institutionalized, informal), political mobilization, coercion (forcible 
assimilation), as well as violence (ethnic cleansing, lynching, rioting, 49). 
Of the boundary-making strategies summarized by Wimmer, one may merit additional 
discussion, boundary blurring (61-63). Rubén Rumbaut discusses it in a more 
conventional but also controversial term, “assimilation” (2005). Rumbaut treats 
“assimilation” as an empirical, analytical category rather than normative, prescriptive 
one, connoting the social, multidimensional processes of boundary reduction which either 
blurs or dissolves an ethnic distinction (158). At the individual level, assimilation 
connotes the cumulative changes that render individuals of one ethnic category more 
acculturated, integrated, and identified with the individuals of another ethnic category. At 
the aggregate level, assimilation may involve the absorption of one or more minority 
categories into the majority category or the merging of minority categories (158). 
Processes of assimilation can be analyzed on three interrelated dimensions, cultural 
(acculturation), structural (integration), and psychological (identification) processes.  
Acculturation involves complex processes of cultural diffusion and changes producing 





homogenizing effects of acculturation processes are generally more extensive among 
members of smaller and less powerful populations, and particularly voluntary immigrants 
(167). Nevertheless, acculturation is empirically never exclusively one-sided, since 
dominant populations can also be culturally influenced through their interactions with 
other populations in the society (167). Two sub-types of acculturation are summarized by 
Rumbaut: subtractive acculturation, which involves relinquishing some attribute-values 
of a cultural repertoire (e.g. language, memory, 167), while replacing them with another 
attribute-value, and additive acculturation, which entails the forming and sustaining a 
more complex repertoire (e.g. bilingualism, 167). Such mechanisms, although not 
necessarily resulting in changes of ethnic categories, resonate with Kanchan Chandra’s 
conceptualization of how ethnic can categories change. Structural integration, as per 
Rumbaut, can be analyzed on two levels. The primary level of structural integration 
involves extensive interaction within interpersonal networks and intermarriages (167). 
The secondary level of structural integration refers to a wide range of key integrative 
processes such as socioeconomic and residential assimilation, the acquisition of 
citizenship as a formally recognized member of the polity (167), and so forth. 
Psychological identification processes, if accompanying widespread acculturation, social 
mobility, and intermarriage, can lead to ethnic identity becoming an optional, leisure-time 
category. Boundaries become fuzzier, less salient, less relevant to everyday social life, 
and the feeling of connection to an ancestral past has significantly faded (167-168). 
Boundary blurring requires actions and reactions from both sides of a given boundary. It 





cultural similarity but also upon the context of reception and the degree of discrimination 
experienced by the subordinate population (166-168). 
Unlike Rumbaut who uses the term “assimilation,” Rahsaan Maxwell discusses boundary 
blurring in terms of “integrations” (2012). He dissects a minority’s level of integration 
into three mutually exclusive dimensions, social, economic, and political integrations. His 
puzzle is based upon such a tri-dimensional conception of integration and revolves 
around a “disjuncture” (14) he observes between social integration and other dimensions 
of integration: why some ethnic minorities’ social integration outcomes may be better 
than others’, while their economic and political integration outcomes may not be as good 
as others’. To explain that, Maxwell’s “integration trade-offs” theory postulates that 
higher level of social integration may undermine a minority’s ability to mobilize, which 
in turn may hinder its ability to bargain with the state for economic benefits and to be 
better politically represented in the state apparatus (4).  
Maxwell posits the majority-minority dynamics as endogenous to the agency of both 
elites and masses of ethnic minorities. To causally link levels of social integration to 
levels of economic and political integrations, the mediating variable of his analytical 
framework is an ethnic minority’s capacity to mobilize intra-ethnic networks. He bases 
his understanding of greater segregation leading to better capacity for mobilization on the 
“importance of collective identity for political mobilization” (22). In other words, social 
segregation, corresponding to Wimmer’s notion of “social closure,” may have positive 
bearings upon economic or political integrations because it is conducive to the building 
of group consciousness, which in turn prepares the minority for group-based mobilization 





largely inducted from the experiences of former colonial empires in Western Europe, and 
it remains dubious how it may travel to majority-minority dynamics in the contexts of 
ethnic territorially-base autonomy in China or Russia. Indeed, the evidence of Xinjiang 
and Tatarstan tends to indicate the negation of Maxwell’s postulation that more social 
segregation is conducive to more political representation. His “integration trade-offs” 
theory is not adequately applicable to the study of comparative ethnic regional autonomy 
for the following understandings: 
First, the type of minorities studied by Maxwell differs from that of my study in that his 
are migrant minorities without ethno-regions designated for them while mine are titular 
minorities often with ethno-regions designated for them. Second, the institutional order of 
former colonial empires in Western Europe differs significantly from that of such 
colossal, multi-ethnic, and authoritarian regimes as China or Russia. In Great Britain or 
France, political representation of migrant minorities is usually realized through electoral 
processes, wherein individuals cast their votes and minority delegates are elected to 
certain key posts in governmental apparatuses. By contrast, in China or Russia, 
representation of elites of ethnic minority categories are usually realized through elite 
networks within an incumbent party, even if the incumbent party’s picked candidates 
may be legitimized through formal electoral processes as well. Third, regarding 
groupness, higher levels of acculturation and social integration does not necessarily 
translate into reduced group consciousness, or Rumbaut’s dimension of psychological 
identification (2005, 167-168), as evinced in the case of ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan. 





social segregation does not necessarily translate into improved ability to self-organize, as 
manifested in the case of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang.  
Minority elites’ capacity to mobilize masses tends to hinge upon patterns of intra-ethnic 
cleavages. When the minority-majority cleavage completely overlaps with class-based 
cleavage, as illustrated in Pattern I of the figure below, such a “ranked system”50 
(Horowitz 1985) can be conducive to the building of mobilizational capacity for the 
minority, because elites and masses bear similar socio-economic profiles. When the 
minority-majority cleavage almost overlaps with class-based cleavage but with minority 
elites more integrated socio-economically, as illustrated in Pattern II of the figure below, 
high but not total segregation of the minority can hamper its more-integrated elites to 
mobilize the segregated masses. When the minority-majority cleavage crosscuts with 
class-based cleavages, as illustrated in Pattern III of the figure below, considerably high 
level of integration for the minority can be conducive to building minority elites’ 
mobilizational capacity because a significantly large portion of the minority population 
bears similar socio-economic profiles. 
 
Figure 2.1. Ethnically-based cleavages versus class-based cleavages 
                                                          
50 Structure in which inter-ethnic relations are hierarchical, coinciding largely with social classes and 








Notwithstanding, the groupness as endogenous to group-making processes approach 
displays direct relevancy to explaining differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-
regions, since features of inter-ethnic boundaries or dimensions of inter-ethnic integration 
not only vary empirically across different ethno-regions in China and Russia but are also 
conceptual categories able to capture processually and relationally, for a specific time 
frame, patterns of contested titular-majority relations which contextualize elite-level 
interactions leading to an ethno-region’s autonomy outcome. That said, Wimmer’s 
comparative analytic for the study of ethnic boundary-makings, though pointing to the 
role of elite agency both in deploying modes and means of boundary-makings as well as 





provide theorization about how features of inter-ethnic boundaries could also shape elite 
agency. This is the very question centrally addressed in my analytical framework.  
 
Groupness as endogenous to elite agency 
This sub-approach is based upon the assumption that groupness is first and foremost 
molded by elite agency. Group consciousness is attributed to the manipulation of certain 
elites against rival elites. In this sense, an instrumental conception of groupness is central 
to this sub-approach, and the explained phenomena ranges from ethnic conflicts (Gagnon 
2004), to endogenous institutional changes (Aktürk 2011), to nation-building policies 
(Mylonas 2012). 
V.P. Gagnon’s explanation of violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia is representative 
of the epiphenomenal conception of ethnic conflicts. He critiques the prevalent discourse 
of “ethnic conflicts” as a misnomer for what is fundamentally about power struggles 
among political elites. Gagnon argues that not ethnic heterogeneity but rather elite 
strategies constitute the source of violence (2004). Concretely, certain incumbent elites 
who are confronted with non-ethnic cleavages, political pluralism, and popular 
mobilization respond by inflicting violence on diverse, plural communities with the goal 
of demobilizing key parts of the population by trying to impose political homogeneity on 
heterogeneous social spaces (7). These elites try to protect the status quo and to 
demobilize the population whom challenger elites try to mobilize to achieve fundamental 
changes in the political and economic power structure. Towards that end, status quo elites 
shift the focus of political discourse away from issues around which challengers are 





of structural power does matter, as Gagnon notes. The existing political and economic 
power structures tend to privilege those elites who have access to resources of power in 
their constructing of environments that severely limit individuals’ free expression of self-
perceived interests. Such elites also play key roles in the constructing of images that 
affect how individuals perceive their interests and justificatory discourse that apparently 
aligns politics and elite behavior with the putative interests of the masses (25). 
Gagnon prompts us to rethink the nature of ethnic conflicts. He admonishes that the 
conflict described, explained, and justified in ethnic terms does not mean that the conflict 
is really about ethnicity. He invites scholars to problematize the discourse of ethnic 
conflict and the concepts of groupness and solidarity (12). Delving into the political 
psychology of violence, Gagnon argues that incumbent elites resort to violence to create 
an image of “solidarity” based on fear and threats from perceived differences rather than 
on senses of commonality (27-28) to preclude alternative conceptualizations of 
communities (28). 
Elite agency is also emphasized in Şener Aktürk’s framework explaining why ethnicity 
regimes change (2011). He argues that “counter-elites” who are linked with and 
representative of those constituencies with ethnically-specific grievances (133) against 
the existing ethnicity regime are the major actors tinkering with and pushing for changes 
of the existing ethnicity regime. Concretely, counter-elites develop and advocate for new 
discourse, which is a comprehensive new framing of the link between ethnic categories 
and the national identity that provides justification for specific changes in ethnicity 
regimes (134). In the meantime, counter-elites try to attain hegemonic majority, which 





discourse, and hegemonic majority constitute three of the separately necessary but jointly 
sufficient conditions for change in the ethnicity regime. Briefly put, if “counter-elites” 
representing constituencies with ethnically specific grievances assume power while 
equipped with a “new discourse” on ethnicity and nationality and garner a “hegemonic 
majority,” they may become able to change the existing ethnicity regime (117). 
Harris Mylonas, for his part, builds an explanatory framework to explain the varying 
nation-building policies towards non-core groups across nation-states (2012). The “ruling 
political elites”51 of such nation-states, or rather, the “host-states”, perceive certain 
aggregations of individuals within the border of the state as “non-core”52 groups. These 
ruling elites also perceive certain external powers as cultivating relations with those non-
core groups (5). Predicated upon the foregoing assumptions, Mylonas argues that external 
involvement, whether clandestine, covert, or overt, drives not only the mobilization and 
politicization of non-core group’s identity, but also the ruling elites’ perception of such 
groups and the state’s nation-building policies towards them (5). 
Three types of nation-building policies constitute the repertoire for the ruling elites, i.e. 
assimilationist policies, accommodations, and exclusionary policies. Assimilationist 
policies presuppose “core group53 culture” as superior to non-core group’s culture and 
encompass educational, cultural, occupational, matrimonial, demographic, and other state 
policies aimed at the adoption of the “core group culture” by the targeted non-core group, 
sometimes under the guise of an impartial law (21-22). Accommodations refers to the 
scenarios where formal “minority” status is granted, and cultural “differences” of a non-
                                                          







core group are more or less respected, with institutions regulating or even perpetuating 
differences put in place (22). Exclusionary policies usually aim at the physical removal of 
a non-core group from the host state’s territory and can take the forms of population 
exchange, deportation, internal displacement, segregation, etc. (22-23).  
The type of nation-building policies towards a specific non-core group hinges upon the 
ruling elites’ perceived characteristics of both their own state and the external power 
behind the non-core group. When the host state is revisionist54 and perceives the relevant 
external power as enemy, it will adopt exclusionary policies towards the non-core group 
(37). When the host state is pro-status quo55 and perceives the relevant external power as 
enemy, then it will adopt assimilationist policies towards the non-core group (37). When 
the relevant external power is perceived as an ally by the host state, then it will adopt 
accommodations towards the non-core group (37). When there is no external power 
perceived to be behind a non-core group, then the host-state will try to assimilate the non-
core group (37). 
Mylonas’ focus upon ruling elites’ perception of non-core groups and external powers 
displays limited applicability to explaining differing autonomy outcomes, even if the 
“host state’s perception of non-core groups in relation to external powers” framework 
(2012) does furnish some theorizations about the origins of ethnic territorially-based 
autonomy arrangements, which approximate the nation-building policies of 
                                                          
54 The state’s foreign policy goals derive from previously lost territories and/or increasing power relative 
to competing states and are to challenge the international status quo (37). 
55 The state’s foreign policy goals derive from previously gained territories and/or decreasing power 





“accommodation.” Nevertheless, for states claiming to be multi-ethnic56, sometimes it 
can be tricky to draw a clear-cut boundary between a core group and non-core groups (7), 
since elites governing the state (23) can be drawn from both the ethnic majority and 
ethnic minorities. Moreover, even assuming that Mylonas’ framework is applicable to 
multi-ethnic states, usually the ruling elites’ policies towards minorities exhibit combined 
elements of accommodation, assimilationist, and exclusionary types. In some cases, even 
without identifiable external power, the ruling elites will still adopt formal 
accommodations57 towards certain minorities at certain junctures, contingent largely upon 
domestic elite-level inter-ethnic dynamics. Last but not least, the units of analysis of 
Mylonas’ study are state-and-non-core-group pairs rather than ethno-regions. 
To sum up, the groupness as endogenous to elite agency approach has the merit of 
highlighting elite agency. With regard to explaining differing autonomy outcomes, titular 
elites are the key agents who put formally promulgated autonomy into practice. Differing 
autonomy outcomes derive by definition from varying titular elites’ capacity across 
ethno-regions. However, such agency-based explanations do not adequately address the 
question as regards the source of elite capacity, for instance, as regards how such 
structural conditions as ethnic institutions or ethnic boundary-makings may shape the 
building of elite capacity to exercise autonomy. For instance, Gagnon and Aktürk’s 
frameworks downplay structural factors either by not addressing why incumbent elites 
like Slobodan Milošević chose to play the “ethnic” cards, or why ethnically-based 
                                                          
56 In fact, Harris Mylonas leaves outside the scope conditions of his cases multi-ethnic states, which, as he 
asserts, are by definition “not driven by a homogenizing imperative” (2012, 7) and for whom 
“accommodation rather than assimilation is the default option” (7). 
57 For instance, the establishing of Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic for ethnic Yakuts in the 
USSR; the official recognition of Manchu as an ethnic category and designation of a number of 





categorizations were so salient in the former Yugoslavia, or by not addressing the sources 
of grievances towards the existing ethnicity regimes. Meanwhile, Mylonas’ framework 
relegates the ontological importance of minority elites’ agency to merely a function of 
external manipulations. Furthermore, to discuss implemented autonomy outcomes in 
Xinjiang and Tatarstan, it can be difficult to accurately determine who are the external 
powers.  
 
GROUPNESS AS ENDOGENOUS ITERATIVELY TO STRUCTURE 
AND AGENCY 
The analytical framework I propose in the Introduction is tailored to explaining the 
differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-regions. While appropriating and reframing 
elements from both the groupness as endogenous to historically-determined structure 
approach and the groupness as endogenous to elite agency approach, this framework 
follows what I call groupness as endogenous iteratively to structure and agency 
approach. The framework’s conception of groupness is endogenous to structure in the 
sense that groupness is produced and reproduced in patterns of inter-ethnic boundary-
makings, while its conception of groupness is endogenous also to agency in the sense that 
patterns of inter-ethnic boundary-makings and titular elites’ agency shape each other 
iteratively, creating somehow self-reinforcing cycles.  
In one type of such cycles, greater inter-ethnic integration and consolidated titular elite 
bargaining capacity reinforce each other, leading to higher level of autonomy outcome 





differentiation and limited titular elite bargaining capacity reinforce each other, leading to 
lower level of autonomy outcome for the ethno-region. However, my analytical 
framework has a focus upon how inter-ethnic boundary-makings shape elite agency 
rather than the other way, since the explanatory goal is to trace the process of differing 
patterns of inter-ethnic boundary-makings leading to differing autonomy outcomes by the 
intermediary of titular elites’ agency. 
 
Assumptions of the mechanism 
The logic of my analytical framework relies upon five hypotheses that will be tested to 
the autonomy-building experiences of Xinjiang and Tatarstan in Chapters 4 and 5. These 
hypotheses delineate how differing patterns of inter-ethnic boundary-makings can lead to 
differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-regions by tracing the processes flowing from 
dimensions of inter-ethnic boundary-makings through dimensions of titular elites’ 
bargaining capacity to the implemented autonomy outcome of an ethno-region.  
Hypothesis I: Higher level of acculturation of the population of the titular category is a 
necessary condition for more collusive, less hierarchical types of relationships between 
the titular elites and the majority elites. This hypothesis connects inter-ethnic 
acculturation to elite-level inter-ethnic relations. If the population of the titular ethnic 
category is overall more culturally and linguistically assimilated with the population of 
the central state’s ethnic majority category, then such higher degree of acculturation can 
translate into titular elites’ more solid communication skills with the elites of the majority 
category at both the central and ethno-regional levels. Such communication skills, in turn, 





networks of political alliances as well as of more collusive elite-level inter-ethnic 
relationships.  
Hypothesis II: More solid social integration of an ethno-region’s titular population is a 
necessary condition for lower risk of secession and more positive image of the ethno-
region as perceived by the central state. This hypothesis connects inter-ethnic social 
integration to the central-state’s perception of the titular population and the ethno-region. 
If the population of the titular ethnic category is overall more socially integrated into the 
economy and community of the population of the central state’s ethnic majority category, 
or rather, if the titular population exhibits similar patterns of socio-economic profiles to 
those of the majority population, then that is conducive to prompting the central state to 
perceive the titular population as more structurally embedded in the mainstream society 
and thus more incentivized to stay in the host state than to seek secession from it. 
Inversely, lower degree of social integration plus higher degree of ethnic consciousness 
can drastically increase the central state’s paranoia about its control over the ethno-region 
and its titular population.  
Hypothesis III: Higher level of social integration and robust self-identification as 
ethnically distinct are separately necessary while jointly sufficient for higher level of 
intra-ethnic cohesion within the titular population and titular elites’ capacity to mobilize 
the titular populace. This hypothesis connects inter-ethnic social integration, combined 
with psychological identification, to intra-ethnic cleavage structure. On one hand, 
sustained and sufficient level of ethnic consciousness among individuals of the titular 
ethnic category is indispensable for these individuals to relate to others and to act socio-





ethnic category can significantly blur the boundary between the titular and majority 
populations, which can in turn render the formally designated autonomy increasingly 
dissociated with its intended “subjects” and meaningless. On the other hand, higher 
degree of social integration can translate into internally less differentiated, less polarized 
socio-economic/cultural cleavage structure of the titular population, leading to greater 
upward social mobility encouraging the masses to identify with or to become themselves 
elites. This can in turn promote intra-ethnic cohesion and titular elites’ mobilizing 
capacity. Under certain circumstances, greater social integration can even be conducive 
to the titular elites’ capacity to reach out to members of the central state’s ethnic majority 
residing in the ethno-region. 
In order for there to be heightened intra-ethnic cohesion within the titular population and 
titular elites’ mobilizational capacity, there need to be both heightened inter-ethnic social 
integration and robust ethnic consciousness among individuals of the titular ethnic 
category simultaneously. In other words, a balance between inter-ethnic integration and 
inter-ethnic differentiation needs to be struck to achieve higher titular intra-ethnic 
cohesion. When there is a lack of integration-distinction balance, titular intra-ethnic 
cohesion may likely be low if there is heightened inter-ethnic social integration without 
robust ethnic consciousness, or if there is low inter-ethnic social integration despite 
robust ethnic consciousness, or if both inter-ethnic social integration and titular ethnic 
consciousness are low. 
Hypothesis IV: Titular elites’ more solid relationships with the central-state elites, 
overall positive image of the ethno-region in the eyes of the central state, and relatively 





heightened representation of the titular elites in the ethno-regional state and its most 
powerful positions. This hypothesis connects the first three dimensions of titular elites’ 
bargaining capacity to the fourth dimension. The three dimensions are elite-level inter-
ethnic relations, central-state’s perception of the titular group, and inter-ethnic cleavage 
structure, whereas the fourth dimension is titular elites’ representation in the ethno-
regional state and its most powerful positions. The first three are jointly sufficient for the 
fourth. If the titular elites have established more collusive, more broadened ties to the 
majority elites at both the central and the ethno-regional levels, if the central state, for its 
part, places augmented trust in the titular elites, and if the titular group is internally more 
close-knit and can bear more potential impact upon the mainstream society in the event of 
mobilizations, then the titular elites will be perceived more as “important allies” of the 
central state than as “fungible agents,” wield more bargaining power vis-à-vis the central 
state and be featured more securely in the ethno-regional state organs.  
Hypothesis V: Proportionate representation of titular elites in the ethno-regional state is 
a sine qua non for more conspicuously-felt autonomy outcome for an ethno-region. 
Proportionate titular control of the ethno-regional state is a defining attribute of ethnic 
territorially-based autonomy, a necessary condition for autonomy implementation, and a 
property unique to autonomy as implemented. The higher such representation, the more 
capable an ethno-region is to practice its stipulated autonomy, since sufficient titular 
representation can provide a check on central state’s control that exceeds the limit of its 
stipulated sphere of responsibilities. Admittedly, adequate titular representation alone is 
not sufficient for higher degree of autonomy outcome, as it has to be combined with 





agency can be more contingent, for example, upon various institutional constraints or 
opportunities. In other words, although sufficient titular representation in the ethno-
regional state organs and their powerful positions cannot be equated with autonomy as 
implemented outcome, it is a prerequisite and a starting point for titular elites’ agency to 
be effective in the exercising of formally promulgated autonomy. 
 
Some caveats 
Caveat I   The two condition variables of my framework, formal arrangements of center-
periphery relations and party-state relations, are intended to represent institutional 
constraints or opportunities rather than to be used as explanatory variables framing the 
causal phenomena (Van Evera 1997, 10). When formal institution arrangements tend to 
limit the range of officially permissible behaviors (Tsai 2007, 38), they can constitute 
constraints. On the other hand, formal institutional contexts with overlapping 
jurisdictions can provide opportunities for actors to adjust discrete portions of formal 
institutions (38). Notably, since center-periphery relations and party-state relations are 
national-level rather than subnational-level institutional arrangements, they vary across 
countries but not within a country across different ethno-regions. Therefore, such 
institutional differences are suitable to account for, often in conjunction with other 
variables, differences in terms of autonomy outcome between an ethno-region in one 
country and an ethno-region in another, if the autonomy outcomes of the two ethno-
regions differ. Nonetheless, such institutional differences may not satisfactorily serve as 
explanatory tools for the differing autonomy outcomes across ethno-regions within the 





Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia in China. Moreover, such institutional constraints and 
opportunities may themselves be sculpted by elite-level compromises at certain historical 
junctures, for instance, in the context of Russia and Tatarstan interactively molding 
ethno-federal institutions in the early 1990s. 
Caveat II   The major explanatory variable, inter-ethnic boundary-makings, is intended to 
capture group-level, ethno-regional-level structural characteristics rather than individual-
level ones. In other words, even if the titular population is overall less integrated, there 
can still be segments of the population more integrated; even if the titular population is 
overall highly integrated, there can still be segments of the population less integrated, 
since there can be multiple concurrent types of boundary-making strategies deployed 
within a group. Over time, as individuals shift their boundary-making strategies and as 
certain strategies replace other ones as more predominant, it is possible for there to be 
improved integration or improved elite-level relationship for previously less integrated 
populations. In this sense, for the population of the titular ethnic category of an ethno-
region, level of integration can change. So can the titular elites’ bargaining capacity and 
the ethno-region’s autonomy outcome. Nonetheless, the dissertation largely leaves out of 
its purview the addressing of such changes, considering that it is focused upon synchronic 
cross-case variations rather than diachronic within-case variations.  
Caveat III   The possibility of the bargaining capacity of the titular elites of certain ethno-
regions impacting that of the titular elites of other ethno-regions under one central-state 
cannot be ruled out: pre-existing patterns of certain titular elites wielding more 
bargaining capacity vis-à-vis the central state than others can somehow exercise 





disadvantaged population becomes more integrated into the mainstream society. 
Nonetheless, since this possibility is not an issue for the comparison of Xinjiang in China 
and Tatarstan in Russia, it will only be cursorily revisited in the conclusion. 
 
Added value of the analytical framework 
Compared to the existing approaches to the study of ethnic politics, my analytical 
framework may possess greater explanatory potential in terms of explaining differing 
autonomy outcomes across ethno-regions for the following considerations. 
First, my analytical framework has the potential of describing and explaining ethnic 
territorially-based autonomy as a sui generis type of ethnic politics. It can achieve that by 
uncovering the process of how ethno-regions reach differing implemented autonomy 
outcomes. Meanwhile, it also explores how it can be possible to strike not only the 
balance between entrenched ethnic identities and a multi-ethnic state’s territorial integrity 
but also the balance between two mutually competing but not necessarily incompatible 
tendencies, one towards inter-ethnic differentiation and the other towards inter-ethnic 
integration. 
Second, the conceptual framework proposed and applied in Chapters 3 and 6 to measure 
and to compare autonomy as implemented outcome allows for comprehensive analysis of 
such outcomes. Using normative institutions as baselines, it sheds light upon the 
understanding that what is practiced may not exactly coincide with what is promulgated. 





based autonomy in two modes, autonomy as normative institution and autonomy as 
implemented outcome. 
Third, my analytical framework follows an eclectic approach (Mahoney and Snyder 
1999, 21) by combining domestic-structural factors58, elite-level agential factors59 (9-10), 
and meso-level (17) institutional factors. On one hand, with regard to domestic-structural 
factors, my analytical framework does not take for granted and assume groupness. 
Instead, it conceptualizes ethnicity and inter-ethnic cleavages both processually and 
relationally, acknowledging that inter-ethnic relations are not by nature conflictual but 
rather are contested and multifaceted. On the other hand, by highlighting the agency of 
elites, it challenges the assumption that “there is not much elites can do” while 
contextualizing how domestic-structural factors and meso-level institutional factors may 
impact elite-level agential factors. In this regard, agency of both elites and masses is 
treated as over-socialized in inter-ethnic boundary-makings, which entails long-term, 
impersonal processes, limited maneuverability, as well as identity and interests 
constituted (5-6) by such boundary-makings. Agency of elites is treated as under-
socialized in terms of yielding actually exercised autonomy outcomes in that ongoing 
interactions between purposeful actors shape the outcome (5-6). In the meantime, meso-
level institutional factors can be both constraining and generative (6). 
Fourth, my argument that higher level of social integration for the titular population 
can lead to greater autonomy outcome for the ethno-region by boosting titular 
elites’ bargaining capacity is abducted from the application of my analytical framework 
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to a controlled comparison in Chapters 4 and 5 of Xinjiang and Tatarstan whose 
implemented autonomy outcomes are strikingly contrasted. The argument shows its 
potential of traveling to more ethno-regions in China and Russia in Chapter 6, where it 
has been able to predict the levels of implemented autonomy outcome for Inner Mongolia 
and Tibet of China as well as for Bashkortostan and Yakutia of Russia on the basis of the 
level of social integration for the titular populations of these ethno-regions. Accordingly, 
although no controlled comparisons or process tracings are conducted of these shadow 
cases, my analytical framework demonstrates its potential of contributing to a broader 
understanding of how to build the capacity to exercise ethnic territorially-based 






3. AUTONOMY AS PRESCRIPTIVE INSTITUTION 
AND AS IMPLEMENTED OUTCOME IN CHINA 
AND RUSSIA 
 
This chapter establishes differing autonomy outcomes across Xinjiang and Tatarstan as 
observable facts. It begins with chronologically reviewing the respective historical 
trajectories of institutionalized ethnicity in Russia and China, followed by a comparison 
of ethnic territorially-based autonomy as prescriptive institution in China and Russia. The 
chapter culminates with introducing a conceptual framework with which to measure and 
to compare, based upon collected data, the differing degrees of actually-exercised 
autonomy of Xinjiang and Tatarstan in relation to the legally binding covenants that 
establish normative autonomy for the ethno-regions. Within this conceptual framework, 
dimensions of an ethno-region’s implemented autonomy outcome for a specific time 
frame are scored, weighted and aggregated to create a score of compliance for that ethno-
region. I argue that level of implemented autonomy outcome has been remarkably higher 






BRIEF HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONALIZED ETHNICITY IN CHINA 
AND RUSSIA 
China resembles the Soviet Union in terms of the contours of category-defining and 
category-managing ethnic institutions60, while post-Soviet Russia largely inherited the 
legacies of the Soviet Union. Why did both Bolsheviks and the Chinese Communist Party 
(hereafter CCP) opt for using the ethnic mode of categorization? It would be more helpful 
to investigate the knowledge structure61 that foregrounds and constrains the ethnic mode 
of categorizing than to construct a rational-choice model. Such a knowledge structure 
may have rested on two foundations, a theoretical one and an empirical one.  
The theoretical foundation consists of some panoramic assumptions about human history. 
These assumptions combine elements62 of Marxist-Leninist (Kaup 2000, 53) and 
Herderian63 thoughts and tend to hold that human beings, apparently composed of 
culturally-bounded “ethnic groups” or “nations”, are teleologically bound for a common 
destination of communism. “Nations” are both a product and a reflection of bourgeois 
production relations (63). They would eventually merge with one another and gradually 
lose their prominence, as human beings collectively moved into socialist and communist 
modes of productions (63). However, both Bolsheviks and the CCP were aware that not 
all populations were on a par with one another in terms of modes of production. In the 
                                                          
60 Conceptualized in the subsection “State and institutionalized ethnicity” of Chapter 2. 
61 Based upon Alexander Wendt’s conceptualization of “social structure of shared knowledge” (1995), I 
define “knowledge structure” as a system of shared ideas about mutually intertwined assumptions, 
concepts, theories, knowledge of institutions that represent the material and social world. Relevant 
actors’ identities and interests are socially constructed in these shared ideas.  
62 Corresponding to what Terry Martin summarizes as the Marxist, modernization, and colonial premises 
(2001, 4-8). 





eyes of Bolsheviks, CCP, and their ethnographers, some populations were “nations” 
(Russian: natsiya; Chinese: minzu), which, as Francine Hirsch summarizes, refers to  
a state-bearing people with its own territorial region and “other state attributes,” among 
them common language, common economic life, and common culture, that it had “attained 
over the course of its entire process of development.” (2005, 266-267) 
Populations not as fully-fledged as nations were “nationalities” (Russian: natsional’nost’; 
Chinese: minzu jituan, Mullaney 2011, 82-83) among whom national consciousness has 
been forming. But such populations have nevertheless not yet attained other essential 
attributes of a “nation” such as common land, common language, common economic life, 
and common culture (267). Even less fledged were the “tribal federations” (Russian: 
narodnost’; Chinese: buzu, Mullaney 2011, 82), which connotes populations with 
ethnically, culturally-based peculiarities, irrespective of whether group consciousness has 
been forming or not (267). As economy develops and as new modes of production 
prevail, it was assumed that tribal federations would amalgamate into nationalities, which 
would in turn merge into nations (267). The capitalist mode of production is considered 
the necessary stage prior to the stage of socialism, and at the stage of capitalism, 
populations are predicted to start merging into nations under nation-states. Considering 
that, both Bolsheviks and CCP tended to believe that, to proactively accelerate the 
process towards socialist and communist modes of production, populations must be 
consciously reorganized ethnically into nationalities or nations, whose proletarians would 
then merge (Russian: sliyaniye, Dreyer 1976, 55) into even bigger nations towards the 





The empirical foundation of the knowledge structure consists of certain heuristic 
understandings about the populations inhabiting the territories Bolsheviks and CCP 
sought to control. Such populations were perceived as diverse ethnically, linguistically, 
and culturally with competing understandings of who they were and what they wanted. 
How to effectively manage the perceived diversity and to transform diversity into support 
of the new regimes in their attempts to establish political power as well as in their 
transformative agendas? Ethnic categories were favored, more or less because they are 
versatilely able to simultaneously capture linguistic differences, to capture perceptions of 
mutually separate but also intertwined historical trajectories, as well as to accommodate 
already-forming ethno-national consciousness. Accordingly, an important type of criteria 
upon which ethnic categorizations were reliant is linguistic differences or similarities. 
Ethnic institutions were established to stabilize perceptions about the ethnic composition 
of the multi-ethnic populations as well as to promote state-sponsored ethnographic 
knowledge about the multi-ethnic populations by means of monopolizing on what 
knowledge and symbols should be created, propagated, and transmitted within the 
territory of the respective multi-ethnic states.  
Both Bolsheviks and CCP position themselves as super-ethnic parties with evolutionary 
understandings of “nations” and super-ethnic visions about the populations they seek to 
transform. Both keenly utilized already-forming spontaneous ethno-national 
consciousness in their revolutionary causes against respective prior regimes, at times 
even by eliciting the discourse of self-determination. For Bolsheviks, the prior regime 
was the Imperial Russia, while for the CCP, the prior regime was the Republic of China, 





their state-building processes, both Bolsheviks and CCP accommodated pre-existing 
ethno-national consciousness by enlisting support of ethnically-based categorizations 
both from intellectuals (“ethnographers”, Hirsch 2005, or “ethnologists”, Mullaney 2011) 
and ethno-nationally-minded elites. Such categorizations formally recognized and 
promoted some pre-existing tendencies in ethnic boundary making processes towards 
integration or differentiation while downplaying others. Operationally, by requiring 
individual citizens to register only one ethnic category on their governmentally-issued 
identification paper, ethnically-based categorizations had the effect of formally setting up 
inter-ethnic boundaries not only at the population level but also at the individual level.  
Meanwhile, a flavor of “statehood” was achieved for certain ethno-nationally-minded 
local elites by means of establishing ethnic territorially-based autonomous entities 
designated for certain ethnic categories such that territorially-based self-determination be 
“satisfied” to some extent. Indigenization of party cadres was institutionalized to train 
elites of ethnic minority categories intended to be fluent in state ideologies and policies 
while capable of propagating such ideologies and policies to their “co-ethnics” in 
“titular” languages and scripts (Kaup 2000, 65). Based upon the teleological assumption 
that all populations will merge into nations in their transitions from pre-capitalist via 
capitalist towards socialist modes of productions, both Bolsheviks and CCP, actively and 
interactively with elites of ethnic minority categories, promoted ethno-national categories 
and consciousness of such categories among the populations. However, as new category-
defining and category-managing institutions became consolidated, both Bolsheviks and 
CCP became more concerned with maintaining state-sponsored ethnic boundaries as well 





Although it was usually ethnic minority elites’ preferred vision that territories of ethno-
regions be drawn in such a way that the titular ethnic category make up the majority of 
the population, the pre-existing demographic patterns usually featured ethnically, 
linguistically, and culturally heterogeneous populations in numerous localities. By dint of 
ethnic categorizations, such heterogeneity constantly translates into several officially 
recognized ethnic categories concentrated in the same ethno-region. With regard to many 
ethno-regions, Bolsheviks and CCP displayed explicit vision of integrating the ethno-
regional economy into the national economy. Demographic heterogeneity combined with 
integrationist vision translated into the reality that various ethno-regions are demarcated 
either with a titular-category majority/plurality64, or a majority-category 
majority/plurality65, or a third-category majority/plurality66, or multiple titular 
categories67. 
 















State constitutionally defined as 






                                                          
64 For instance, Tibet/Xizang Autonomous Region in China (majority ethnic Tibetans) and Republic of Tıva 
in Russia (majority ethnic Tuvans). 
65 For instance, Republic of Bashkortostan in Russia (plurality ethnic Russians) and Nei Mongol 
Autonomous Region in China (majority ethnic Han). 
66 For instance, Kyzylsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture of China (majority ethnic Uyghurs). 
67 For instance, Republic of Dagestan of Russia (Avar, Lezgin, Dargin, Kumyk, Lak, etc. as co-titular) and 
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Citizenship restricted to one 
ethnic category or not 
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Immigration prioritizing certain 
















Ethnicity indicated on 
governmentally-issued 
identification paper or not 
 
Yes No 
Ethnic territorially based 
autonomy designated for certain 
ethnic minorities or not 
 
Yes Yes 
Ethno-federalism or not 
 
No Yes 
Massive recruitment and 
trainings of ethnic-minority 
cadres or not 
 
Yes Yes  
(more at the ethno-
regional level) 
 
More than one language 
accorded with official status at 
the subnational level or not 
 
Yes Yes 
State-sponsored institutions for 
the production and reproduction 
of ethnically-specific knowledge 
and symbols or not 
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Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic under the Soviet Union 
1) Category-defining institutions 
After the October Revolution, Bolsheviks made it one of their major missions to 
fundamentally change the situation of those so-called “non-Russian” (Russian: nerusskie) 
populations as well as to resolve the “nationality question” (Russian: natsional’nyi 
vopros) within the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (hereafter 
RSFSR)68. Several principles with regard to how the Bolshevik state promised to conduct 
nationalities-related policies was laid in the 1917 Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples 
of Russia: equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia, their right to self-
determination (Russian: pravo na samoopredeleniye) and even to secession (Russian: 
otdeleniye), abolition of ethnically-based or ethno-religiously based restrictions and 
privileges, and the free development of ethnic minorities (Russian: svobodnoe razvitiye 
natsional’nykh men’shinstv)69.   
In the 1918 constitution of the RSFSR, an incipient ethno-federal principle was 
promulgated, defining RSFSR as a federation of nationality-based soviet republics 
                                                          
68 Oleg I. Chistyakov, “The making of the USSR Constitution,” [in Russian] 
http://constitution.garant.ru/science-work/modern/3988990/chapter/1/#block_100 (accessed July 31, 
2017). RSFSR was subsequently reorganized as USSR. 
69 Yosif Dzhugashvili-Stalin and Vladimir Ul’yanov, Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia [in 





(Russian: sovietskaya natsional’naya respublika) in Article 270. Moreover, in Article 22, 
the RSFSR recognizes equal rights of its citizens irrespective of their racial or ethnic 
affiliations while declaring as unconstitutional the establishing of privileges on the basis 
of race or ethnicity, the oppression of ethnic minorities, and the restriction of their equal 
rights71. Generally speaking, at the beginning of their state-building ventures, despite that 
the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) was itself unitarily organized, Bolsheviks’ 
vision of the Soviet state was moving towards allowing ethnic minorities self-
determination as well as towards building more sophisticated structure of the state 
(Russian: uslozhneniye formy gosudarstvennogo edinstva)72 to accommodate the 
culturally and ethnically heterogenous character of the RSFSR. Then who should be 
counted as the non-Russian populations? Who were entitled to self-determination? 
The “nationality question” confronting the Bolsheviks pertains to how to build socialism 
in a geographically vast, multi-ethnic landscape populated by populations, whether 
settled or nomadic, with a multitude of pre-existing linguistic, confessional, and ethnic 
affiliations (Hirsch 2005, 5), how to reconcile Bolsheviks’ anti-imperialist ideology with 
the necessity to maintain the territory of the former Imperial Russia (5) as well as how to 
secure involvement in the socialist experiments of the culturally heterogeneous 
populations (5). In response, Bolsheviks started enlisting support from former imperial 
experts such as ethnographers, economists, and ethnic non-Russian elites (5). Based upon 
                                                          
70 Constitution of the RSFSR (adopted by All-Russia Congress of Soviets on June 10, 1918) [in Russian], 
available at http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-rsfsr/1918/chapter/1/ (accessed July 31, 2017). 
71 Constitution of the RSFSR (adopted by All-Russia Congress of Soviets on June 10, 1918) [in Russian], 
available at http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-rsfsr/1918/chapter/5/#block_2100 (accessed July 
31, 2017). 
72 Oleg I. Chistyakov, “The making of the USSR Constitution,” [in Russian] 






the progressive tenet that all peoples can evolve and thrive and upon the conviction that it 
is possible to engineer history and to turn theories into reality, Bolsheviks found it 
necessary to produce and to reproduce knowledge about the cultural heterogeneity of the 
populations now under their control (6-7).   
With the establishment of Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the 
Population of Russia (Russian: komissiya po izucheniyu plemennogo sostava naseleniya 
Rossii) in 1917 (7), the RSFSR embarked on its ventures of ethnically categorizing the 
populations. In that regard, the Bolsheviks promoted state-sponsored evolutionism while 
accommodating and manipulating ethno-national consciousness that had already been 
forming. State-sponsored evolutionism holds that the Soviet state was supposed to 
accelerate the social evolution of populations and to engineer formations of 
“nationalities” (Russian: natsional’nost’) in areas where clan and tribally-based identities 
prevailed and where local people seemed to lack national consciousness. In that regard, 
ethnographers, in cooperation with ethnic non-Russian elites and with the state, 
demarcated inter-ethnic boundaries as well as official languages, historical narratives, and 
so forth for each ethnic category, while amalgamating clans and tribes first into “tribal 
federations” (Russian: narodnost’), then into “nationalities” (8), then into putatively 
socio-economically more developed “nations” (Russian: natsiya) (9). Meanwhile, 
spontaneous group-making and nation-building attempts among ethnic non-Russian elites 
were rarely tolerated, usually denounced as “bourgeois nationalism”, and repressed (9-
10).  
In the processes of ethnic categorizations, two types of knowledge were created, i.e. 





professional ethnographers, anthropologists, geographers, and other experts collected and 
compiled to facilitate governmental work (10). In producing such knowledge, a new 
discipline called etnografia emerged under the Soviet authority, encompassing 
geography, archaeology, physical anthropology, and linguistics (10). Local knowledge 
refers to what local elites submitted to the central-state about the geography and 
demography of their specific localities (10). Both ethnographic experts and local elites 
helped the Soviet state generate official ethnic categories (11). The Soviet state then used 
ethnographic knowledge to justify its political decisions (11). More specifically, 
ethnographers were usually charged with explaining politically-motivated decisions in 
putatively “scientific” terms, with assisting in subordinating the population to state 
authority, and with establishing legitimacy for official schemes of ethnic categorizations 
(308). 
Notably, USSR’s ethnic categorizations care more about various populations’ 
“consciousness” (307) than about their phenotypical traits. Accordingly, USSR’s list of 
officially recognized ethnic categories experienced revisions throughout the Soviet period 
(307). On the 1927 list, a total of 172 categories were recognized as tribal federations, or 
narodnost’ (134). These narodnost’ then were merged into 62 natsional’nost’ and 30 
natsional’nyi men’shinstvo, as recognized in the 1939 USSR census (333-335) under 
Stalin. In the 1959 USSR census, 109 categories including 78 natsional’nost’ and 31 
narodnost’ were recognized, whereon certain categories removed from the 1939 census 
were placed back (320). Nevertheless, the number of categories in the 1959 census was 
not as high as that in the 1927 census, which certain ethnographers attributed to 





including 73 natsional’nost’ and 31 narodnost’ were recognized (322). The number 
dropped further to 101 categories including 68 natsional’nost’ and 33 narodnost’ in the 
1979 census (322). During the period of glasnost’ and perestroika, the discourse about 
self-determination gained popularity again, and the number of ethnic categories rose back 
to 128 including 102 natsional’nost’ and 26 narodnost’ in the 1989 USSR census (323-
324).   
Throughout the Soviet era, citizenship was not restricted to one ethnic category, and 
immigration policies did not prioritize specific ethnic categories. However, deprivation of 
citizenship was practiced, targeting specific ethnic categories, which culminated in 
NKVD’s73 preparation of lists of “enemy nations” or “unreliable peoples” accused of 
“anti-Soviet activities” during World War II (307) and in the mass deportation of ethnic 
Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachay, Kalmyks, 
Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Kurds, Meskhetian Turks, etc. NKVD wielded the authority to 
determine which categories will be added to or removed from such lists (307). 
Compared to Western practices, USSR did not reify racial categories either in censuses or 
on internal passports. In effect, USSR’s official conceptualization of “race” and ethnicity 
was among the most progressive of the time. To address the varying levels of 
modernization across the populations of the USSR, the Soviet state emphasizes the 
potential in all ethnic populations to develop into equal outcomes. To counter Nazi 
Germany’s assumptions that “race” and ethnicity overlap and that race has an impact 
upon “historical processes”, Soviet ethnographers clearly distinguished race from 
                                                          






ethnicity. They argued that peoples of one race could be members of different 
nationalities, that all nationalities were comprised of people of various racial origins, that 
“racial types” were rather “abstractions” extrapolated from the “variations of racial traits” 
found within nationalities (Hirsch 2005, 266). Moreover, the Soviet authority explicitly 
used the term “colonization” (Russian: kolonizatsiya), which can be understood as the 
reorganization of the territories and economies of the entire Soviet Union in accordance 
with a central-state plan to develop local productive forces in a coordinated manner (90). 
 
2) Category-managing institutions 
People’s Commissariat for Nationalities (Russian: Narodnyi Komissariat po Delam 
Natsional’nostei, or Narkomnats) was a self-standing, ministry-level state organ 
established by the Bolsheviks, overseeing the management of “nationality questions” 
within the territory of first the RSFSR and later the USSR between 1917 and 192374. 
Stalin chaired Narkomnats throughout this period (Martin 2001, 3). To supervise 
Bolsheviks’ relations towards the Muslim populations of the RSFSR, Central Muslim 
Commissariat75 (hereafter CMC, Russian: Tsentral’nyi Musul’manskii Komissariat) was 
created under Narkomnats. The first head of the CMC was an ethnic Tatar revolutionary, 
Mullanur Wakhitov. Another ethnic Tatar revolutionary, Mirsəyet Soltangaliev, was the 
second head of the CMC (Gizzatullin and Sharafutdinov 1998, 11-12). In 1920, CMC 
                                                          
74 Bashkir Encyclopedia, “People’s Commissariat for Nationalities,” [in Russian], http://башкирская-
энциклопедия.рф/index.php/2-statya/14820-narodnyj-komissariat-po-delam-natsionalnostej (accessed 
July 31, 2017). 
75 Bashkir Encyclopedia, “Central Muslim Commissariat,” [in Russian], http://башкирская-






was re-designated76 as the representative office of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (TASSR) in Moscow.  
Then at the 12th congress of the Bolsheviks in 1923, three interrelated policies towards 
ethnic non-Russians were formulated. A first of these policies is the “national-territorial 
principle,” which connotes creating ethnic territorially-based autonomous entities for 
ethnic minority categories within a federated system (Liber 1991, 16). A second policy 
entails creating separate communist parties for certain union republics (16). A third one is 
called korenizatsiya (indigenization), which pertains to elevating the formal status of non-
Russian languages and cultures, training and promoting ethnic non-Russian cadres into 
key positions of the party, the state, and trade unions, and reconciling the culturally more 
Russified urban areas with the culturally more non-Russian countryside (16). It was 
estimated that massive industrialization will foster proletariats for each ethnic population 
under the principle of “national in form, socialist in content” (17).  
On one hand, under the token of korenizatsiya, the Soviet state promoted the 
standardization of non-Russian ethnic languages, invested in anti-illiteracy campaigns, 
expanded the use of non-Russian languages in knowledge production and reproduction. 
These contributed to the forming of ethnic non-Russian intelligentsia and of epistemic 
communities that correspond to different ethnic languages (18-19). On the other hand, 
heightened level of urbanization strengthened ethno-national consciousness among ethnic 
non-Russians who migrated into cities. Some ethnic non-Russian cadres tended to 
interpret korenizatsiya in terms of emphasizing differences (21) and expanding non-






Russian cultural, linguistic space in cities, which was at odds with the central-state’s 
interpretation of korenizatsiya in terms of ethnic non-Russian cadres’ building cross-
ethnic, class-based consciousness by reaching out to ethnic non-Russian populations in 
the countryside (21). Among such ethnic non-Russian cadres, many were accused by 
Stalin of “national communism”. Eventually korenizatsiya was discontinued in the 1930s 
(Gorenburg 2003, 46), and a large number of ethnic minority cadres were purged, many 
executed.  
Nevertheless, certain institutional legacies of korenizatsiya survived the Great Purge and 
became pillars of the USSR’s ethnic institutions. Examples of such legacies include, but 
are not confined to, ethnic territorially-based autonomy, standardized ethnic languages 
and scripts, state-sponsored institutions for the production and reproduction of ethnically-
specific knowledge and symbols, and ethnically-based affirmation actions. In the post-
WWII years, training and promotion of ethnic minority cadres were restored and 
reinforced to the extent that such cadres became pivotal in center-periphery relations 
where ethnic, economic, and territorially-based cleavages coincide (Burg 1990, 24). 
Increasing numbers of minority elites achieved key posts in both ethno-regional-level and 
central-state apparatuses during Brezhnev’s term as general secretary (25). However, as 
various ethnic populations became more equalized in terms of education profiles and 
Russian-language proficiency, opinions against preferential treatments of ethnic minority 
cadres also emerged. For instance, the renowned Soviet ethnographer, Iulian Bromlei, 
was said to have suggested that ethnic identity should not be the basis of either privilege 





The designation of ethnic territorially-based autonomy under an ethno-federal framework 
for non-Russian ethnic categories started in the late 1910s, well prior to its being fully 
enshrined in the 1936 USSR Constitution. Four tiers of ethno-regions were established on 
a hierarchy (Gorenburg 2003, 31), including union republics (or soviet socialist republics, 
hereafter SSR), autonomous soviet socialist republics (hereafter ASSR), autonomous 
oblast’ (hereafter AOb), and autonomous okrug (hereafter AOk). Union republics were 
fully sovereign (31), and one of them, RSFSR, was designated for the ethnic majority 
category, ethnic Russians. ASSRs were partially sovereign and subordinate to SSRs (31), 
while AObs and AOks were not sovereign. ASSRs were provincial-level units, while 
AObs and AOks were usually administratively subordinate to provincial-level krai 
(“territories”). Each of the SSRs and ASSRs were allowed to enact its own constitution 
and to promulgate the language associated with its titular ethnic category as official 
alongside Russian. Nevertheless, regarding the relations between RSFSR and its 
constituent ASSRs, the legal codes of RSFSR could override ASSR-level legal codes in 
case of contradictions77. AObs and AOks had no authority to enact constitutions.  
The ethno-federal system of ethnic territorially-based autonomy became partially 
enshrined in the 1924 USSR constitution where the state organs of SSRs were concisely 
defined78. In the first section of that constitution, the USSR was defined as “voluntary” 
association of peoples of equal rights, and the right to freely secede from the union was 
                                                          
77 Constitution of the RSFSR on April 12, 1978 [in Russian], available at 
http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-rsfsr/1978/red_1978/5478721/chapter/8/#block_3800 
(accessed July 31, 2017). 
78 Constitution of the USSR (approved by the second Congress of Soviets of the USSR on January 31, 1924) 
[in Russian], available at http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-





guaranteed to each of its constituent SSRs79. It even stipulated that future polities taking 
the form of “Soviet Socialist Republic” were welcome to join USSR (Russian: dostup v 
Soyuz otkryt)80. According to that constitution, the SSRs of the USSR were the RSFSR, 
Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, 
Turkmen SSR, Uzbek SSR, and Tadzhik SSR81. In the 1936 USSR Constitution, the state 
organs of both SSRs (in Glava IV82 and VI83) and ASSRs (in Glava VII84) were 
demarcated. In the 1977 USSR Constitution, all the four tiers of ethno-regions were 
explicitly enshrined85.  
On May 27, 1920, the incumbent chair of the Council of the People’s Commissariats of 
the RSFSR, Vladimir Lenin, and the incumbent chair of the All-Russia Central Executive 
Committee, Mikhail Kalinin, signed into effect the decree on the founding of the Tatar 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Faizullin 2015, 34). TASSR was the second 
ASSR established under RSFSR, immediately after the founding of Bashkir ASSR 
(hereafter BASSR) in 1919 (Russian: malaya Bashkiria, 25). The original plan, 
advocated by such Bolsheviks as Mirsəyet Soltangaliev, was to create a Tatar-Bashkir co-
titular Republic covering parts of the Imperial Russia’s Ufa, Orenburg, Kazan, Perm, 
Vyatka, Simbir, and Samara provinces (21). However, the vision of one republic jointly 




82 Constitution of the USSR (approved by the order of the Extraordinary eighth Congress of Soviets of the 
USSR on December 5, 1936) [in Russian], available at http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-
rsfsr/1936/red_1936/3958676/chapter/4/#block_1400 (accessed July 31, 2017). 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Constitution of the USSR (adopted at the extraordinary seventh session of the ninth convocation of the 
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designated for two ethnic categories did not materialize, due to the disputes between the 
leaders of the Tatar and Bashkir ethno-national movements (21) and due to the reluctance 
of the supreme leadership of the RSFSR to create “huge ethnic republic” (Russian: 
bol’shaya natsional’naya respublika).  
The originally intended territory of TASSR was to include both cities of Kazan and Ufa 
(26) and a significant portion that later became part of BASSR. The Bolsheviks justified 
the assignment of the city of Ufa and its surrounding areas to BASSR in terms of 
rewarding ethnic Bashkir elites’ support of the revolutionary cause while facilitating the 
administrative and economic integration of the BASSR (29). The central leadership of the 
Bolsheviks also prepared official “data” of ethnic demography (29), in which the 
proportion of ethnic Tatars in Ufa and its vicinities was significantly reduced and the 
proportion of ethnic Bashkirs was significantly augmented (29-30). Eventually, Ufa was 
designated as the capital of BASSR, while Kazan was designated as the capital of 
TASSR. At the outset of TASSR, Tatar-speaking populations (including those 
categorized as Tatar, Bashkir, Teptiar, and Mishar) made up 54.1% (26) of the total 
population, while those categorized as Chuvash, Mari, Mordvin, and Votyak 
(subsequently Udmurt) while competent in the Tatar language made up 9.1% of the total 
population (27). Ethnic Russians made up 35.3% of the TASSR population (27).  
Throughout the 1920s, ASSRs founded under RSFSR include the Kirghiz (subsequently 
renamed Kazakh) ASSR, Volga German ASSR, Crimean ASSR, Dagestan ASSR, 





Chuvash ASSR, Kirghiz ASSR86. Kazakh ASSR and Kirghiz ASSR were elevated to the 
status of SSR in 1936. Karelia ASSR was elevated to an SSR of USSR in 1940 and 
relegated back to ASSR in 1956. Gorskaya ASSR in the North Caucasus were dissolved 
into several AObs designated for various ethnic categories. Buryat-Mongol ASSR was 
renamed Buryat ASSR in 1958. Volga German ASSR was abolished in 1941, while 
Crimean ASSR was abolished in 1945, as ethnic Volga Germans and ethnic Crimean 
Tatars were collectively deported to Central Asia and Siberia.  
Throughout the 1930s, Mordovia ASSR, Udmurt ASSR, Kalmyk ASSR, Chechen-Ingush 
ASSR, Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, Komi ASSR, Mari ASSR, North Ossetian ASSR were 
created87. Between 1944 and 1957, the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR was renamed Kabardin 
ASSR, as ethnic Balkars were deported to Central Asia. Kalmyk ASSR was abolished in 
1943 and restored in 1958. Chechen-Ingush ASSR was abolished in 1944 and restored in 
1957. Tuva ASSR was created in 1961, and the Gorno-Altay ASSR was created in 1990. 
During the Soviet period, ethnicity was required to be indicated on governmentally-
issued identification papers called “internal passports” first introduced in 1932 
(Gorenburg 2003, 29). The registration of ethnicity of individual citizens was initially 
based upon consciousness, or “self-identification” (29). However, citizens were usually 
prohibited from switching to other ethnic categories once the passport had been issued 
(29). Ethnicity on passports was transmitted from parents to children, and those whose 
parents are of different ethnic categories were required to choose only one category (30). 
Ethnicity indicated on internal passports systematically reified officially-recognized 
                                                          






ethnic categories and somehow contributed to the growing sense of groupness among 
those who share ethnic categories on their internal passports. In the Soviet era, passports 
issued by the SSRs were bilingual, using Russian and the republic’s titular language. 
ASSRs, most of which were located in RSFSR, were not granted that privilege (Arel 
2001, 9).  
According to Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver (1990) who studied school 
textbooks of the Soviet era, the Soviet state’s policies towards non-Russian languages can 
largely be summarized into three periods: 
1917-1938, period of egalitarian development of minority languages whose first half 
overlapped with the promotion of korenizatsiya. During this period, the Soviet authority 
at the SSR or ASSR levels worked on constructing new alphabets, opening titular-
language schools, and limiting the use of the Russian language in non-Russians-speaking 
areas. The learning of Russian was not even made mandatory in schools (108).  
1938-1959, period of differentiated bilingual education. During this time, Russian 
became mandatory in schools, whereas titular languages still functioned as the primary 
medium of instruction for titular populations in various ethno-regions. The highest grade 
for which a given titular language could serve as the primary medium of instruction 
remained stable and was more contingent upon the titular population’s formal status in 
the ethno-federal system. Meanwhile, ASSR-level titular populations tended to receive 
education in Russian when completing their secondary education (108).  
1959-1985, the period of highly differentiated bilingual education. During this period, the 





schoolchildren. Two types of titular-language schools were in operation, schools where 
titular languages served as medium of instruction and schools where titular languages 
were taught as subjects. This period saw the significant decrease in the number of non-
Russian languages as medium of instruction as well as decrease in the highest-grade level 
at which non-Russian languages served as medium of instruction (109). The overall 
decline of titular-language schooling was associated with the mass loss of males in World 
War II contributing to sex imbalance, which in turn heightened inter-ethnic marriages 
(110-114). The decline was also associated with emulation of either ethnic Russian or 
Russian-speaking role models (110-114).  
Overall, according to the officially prescribed scope of use for languages, the linguistic 
hierarchy of the USSR was largely five-tiered. Russian solely occupied the highest tier, 
functioning as the lingua franca of the populations of the Soviet Union. At the second tier 
were titular literary languages of the SSRs, such as Georgian, Armenian, Estonian, 
Uzbek, Kazakh, Azerbaijani, etc. At the third tier were literary languages of the ASSRs, 
such as Tatar, Bashkir, Yakut, Chuvash, etc. The fourth tier consists of written languages 
associated with those ethnic categories without ASSRs designated for them, such as 
Karachay, Khakas, Khanty, Vepsian, etc. The fifth tier encompasses various unwritten 
languages, dialects, or vernaculars (109). Within RSFSR, almost all titular languages of 
ASSRs (e.g. Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash, Udmurt, Ossetian, Yakut, Buryat, Chechen) shifted 
to the Cyrillic alphabet in the 1930s and the 1940s. 
A variety of types of state-sponsored institutions for the production and reproduction of 
ethnically-specific knowledge and symbols were established during the Soviet period, 





pedagogical institutes, ethno-regional branches of the USSR Academy of Sciences 
(Gorenburg 2003, 39-43). Publishing houses of books, newspapers, magazines in titular 
languages were established in various ethno-regions (43-46).  Other institutions include 
titular-language theaters and professional unions of cultural workers like writers, 
journalists, composers, cinematographers, theater workers, architects, and artists (44). 
These institutions were engaged in the standardization of ethnic minority languages and 
scripts, the constructing of historical narratives, the publication of works in ethnic 
minority languages and scripts, etc. A system of ethnically-based affirmative action 
programs was initiated under korenizatsiya in the 1920s. Quotas earmarked for titular 
categories in party-state positions, trade union positions, judiciary positions, factory 
worker recruitment, admissions into higher education institutions, and so forth were set 
and practiced in ethno-regions throughout the Soviet period, even after korenizatsiya was 
discontinued (46). 
Ironically, Soviet-era ethnic institutions laid the institutional foundation for the demise of 
the USSR as well as for the ethno-federal structure of the post-Soviet Russia. The 
disintegration of the USSR took the form of SSRs declaring independence and morphing 
into sovereign states in the early 1990s, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation largely 
inherited and kept intact the administrative arrangements of the Soviet-era RSFSR. 
 
Post-Soviet Russian Federation 





The post-Soviet Russian Federation (RF) has been defined as a multi-ethnic federation 
according to the Constitution adopted after a referendum in 199388. Accordingly, 
citizenship of the Russian Federation is not restricted to one ethnic category. In terms of 
immigration policies, though not practicing exclusions based upon ethnicity, RF does 
prioritize sootechestvennik, or rather, ethnic Russians or individuals of other ethnicities 
whose titular ethno-regions are constituent units of the RF. For instance, ethnic Kazan 
Tatars are allowed to immigrate back from other former SSRs (Shevel 2011, 5) in the 
form of “repatriation” (Russian: vozrashcheniye)89. 
After the dissolution of the USSR, two country-wide population censuses were conducted 
in the Russian Federation in 2002 and in 2010 consecutively. In both censuses, the 
population was categorized ethnically, whereas individuals’ ethnic affiliation was largely 
recorded out of self-identification. As a result, including those categories stabilized 
during the Soviet era, the total number of ethnic categories in the 2002 census shot up to 
182, with a number of sub-categories (e.g. Kryasheni) subsumed under broader ethnic 
categories (e.g. Tatary). The 2010 census largely used the same number of ethnic 
categories as in 2002. In addition to ethnicity, both 2002 and 2010 censuses also surveyed 
individuals’ self-identified “native languages” (Russian: rodnoi yazyk) and command of 
languages (Russian: vladeniye yazykami). Both censuses also explicitly made distinctions 
between “less populous indigenous populations” (Russian: korennie malochislennie 
                                                          
88 President of Russia, Constitution of the Russian Federation [in Russian], http://constitution.kremlin.ru 
(accessed February 28, 2017) 
89 Order of the President of the Russian Federation on June 22, 2006, “On measures in terms of how to 
contribute to the voluntary resettlement in the Russian Federation of sootechestvennik residing abroad” 





narody) such as Telengit, Nenets, Mansi, Koryak, Vepsian, Shor, Dolgan, Chukchi, etc. 
and “most populous nationalities” (Russian: naibolee mnogochislennie natsional’nosti).  
 
2) Category-managing institutions 
RF citizens’ ethnicity is no longer indicated on governmentally-issued identification 
papers. In 1997, the RF central-state announced that its new internal passports would no 
longer mark bearers’ ethnic affiliation (Russian: natsional’nost’). Officials in several 
ethnic republics including Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria 
(Arel 2001, 6) announced that they would disregard the new federal regulation by adding 
an extra page indicating citizens’ ethnicity to the internal passports issued in these 
republics (6). The standoff persisted until Vladimir Putin’s first term as the president of 
RF, when the federal government was determined to enforce the passport changes in 
early 2001 (8). Bashkortostan appealed to the RF constitutional court, while Tatarstan 
eventually agreed that ethnicity would not be indicated on its future internal passports. To 
reward such a concession, the federal government allowed Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 
to insert four additional pages printed in their titular languages to the internal passports, 
which rendered such passports bilingual (8-9). 
During the last days of the RSFSR, an important impact of chains of ethno-national 
mobilizations in various ethno-regions was the adoption of sovereignty declarations 
(Gorenburg 2003, 201) by ASSR governments. If the incumbent political elites of the 
ASSRs viewed such declarations as a way to demand more formal autonomy from 





them as pathways to full statehood and self-determination (201). Sovereignty declarations 
started from Tatar ASSR on August 30, 1990 (202), followed by such ASSRs as Yakutia, 
Bashkiria, Chuvashia, etc. TASSR’s declaration of sovereignty formally elevated its 
political status from an ASSR to an SSR of the USSR while renaming the republic 
“Tatarstan.” The declaration also promulgated that Tatarstan’s sovereignty should belong 
to the “Tatar nation” and to the “entire people of the republic” (202). On November 7, 
1992, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan was adopted (206). In February 1994, 
RT’s unique status (Graney 2009, 38) within the Russian Federation was formally 
affirmed in the legally-binding power-sharing Treaty on Delimitation of Jurisdictional 
Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers between Bodies of Public Authority of the 
Russian Federation and Bodies of Public Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan reached 
betweem the federal government and Tatarstan. 
The treaty symbolizes the extraordinary level of formal autonomy to which Tatarstan is 
entitled vis-à-vis the federal government while also contributing to the institutionalization 
of asymmetric federalism in Russia. A number of other constituent units of RF also 
sought and reached90 power-sharing treaties with the federal government, but only the 
federal-Tatarstan treaty was renewed. A second treaty between the Russian Federation 
and the Republic of Tatarstan was signed into force in July 2007 (147). Bearing the name 
Treaty on Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Powers between Bodies of Public 
Authority of the Russian Federation and Bodies of Public Authority of the Republic of 
Tatarstan, the 2007 Treaty RFRT dropped the term “sovereignty” and was valid for ten 
                                                          
90 In addition to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, 46 constituent units of RF sought and reached bilateral 





years from its date of adoption (Administration of the President of Republic Tatarstan, 
2007). Nevertheless, the Treaty RFRT 2007 was not renewed in 2017. 
In the rest of post-Soviet Russia, all the Soviet-period ASSRs were elevated to the status 
of republics under Yeltsin’ presidency. The soviet-period AObs of Altai, Adyghea, 
Karachay-Cherkessia, and Khakassia were elevated to the status of republics as well. In 
1992, Ingushetia established itself as a republic separate from the former Chechen-Ingush 
ASSR. In November 1991, Chechnya declared independence from the USSR, but power 
struggles among ethnic Chechen political and military elites ensued (Stoner-Weiss 2004, 
304-305). In 1994, the first Chechen War broke out between Moscow and Chechnya-
based militants, which ended in 1996, when Moscow did not restore its control over 
Chechnya. It succeeded in doing so only after the second Chechen War (1999-2000) by 
installing a pro-Moscow clan in the most powerful positions of Chechnya. In 2003, a 
constitution was adopted out of a referendum (307) in Chechnya, which stipulates 
Russia’s sovereignty over Chechnya. In 2014, Crimea was annexed into RF and 
designated as the newest republic of RF. Of the soviet-period AOks, only four were 
retained by the end of 2010. The Jewish AOb in the Far East of Russia was not elevated 
into a republic. 
 
Table 3.2. Republics, autonomous oblast’, and autonomous okrugs in Russia (as of 2016) 
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Sources: Prokhorov, A.M., Great Soviet Encyclopedia (New York: Macmillan, 1973-1983); All Russia Population 
Census 2010, http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed February 28, 2017); Federal Geodetics and Cartography Services, 
National Atlas of Russia (Moscow: Federal Geodetics and Cartography Services, Moscow); Constitution of the 





President of Russia, Constitution of the Russian Federation, http://constitution.kremlin.ru (accessed February 28, 
2017); Compendium of USSR Laws and Edicts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1938-1956 
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Yuridicheskoi Literatury, 1956); Constitution of the RSFSR, April 12, 1978, 
http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-rsfsr/1978/red_1978/5478721/chapter/7/#block_3700 (accessed February 28, 
2017). 
 
In post-Soviet Russia, the promotion of titular languages has been more conspicuous in 
certain ethno-regions than in others. Except in Karelia, all republics have established the 
titular language as official alongside Russian. Only in Tatarstan has the learning of the 
titular language been made mandatory for all primary and secondary schoolchildren 
regardless of ethnicity. State-sponsored institutions for the production and reproduction 
of ethnically-specific knowledge and symbols have largely been the post-Soviet avatars 
of their predecessors but expanded in certain republics. More titular-language magazines, 
TVs, and radio programs have become available in republics like Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan, Yakutia, and Dagestan. Nevertheless, most of the institutions that produce 
ethnically-specific knowledge have been concentrated at the ethno-regional level, unlike 
in China where central-state-level ethnic cultural institutions (e.g. universities, press, and 
radio) are present in Beijing. Two federal-level state organs, Ministry of Regional 
Development and Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs91 were created under Vladimir 
Putin’s third term as RF President to oversee issues related to ethnic republics and ethnic 
non-Russian populations.  
Since ethnicity is no longer indicated on the internal passport of RF, affirmative actions 
based on internal passport is no longer feasible. However, at the ethno-regional level, 
ethnically-based affirmative actions in the forms of quota-setting in hiring and 
                                                          
91 President of Russia, “Executive Order on Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs,” March 31, 2015, 





admissions are still in practice to varying extent. Individual citizens’ perceptions about 
their own ethnicity and ethnicity of others remain stable in most of the ethno-regions, 
which in turn makes it possible for ethnically-based affirmation actions to continue 
informally in such ethno-regions as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia, etc. 
 
China 
Pre-reform People’s Republic of China 
1) Category-defining institutions 
In the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter CPRC) adopted in 1954, 
the PRC state was constitutionally defined as multi-ethnic (CPRC 1954, Article 3, 
Chinese: duominzu guojia)92. A formal qualification of the state as such has been kept in 
subsequent versions of the PRC constitution. Accordingly, PRC citizenship has never 
been restricted to one ethnic category. PRC’s immigration policies, though prioritizing 
“overseas Chinese,” formally does not prioritize specific ethnic categories93.  
The culturally, linguistically diverse populations found under the jurisdiction of PRC 
have been officially categorized ethnically in all of its conducted population censuses. 
However, throughout 1950s and the early 1960s, it was a major puzzle for the PRC state 
                                                          
92 The NPC of PRC, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954) [in Chinese], 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/26/content_4264.htm (accessed July 31, 2017). 
93 Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the PRC State Council, Regulation on Defining Huaqiao (“Chinese” 
settled overseas but still bearing PRC passports), Waiji Huaren (“Chinese” bearing non-PRC passports), 
Guiqiao (overseas “Chinese” repatriated), Qiaojuan (family members of the foregoing three types of 
“Chinese”) [in Chinese], http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2015/1125/37146.shtml (accessed July 31, 2017).  
Individuals “permanently” residing outside PRC may be legally determined as “overseas Chinese” if they 
are still bearing PRC citizenship, or if they used to be but no longer are PRC citizen, or if they can 
demonstrate that some of their ancestors were PRC citizens, or if they can demonstrate that some of their 





to determine which ethnic categories to officially endorse and promote as well as how 
ethnic categories should be assigned to each individual citizen. In this regard, the PRC 
state launched the so-called “Ethnic Classification Project” (Chinese: minzu shibie, 
Mullaney 2011, 3), by means of which the number, names, and compositions of officially 
recognized ethnic categories were established. Indeed, the very process of minzu shibie is 
per se part of the historical trajectory of each of the officially recognized ethnic 
categories, or concepts, to which minzu shibie gave rise (4). 
Ethnologists, linguists, and certain prominent ethnic minority elites played a crucial role 
in establishing a paradigmatic status (11) to both the concept of “ethnicity” (Chinese: 
minzu) and ethnic categorizations. Among these intellectuals, the Hederian-Marxist 
approaches94 to the study of demographic peculiarities of the populations within the 
territory of PRC were adapted. Admitting that certain populations had barely reached the 
developmental stage of capitalism and not yet meeting the criteria of “common 
language”, “common economic life”, and “common culture” and thus did not qualify as 
“nations” (Chinese: minzu; Russian: natsiya) and that some populations were not even 
qualifying as “nationalities” (Chinese: minzu jituan; Russian: natsional’nost’) or “tribal 
federations” (Chinese: buzu; Russian: narodnost’) due to a lack of group consciousness, 
these intellectuals decide to lump concepts like nations, nationalities, tribal federations 
altogether under the token of minzu. For instance, Lin Yaohua, an ethnologist who 
participated in the Ethnic Classification Project in Yunnan Province, circumvented the 
Stalinist conception of nations as emanating from a process of linguistic, territorial, 
                                                          
94 Assuming that culturally-bounded ethnic groups will gradually merge into nations while advancing 





economic, and cultural integration unique to the capitalist mode of production (81), 
treated certain minzu jituan and certain buzu indiscriminately as minzu jituan under the 
teleological justification that minzu jituan will eventually morph into nations (83).  
In this manner, many ethnic categories, or minzu, were formulated out of minzu jituan. In 
the meantime, the criteria for determining boundaries of minzu jituan regarding who 
should be included in the minzu jituan and who should be not is mostly linguistic, 
specifically by comparing collected word lists and summarized grammar (113). 
Inevitably, the ways comparative linguistics were used in ethnic categorizations were 
more or less rife with experts’ selective biases. As a result, certain ethnonyms95 
disappeared from official discourse, while certain ethnonyms96 gained prominence in 
official discourse and have been taxonomically reified in censuses and household 
registrations. In the 1953 PRC population census, 39 ethnic categories were 
taxonomically recognized and reified, and the total population of those classified as 
“ethnic minority” constituted 5.89% of the total PRC population, including 1,017,299 
with yet-to-be-classified ethnicity (Economic and Development Department of the PRC 
State Ethnic Affairs Commission & Department of Integrated Statistics of the PRC 
National Bureau of Statistics 2011, 655-6). In the 1964 population census, 5497 ethnic 
categories were taxonomically recognized and reified, and the total population of those 
classified as “ethnic minority” made up 5.77% of the total PRC population, including 
32,411 with yet-to-be-classified ethnicity (655-6).  
                                                          
95 Such as Taranchi, Solon, Nong, Nuosu, Sani. 
96 Such as Uyghur, Mongol, Zhuang, Tibetan, etc. 
97 Newly added ethnic categories include Tujia, She, Daur, Mulam (Mulao), Blang, Maonan, Gelao, Achang, 





Language categorizations were also established hand in hand with ethnic categorizations. 
Language survey teams were dispatched to determine linguistic affiliations of various 
tongues within the territory of PRC (Dwyer 1998, 69). Based upon the stylized findings 
of language surveys as well as the consensus among ethnologist, linguists, and ethnic 
minority elites, official minority languages or dialects were established through 
prescriptive standardization (68). According to such prescriptive standardization, a 
linguistic hierarchy was laid out concerning which should be called languages (Chinese: 
yuyan), which should be called dialects (Chinese: fangyan), which should be called 
vernaculars (Chinese: tuyu). Standard orthographies were constructed and officially 
endorsed (77), and a baseline for how to classify and designate languages and linguistic 
groups (80) was set. 
According to the officially prescribed scope of use of various tongues, the linguistic 
hierarchy was largely five-tiered (71). At the first tier is the national lingua franca, 
combining Mandarin Chinese with the Simplified Chinese characters plus Hanyu Pinyin. 
The second tier consists of ethno-regional-level standardized literary languages such as 
Uyghur, Mongolian, Tibetan (Amdo, Ü-Tsang, and Kham), and Zhuang. Then comes the 
third tier of other standardized literary languages among ethnic minorities such as 
Korean, Kazakh, Yi (Sichuan), Dai Li, Dai Na, Kyrgyz, Xibe (Xinjiang), Oiratic 
Mongolic (Xinjiang), etc. The fourth tier consists of other languages either used in radio 
and TV broadcastings or taught in schools as subjects, such as Sinitic “dialects” and 
“vernaculars” (Cantonese, Wu, Minnan, Mindong, Hakka, etc.), Miao, Hani, Lisu, Lahu, 





made up of a myriad unrecognized languages and dialects (e.g. Gyalrong, Fuyu Khakas, 
Tuvan, Lingao).  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, work also started on compiling “concise history” and 
assigning narratives of “ethno-genesis”, heroic figures, class struggles, and anti-
imperialist struggles to each of the officially recognized ethnic categories. In practice, 
retroactive projection and use of newly-constructed ethnonymic labels in historiography 
was accepted and encouraged (83).   
 
2) Category-managing institutions 
CCP recognized “equal right to be autonomous” (Chinese: pingdeng zizhi) and “to freely 
join” (Chinese: ziyou jiaru) the Chinese Federation (Chinese: zhongguo lianbang) of all 
ethnic minorities in the Declaration of the China People’s Liberation Army on October 
10, 1947 (Zhang 2015, 76). Nevertheless, it was not clear whom these “ethnic minorities” 
refer to, how such rights could be practiced, as well as who would represent these 
minorities to practice such rights.  
In 1949, the Central People’s Government of the PRC established a self-standing 
ministry-level apparatus, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (hereafter SEAC)98 intended 
to supervise and to study the formulation and implementation of policies towards the 
                                                          
98 The SEAC was modeled upon Bolsheviks’ People’s Commissariat for Nationalities. Intellectuals in China 
also tend to believe that the design of SEAC was also inspired by the Lifan Yuan of the Qing Empire and 





defining and managing of ethnic categories, towards the building of ethnic territorially-
based autonomous entities, as well as towards the training of ethnic cadres.  
Also in 1949, prior to the holding of the first plenary session of the China People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, then head of SEAC, Li Weihan, argued against the 
proposal to adopt ethno-federalism in PRC. He justified the argument by indicating that 
various ethnic populations of PRC follow the residential patterns of “mostly intermixed, 
partially concentrated (Chinese: dazaju xiaojuju)” and that ethnic minorities made up 
merely 6% of the total population (76). In other words, PRC’s ethnic demography was 
characterized as more homogenous than that of the Soviet Union, and Li proposed that 
ethnically unitary structure of state, if also complemented with ethnic territorially-based 
autonomous entities designated for ethnic minorities, be more suitable for PRC. 
Similarly, Zhou Enlai also noted the risk of “Western Imperial powers” (Chinese: xifang 
diguozhuyi lieqiang) utilizing the discourse of self-determination within a federal 
framework to “estrange” different ethnic populations and to dismember PRC (Chinese: 
liyong minzu wenti tiaobolijian zhongguo de tongyi, 160-161).  
In 1952, the Central People’s Government of PRC introduced the Implementation 
Syllabus for Ethnic Regional Autonomy in PRC, in which it was stipulated that 
autonomous entities designated for ethnic minorities should be local-level state 
authorities under the leadership of the PRC central-state (78). Ethno-regions would be 
established at three levels, i.e. provincial-level autonomous regions, prefectural-level 
autonomous prefectures, and county-level autonomous counties. Three types of ethno-
regions were proposed to be established: 1) those designated primarily for one ethnic 





Prefecture of Jilin Province, Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province); 
2) those designated primarily for one ethnic category but with lower-level ethno-regions 
designated for other ethnic categories under them (e.g. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture of Xinjiang); 3) those designated for two or 
even more ethnic categories jointly (e.g. Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture 
of Hunan Province, Haixi Mongol/Tibetan/Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture of Qinghai 
Province) (79; Ji 2013, 31-32). In the 1954 PRC Constitution, ethnic territorially-based 
autonomy was enshrined99 as an integral part of the institutions governing how the 
central-state and various ethno-regions are supposed to be related.   
The first provincial-level ethnic territorially-based autonomous entity under CCP was 
founded in Manchuria in 1947, designated for those categorized as “ethnic Mongols.” 
During the Manchukuo period under Imperial Japan (1932-1945), ethno-national 
consciousness of being “ethnic Mongol” rose steadily among the Mongolic-speaking 
populations in Western Manchuria (Chinese: Ximan or Xing’an sisheng, largely 
overlapping with present-day eastern part of NMAR, Atwood 1992, 17, 24). This 
tendency started competing with a concurrent process of symbiosis between those who 
would identify as Han and those who would identify as Mongol (15-17). Such a rise in 
ethno-national consciousness can be associated with the abolition of Qing-dynasty 
aristocracy in the Mongolic-speaking areas of Manchuria (Liu 2006, 128), with “pan-
Mongolism”100 which was introduced from the Soviet Union, and with the development 
                                                          
99 The NPC of PRC, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954), [in Chinese] 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/26/content_4264.htm (accessed July 31, 2017). 
100 Influenced by Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union’s linguistic categorization of Turkic, Mongolic, and 
Tungusic languages and inspired by pan-Slavism and pan-Turkism, pan-Mongolism was first developed 
among ethnic Buryat intellectuals in Imperial Russia and later the Soviet Union. It regards those who 





in Manchuria of Mongolic-language education systems under the auspices of the 
Japanese colonial rule (Atwood 1992, 18). As the USSR Red Army marched into 
Manchuria to disarm Imperial Japan’s Kwantung Army, a movement calling for formal 
autonomy for Mongolic speakers in Manchuria (Chinese: dongmeng zizhi yundong) 
formed under the leadership of Manchukuo-trained Mongolic-speaking elites in 1945, 
with support from the Soviet Union (Liu 2006, 132).  
This movement initially demonstrated an ethnocentric ideology (Chinese: minzure, 
“national fever”, 123-24) and aimed even at mobilizing Mongolic-speakers beyond 
Manchuria (133). In 1946, the Manchuria-based dongmeng zizhi yundong was 
incorporated under the leadership of CCP after the Chengde Conference (161; Atwood 
1992, 57-67). On April 23, 1947, Nei Mongol Autonomous Region (NMAR) was 
founded in Wangyemiao101 in Western Manchuria, whose territory initially included 
Western Manchuria only. As the PLA was taking over the entire territory of the Republic 
of China, NMAR’s territory continually expanded, incorporating parts of the provinces of 
Rehe102, Chaha’er103, Suiyuan104, and Gansu105. The geographic expanse of the ethno-
regional territory rose from around 540,000 km2 in 1947 to around 1,180,000 km2 in 1956 
(Zhang 2015, 74; Chen & Chen 2012, 55-58; Wang 2007, 232-243). Admittedly, 
                                                          
boundary of such a “nation” can be quite ambiguous, for example, by excluding the Mongolic-speaking 
but traditionally Muslim Dongxiang people and by including the Turkic-speaking ethnic Tuvans. 
101 Present-day Ulanhot, the administrative center of the Hinggan League (Chinese: Xing’an Meng) of 
NMAR.  
102 Abolished in 1955 (Chen & Chen 2012, 20). 
103 Abolished in 1952 (Chen & Chen 2012, 48). 
104 Abolished and merged with NMAR in 1954 (Chen & Chen 2012, 18). 





dongmeng zizhi yundong’s vision of “unifying Inner Mongolia” was actually realized 
under the CCP.  
It took six years for PRC’s second provincial-level ethnic territorially-based autonomous 
entity, XUAR, to be founded. In 1949, PLA marched into what was the Xinjiang 
Province of the Republic of China and reorganized what was once under the control of 
the East Turkestan Republic106 between 1944 and 1949 into the Xinjiang Province of 
PRC (Millward and Tursun 2004, 82-87). However, the Xinjiang Province was not 
immediately replaced with an autonomous region primarily for such considerations as 
political order still being established under CCP, competing visions about the future of 
Xinjiang, inter-ethnic discord, as well as low level of economic development (Ji 2013, 
84-85). CCP’s ethnic categorization in Xinjiang largely inherited the categorization 
legacy of Sheng Shicai’s rule over Xinjiang107 and established “ethnic Uyghurs”108 as the 
largest ethnic category of Xinjiang (at approximately 76% of the entire population in the 
early 1950s, 80-81) while stabilizing official boundaries between various ethnic 
categories.  
                                                          
106 “Three Districts Revolution” (Chinese: sanqu geming) according to PRC-based sources. 
107 Between 1934 and 1944 (Millward and Tursun 2004, 79-81). Under the dictatorial rule of Sheng Shicai, 
Soviet-style ethnic categorization was conducted. 14 ethnic categories were recognized, i.e. Uyghur, 
Kazakh, Han, Hui, Taranchi, Kyrgyz, Mongol (or Oirat), Guihua (Russian under PRC), Xibe, Uzbek, Tajik (or 
Pamiri), Tatar, Solon (Daur under PRC), and Manchu (Qi 2006). “Taranchi” was merged into “Uyghur” 
under PRC. 
108 The first use of the category “Uyghur” to designate either agrarian or urban-based Turkic-speaking 
populations of the Xinjiang Province (Republic of China) despite their cultural heterogeneity and lack of 
shared consciousness (distinct from the categories of “Kazakhs” or “Kyrgyz” to designate those mostly 
pastoral and clan-based as well as from the categories of “Uzbek” or “Tatar” to designate those who 
migrated from Imperial Russia/Soviet Union to Xinjiang) has been attributed to a congress held in 
Tashkent in 1921 by the Organization of Workers and Farmers of Altishahr and Dzungaria (Millward and 
Tursun 2004, 73). In 1934, the category “Uyghur” already adopted in the Soviet Union was officially 
appropriated to Xinjiang by Sheng Shicai in consultation with an ethnic Kazan Tatar elite, Borhan Shahidi. 
Borhan Shahidi later changed his own ethnic category from “Tatar” to “Uyghur” in order to fill the post of 





In 1953, CCP formulated the roadmap for reorganizing Xinjiang into an autonomous 
region, calling on those categorized as “ethnic Uyghurs” to “proactively accommodate 
other brotherly minzu” (Chinese: zhudong zhaogu xiongdi minzu) in terms of tolerating 
the designating of lower-level autonomous prefectures, counties, and townships for other 
ethnic minority categories (86-87). Meanwhile, CCP Xinjiang Bureau was actively 
recruiting and training cadres of ethnic minority categories in the form of “cadre training 
classes” (Chinese: ganbu peixun ban, 87-88). In 1954, six autonomous counties109 and 
five autonomous prefectures110 were designated within the confine of Xinjiang Province. 
Notably, the territory of Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture largely overlaps with that of 
the 1944-1949 East Turkestan Republic and administers three prefectures under its own 
jurisdiction, Ghulja, Tacheng, and Altay. On September 30, 1955, Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region designated for ethnic Uyghurs was officially proclaimed by the 
Xinjiang Province People’s Congress. The naming of the ethno-region combines the 
Chinese-language designation of the region with the titular ethnic category “Uyghur”, 
while proposals to name it “Uyghurstan” was not adopted (90-91). The territory of 
XUAR coincides with the territory of its predecessor, Xinjiang Province.   
In 1958, two more provincial-level ethno-regions were proclaimed, Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region designated for ethnic Hui and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
designated for ethnic Zhuang. In 1965, the fifth provincial-level ethno-region, Xizang 
(Tibet) Autonomous Region designated for ethnic Tibetans, was created111.  
                                                          
109 Yanqi Hui, Qapqal Xibe, Mori Kazakh, Hoboksar Mongol, Tashkorgan Tajik, and Barköl Kazakh. 
110 Bayingholin Mongol, Bortala Mongol, Kyzylsu Kyrgyz, Changji Hui, and Ili Kazakh. 





As ethno-regions at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels were being established, 
massive recruitment and trainings of ethnic-minority cadres were also under way to 
create ethnic cadres well-versed in the “ethnic in form, socialist in content” nature of 
CCP’s managing of ethnicity and capable of filling the key posts in the governmental 
apparatuses of those newly-founded autonomous regions. For that purpose, minzu 
colleges (Chinese: minzu xueyuan) were established in Beijing (Central Minzu College), 
Lanzhou (Northwestern Minzu College), Chengdu (Southwestern Minzu College), 
Kunming (Yunnan Minzu College), Guiyang (Guizhou Minzu College), Xining (Qinghai 
Minzu College), Wuhan (Zhongnan Minzu College), and Nanning (Guangxi Minzu 
College). Aside from minzu colleges, various universities, pedagogical colleges (Chinese: 
shifan xueyuan) and pedagogical-professional schools (Chinese: shifan zhuanke xuexiao) 
were established in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (Jilin), Nei Mongol, 
Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Guangxi. Aside from higher education institutions, other state-
sponsored institutions for the production and reproduction of ethnically-specific 
knowledge and symbols were also massively created, including minority-language 
primary and secondary educations, publishing houses, newspapers, magazines at central, 
provincial, and prefectural levels, radio broadcastings in ethnic minority languages 
beamed from central, provincial, and prefectural levels, central and ethno-regional-level 
academies of social sciences (Chinese: shehui kexueyuan), etc. 
Ethnically-based affirmative action programs were broadly practiced in the areas of cadre 
recruiting, higher education matriculation, hiring and promotion, marriages, etc. in the 





Law of PRC even customarily tolerated polygamy and traditional divorces in certain 
ethnic-regions (Sautman 1998, 88). 
Since the very inception of PRC, the official lines about ethnically-related issues have 
been revolving around denouncing Han chauvinism (Chinese: da hanzu zhuyi) as well as 
local nationalism (Chinese: difang minzu zhuyi). Defined by Mao Zedong as reactionary 
thoughts of the landlord and bourgeois classes on inter-ethnic relations, Han chauvinism 
is a catchword lumping together ideas that can be associated with political, economic, or 
cultural domination by ethnic Han elites. As opposed to Han chauvinism, local 
nationalism is the catchword pertaining to ideas associated with political domination by 
ethnic minority elites, which can emphasize ethnically-based cleavages over class-based 
cleavages while frowning upon inter-ethnic cultural exchanges, marriages, etc.112 The 
label of local nationalism is closely related to the label of “bourgeois capitalism”, which 
connotes the primordial (“from time immemorial”), patrimonial (“property of specific 
ethnic groups”), static (“unchanging”) conceptions of ethnic cultures among those ethnic 
minority cadres who tend to be “unwilling to admit backwardness while hailing 
everything ‘ethnic’ as something positive” (Liu 1996, 217). By creating the duality of 
Han versus non-Han out of ethnic categorizations, the PRC state has to arduously strike 
the balance between accommodating the consciousness of being of the ethnic Han 
category and accommodating the consciousness of being of ethnic minority categories.  
Nevertheless, during the Cultural Revolution, notions like minzu were increasingly 
denounced as phenomena of the past and bound to disappear as the populations “move 
                                                          
112 The United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, “Han Chauvinism and Local 
Nationalism,” [in Chinese] http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64107/65708/66066/66078/4468606.html 





onto higher stages” of socialist development. Numerous ethnic minority cadres were 
labeled as “class enemies” and targeted for struggling (Chinese: pidou). Previously 
recruited and promoted ethnic minority cadres were massively purged, and the 
representation of ethnic minority cadres in party or state apparatuses dropped 
significantly. For instance, in 1975, the proportion of ethnic minority cadres in the total 
number of cadres of XUAR was only around 26.4%, compared to 42% in 1955, marking 
the record low (Ji 2013, 99). Ethnic territorially-based autonomy went largely into 
dysfunction, especially when the 1975 Constitution of PRC removed the mention of 
ethnic territorially-based autonomy for ethnic minorities (Zhang 2015, 80). It was alleged 
that Muslims in certain localities were forced to raise pigs (Ma 1995, 78) and that burial 
rites among certain ethnic minorities in certain localities were forcibly altered (78). With 
regard to higher education admissions and cadre recruitments, ethnically-based 
affirmative action programs were replaced by class-based affirmative action programs, 
privileging those who were classified as “workers, farmers, or soldiers” (Chinese: 
gongnongbing) regardless of ethnicity. 
 
Table 3.3. Provincial-level and semi-provincial-level ethno-regions in China 
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a IKAP has its own prefectures. Hence IKAP is considered a semi-provincial-level ethno-region in China. 
Sources: Chen, Chao, and Hongling Chen, Atlas of the Continuity and Change in the Territorial Administrative 
Arrangements of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Zhongguo Ditu Chubanshe, 2012); Economic and 
Development Department of the PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission & Department of Integrated Statistics of the 
PRC National Bureau of Statistics, China’s Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 2010 (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2011); PRC 
National Bureau of Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 
Population Census of China (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2013); Ji, Lei, Study of the Institutions of Ethnic Regional 
Autonomy in China (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2013). 
 
Since Deng Xiaoping’s reform 
1) Category-defining institutions 
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the 1982 PRC Constitution reiterated the 
constitutionally multi-ethnic nature of the PRC state, which has remained stable ever 
since. The populations of PRC continue to be officially categorized ethnically in 
censuses, and the number of officially recognized ethnic categories was fixed at 56. 
According to the 1982 PRC population census, 56113 ethnic categories were 
taxonomically recognized and reified, and the total population of those classified as 
“ethnic minority” made up 6.62% of the total PRC population, including 799,705 with 
yet-to-be-classified ethnicity (Economic and Development Department of the PRC State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission & Department of Integrated Statistics of the PRC National 
Bureau of Statistics 2011, 655-6). In the 1990 PRC population census, those classified as 
“ethnic minority” constituted 8.01% of the total PRC population. Ethnic minorities’ 
population share in China rose to 8.41% as of the 2000 PRC population census and to 
8.49% as of the 2010 census.  
                                                          






2) Category-managing institutions 
Starting 1985, it is required that each PRC citizen reaching the age of 16 be issued an 
identification card by the relevant local branches of the Public Security Bureau (Chinese: 
gong’anju), on which ethnicity is indicated. Such ethnicity is transmitted from parents to 
children. Only one category is allowed to each citizen, which somehow stabilizes the 
ethno-taxonomic system. Notably, on the ID cards issued in ethno-regions with two 
official languages, the legends have been presented in both Chinese characters and the 
script associated with the ethno-region’s titular category: for the first-generation ID cards, 
usually the ethnic minority script is handwritten, whereas on the second-generation ID 
cards introduced in 2004, all ethnic minority scripts have become digitally printed114. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, large numbers of previously purged ethnic minority 
cadres were rehabilitated and restored to various positions in party-state apparatuses of all 
levels. To enlist support from ethnic minority populations of the central-state’s economic 
reforms and developmental strategies, various types of ethnic institutions were re-
                                                          
114 Min Sheng, “Ethnic minority citizens’ bilingual ID cards for certain ethno-regions now can be issued in 
situ in Chongqing Municipality,” [in Chinese] Zhongguo Minzubao, February 17, 2017. The minority scripts 
printed on ID cards include the Huihu (ancient Uyghur) script used in Nei Mongol Autonomous Region, 
Qian Gorlos Mongol Autonomous County (Jilin), Dörböd Mongol Autonomous County (Heilongjiang), Fuxin 
Mongol Autonomous County (Liaoning), and Henan Mongol Autonomous County of Huangnan Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture (Qinghai); Arabic Uyghur script used in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; 
Latin Zhuang script used in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; Tibetan script used in Xizang 
Autonomous Region, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (Sichuan), Ganzi Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture (Sichuan), Muli Tibetan Autonomous County of Liangshan Yi Autonomous 
Prefecture (Sichuan), Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Qinghai), Hainan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture (Qinghai), Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Qinghai), and Yushu Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture (Qinghai); Korean script used in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (Jilin), Changbai 





established, and expression of ethnically, linguistically, and culturally-based differences 
again became largely encouraged by the PRC state.  
Ethnic territorially-based autonomy became formally enshrined as normative institution 
of PRC in 1984, when the PRC National People’s Congress passed the Law of Ethnic 
Regional Autonomy (hereafter LERA) of the PRC. The founding chair of NMAR, 
Wulanfu, presided over the drafting of LERA (Wang 2007, 582-583). Subsequently, 
LERA was amended by the PRC National People’s Congress in 2001 with regard to 
fiscal/investment policies, poverty-reduction, education, inter-provincial economic aid 
programs, cadre recruitment, etc.115 Notably, LERA is after all a baseline law, and its 
implementation may require the legislation of various auxiliary regulations and 
guidelines in time to come116. By 2015, 139 autonomy regulations were legislated at the 
prefectural and county-level ethno-regions, 777 separate regulations were legislated at the 
provincial, prefectural, and county-level ethno-regions (Zhang 2015, 115). In addition to 
ethnic territorially-based autonomy, other ethnic institutions such as systematic 
recruitment and trainings of ethnic-minority cadres, more than one language accorded 
with official status at the subnational level, state-sponsored institutions for the production 
and reproduction of ethnically-specific knowledge and symbols, ethnically-based 
affirmative action programs, and so forth were all enshrined somehow in the LERA. 
By 2003, China had designated 120 autonomous counties, 30 autonomous prefectures, 
and 5 autonomous regions. Of the 55 minority categories, 44 categories had been 
conferred with autonomous entities where the categories are titular. 71% of total minority 
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populations were residents of ethno-regions, while the total geographical area of ethno-
regions of all administrative levels combined constituted 64% of the total territory of 
PRC (80).  
Under the supervision of an ethnologist, Ma Yin, and the head of SEAC between 1978 
and 1986, Yang Jingren117, throughout the 1980s, five series of booklets on “ethnic 
issues” (Chinese: minzu wenti wuzhong congshu) were published. They consist of general 
guides to each of the ethnic minority categories, concise “history” for each of the 
minorities, concise grammar of languages, general guides to each of the ethno-regions, 
and surveys of social history (Ma 1995, 226-7). These publications tend to assume that 
ethnic identity is primordial and fixed while implying groupness by officially assigning a 
“bundle of immutable features” (Dwyer 1998, 74) such as ethnonym, history, language, 
locale, and customs (73) to all the 55 officially-recognized ethnic minority categories. 
Such officially-endorsed ethnically-specific knowledge and symbols were produced and 
reproduced by experts of both minority and Han categories in higher education 
institutions, social science academies, ethnic minority language publishing houses of 
books/newspapers/magazines (Chinese: chubanshe, baoshe, zazhishe), ethnic minority 
language TV and radio channels, etc. On the other hand, those ethnonyms, categories, 
dialects, and historical narratives not recognized by the state have been marginalized to 
varying extent.  
Beijing, the capital of PRC, boasts of hosting a number of central-state-level institutes 
producing and reproducing officially-endorsed ethnic knowledge and symbols. Examples 
                                                          





include Minzu University of China, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Ethnic Publishing House, Nationality Pictorial 
Press, Press of the Periodical Zhongguo Minzu, Central Translation Bureau of Ethnic 
Languages and Scripts, China National Radio’s ethnic minority language services. After 
the 2008 mass protests in ethnic-Tibetan-inhabited areas and after the 2009 inter-ethnic 
violent clashes in Ürümqi, Xinjiang, additional TV and radio channels broadcasting in 
Tibetan and Uyghur languages were opened respectively. As of the 2010s, the major 
ethnic minority languages/scripts used in media include Mongolian, Uyghur, Zhuang, 
Tibetan, Korean, Kazakh, Yi, etc. On the renminbi banknotes, four scripts other than 
Chinese characters are printed, i.e. Mongolian (ancient Uyghur script), Uyghur (Arabic 
script), Zhuang (Latin script), and Tibetan (Tibetan script).  
It was reported that by 2007, over 60 million PRC citizens were using various ethnic 
minority languages, while close to 30 million PRC citizens were using various ethnic 
minority scripts (Zhang 2015, 132). Languages associated with ethnic minority categories 
are taught in two types of pre-tertiary schools, those whose instruction is conducted in 
such languages and those where such languages are taught as a subject while the 
language of instruction for most curricula is Mandarin Chinese. Starting the early 2000s, 
titular-language education at the preschool, primary, secondary, and tertiary levels has 
been formally enshrined in relevant legal documents in certain ethno-regions (e.g. Nei 
Mongol118) but shrinking in other ethno-regions (e.g. Xinjiang). Nevertheless, options to 
take college entrance exams (Chinese: gaokao) in such languages as Mongolian, Uyghur, 
                                                          
118 Public Announcement No. 24 of the standing committee of the 12th People’s Congress of the NMAR, 
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Tibetan, Kazakh, Korean, and Yi remain open to high school students, and preferential 
treatments such as lower admission thresholds and bonus scores for exam-sitters of ethnic 
minority categories have been in practice since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Under 
circumstances where inter-ethnic boundaries tend to ambiguous, preferential treatments 
would incentivize parents to register their children as “ethnic minority” rather than ethnic 
Han. 
Preferential treatment in terms of family planning allows ethnic minority citizens to have 
one more child than ethnic Han couples in most of the provincial-level units of PRC. In 
XUAR, notably, starting July 2017119, regardless of ethnicity, all urban-based couples are 
allowed to have two children, and all rural-based couples three children. In this sense, 
ethnically-based preferential treatments in terms of family planning in Xinjiang have 
been terminated. 
The notion of the “Chinese nation” (Chinese: zhonghua minzu) corresponding to a 
community of all PRC citizens regardless of ethnicity has been promoted since Jiang 
Zemin’s term as the general secretary of CCP. Since the 18th National Congress of the 
CCP, the party general secretary Xi Jinping has been proposing that “Chinese nation” be 
engineered as a community of “diversity in one”120, where ethnically-based identities 
should be reconciled and integrated with nation-based identifications with the PRC state 
and citizenship. The qualitative difference of Xi’s “diversity in one” from Jiang’s super-
ethnic community seems to be a stronger emphasis upon inter-ethnic “amalgamation,” 
                                                          
119 “Maternity leave extended to 60 days in the newly revised XUAR Population and Family Planning 
Regulations,” [in Chinese] Tianshannet http://news.ts.cn/content/2017-07/28/content_12754730.htm 
(accessed July 31, 2017). 
120 Jin Binghao, “A tentative study of Xi Jinping’s understandings of “Chinese nation” since the 18th 





according to which the PRC party-state would aim at promoting greater inter-ethnic 
cultural similarity and socio-economic integration. 
The rest of the chapter introduces a conceptual framework and applies it to a controlled 
comparison of Xinjiang and Tatarstan. The framework conceptualizes ethnic territorially-
based autonomy in two separate modes, autonomy as prescriptive institution and 
autonomy as implemented outcome. Autonomy as prescriptive institution in China and 
Russia will be compared first, followed by measuring and comparison of autonomy as 
implemented outcomes. 
 
AUTONOMY AS PRESCRIPTIVE INSTITUTION 
In Chapter 2, formal institutions of ethnic territorially-based autonomy is conceptualized 
as territorially-based power-sharing arrangements distinguishing an ethno-regional state 
from the central-state, in which a specific territory is formally attached to and designated 
for a specific ethnic category, usually a minority category, and in which elites of that 
ethic category are supposed to be adequately represented in the decision-makings in the 
ethno-regional state governing that territory. This conceptualization treats ethnic 
territorially-based autonomy as prescriptive, formal institutions stipulating how authority 
is supposed to be shared between the ethno-regional state and the central-state to ensure 
political participation, economic development, as well as cultural promotion among the 
titular populations of such ethno-regions. Such institutions are usually embodied in the 
relevant legally-binding documents that legitimate and delimit the expected roles of both 





Such expected roles can differ across the respective combination of legal documents 
governing different pairs of central-verusus-ethno-regional relations. For ethno-regions in 
China, the governing documents as of most recently are the PRC Constitution mostly 
recently amended in 2004 and the LERA of PRC most recently revised in 2001. For 
ethno-regions in Russia, the governing documents usually encompass the 1993 RF 
Constitution (hereafter CRF) and the Constitution of ethnic republics (e.g. Constitution of 
the Republic of Tatarstan, hereafter CRT). In the case of Tatarstan, a third document, the 
2007 Treaty RFRT, has also been serving as baseline. In the following three sub-sections, 
I outline the expected roles of both central and ethno-regional states as prescribed in the 
relevant legal documents on three dimensions, titular political participation, ethno-
regional economic development, and titular cultural promotion. 
 
Titular political participation 
China 
In China, the ethno-regional state is defined as both local extensions of the central-state 
and state organs of autonomy (Chinese: zizhi jiguan) over particularly delimited areas of 
jurisdictions in both the PRC Constitution and the LERA (LERA 2001, Article 4; CPRC 
2004, Article 115). The types of ethno-regional state organs designated to practice 
autonomy are the ethno-regional121 “People’s Government” (Chinese: renmin zhengfu) 
and “People’s Congresses” (Chinese: renmin daibiao dahui,). People’s Governments of 
ethno-regions should report to People’s Congresses at the same administrative level and 
                                                          





to governments at the next higher administrative level, or to the standing committee of 
ethno-regional People’s Congresses when they are not in session (LERA 2001, Article 
15; CPRC 2004, Article 112). Ethno-regional People’s Governments are also subordinate 
to the PRC State Council (LERA 2001, Article 15). In the event of an enforcement 
decision from a higher-level state authority considered not suiting the “actual conditions” 
(Chinese: shiji qingkuang) of an ethno-region, the ethno-regional state may appeal to the 
higher-level state either to implement the higher-level decision adaptively or not to carry 
out the decision whatsoever. In that scenario, the higher-level state is supposed to furnish 
formal response within sixty days of receiving the appeal (LERA 2001, Article 20). 
In the ethno-regional People’s Congress, appropriate representation of deputies of the 
titular ethnicity and of other ethnicities inhabiting the ethno-region is supposed to be 
ensured. In addition, there needs to be at least one citizen of the titular ethnicity to fill the 
position of chairs or vice-chairs of the ethno-region’s standing committee of People’s 
Congress (CPRC 2004, Article 113). The chair of an autonomous region, the prefect of 
an autonomous prefecture, or the head of an autonomous county are expected to be 
citizens of the titular ethnicity of the ethno-region (CPRC 2004, Article 114; LERA 2001, 
Article 17). The central-state is expected to assist in the training of cadres, specialized 
personnel, and skilled workers in ethno-regions who would be competent to fill the key 
positions in the ethno-regional state organs (CPRC 2004, Article 122). The number and 
proportion of deputies to the People’s Congress of an ethno-region for both the titular 
ethnicity and other ethnicities inhabiting the ethno-region are supposed to be determined 
by the standing committee of the relevant provincial-level People’s Congress and to be 





Of those who formally chair the standing committee of the People’s Congress of an 
ethno-region, at least one citizen of the titular ethnicity should be appointed (LERA 2001, 
Article 16). 
The cadres employed by the state organs of an ethno-region should be proportionally 
drawn from citizens of both the titular ethnicity and other ethnicities inhabiting the ethno-
region (LERA 2001, Article 18). Towards that vision, training of cadres, specialized 
personnel, and skilled workers is supposed to be conducted, and ethnic minority cadres 
should be preferentially hired (LERA 2001, Articles 22, 70). In their recruiting of 
personnel, enterprises (Chinese: qiye) and non-entrepreneurial institutions (Chinese: shiye 
danwei) are supposed to preferentially enlist employees from ethnic minority 
populations, especially from those resident in rural and pastoral areas (LERA 2001, 
Article 23). 
Ethno-regional People’s Congress has the authority to enact autonomy regulations 
(Chinese: zizhi tiaoli) and separate regulations (Chinese: danxing tiaoli, CPRC 2004, 
Article 116; LERA 2001, Article 19). An ethno-region is allowed to organize its local 
public security forces (CPRC 2004, Article 120; LERA 2001, Article 24). Ethno-
regional-level People’s Courts (Chinese: renmin fayuan) and People’s Procuratorates 
(Chinese: renmin jianchayuan) are not autonomy-practicing state organs. Instead, they 
are subordinate solely to higher level organs. Nevertheless, some of the positions chairing 
ethno-regional-level People’s Courts and People’s Procuratorates are supposed to be 
filled by citizens of the titular ethnicity of the ethno-region (LERA 2001, Article 46). 
In terms of managing inter-ethnic relations, the LERA stipulates group-level equal rights 





mandated to support all of its recognized ethnic categories, including both concentrated 
and scattered ones (Article 50), to conduct full consultation with representatives of 
various ethnic categories (Article 51), and to promote ideas about common allegiance to 




In Russia, constituent entities such as ethnic republics of the RF are entitled to 
independently establish system of state organs at the sub-national level. Meanwhile, 
executive organs of RF and executive organs of constituent entities of the RF are also 
expected to form a unified system of executive power (CRF 1993, Article 77). The 
Constitution of the RT stipulates separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, 
while the RT President, State Soviet (Russian: gosudarstvennyi sovyet; Tatar: dəülət 
sovyet)122, Cabinet of Ministers (Russian: kabinet ministrov; Tatar: ministrlar kabinetı), 
and courts at different levels constitute the Tatarstani state. Executive power is exercised 
by the RT Cabinet of Ministers. In their exercises of authority, they are expected to take 
into account the historical, ethnic, and other peculiarities of Tatarstan (CRT 1992, Article 
9). 
The RT State Soviet consists of 100 deputies. In order to be elected deputy to the State 
Soviet, one has to be a citizen of RT reaching the age of 21 (CRT 1992, Article 69). To 
be elected President of Tatarstan, one has to be a citizen of RT no younger than 30 and is 
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required to know competently both state languages of Tatarstan, i.e. Tatar and Russian 
(CRT 1992, Article 91; Treaty RFRT, Article 2.5). The State Soviet of the RT serves as 
the legislative organ (Tatar: zakon chıgaru organı) of the RT (CRT 1992, Articles 67-88). 
The Cabinet of Ministers of the RT serves as the executive organ (Tatar: bashkarma 
organı) of the RT (CRT 1992, Articles 99-105). The President of RT serves term on a 
five-year basis but cannot serve more than two terms consecutively (CRT 1992, Articles 
89-98). Judicial power in Tatarstan is supposed to be wielded by a hierarchical system of 
courts including the Supreme Court of the RT (Tatar: yugarı məxkəməse), Constitutional 
Court of the RT (Tatar: konstitutsyon məxkəməse), Arbitration Court of the RT (Tatar: 
arbitrazh məxkəməse), and sub-republic-level courts (CRT 1992, Articles 106-115). 
According to the RF Constitution, ethnic republics can establish their own constitutions 
and legislatures. The ethno-federal structure of RF is founded upon the territorial 
integrity of Russia, upon unified state power, upon delimitation of jurisdictions between 
the central state and the constituent entities, and upon equality and “self-determination” 
of various “nationalities” of RF (CRF 1993, Article 5). The state power of constituent 
entities of RF is exercised by the organs established by them (CRF 1993, Article 11.2). 
The delimitation of jurisdiction between RF and its constituent entities is exercised 
according to the present constitution and to the treaties reached between RF and its 
constituent entities (CRF 1993, Article 11.3). Outside the areas of jurisdictions solely 
wielded by the RF or jointly wielded by RF and its constituent entities, the constituent 
entities wield full authority (CRF 1993, Article 73). In the areas of jurisdictions solely 
wielded by the RF or jointly wielded by RF and its constituent entities, federal laws 





76). RF constitution prevails in the event of treaties contradicting the constitution (CRF 
1993, Statement 1 of Section II). 
Concerning the legally defined relations between RT and the federal state, Tatarstan is 
defined as both a “state” united with RF and its constituent entity (Tatar: berləshkən həm 
subyektı bulgan) on the basis of the RF Constitution, the RT Constitution, and the Treaty 
RFRT. According to the 2007 Treaty RFRT, Tatarstan is defined as a constituent entity of 
the RF while possessing full state authority beyond areas solely under the jurisdiction of 
the RF and beyond powers of the RF with regard to matters under the joint authority of 
the RF and RT (Treaty RFRT 2007, Articles 1, 2.1). The state authority of RT is 
supposed to maintain a corresponding representative office under the President of the RF 
in Moscow (Treaty RFRT 2007, Article 4).  
Outside the scope of authority wielded by RF or jointly by RF and RT, the RT is a 
sovereign state, whose sovereignty is an unalienable property (CRT 1992, Article 1.1). 
The status of the RT cannot be changed or altered unless on the basis of mutual consent 
between RF and RT. RT’s borders cannot be changed without its consent (CRT 1992, 
Article 1.3). The RT can establish and exercise its own normative rules and regulations. 
Such republic-specific rules and regulations is expected to prevail in the event of 
contradictions between RT rules and RF laws (CRT 1992, Article 4). Tatarstan has its 
own citizenship. Those RF citizens who constantly reside in Tatarstan are also citizens of 
RT, while RT citizens are simultaneously RF citizens (CRT 1992, Articles 21, 22). The 
Treaty between the RF and the RT is part of the legal system of both RF and RT (CRT 





The RT state coordinates with the federal government of RF in rendering support and 
assistance to its compatriots (Russian: sootechestvennik, loosely synonymous with “co-
ethnics”) in their “preservation of identity” and “development of national culture and 
language” (Treaty RFRT 2007, Article 2.4). Support of ethnic Tatars outside Tatarstan is 
also explicitly prescribed in the Constitution of RT (CRT 1992, Article 14). In the 
meantime, the RT state is supposed to “independently” participate in international 
economic affairs (CRT 1992, Article 1.4) and can reach agreement/treaties and share 
jurisdictions with sub-national entities outside Russia and participate in international 
organizations (CRT 1992, Article 6). Tatarstan can develop relationships, reach 
agreements and treaties, share jurisdictions, form organizations with other constituent 
entities of Russia (CRT 1992, Article 7). In the 2007 Treaty RFRT, more specific 
guidelines are provided with regard to how the RT state is supposed to conduct 
international economic relations: RT, within its competence, can carry out economic 
relations internationally with sub-national-level units of foreign states, participate in the 
activities of international organizations specially created for the purpose of sub-national-
level co-operations and sign agreements for the implementation of international economic 
relations. Such activities should be conducted in coordination with the Ministry of 







Ethno-regional economic development 
China 
In China, ethno-regions, especially provincial-level ones, are required to devise their own 
developmental strategies and plans under the guidance of the central-state (LERA 2001, 
Article 25; CPRC 2004, Article 118). Ethno-regional states should promote diverse 
ownership structure, ensure that key role is played by public ownership (LERA 2001, 
Article 26) and protect forests and grasslands (LERA 2001, Article 27). The central-state 
is expected to assist ethno-regions in terms of formulating developmental strategies, 
banking, financial, material, and technical supports by taking into account the 
peculiarities of such ethno-regions (LERA 2001, Article 55; CPRC 2004, Article 122).  
Ethno-regions are supposed to “rationally” exploit natural resources (LERA 2001, Article 
28) while improving ecological environments against pollution and hazards (LERA 2001, 
Article 45). The central-state should somehow compensate for the negative ecological 
effects of natural resources exploitations in ethno-regions (LERA 2001, Articles 65-66). 
The central-state is also expected to give priority to infrastructure buildings in ethno-
regions by means of favorable investment policies, reducing matching funds by ethno-
regions, encouraging skillful personnel to work for ethno-regions, providing necessary 
technologies and equipment, etc. (LERA 2001, Article 56). Both the central and ethno-
regional-level states are prescribed to support enterprises in ethno-regions in their 
exchanging of know-hows with enterprises outside the ethno-regions, in particular ethno-
regional pharmaceutical enterprises (LERA 2001, Articles 30, 58, 60). Enterprises 
affiliated to the central-state but based in ethno-regions are supposed to preferentially 





Ethno-regional states’ financings are integral parts of the unified state financial system, 
where ethno-regions should receive preferential transfer payments from the central-state 
while setting up their own reserve funds (LERA 2001, Article 32). On one hand, ethno-
regional states are supposed to autonomously administer finances by determining the 
standards of expenditure, the sizes of their personnel, as well as the workloads for such 
personnel (LERA 2001, Article 32; CPRC, Article 117). On the other hand, ethno-
regional states are supposed to employ policies of tax reductions or tax exemptions 
(LERA 2001, Article 34) in support of local businesses while operating and regulating 
local commercial banks and credit unions (LERA 2001, Article 35). With regard to 
investment, the central-state is expected to use combination of currency market and 
capital market to support ethno-regions by encouraging financial organizations to 
increase fixed assets investment and to provide favorable loan terms, etc. (LERA 2001, 
Article 57). Special funds should be established for economic and cultural development 
in ethno-regions (LERA 2001, Article 59), while central-state’s transfer payments to 
ethno-regions should increase as central-state’s revenue increases (LERA 2001, Article 
62). 
In the managing of human capital, ethno-regional states are required to regulate and to 
monitor “floating populations” (Chinese: liudong renkou), or those who have been living 
outside the localities of their household registrations (Chinese: hukou) (LERA 2001, 
Article 43). Family planning applies to all citizens of ethno-regions regardless of their 
ethnic categories (LERA 2001, Article 44), while ethno-regional states and the central-






Ethno-regions are encouraged to engage in international trade and to set up trading posts 
(Chinese: maoyi kou’an) while receiving preferential treatment from the central-state in 
these aspects (LERA 2001, Article 31). Ethno-regional states, in their managing of local 
economy, are supposed to develop comparative advantages for the ethno-regions (LERA 
2001, Article 61). Multilayered and multifaceted exchange programs between 
economically “more advanced” areas and ethno-regions should be introduced (LERA 
2001, Article 64). 
 
Russia 
The Constitution of the RT provides very general guidelines about how the Tatarstani 
state is supposed to manage and to develop its economy: the RT should follow the model 
of socialist market economy (Tatar: sotsyal bazar xucalıgı) featuring diverse ownerships 
and significant role of the public sector (CRT 1992, Article 17). The RT state is required 
to protect private, state, and collective properties (CRT 1992, Article 18). These 
properties are non-violable and cannot be unlawfully seized (CRT 1992, Article 19). 
The RT state should endeavor to coordinate consumer-producer and labor-capital 
relationships without interfering with the productive activities of owners and workers. 
Meanwhile, the RT state is expected to devise developmental programs while using 
budgetary, fiscal, infrastructural, investment, credit, pricing policies to regulate the 
economy (CRT 1992, Article 17). Concretely, the RT state prohibits monopolies or unfair 
competitions and should promote small and medium size enterprises (CRT 1992, Article 
20). In the meantime, the RT state is supposed to strike the balance between utilization 






Titular cultural promotion 
China 
According to the LERA, both the central-state and ethno-regional states should invest in 
educational institutions. Ethnic minority students should be preferentially recruited, while 
minzu colleges and pedagogical institutes should be established to train teachers who 
would work in ethno-regions (LERA 2001, Article 71). Ethno-regional-level states are 
supposed to determine the contour of the educational system, especially in terms of the 
forms, curricula, and languages used in instruction (LERA 2001, Article 36). Boarding 
schools should be established in urban centers for ethnic minority students from remote 
rural areas, and such schools should be subsidized (LERA 2001, Article 37). Ethno-
regional-level states are expected to promote both the use of ethnic languages and the 
teaching of simplified Chinese characters in schools while supporting publication and 
translation in ethnic minority languages and scripts (LERA 2001, Article 37). They are 
also supposed to invest into local knowledge-producing institutions as means to promote 
cultural heritages (LERA 2001, Article 38) while formulating plans on the promotion of 
science and technology (LERA 2001, Article 39). Ethno-regional states should contrive 
to develop health services together with both modern and traditional medicines, while 
actively monitoring public health issues and sanitary conditions (LERA 2001, Article 
40). Ethno-regional states should promote sports and physical fitness (LERA 2001, 
Article 41) and are allowed to engage in cultural exchanges both within China and 





Ethno-regional state organs should guarantee the “freedom of religious belief” (Chinese: 
zongjiao xinyang ziyou) to citizens regardless of their ethnic categories. State organs, 
organizations, or individuals are prohibited from forcing citizens either to believe in or 
not to believe in any religion and from discriminating against citizens according to 
whether they believe in any religion or not. Ethno-regional state protects “normal” 
(Chinese: zhengchang) religious activities. However, individuals are not allowed to 
disrupt public order, to harm the health of citizens or to interfere with the educational 
system of the state in the name of any religion. Moreover, religious organizations and 
religious affairs cannot be administratively subordinate to any foreign organizations 
(LERA 2001, Article 11).  
Ethno-regional states officially establish what constitutes the commonly used spoken and 
literary language or languages of the ethno-region and employ these language(s) in their 
exercising of authority (CPRC 2004, Article 121; LERA 2001, Articles 21, 36). Ethnic 
minority languages and scripts should be used both in textbooks and as media of 
instruction in schools where most of the students are recruited from non-Chinese-
speaking ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, teaching of simplified Chinese characters should 
start from certain grade in ethnic-minority-language-instructed primary schools (LERA 
2001, Article 37). Ethno-regional states are supposed to encourage mutual learning of 
languages among cadres of the various ethnic categories. On one hand, ethnic Han cadres 
should learn the language and script of local ethnic minorities. On the other hand, while 
learning and using the language and script associated with their own ethnic categories, 
ethnic minority cadres should also learn Mandarin Chinese and the Chinese characters 





even more languages commonly used in the relevant locality should be awarded (LERA 
2001, Article 49).  
In the hearing and investigation of cases, ethno-regional-level People’s Courts and 
People’s Procuratorates are expected to use the commonly used local languages. They are 
also expected to hire personnel proficient in both the spoken and literary languages used 
among local ethnic minorities. For those involved in cases not familiar with the language 
used by the courts or procuratorates, translation services should be provided. When 
necessary, legal documents can be written in the language or languages commonly used 
in the locality. Citizens of various ethnicities are entitled to use their preferred spoken 
and written languages in court proceedings (LERA 2001, Article 47). 
 
Russia 
The RF is defined as secular with no state religion proclaimed for it, whereas all religious 
organizations are equal in front of the law (CRF 1993, Article 14). The official language 
of RF is solely Russian, while ethnic republics can establish their own state languages in 
addition to Russian (CRF 1993, Article 68). RF guarantees to all ethnic populations 
(Russian: narod) rights to preserve their ethnic languages, to create conditions for the 
study and promotion of these languages (CRF 1993, Article 68).  
In Tatarstan, Tatar and Russian are official languages of the RT on an equal footing (CRT 
1992, Article 8; Treaty RFRT 2007, Article 2.5). Both official languages are supposed to 
be used in a mutually equal status in republic-level state apparatuses and county-level 





constitutionally defined as a secular state, where religious organizations are equal in front 
of the law and separated from the state (CRT 1992, Article 11). RT’s legal documents 
should be published in both Tatar and Russian, wherein contents in both languages 
should correspond to each other and be compatible (CRT 1992, Article 80). On the 
internal passports issued in RT to its citizens, there should be an inserted page printed in 
the Tatar language (Treaty RFRT 2007, Article 3). Moreover, the RT can designate its 
own state symbols (CRT 1992, Articles 121, 122). Ideological diversity is officially 
recognized in Tatarstan, and no state-sponsored ideologies would be allowed to prevail 
(CRT 1992, Article 12.1). The budget of the RT state should support the development of 
“material and spiritual cultures” (Tatar: matdi həm ruxi mədəniyət) for the benefits of the 
entire population (CRT 1992, Article 16.2).  
 
Summary 
Ethno-regional-level states in China are formally sub-national-level extensions of the 
central-state but are also formally designated to practice autonomy in specifically-defined 
areas of jurisdiction. Elite representation at the ethno-regional state organs in China is 
meant to follow a principle balancing both titular priority and equitability among all 
officially recognized ethnic categories of the ethno-region. In Russia, ethno-regional-
level states are formally separate from the central-state in the ethno-federal framework, 
and ethnic republics are entitled to adopt their own constitutions. They are also supposed 
to delimit with the federal government areas of jurisdiction solely under the federal 
government, areas of jurisdictions jointly under the federal government and a republic, 





agreements with the federal government setting up concrete guidelines of power-sharing. 
Ethnic republics like Tatarstan are allowed to actively reach out to co-ethnics of the 
republic’s titular ethnic category living outside the republic and to participate in 
international-level activities in coordination with the federal government.  
In terms of managing and developing the ethno-regional economy, prescriptive autonomy 
institutions in both China and Russia stipulate a combination of market economy with 
important public sector. However, prescriptive autonomy institutions in China are 
explicitly more focused upon central-state’s support of ethno-regions in the forms of 
financial (investment), fiscal, infrastructural, and technical (personnel) assistances than 
those in Russia. Ethno-regions in China are explicitly entitled to receive growing 
amounts of fiscal transfers from the central-state, while something equivalent is not 
explicitly stipulated in Russia. Autonomy as prescriptive institutions in both China and 
Russia formally guarantees the use of titular languages and scripts in ethno-regions in the 
domains of government, education, and public sphere123, while requiring the state 
authorities to be religiously neutral. In Russia, ethnic republics are allowed to designate 
ethno-regional-level state symbols, whereas equivalent privilege is not available for 
ethno-regions in China.  
 
                                                          





MEASURING AUTONOMY: AUTONOMY AS IMPLEMENTED 
OUTCOME 
This section introduces the other mode of the conceptual framework, which measures and 
compares ethno-regions’ degree of actually exercised autonomy in terms of how much of 
what is stipulated in the legally binding covenants establishing the formal autonomy for 
the ethno-region has been empirically implemented in compliance. Such implemented 
outcomes in relation to the baseline (Tsai 2007, 38) set up in the formal, prescriptive 
institutions of ethnic territorially-based autonomy can remarkably differ across respective 
ethno-regions. Conceptually, such outcomes tend to be a medley, involving both state and 
non-state actors, of intended consequences of the formal institutions, circumventions of 
or disregards for the formal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky 2004, 727), informal 
behavioral regularities (727), informal institutions, as well as cultural inheritance (Tsai 
2007, 37). However, since the purview of the section is to measure autonomy as 
implemented outcome as a whole for individual ethno-regions, I will not delve into the 
aforementioned conceptual categories.  
Instead, autonomy as implemented outcome is comprehensively evaluated through an 
instrument I propose. The instrument consists of three dimensions, political participation 
among the ethno-region’s titular population, economic development of the ethno-region, 
and cultural promotion among the ethno-region’s titular population. The instrument will 
score an ethno-region’s performance on each of these dimensions, and the score of each 
dimension will be assigned a weight of 1/3, generating an aggregate score up to 100%. 
The higher the score for an ethno-region, the greater the level of compliance with 





ethno-region in China, the formula with which to calculate the degree of its actually 
exercised autonomy, A1, is proposed as 
A1 = (p1/9×1/3+e1/8×1/3+c1/6×1/3) ×100% 
For an ethno-region in Russia, the formula with which to calculate the degree of its 
actually exercised autonomy, A2, is proposed as 
A2 = (p2/10×1/3+e2/6×1/3+c2/6×1/3) ×100% 
 
Titular political participation 
China 
The implemented autonomy outcome of an ethno-region in China on the dimension of 
political participation among the ethno-region’s titular population will be assigned with a 
total score ranging from 0 to 9 points. If such a score is called p1, then p1 will be 
disaggregated on nine sub-dimensions. An ethno-region’s performance on each of these 
sub-dimensions is measured according to an ordinal scale of scores assigned to an ordinal 
scale of either dichotomous categories or indexes taking more than two values. Sub-
dimensions considered necessary attributes of autonomy as practically implemented can 
take the value of 0 if empirically evidence points to the absence of such attributes. 
The following sub-dimensions are assessed on an ordinal scale of dichotomous 
categories. Accordingly, an ethno-region’s score on these sub-dimensions will take one 





P1. Has there been incidence of central-state’s mandates formally claimed as not suiting 
the ethno-region’s conditions by the ethno-regional state? If yes, the score will be 1. If 
no, then the score will be 0.5. 
P2. Has there been systematic training of ethnic minority cadres or not? If yes, the score 
will be 1. If no, then the score will be 0. 
P3. Has there been formal consultation with representatives of various ethnic populations 
or not? If yes, the score will be 1. If no, then the score will be 0.5. 
P4. Is the Chair of the ethno-region of titular category or not? If yes, the score will be 1. 
If no, then the score will be 0.  
The following sub-dimensions are assessed on an ordinal scale of three categories. 
Accordingly, an ethno-region’s score on these sub-dimensions will take one of the three 
mutually discrete values: 
P5. Has there been practice of preferential treatment of ethnic minorities for recruitment 
in ethno-regional state apparatus or in state-owned enterprises? If yes, the score will be 1. 
If moderately yes, then the score will be 0.75. If such practice is totally absent, then the 
score will be 0. 
P6. Have autonomy regulations or separate regulations ever been enacted or not? If 
regulations of both types have been enacted, then the score will be 1. If separate 
regulations have been enacted but no autonomy regulations, then the score will be 0.5. If 





P7. As regards representation of the titular population in the ethno-regional-level 
People’s Congress, if for a specific time frame, the proportion of titular representatives in 
the total number of representatives at the ethno-regional-level People’s Congress is 
higher than or equals the population share of the titular group in the total population of 
the ethno-region, then the score will be 1. If for a specific time frame, the proportion of 
titular representatives in the total number of representatives is lower than the population 
share of the titular group in the total population of the ethno-region, then the score will be 
0.5. If titular representation is completely absent in ethno-regional-level People’s 
Congress, then the score will be 0. 
P8. As regards proportionality of titular cadres to titular population, if for a specific time 
frame, the proportion of titular cadres in the total number of cadres working for party and 
state apparatuses combined exceeds or equals the population share of the titular group in 
the total population of the ethno-region, then the score will be 1. If for a specific time 
frame, the proportion of titular cadres in the total number of cadres working for party and 
state apparatuses combined is lower than the population share of the titular group in the 
total population of the ethno-region, then the score will be 0.5. If titular cadres are 
completely absent in the ethno-region, then the score will be 0. 
P9. As regards proportion of titular-category chairs and vice-chairs at the ethno-regional-
level People’s Congress, if for a specific time frame, the proportion of titular-category 
chairs and vice-chairs in the total number of chairs and vice-chairs at the ethno-regional-
level People’s Congress exceeds or equals the population share of the titular group in the 
total population of the ethno-region, then the score will be 1. If for a specific time frame, 





vice-chairs at the ethno-regional-level People’s Congress is lower than the population 
share of the titular group in the total population of the ethno-region, then the score will be 
0.5. If titular-category chairs are completely absent in the ethno-regional-level People’s 
Congress, then the score will be 0. 
 
Russia 
The implemented autonomy outcome of an ethno-region in Russia on the dimension of 
political participation among the ethno-region’s titular population will be assigned with a 
total score ranging from 0 to 10 points. If such a score is called p2, then p2 will be 
disaggregated on ten sub-dimensions. An ethno-region’s performance on each of these 
sub-dimensions is measured according to an ordinal scale of scores assigned to an ordinal 
scale of dichotomous categories taking two mutually discrete values or of three categories 
taking more than two values. Such sub-dimensions include: 
P1. Has there been separate system of state organs in the ethno-region from the federal 
one? If yes, the score will be 1. If no, then the score will be 0. 
P2. Has there been formal separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers or not? 
If yes, the score will be 1. If no, then the score will be 0.5. 
P3. Does the incumbent president (or executive head of the ethno-region) meet the 
eligibilities defined in the legally binding documents or not? If yes, the score will be 1. If 
no, then the score will be 0. 
P4. Does the ethno-region have its own normative rules and regulations or not? If yes, the 





P5. Does the ethno-region have representative office under President of RF or not? If yes, 
the score will be 1. If no, then the score will be 0. 
P6. Does the ethno-region have representative office(s) outside the border of RF? If yes, 
the score will be 1. If no, then the score will be 0.5. 
P7. Does the ethno-region have treaties or agreements with other constituent entities of 
RF? If yes, the score will be 1. If no, then the score will be 0.5. 
P8. Does the ethno-region provide support to those living outside the ethno-region but of 
the ethno-region’s titular ethnic category? If yes, the score will be 1. If no, then the score 
will be 0.5. 
P9. As regards representation of the titular population in the legislative organ of the 
ethno-region, if for a specific time frame, the proportion of titular deputies in the total 
number of deputies in the ethno-regional legislative organ is higher than or equals the 
population share of the titular group in the total population of the ethno-region, then the 
score will be 1. If for a specific time frame, the proportion of titular deputies in the total 
number of deputies is lower than the population share of the titular group in the total 
population of the ethno-region, then the score will be 0.5. If titular deputies are 
completely absent in the legislative organ, then the score will be 0. 
P10. As regards representation of the titular population in the executive organ of the 
ethno-region, if for a specific time frame, the proportion of titular ministers in the total 
number of ministers in the ethno-regional executive organ is higher than or equals the 
population share of the titular group in the total population of the ethno-region, then the 





number of ministers is lower than the population share of the titular group in the total 
population of the ethno-region, then the score will be 0.5. If titular ministers are 
completely absent in the executive organ, then the score will be 0. 
 
Ethno-regional economic development 
China 
The implemented autonomy outcome of an ethno-region in China on the dimension of 
ethno-regional economic development will be assigned with a total score ranging from 0 
to 8 points. If such a score is called e1, then e1 will be disaggregated on eight sub-
dimensions. An ethno-region’s performance on each of these sub-dimensions is measured 
according to an ordinal scale of scores assigned to an ordinal scale of either dichotomous 
categories or indexes taking more than two values. Again, sub-dimensions considered 
necessary attributes of autonomy as practically implemented can take the value of 0 if 
empirically evidence points to the absence of such attributes. 
E1. Is the ethno-region a “donor” region or not? If yes, the score will be 1. If no, then the 
score will be 0.5. An ethno-region qualifies as a “donor” region if it contributes more to 
the central government’s budget than it receives from the central government in the form 
of fiscal transfers. This sub-dimension is a proxy for the overall affluence and 
productivity of a given ethno-region relative to the national average. 
E2. Have there been special funds set up or not for the ethno-region? If yes, the score will 





E3. Have fiscal transfer payments been increasing or not? If yes, the score will be 1. If 
no, then the score will be 0.5. 
E4. Central-state’s-transfer-to-ethno-regional-revenue ratio is a proxy for the ethno-
region’s capacity to strike the balance between financial self-sufficiency and ability to 
procure financial transfers from the central-state. If the ratio is higher than 0 but no 
higher than 1, then the score will be 1. Then the ratio is higher than 1, then the score will 
be 0.5. 
E5. As regards GDP per capita of an ethno-region, if it exceeds or equals the national 
average, then the score will be 1. If it is lower than the national average, then the score 
will 0.5. 
E6. As regards an ethno-region’s unemployment rate, if it is lower than or equals the 
national average, then the score will be 1. If it exceeds the national average, then the 
score will be 0.5. 
E7. As regards development of ethno-regional comparative advantages, if such 
comparative advantages are concentrated in manufacturing sectors and if the ethno-
regional state has been implementing innovative investment policies, then the score will 
be 0.75. If such comparative advantages are concentrated in agricultural or mining 
sectors, then the score will be 0.5. If no such comparative advantages have been 
established, then the score will be 0. This sub-dimension is a proxy for the developmental 
sustainability of a given ethno-region. 
E8. Regarding the proportion of an ethno-region’s expenditures covered by the ethno-





If the proportion is lower than 75% but no lower than 50%, then the score will be 0.5. If 
the proportion is lower than 50%, then the score will be 0.25. This sub-dimension is a 




The implemented autonomy outcome of an ethno-region in Russia on the dimension of 
ethno-regional economic development will be assigned with a total score ranging from 0 
to 6 points. If such a score is called e2, then e2 will be disaggregated on six sub-
dimensions. An ethno-region’s performance on each of these sub-dimensions is measured 
according to an ordinal scale of scores assigned to an ordinal scale of either dichotomous 
categories or indexes taking more than two values. Again, sub-dimensions considered 
necessary attributes of autonomy as practically implemented can take the value of 0 if 
empirically evidence points to the absence of such attributes. 
E1. Is the ethno-region a “donor” region or not? If yes, the score will be 1. If no, then the 
score will be 0.5. An ethno-region qualifies as a “donor” region if it contributes more to 
the federal government’s budget than it receives from the federal government in the form 
of fiscal transfers. This sub-dimension is a proxy for the overall affluence and 
productivity of a given ethno-region relative to the national average. 
E2. Central-state’s-transfer-to-ethno-regional-revenue ratio is a proxy for the ethno-
region’s capacity to strike the balance between financial self-sufficiency and ability to 





no higher than 1, then the score will be 1. Then the ratio is higher than 1, then the score 
will be 0.5. 
E3. As regards GDP per capita of an ethno-region, if it exceeds or equals the national 
average, then the score will be 1. If it is lower than the national average, then the score 
will 0.5. 
E4. As regards an ethno-region’s unemployment rate, if it is lower than or equals the 
national average, then the score will be 1. If it exceeds the national average, then the 
score will be 0.5. 
E5. As regards development of ethno-regional comparative advantages, if such 
comparative advantages are concentrated in manufacturing sectors and if the ethno-
regional state has been implementing innovative investment policies, then the score will 
be 0.75. If such comparative advantages are concentrated in agricultural or mining 
sectors, then the score will be 0.5. If no such comparative advantages have been 
established, then the score will be 0. This sub-dimension is a proxy for the developmental 
sustainability of a given ethno-region. 
E6. Regarding the proportion of an ethno-region’s expenditures covered by the ethno-
region’s own revenues, if the proportion exceeds or equals 75%, then the score will be 1. 
If the proportion is lower than 75% but no lower than 50%, then the score will be 0.5. If 
the proportion is lower than 50%, then the score will be 0.25. This sub-dimension is a 







Titular cultural promotion 
China 
The implemented autonomy outcome of an ethno-region in China on the dimension of 
cultural promotion among the ethno-region’s titular population will be assigned with a 
total score ranging from 0 to 6 points. If such a score is called c1, then c1 will be 
disaggregated on six sub-dimensions. An ethno-region’s performance on each of these 
sub-dimensions is measured according to an ordinal scale of scores assigned to an ordinal 
scale of either dichotomous categories or indexes taking more than two values. Again, 
sub-dimensions considered necessary attributes of autonomy as practically implemented 
can take the value of 0 if empirically evidence points to the absence of such attributes. 
C1. As regards the use of the titular language and scripts in the ethno-regional-level 
government, if the titular language has been dominant in both formal and informal 
conducts of the ethno-regional-level governmental apparatuses, then the score will be 1. 
If the titular language has been dominant not in formal but in informal conducts of the 
ethno-regional-level governmental apparatuses, then the score will be 0.75. If the lingua 
franca of the multi-ethnic central-state has been dominant, then the score will be 0.5. 
C2. As regards the use of the titular language and scripts in public sphere, if formal use of 
the titular language has been present in academic institutions, print media (books, 
newspapers, magazines), radio and TV, internet, and if there has been ubiquitous 
informal, conversational use of the titular language, then the score will be 1. If formal use 
of the titular language has been present in academic institutions, print media (books, 
newspapers, magazines), radio and TV, internet, and if there has been noticeable, but not 





C3. Has the official historiography of the ethno-region been promoting debates or not? If 
there have been competing historical narratives with debates, then the score will be 1. If 
there has been strictly controlled historiography discouraging debates, then the score will 
be 0. 
C4. Has the ethno-regional state been regulating individual citizens’ practices of religion 
or not? If the state has been regulating mostly the forms and interpretations of religious 
practices, then the score will be 1. If the state has been regulating not only the forms and 
interpretations of religious practices but also those who are allowed to practice and those 
who are not, then the score will be 0.5. 
C5. Has there been preferential treatment of the titular population in terms of 
matriculating students or not? If yes, the score will be 1. If no, then the score will be 0. 
C6. As regards the use of the titular language and scripts in education, if learning of the 
titular language has been made mandatory for all students in pre-tertiary education while 
being used as medium of instruction for some students, and if the titular language has 
been used to some extent in higher education, then the score will be 1.If the titular 
language is not mandatory for all students in pre-tertiary education but still is used as 
medium of instruction for some students, and if the titular language has been used to 
some extent in higher education, then the score will be 0.75. If the titular language has 
been used as medium of instruction for some subjects only or merely taught as a subject 
in pre-tertiary education, and if the titular language is barely used in higher education, 







The implemented autonomy outcome of an ethno-region in Russia on the dimension of 
cultural promotion among the ethno-region’s titular population will also be assigned with 
a total score ranging from 0 to 6 points. If such a score is called c2, then c2 will be 
disaggregated on six sub-dimensions. An ethno-region’s performance on each of these 
sub-dimensions is measured according to an ordinal scale of scores assigned to an ordinal 
scale of either dichotomous categories or indexes taking more than two values. Again, 
sub-dimensions considered necessary attributes of autonomy as practically implemented 
can take the value of 0 if empirically evidence points to the absence of such attributes. 
C1. As regards the use of the titular language and scripts in the ethno-regional-level 
government, if the titular language has been dominant in both formal and informal 
conducts of the ethno-regional-level governmental apparatuses, then the score will be 1. 
If the titular language has been dominant not in formal but in informal conducts of the 
ethno-regional-level governmental apparatuses, then the score will be 0.75. If the lingua 
franca of the multi-ethnic central-state has been dominant, then the score will be 0.5. 
C2. As regards the use of the titular language and scripts in public sphere, if formal use of 
the titular language has been present in academic institutions, print media (books, 
newspapers, magazines), radio and TV, internet, and if there has been ubiquitous 
informal, conversational use of the titular language, then the score will be 1. If formal use 
of the titular language has been present in academic institutions, print media (books, 
newspapers, magazines), radio and TV, internet, and if there has been noticeable, but not 





C3. Has the official historiography of the ethno-region been promoting debates or not? If 
there have been competing historical narratives with debates, then the score will be 1. If 
there has been strictly controlled historiography discouraging debates, then the score will 
be 0. 
C4. Has the ethno-regional state been regulating individual citizens’ practices of religion 
or not? If the ethno-regional state has been regulating mostly the forms and 
interpretations of religious practices, then the score will be 1. If the ethno-regional state 
has been regulating not only the forms and interpretations of religious practices but also 
those who are allowed to practice and those who are not, then the score will be 0.5. 
C5. Have the ethno-regional state’s legally defined symbols been broadly used or not? If 
they have been broadly used, the score will be 1. If they have rarely been used, then the 
score will be 0. 
C6. As regards the use of the titular language and scripts in education, if learning of the 
titular language has been made mandatory for all students in pre-tertiary education while 
being used as medium of instruction for some students, and if the titular language has 
been used to some extent in higher education, then the score will be 1.If the titular 
language is not mandatory for all students in pre-tertiary education but still is used as 
medium of instruction for some students, and if the titular language has been used to 
some extent in higher education, then the score will be 0.75. If the titular language has 
been used as medium of instruction for some subjects only or merely taught as a subject 
in pre-tertiary education, and if the titular language is barely used in higher education, 





The next two sections apply the instrument proposed in this section to scoring 
implemented autonomy outcomes for the first six years of the 2010s of Xinjiang and 
Tatarstan. 
 
AUTONOMY OUTCOME IN XINJIANG 
Titular political participation 
Throughout the first six years of the 2010s, not a single incidence has been reported of 
central-state’s decisions formally claimed as not suiting the ethno-region’s “conditions” 
by XUAR ethno-regional People’s Government or People’s Congress. In fact, it was 
largely the “Xinjiang Work” Forum (Chinese: xinjiang gongzuo zuotanhui)124 organized 
by CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council at the central-state level that sets the 
tone and determined the suitability of central-state’s mandates to XUAR. Accordingly, 
XUAR receives a score of 0.5 on dimension P1. 
There has been systematic training of ethnic minority cadres in XUAR for party-state 
apparatuses. Such cadres are drawn from ethnic categories of Uyghur, Kazakh, Hui, 
Kyrgyz, Mongol (Oiratic), Xibe, Uzbek, Tatar, Daur, Dongxiang, Tajik (Pamiri), etc. and 
most often enrolled either full-time or part-time in higher education institutions or in 
party schools (Chinese: dangxiao) at the central, ethno-regional, or prefectural levels. 
Some of the party schools are formally affiliated to specific departments of XUAR 
People’s Government. The faculty of party schools may conduct policy studies or 
                                                          
124 The first Xinjiang Work Forum was held in Beijing in 2010 under Hu Jintao’s service as the CCP general 






lectures either in Mandarin Chinese or in titular languages (e.g. Uyghur, Kazakh). Since 
2014, up to 200,000 cadres regardless of ethnicity have been required to station 
themselves on usually a one-year term in economically underdeveloped, ethnic-minority-
concentrated villages throughout XUAR125. These cadres have been mandated to work on 
poverty-reduction, policy promotion, infrastructural and agricultural improvements, 
teaching of Mandarin Chinese, and so forth126. Overall, XUAR receives 1 point on 
dimension P2. 
The XUAR party-state apparatuses conduct formalistic consultation with those 
designated as “representatives” of various ethnic populations by holding forums, visiting 
families, etc. Nevertheless, these representatives usually are themselves cadres affiliated 
to either party or state apparatuses. Themes of formal consultations tend to be more 
focused on cultural, educational, religious affairs, decisions about personnel 
management127. Usually representatives consulted would engineer their comments in 
endorsing manners. Overall, I assign 1 point to XUAR on dimension P3. 
Throughout the first six years of the 2010s, chairs of the XUAR People’s Government128 
have consistently been drawn from the titular category. Hence the score is 1 for XUAR 
on Dimension P4.  
                                                          
125 Zheng Yanjiang, “Visiting people’s families, benefiting people’s life, connecting people’s heart: the 
Xinjiang model of grass-roots-level governance in China,” [in Chinese] Tianshannet, 
http://news.ts.cn/content/2016-08/29/content_12252819.htm (accessed July 31, 2017). 
126 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on 7 August 2015, 2 March, 10 August of 
2016, March 30 of 2017. 
127 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on 7 August 2015, 2 March, 10 August of 
2016, March 30 of 2017. 
128 Nur Bekri served as the chairman of XUAR between 2008 and 2014. Since 2014, Shöhrət Zakir has been 





Overall, preferential treatment of ethnic minorities for recruitment in ethno-regional 
party-state apparatuses or in SOEs has long been practiced in XUAR. Especially since the 
end of the Cultural Revolution, such preferential recruitment has been systematically and 
continuously implemented, often in the forms of quota-setting or threshold-lowering, 
which stoked resentment among ethnic Han cadres129. Admittedly, nepotism or favoritism 
are not uncommon in preferential recruitments. Nonetheless, ethnic non-Han populations 
are still underrepresented in party-state apparatuses and even more so in SOEs. 
Moreover, preferential treatments of ethnic minorities have been practiced in party 
apparatus not as much as in state apparatuses (Sautman 1998, 94-97). Preferential 
treatments have been more flexible in job markets. For instance, in the Karamay 
Municipality of XUAR, a 20% quota has been set for ethnic minority categories in 
recruitment, while employers in both the public and non-public sectors will be subsidized 
for hiring ethnic minority employees beyond the 20% quota130. Private businesses owned 
by ethnic Han in XUAR tend to prefer hiring ethnic Han workers. Based on a 
comprehensive evaluation of preferential treatments in Xinjiang, XUAR scores 0.75 on 
Dimension P5. 
Since the founding of XUAR, only separate regulations have been enacted. Examples of 
such regulations include the XUAR Regulations on De-extremization adopted on March 
29, 2017, the Regulations on the Use of Languages and Scripts in the XUAR, XUAR 
Population and Family Planning Regulations, XUAR Regulations on Inter-ethnic Unity 
                                                          
129 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on 7 August 2015, 2 March, 10 August of 
2016, March 30 of 2017. 
130 “Subsidization policies to boost employment in the Karamay municipality,” [in Chinese] available at 





and Progress and so forth. Meanwhile, no autonomy regulations have ever been enacted 
(Ji 2013, 124-127). Therefore, the score for XUAR is 0.5 on Dimension P6. 
Of the initial composition of the 12th XUAR People’s Congress in 2013, the proportion of 
ethnic Uyghur representatives in the total number of representatives was 43% (236 out of 
550)131, slightly lower than ethnic Uyghurs’ population share in the total population of 
XUAR as of 2012 at 47.2%132. Of the initial composition of the standing committee of the 
12th XUAR People’s Congress, the proportion of ethnic Uyghur members in the total 
number of members was 37.9% (18 out of 48)133, to an even greater extent lower than 
ethnic Uyghurs’ population share in the total population of XUAR as of 2012. 
Accordingly, XUAR scores 0.5 on Dimension P7.  
The most recent data on the proportion of ethnic minority party-state cadres in XUAR are 
available for 2004 and 2005. In 2004, 51.6% of all party-state cadres of XUAR were of 
ethnic non-Han categories, lower than the population share of ethnic non-Han categories 
at 60.25% (Ji 2013, 99). In 2005, 51.68% of all party-state cadres of XUAR were of 
ethnic non-Han categories, lower than the population share of ethnic non-Han categories 
at 60.42% (Zhu and Wang 2015, 161-165). The titular population of XUAR has more or 
less been underrepresented among party-state cadres in XUAR. Accordingly, I assign a 
score of 0.5 to XUAR on dimension P8.    
                                                          
131 “A list of the names and work positions of the representatives of the 12th XUAR People’s Congress (550 
representatives in total),” [in Chinese] Xinjiang Daily, July 18, 2013. 
132 Statistical Bureau of XUAR, 2016 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook. 
133 “Public Announcement of the 12th XUAR People’s Congress,” [in Chinese] NPC of PRC, available at 






Of the 12th XUAR People’s Congress, the proportion of ethnic Uyghur chairs and vice-
chairs in the total number of chairs and vice-chairs was 33.3% (3 out of 9) in 2013, 
significantly lower than ethnic Uyghurs’ population share in the total population of 
XUAR as of 2012 at 47.2%. As of 2017, this proportion became 30%, with 3 out 10 
chairs and vice-chairs being ethnic Uyghurs. In view of this, the score for XUAR on 
Dimension P9 is also 0.5. To sum up, XUAR scores 6.25 on a scale of 9 for p1. 
 
Ethno-regional economic development 
The ratio between PRC central government’s budgeted transfers to XUAR and XUAR’s 
budgeted tax and non-tax-based revenues was 93.2% for 2015134. The ratio may 
demonstrate that for the fiscal year of 2015, XUAR was almost as reliant upon transfers 
from the central-state as upon revenues of its own ethno-regional sources. Since the data 
are available only for the fiscal year 2015, at least for 2015, XUAR barely scores 1 point 
on Dimension E4. If similar level applied to years 2010 through 2014, then the score 
would apply to the entire period in question.  
The proportion of XUAR’s budgeted expenditures that was covered by XUAR’s own 
budgeted tax or non-tax-based revenues was 36.8% for 2010, 40% for 2011, 40.6% for 
2012, 44.2% for 2013, 45.3% for 2014, and 40% for 2015135. Considering that the 
indicators for the six consecutive years of 2010-2015 never exceed 50%, I assign 0.25 to 
                                                          
134 “Integrated table of budgeted fiscal returns and transfer payments from the central government to 
provincial-level units,” [in Chinese] available at 
http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2015czys/201503/t20150324_1206398.html; Statistical Bureau of the XUAR, 2016 
Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook [in Chinese]. 





XUAR on Dimension E8. For 2016 alone, XUAR contributed only ￥7.06 billion to the 
central government’s budget while receiving ￥247.19 billion of fiscal transfers from the 
central government136. Considering that for the first six years of the 2010s, XUAR’s 
ability to use its own budgeted revenues to cover its budgeted expenditures has never 
surpassed the threshold of 50%, I classify XUAR as a “recipient” region rather than a 
“donor” region and assign 0.5 to XUAR on dimension E1.  
The GDP per capita of XUAR has consistently been significantly lower than the China-
wide GDP per capita for the statistical years of 2010-2015, as is demonstrated in Table 
3.4. What is also shown in Table 3.4. is that XUAR’s registered unemployment rate has 
been consistently lower than the national average of the RF from 2010 through 2015. 
This may somehow be associated with the massive recruitment in XUAR of young 
people regardless of ethnicity into the local police forces and elementary/secondary 
schools since the aftermath of the 2009 violent clashes in Ürümqi. Accordingly, I assign 
to XUAR 0.5 point on dimension E5 and 1 point on E6.  
 
Table 3.4. GDP per capita and registered unemployment rate of the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region and of the People’s Republic of China compared (2010-2015) 
















                                                          
136 XUAR Department of Finances, “Report on the implementation of the 2016 XUAR budget and on the 
draft 2017 XUAR budget.” [in Chinese] available at 

















































rate of China 
(%) 
4.1 4.1 4.1 4.05 4.09 4.05 
a b Converted according to the exchange rates of December 31, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015, from PRC State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/sy/tjsj_hlzjj_inquire (accessed July 31, 2017) 
Sources: 2016 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook (Statistical Bureau of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region); 2014 
China Population & Employment Statistics Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2014); 2015 China Statistical 
Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2015); 2016 China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 
2016). 
 
Since 2015, XUAR has received special funds for major infrastructural projects like the 
construction of Ürümqi metro subways137. Budgeted transfer payments from the central-
state to XUAR have been rising steadily from ￥155.198 billion for 2015, to ￥183.562 
billion for 2016, and to ￥208.529 billion for 2017. Accordingly, XUAR scores 1 on both 
E2 and E3. 
XUAR’s comparative advantages have mostly been concentrated in oil extraction and 
refining. Aside from major oil fields such as Karamay, Tarim, and Turpan-Qumul 
                                                          
137 “Special funds of the central-state supporting 542 major infrastructural projects in Xinjiang,” [in 






(Chinese: tuha youtian), oil refineries in Dushanzi and Poskam/Zepu, steel plant in 
Ürümqi (Chinese: bayi gangtiechang)138, the industrial sector of XUAR is more or less 
underdeveloped. XUAR is best-known in China for its locally-specific agricultural 
produces such as fruits and cash crops such as cotton. However, tax revenues from such 
produces are quite susceptible to their market prices, and the potential of the agricultural 
sector contributing to XUAR’s ethno-regional revenue is modest.  
By the end of 2015, there were over 20 thousand139 private businesses owned by ethnic 
minority entrepreneurs in XUAR, of which around 90% were small enterprises140. Their 
ability to massively employ ethnic minority workers, though significant, is limited. 
Notably, XUAR does feature several relatively large, private enterprises owned by ethnic 
Uyghur entrepreneurs that specialize in Halal food production and grocery chains141. 
Nevertheless, such enterprises mostly rely upon a Xinjiang-based, Muslim-oriented 
market, and their capacity to create jobs is limited142. Meanwhile, innovative industries 
are still rare in XUAR especially in view of the limited research and development 
capability of XUAR-based institutes of science and technologies. The companies XUAR 
has attracted that specialize in innovative goods and services are almost all based in other 
provincial-level units of China, and the construction of industrial parks in Xinjiang has 
                                                          
138 A subsidiary of China’s major steel-producing SOE, China Baowu Steel Group headquartered in 
Shanghai. 
139 “Ethnic enterprises in Xinjiang start using the capital market.” [in Chinese] Tianshannet, 
http://news.ts.cn/content/2015-12/16/content_11916705.htm (accessed July 31, 2017). 
140 Ibid. 
141 The most famous of such enterprises are Ihlas group and Arman group. Both are pioneers of ethnic 
minority-owned private enterprises in China. 





been reliant upon financial aids from those provinces as well. Therefore, XUAR receives 
0.5 point on E7. To sum up, XUAR scores 5.75 on a scale of 8 for e1 
 
Titular cultural promotion 
Most of the meetings or sessions in XUAR governmental apparatuses, whether at the 
ethno-regional or the prefectural level, are conducted in Mandarin Chinese. the Uyghur 
language is mostly used in settings that require party-state cadres to reach out to Uyghur-
speaking masses. Meanwhile, Uyghur is used to a considerable extent in court sessions 
where Uyghur-speaking plaintiffs or defendants are involved, even if legal documents are 
usually first prepared in Chinese then translated into Uyghur. Notably, in those parts of 
Xinjiang where ethnic Uyghurs are concentrated, it has become a usual scene where the 
entirety of court proceedings is formally conducted in Uyghur. Overall, I assign 0.75 to 
XUAR on dimension C1. 
In XUAR, throughout the first six years of the 2010s, Uyghur has been used as medium 
of instruction for some subjects in certain pre-tertiary schools (Chinese: weixiao, Uyghur-
instructed schools) while merely taught as a subject in other pre-tertiary schools 
(Chinese: shuangyu xuexiao, or “bilingual” schools). Other titular languages used as 
medium of instruction in XUAR include Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Oiratic Mongolic, and Xibe. In 
“bilingual” schools, titular languages are taught as subject, and the language of 
instruction is Mandarin Chinese for the rest of the curricula. More emphasis has been 
placed upon the development of Mandarin Chinese knowledge and skills among ethnic 
Uyghur schoolchildren. In higher education, except for the few departments where 





the language of formal instruction is exclusively Mandarin Chinese. Overall, XUAR 
receives 0.5 on dimension C6. 
As regards use of the titular language and scripts in public sphere, Uyghur has been used 
to a limited extent in the publications of Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences but more 
extensively used in print media, radio, TV, and internet. In 2009, a total of 4,865 kinds of 
books, 94 kinds of magazines, and 39 kinds of newspapers were published in ethnic-
minority scripts in XUAR (Economic and Development Department of the PRC State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission & Department of Integrated Statistics of the PRC National 
Bureau of Statistics 2011, 706, 709, 711). Eight publishing houses in XUAR publish 
books in Uyghur. Also in 2009, a total of 216,381 hours plus 21 minutes of Uyghur-
language radio broadcastings, a total of 241,917 hours plus 3 minutes of Uyghur-
language TV programs, and 85,190 hours plus 20 minutes of Kazakh-language TV 
programs were produced (Economic and Development Department of the PRC State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission & Department of Integrated Statistics of the PRC National 
Bureau of Statistics 2011, 714-715). As of 2016, the XUAR TV station operates six 
exclusively Uyghur-language TV channels143. Uyghur-language websites, though many 
of which closed down after the 2009 violent incidents in Ürümqi, are still the most 
commonly visited and the most visible of all ethnic minority script websites in China. 
Uyghur is also the most commonly used ethnic minority script in China’s utmost social 
media app, WeChat (Chinese: weixin). Overall, there has been ubiquitous informal, 
                                                          





conversational use of the titular language in public sphere in XUAR, and accordingly, I 
assign 1 point to XUAR on dimension C2. 
In XUAR, there has been strictly controlled, highly primordial historiography with regard 
to the “ethno-genesis” of ethnic Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, etc. Debates in these areas are 
discouraged, and individuals tend to self-censure144 their discussions of these topics. The 
“origins” of ethnic Uyghurs are officially either linked to the ancient Uyghur Khaganate 
based on the Mongolian plateau or simply left unaddressed145, while the “origins” of 
ethnic Kazakhs are officially linked to the ancient polity of Wusun based in the Ili River 
valley146. Those Oirats (or Kalmyks, classified as ethnic “Mongol” in China) whose 
ancestors migrated from the lower reaches of Volga to what is today’s Xinjiang during 
the Qing dynasty are officially lauded for their “patriotism.”147 Although the periods of 
the medieval Chagatai Khanate (or Moghulistan) and Golden Horde (or Ulus of Jochi) 
were crucial for the formation of shared consciousness among ethnic Uyghurs and 
Kazakhs, history of these periods is understudied in XUAR. The historical linkages 
between the ethnic non-Han populations of XUAR and populations outside PRC are 
downplayed. Notions, if labeled as pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, self-determination, etc. 
will be officially characterized as “erroneous thoughts” (Standing Committee of the 
XUAR 12th People’s Congress 2016, 30) and sanctioned. Overall, I assign 0 point to 
XUAR on dimension C3.  
                                                          
144 Based upon the author’s observations. 
145 Based upon visits to the following museums: XUAR Museum, IKAP Museum, Museum of Kashgar, 







The XUAR state has been regulating the forms and interpretations of religious practices 
by incorporating clergies into such state apparatuses as the XUAR Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Commission and the XUAR Islamic Association. The XUAR state has also been 
actively regulating those who are allowed to practice religions and those who are not. 
Minors are prohibited from participating in religious activities, while religious activities 
are forbidden in state apparatuses, schools (except those which train clergies), and non-
entrepreneurial institutions affiliated to the state148. Overall, I assign a score of 0.5 to 
XUAR on dimension C4. 
Preferential treatment in terms of matriculating students into higher education institutions 
has been systematically practiced with regard to students of ethnic minority categories149 
who take the college entrance exams in Chinese rather than in titular languages (i.e. 
Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Mongolian150), usually in the forms of bonus scores or lowered 
thresholds. Notably, ethnic Han students also receive bonus scores or lowered thresholds 
if they choose to take the college entrance exam in titular languages151. Starting 2000, 
“Xinjiang cohorts” (Chinese: xinjiangban) have been established in senior high schools 
in a number of provinces and municipalities of PRC, recruiting mostly students of ethnic 
minority categories and native to Xinjiang. As of 2009, 6,803 students were newly 
enrolled in such Xinjiang cohorts, and a total of 19,165 students were studying in such 
cohorts (Economic and Development Department of the PRC State Ethnic Affairs 
                                                          
148 XUAR Regulations on Religious Affairs, Articles 31, 37. 
149 Not applicable to ethnic Manchus. 
150 Using the exams officially designed in NMAR rather than using local Oiratic dialects. 
151 “Policies of allocating bonus scores for XUAR-based college entrance exams for 2016,” [in Chinese] 






Commission & Department of Integrated Statistics of the PRC National Bureau of 
Statistics 2011, 699-701). Overall, XUAR receives 1 point on dimension C5. To sum up, 
XUAR receives 3.75 on a scale of 6 for c1. 
 
AUTONOMY OUTCOME IN TATARSTAN 
Titular political participation 
Throughout the first six years of the 2010s, RT has been maintaining a system of state 
organs separate from the RF’s federal system. RT’s own system of state organs consists 
of the President of RT, the State Soviet of RT, the Cabinet of Ministers of RT, and the 
Constitutional Court of the RT. The federal-level state organs have their branches in 
Tatarstan (e.g. Federal Security Services, Federal Immigration Services, Federal 
Statistical Services), but these branches administratively do not overlap with RT’s state 
organs. Formal separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers has also been 
maintained, even if these organs rarely conflict with one another on legislative agendas, 
governance, or application of legal codes. The incumbent President of RT, Röstəm 
Mingnekhanov, is both native to and a citizen of RT no younger than 30 while knowing 
competently both Tatar and Russian. Thus, he meets the eligibility requirements laid in 
both the CRT and the 2007 Treaty RFRT. Accordingly, RT scores 1 point on the 
dimensions of P1, P2, and P3. 
The State Soviet of the RT has enacted a series of normative rules and regulations 
applicable to Tatarstan. Types of such normative rules and regulations include laws 





Education, Law on the State Languages of the Republic of Tatarstan and Other 
Languages in the Republic of Tatarstan), codes (Russian: kodeks; Tatar: kodeks, e.g. 
Ecological Codes of RT, Family Codes of RT, Electoral Codes of RT), and State Soviet’s 
resolutions (Russian: postanovleniye; Tatar: karar). Such normative rules and regulations 
have consistently been prepared bilingually in both Russian and Tatar as of the first six 
years of the 2010s. Meanwhile, RT has been maintaining a representative office under the 
President of RF in Moscow. Hence the scores on dimensions P4 and P5 are both 1 point 
for RT. 
As of 2016, the RT state has opened representative offices in Kazakhstan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, France, Bashkortostan (republic of RF), Crimea (annexed republic of RF), 
Sverdlovsk (oblast’ of RF), St. Petersburg (city of federal significance of RF), 
Uzbekistan, UAE, Nizhny Novgorod (oblast’ of RF), Khanty-Mansi (AOk of RF), Czech 
Republic, and Ukraine. RT has also been an observer member of the International 
Organization of Turkic Culture (or TÜRKSOY). RT reached a treaty with the Republic of 
Chuvashia, another ethnic republic of RF, on May 13, 1994. The treaty was renewed on 
March 15, 2011152. Meanwhile, RT has been engaged in outreach activities to ethnic 
Tatars living outside Tatarstan or outside Russia through the umbrella organization called 
World Congress of Tatars (Tatar: Bötendönya Tatar Kongressi). For instance, tuition 
waiver program has been established for ethnic Tatar students from China who want to 
pursue higher education in Tatarstan. The RT state has also sponsored ethnic Tatar festive 
                                                          
152 “Treaty on Co-operations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Chuvashia,” [in Tatar] 





gatherings (Tatar: sabantuy) among ethnic Tatar communities outside of Russia. Overall, 
I assign 1 point to RT on each of the P6, P7, P8 dimensions. 
At the fourth Convocation (Russian: sozyv) of the State Soviet of the RT that held office 
between 2009-2014, 65 out of the 107 deputies were ethnic Tatars, at a percentage of 
60.7%153. At the fifth Convocation of the State Soviet of the RT that has been in office 
since 2014, 64 out of 100 deputies are ethnic Tatar, at a percentage of 64%154. Since 
2014, of the two representatives at the Federal Council of the Russian Federation 
reserved for the RT, one has been ethnic Tatar155 while the other being ethnic Russian156. 
Of the 15 deputies of the RT elected to the State Duma, 11 have been ethnic Tatar at a 
percentage of 73.3%157. These three percentages are significantly higher than ethnic 
Tatars’ population share in the total population of the RT as of 2010, which is 53.2%158. 
Judging from these data, RT scores 1 point on dimension P9.  
Since 2009, the proportion of ethnic Tatar ministers in the total number of ministers in 
the RT Cabinet of Ministers has been stable around 88.2% (15 out 17 ministers)159, which 
significantly surpasses ethnic Tatars’ population share in the total population of the RT as 
                                                          
153 S. Mustafina, “A list of the deputies of the 4th Convocation of the State Soviet of the RT (2014).” [in 
Russian] 
154 Official Website of the RT State Soviet, “Deputies,” [in Russian] available at 
http://www.gossov.tatarstan.ru/deputaty (accessed July 31, 2017). 
155 Ildus Talgatovich Akhmetzyanov. 
156 Oleg Viktorovich Morozov. 
157 Official Website of the RT State Soviet, “Deputies elected from the Republic of Tatarstan at the 7th 
Convocation of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the RF,” [in Russian] available at 
http://www.gossov.tatarstan.ru/organization/gosduma7 (accessed July 31, 2017). Ethnic Tatar deputies 
are Marat Bariev, Murad Gadylshin, Ildar Gilmutdinov, Irek Zinnurov, Alfiya Kogogina, Irshat Minkin, Fatikh 
Sibagatullin, Airat Farrakhov, Rinat Khairov, Airat Khairullin, and Ravil Khusnullin. 
158 Russian Federation Federal Statistics Service, All Russia Population Census 2010, http://www.perepis-
2010.ru (accessed February 28, 2017). 
159 Government of the RT, “Ministries of the Republic of Tatarstan,” [in Russian] available at 





of 2010. Accordingly, the score for RT on dimension P10 is 1. To sum up, RT scores 10 
on a scale of 10 for p2. 
 
Ethno-regional economic development 
RT has consistently been contributing more to the federal government’s budget than it 
receives from the federal government in the form of fiscal transfers160. Thus, RT qualifies 
as a “donor”161 region in Russia and receives 1 point on dimension E1. 
The ratio between RF federal government’s budgeted transfer payments to RT and RT’s 
own budgeted tax and non-tax-based revenues was 0.58 for 2010, 0.45 for 2011, 0.3 for 
2012, 0.24 for 2013, 0.16 for both 2014 and 2015, and 0.12 for 2016 (Federal Statistical 
Service of the Russian Federation 2017; Accounting Chamber of the Republic of 
Tatarstan 2012; 2013; 2014). In view of the structure of the budgets for the first six years 
of the 2010s, RT was more reliant upon revenues of its own ethno-regional sources than 
upon federal transfers. Since the ratio was consistently higher than 0 but no higher than 1, 
RT scores 1 point on dimension E2.  
The GDP per capita of RT has maintained the pattern of exceeding the Russia-wide GDP 
per capita for statistical years of 2010-2015, as is demonstrated in Table 3.5. Notably, in 
terms of ethno-regional GDP for the first six years of the 2010s, RT has consistently been 
one of the most productive constituent entities of RF, ranking only after the City of 
Moscow, Moscow Oblast’, Khanty-Mansi AOk, City of Sankt Petersburg, and Krasnodar 
                                                          
160 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on May 17 and June 15 of 2016. 
161 Robert Coalson and Alsu Kurmasheva, “’Where Is This Country Going?’ Debt Crisis Tugs At Russian 
Federation’s Seams,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 





Krai. Of all the ethnic republics in Russia, RT has consistently stood out as the 
economically most developed one. Also shown in Table 3.5., RT’s unemployment rate has 
been consistently lower than the national average of the RF from 2010 through 2014. 
Accordingly, I assign 1 point to RT on both E3 and E4. 
 
Table 3.5. GDP per capita and unemployment rate of the Republic of Tatarstan and of the 
Russian Federation compared (2010-2015) 
















































t rate of 
Tatarstan (%) 
6.2 4.7 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.0 
Unemploymen
t rate of Russia 
(%) 
7.3 6.5 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.6 
a b Converted according to the exchange rates of December 31, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015, from the Central 




http://cbr.ru/currency_base/daily.aspx?date_req=31.12.2014 (accessed July 31, 2017) 
Sources: “GDP per capita by constituent units of the Russian Federation 1998-2015,” 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/# (Federal Statistical Service of the 
Russian Federation, accessed July 31, 2017); Labor and Employment in Russia 2015 (Moscow: Federal Statistical 
Service of the Russian Federation, 2015); Basic socio-economic indicators of the Republic of Tatarstan 2011-2015 
(Kazan: Republic of Tatarstan Branch of the Federal Statistical Service, 2017); “Annual average levels of 
unemployment of the population of constituent units of the Russian Federation” (Moscow: Federal Statistical Service 






Tatarstan’s comparative advantages162 have mostly been concentrated in oil extraction 
and manufacturings which feature automotive, chemical, and machinery industries, 
whose infrastructural and technological foundations were laid during the post-WWII 
soviet era. Most of the oil extractions in Tatarstan has been conducted by Tatneft’. 
Headquartered in Əlmət/Almetyevsk, Tatarstan, Tatneft’ is one of the biggest oil and gas 
companies of Russia. 29.7% of RT’s industrial output comes from oil extraction, while 
refinery is conducted either inside Tatarstan by two locally-based petroleum companies, 
TANECO and TAIF-Nizhnekamsk, or in the Republic of Bashkortostan or the oblast’ of 
Nizhny Novgorod (Gaisin et al. 2013, 57-60). Of the manufacturing sector of RT, 
Tatarstan leads the entire Russia in terms of the market shares of the following products: 
55% of over-16-ton truck vehicles, 24% of tractors, 60% of polystyrene, 50% of 
polyethylene, 40% of synthetic rubber, and 33% of auto tires (55). The KAMAZ truck 
plant headquartered in the second largest city of Tatarstan, Yar Challı/Naberezhnye 
Chelny, has been prestigious internationally for its expertise of truck and engine 
manufacturing. The AO-Gorky shipyard based in the city of Yəshel Üzən/Zelenodolsk 
has been building sea and river ships and vessels for over a century163. Moreover, RT has 
been actively pursuing innovative investment policies. The first IT innovation and 
professional development center of Russia, Innopolis, has been established in the 
Verkhneuslonskii County (Tatar: Yugarı Oslan) of RT. Innopolis has attracted companies 
                                                          
162 Notably, RT also features a major food/grocery chain called Bəxetle that specialize in ethnic Tatar/Halal 
food production. Owned by ethnic Tatar entrepreneur Möslimə Latıypova, Bəxetle has opened stores not 
only inside Tatarstan but also in Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Barnaul. Bəxetle claims to be employing over 
5,000 people. See “About the Company” [in Tatar], https://bahetle.com/tat/info/view/category/15 
(accessed July 31, 2017). 
163 Made in Tatarstan, “Zelenodolsk Shipyard,” available at 





that specialize in IT outsourcing, software-development, and electronic business 
solutions164. The ratio of innovative goods and services in the republic’s GDP in 2010 
was reported to be 18%, 1.5-2 times higher than the national average of the RF (50). 
Nevertheless, innovative industries are still at their inchoate stage of development in RT. 
To sum up, the score for RT on dimension E5 is 0.75.  
The proportion of RT’s budgeted expenditures that was covered by RT’s own tax or non-
tax-based revenues was 57.4% for 2010, 63.7% for 2011, 75.9% for 2012, 80.3% for 
2013, 79.6% for 2014, 83.8% for 2015, reaching a new high at 89.4% for 2016 (Federal 
Statistical Service of the Russian Federation 2017; Accounting Chamber of the Republic 
of Tatarstan 2012; 2013; 2014). Considering that the indicators for the first six years of 
the 2010s follow an upward trend and yield an average of 75%, I assign 1 point to RT on 
dimension E6. To sum up, RT receives a score of 5.75 on a scale of 6 for e2.  
 
Titular cultural promotion 
In meetings, sessions or debates of the RT State Soviet, the principally-used language is 
Russian. Even if most of the top political elites of Tatarstan are ethnically Tatar, and even 
if many of them are able to speak Tatar fluently, in formal political deliberations, Russian 
significantly overwhelms Tatar. Usually legal documents are prepared originally in 
Russian, then, only if necessary, are translated into Tatar. In the executive organs of the 
RT state, Russian dominates formal conversations, whereas it is unknown to what extent 
Tatar is being used in formal settings, if it is ever used. Court sessions are predominately 
                                                          
164 Made in Tatarstan, “IT Services,” available at http://madeintatarstan.com/en/catalog?parent_tid=218 





conducted in Russian, and translation and interpretation services between Tatar and 
Russian will be delivered in the event that either the plaintiff or the defendant is a native 
speaker of Tatar and has difficulty understanding or expressing himself or herself in 
Russian. In general, I assign 0.5 point to RT on dimension C1. 
In the realm of pre-higher education, the formal recognition of the Tatar language in 
Tatarstan has been promoted to such an extent that Tatar has become a mandatory subject 
in nearly all of the pre-tertiary education institutions. As of 2016, there are three types of 
pre-tertiary education institutions according to languages of instruction in Tatarstan: 
Tatar-instructed schools, schools of mixed Tatar-Russian instructions, and Russian-
instructed schools. The first two types are considered parts of the “national education” 
system (Russian: natsional’noe obrazovaniye). RT boasts of the largest number of higher 
education institutions as well as the largest student body enrolled in higher education in 
RF’s Volga Federal District165 throughout the first six years of the 2010s. However, in 
higher education institutions in Kazan, formal Tatar-language instruction is largely 
limited to those departments devoted either to the production of ethnically-specific 
knowledge or to the training of experts with such knowledge166. Overall, RT receives 1 
point on dimension C6. 
The Tatar language has been used to a limited extent in the publications of Tatarstan 
Academy of Sciences but much more extensively used in print media, radio, TV, and 
internet. As of 2016, 17 kinds of magazines (of which 3 for children), 56 kinds of 
                                                          
165 The Volga Federal District includes six ethnic republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Mordovia, 
Mari El, Udmurtia), one krai (Perm), and seven oblast’ (Kirov, Nizhegorod, Orenburg, Penza, Samara, 
Saratov, Ulyanovsk). 
166 An exception can be the Tatar-Russian bilingual instructions conducted in Kazan State University of 





newspapers throughout Tatarstan were published in the Tatar language167. Most of Tatar-
language publications come out of one publishing house, Tatarstan Publishing House 
(Tatar: Tatarstan Kitaplar Nəshriyatı; Russian: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo). 
Moreover, 16 radio channels (both republic-level and county-level), 21 TV168 channels 
(both republic-level and county-level) produced programs either fully or partially in the 
Tatar language169. Overall, there has been noticeable, but not ubiquitous, informal, 
conversational use of the Tatar language in public sphere in RT. Russian assumes 
dominant role as the language in market and of business transactions, and Tatar is 
featured more often in formal, ethno-cultural events. Accordingly, I assign 0.5 point to 
RT on dimension C2. 
On the “ethno-genesis” of the present-day Kazan Tatar population, the debates between 
Tatarists, holding that Tatars are heirs of the Golden Horde (Tatar: Altın Urda, or Ulus of 
Jochi), and Bulgarists, holding that Tatars are descendants of Volga Bulgaria170, can date 
back to the early 19th century (Kondrashov 2000, 66). The official historiography of the 
Soviet era was biased against the Tatarist view, and the study of the history of the Golden 
Horde was even officially banned during the 1940s (68). USSR’s official historical 
                                                          
167 Association of Distributors of Print Products of Russia, “Print media of Tatarstan: life without postal 
doping,” [in Russian] July 29, 2014, available at http://www.arpp.ru/2009-01-28-14-47-44/273089-
pechatnye-smi-tatarstana-zhizn-bez-pochtovogo-dopinga.html (accessed July 31, 2017); Rimma 
Əbdrəshitova, “A look at the circulation of ethno-national newspapers and magazines one by one,” [in 
Tatar] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, https://www.azatliq.org/a/28627233.html (accessed July 31, 
2017). 
168 Of them, there were three republic-level TV channels, TNV-Tatarstan, TNV-Planeta, and Rossiya 1-
Tatarstan. 
169 Joint-stock media company “Tatmedia,” [in Russian] available at http://tatmedia.ru/smitatmedia/30 
(accessed July 31, 2017). 
170 A Turkic-speaking polity based in the middle reaches of Volga prior to the “Mongol-Tatar” invasion. The 
term “Mongol” here refers to the state authority of the Mongol Empire and is conceptually distinct from 





narrative171 attributes ethnic Tatars’ “ethno-genesis” to Volga Bulgaria and the ancient 
Volga Bulgar civilization (Vorob’ev, Gainullin et al. 1955, 99). The incorporation in 
1552 of Kazan Khanate (Tatar: Kazan Xanlıgı) into the Muscovy was portrayed as 
“voluntary” and “progressive”, while the population under the Kazan Khanate was 
portrayed as socio-economically backward (Lazzerini 1981, 629). Since the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, historiography of ethnic Tatars has become highly contested and 
featuring Tatarist-oriented challenges of the official historiography (1981). Following the 
disintegration of the USSR, the study of the Golden Horde began prospering. As of 2016, 
the Kazan-based Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the RT has become a 
center for the study of the history of the Golden Horde and its successor Khanates, such 
as the Kazan Khanate and the Crimean Khanate. Tatarists’ view that ethnic Tatars are the 
heirs of rather than victims to the Golden Horde has largely been accepted as official 
historical narrative in Tatarstan, while Bulgarists’ claim has also been partially integrated 
into Tatarists’ historical narratives. On the whole, RT receives 1 point on dimension C3. 
The RT state has been regulating the forms and interpretations of religious practices 
through such organizations as the RT Spiritual Board of Muslims (Tatar: diniyə 
nəzarəte). Nevertheless, the RT state does not impose restrictions regarding who are 
allowed to practice and who are not. In reality, minors are visibly allowed to enter 
mosques or churches in Tatarstan, and certain governmental officials symbolically 
participate in religious events. Accordingly, I assign 1 point to RT on dimension C4.  
                                                          
171 According to this narrative, tribal confederation of Volga-Kama Bulgars turned out to be one of the 
most important components in the ethno-genesis of present-day Kazan Tatars (Vorob’ev, Gainullin et al. 
1955, 40). With the conquest by “Mongol-Tatars” of what is today’s southern part of the European Russia, 





Tatarstan’s state flag and emblem have been broadly used throughout the republic, 
especially over state apparatuses’ buildings, on governmental websites, or on state-issued 
documents. In fact, the presidential residence located in Kazan Kremlin was flying only 
the RT flag, rather than alongside the flag of the Russian Federation, on its top as of 
2016. Moreover, the RT state anthem is sung in both Tatar and Russian on formal 
occasions. Also notably, the RT state has been actively pushing for historical and 
archaeological sites of Tatarstan to be listed as UNESCO’s World Heritage Sites. By 
2016, Tatarstan’s Historical and Architectural Complex of the Kazan Kremlin, Bolgar 
Historical and Archaeological Complex, and Assumption Cathedral and Monastery of the 
town-island of Sviyazhsk have been recognized by UNESCO as world heritage sites, 
accounting for 3 out of a total of 17172 sites thus far recognized in Russia. Hence, the 
score for RT on dimension C5 is also 1. To sum up, RT receives a score of 5 on a scale of 
6 for c2. 
 
AUTONOMY AS IMPLEMENTED OUTCOME COMPARED 
Based upon the foregoing evaluations, the calculated degree of actually exercised 
autonomy from 2010 through 2015 is 67.9% for XUAR in China and 93% for RT in 
Russia. Accordingly, it is argued that level of compliance of implemented autonomy with 
formally stipulated autonomy has been significantly higher in Tatarstan than in Xinjiang 
for the first six years of the 2010s.  
 
                                                          





Table 3.6. Xinjiang and Tatarstan compared in terms of autonomy as implemented 
outcome (2010s) 
 Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region 
Republic of Tatarstan 
Titular political 
participation 
6.25/9 = 69.4% 10/10 = 100% 
Ethno-regional economic 
development 
5.75/8 = 71.9% 5.75/6 = 95.8% 
Titular cultural promotion 3.75/6 = 62.5% 5/6 = 83.3% 
Overall A1=67.9% A2=93.0% 
 
With regard to titular political participation, the level of compliance of actually 
implemented autonomy with formally prescribed autonomy has been generally higher in 
Tatarstan than in Xinjiang for the first six years of the 2010s. Concretely, despite 
continued training of ethnic minority category cadres and preferential recruitment of such 
cadres in Xinjiang, the titular ethnic category remains underrepresented in the 
governmental apparatuses of the autonomous region. By contrast, in Tatarstan, not only 
has the titular ethnic category been overrepresented in the legislative and executive 
organs of the ethno-regional state, but the ethno-regional state has also been able to 
establish representative offices outside Russia and to reach out to ethnic Tatars outside 
Tatarstan. 
With regard to ethno-regional economic development, the level of compliance of actually 
implemented autonomy with formally prescribed autonomy has also been overall higher 
in Tatarstan than in Xinjiang for the first six years of the 2010s. Specifically, Tatarstan 





government of Russia than it receives from the federal government in the form of fiscal 
transfers, whereas Xinjiang’s budgeted expenditures largely have been reliant upon fiscal 
transfers from the central government of China. The overall level of productivity of 
Tatarstan has been higher than the average level in Russia, while the overall level of 
productivity of Xinjiang has been consistently lagging behind the average level in China. 
While Tatarstan is taking the lead in Russia in terms of promoting technologically-
innovative sectors, Xinjiang’s economic specializations have yet to go beyond oil, gas, or 
agricultural produces. 
With regard to titular cultural promotion, the level of compliance of actually 
implemented autonomy with formally prescribed autonomy has, again, been higher in 
Tatarstan than in Xinjiang for the first six years of the 2010s. Difference in terms of the 
use of titular languages turns out more nuanced: Tatar is more featured in the sphere of 
formal instructions in Tatarstan than Uyghur in Xinjiang, but Uyghur nevertheless tends 
to be more commonly used in informal, conversational settings in public sphere in 
Xinjiang than does Tatar in Tatarstan. Regulations on religious practices among Muslims 
are much more stringent in Xinjiang than in Tatarstan. Meanwhile, state monopolization 
over historiography also tends to be more conspicuous in Xinjiang than in Tatarstan, 
where themes discouraged during the Soviet period have prospered in both academia and 
popular historical narratives.  
Autonomy as prescriptive institution has been implemented in both Xinjiang and 
Tatarstan and therefore may not be simply dismissed as “paper autonomy,” but 
remarkable disparity between the two ethno-regions in terms of respective ethno-regional 





a controlled comparison, it has been observed that Tatarstan has been significantly more 
capable of implementing prescribed autonomy than has Xinjiang. Why has there been 
such a disparity? I will address this question in the upcoming three chapters. In Chapter 
6, the external validity of the instrument constructed in this chapter to measure autonomy 






4. INTER-ETHNIC BOUNDARY-MAKINGS, 
TITULAR ELITES, AND AUTONOMY OUTCOME 
IN XINJIANG 
 
Xinjiang has never hit more headlines than in July 2009, when violent inter-ethnic 
clashes erupted in the streets of its capital, Ürümqi. The clashes turned Uyghur-Han 
relations in Xinjiang into one of the hottest topics in China. Since then, governance of 
XUAR has been treated as a separate, self-standing issue-area for the PRC central-state, 
which prompted the convening of two sessions of “Xinjiang Work” Forums173 in Beijing. 
On March 1, 2014, attack on civilians at the major railway station of Kunming, the 
capital of Yunnan Province, by individuals whom the government identified as “ethnic 
Uyghurs”174 reinforced the negative stereotypes of ethnic Uyghurs as posing “potential 
threat to public security” in China. In September 2014, Ilham Tohti, a teacher at the 
Minzu University of China who had been vocally critical of certain policies in Xinjiang, 
received life sentence175. In August 2016, Zhang Chunxian, widely viewed as a CCP 
XUAR secretary who took a more moderate approach towards the governance of 
Xinjiang (Chinese: rouxing zhizhang), was replaced by Chen Quanguo, considered a 
                                                          
173 First in 2010 and second in 2014. 
174 Ma Junqing, “Verdict announced at the second trial of those involved in the Kunming Railway Station 
attack, verdict of the first trial upheld,” [in Chinese] Xinhuanet, http://www.xinhuanet.com/photo/2014-
10/31/c_127163535.htm (accessed July 31, 2017). 
175 “Verdict announced at the second trial of Ilham Tohti for separatism” [in Chinese] Tianshannet, 





hardliner176 in terms of cracking down upon violent resistance or religious revivals as 
well as strengthening the teaching of Mandarin Chinese among ethnic non-Han 
populations in Xinjiang. Ethnic Uyghur elites were underrepresented at both the 18th and 
19th National Congress of CCP177 held respectively in 2012 and 2017 in Beijing. In the 
meantime, ethnic Uyghur cultural workers have become increasingly visible in China’s 
broadcast media and entertainment industry, and more ethnic Uyghur students than ever 
are learning Mandarin Chinese and expected to develop a competent knowledge of the 
multiethnic state’s lingua franca. 
Despite state-sponsored efforts to further incorporate ethnic Uyghurs into the economic 
and social life of China’s mainstream, ethnic Uyghurs remain largely politically and 
discursively marginalized, if not demonized, while XUAR remains considerably less able 
to implement its prescribed autonomy than, for example, Tatarstan of Russia. Why is it 
the case? This chapter examines in details the most recent trends in Uyghur-Han inter-
ethnic boundary-makings and ethnic Uyghur elites’ bargaining capacity in Xinjiang. 
Based upon both primary and secondary data, I first demonstrate how ethnic Uyghurs’ 
low level of linguistic Sinicization178 tends to hamper ethnic Uyghur elites’ capacity to 
                                                          
176 Chen Quanguo was the CCP XAR (Tibet) secretary between 2011-2016. His governance style can be 
characterized as coercive, penetrative, and costly in Tibet and Xinjiang, involving massive social 
surveillance and forcible “ideological trainings” among the local population (regardless of ethnicity). 
Characterized as prioritizing crackdowns over economic development, his governance has stirred up 
controversies.  
177 Ethnic Uyghur delegates made up 0.53% of all delegates to the 18th Congress and 0.57% to the 19th 
Congress. According to the 2010 census, ethnic Uyghurs constituted 0.75% of the total population of PRC. 
Calculated from “List of Delegates to the 18th National Congress of CCP,” [in Chinese] available at 
http://news.cntv.cn/special/18ddbxj/mingdan/index.shtml (accessed July 31, 2017); “List of Delegates to 
the 19th National Congress of CCP,” [in Chinese] available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-
09/29/c_1121747855.htm (accessed July 31, 2017). 
178 In the sense of developing skills in Sinitic languages (mostly Mandarin Chinese), not in the sense of 





build cross-ethnic political networks and more collusive, less hierarchical types of 
relationships with ethnic Han elites. Then I proceed to demonstrate how ethnic Uyghurs’ 
lack of social integration tends not only to exacerbate perceptions of ethnic Uyghurs by 
the PRC central state but also to translate into more differentiated intra-ethnic socio-
economic and cultural contour. Such a contour can obstruct upward social mobility which 
would encourage ethnic Uyghur populace to identify with or to become themselves elites, 
which in turn undermines intra-Uyghur cohesion and ethnic Uyghur elites’ mobilizing 
capacity. I conclude the chapter by arguing that ethnic Uyghur elites’ less solid 
relationships with both the central state and their “co-ethnic” masses, coupled with a less-
than-positive image of ethnic Uyghurs in the eyes of the central state, have been jointly 
sufficient for the underrepresentation of ethnic Uyghur elites in the XUAR state organs 
and their most powerful positions. 
 
UYGHUR-HAN INTER-ETHNIC BOUNDARY-MAKINGS 
Acculturation among ethnic Uyghurs and in Xinjiang 
Acculturation connotes the processes of linguistic and cultural diffusions and changes 
resulting in greater linguistic and cultural similarity between populations of the titular 
ethnic category of the ethno-region and the central state’s ethnic majority category. Since 
the most fundamental marker of cultural differences can be shared languages in which 
various “societal institutions” (Kymlicka 2001) are exercised, the level of acculturation is 
operationalized mostly in terms of actual and perceived levels of fluency in the central-






Although censuses in China usually do not survey language uses among the population, 
few in Xinjiang would disagree with the assertion that, on a visible magnitude, ethnic 
Uyghurs still prefer to use the Uyghur language “in all but the professional realm” 
(Finley & Zang 2015, 13). The majority of adult-aged ethnic Uyghur residents in 
Xinjiang either actively or passively know and use the Uyghur language, but only some 
of them are bilingual and able to competently use Mandarin Chinese, with the rest 
knowing only Uyghur. Meanwhile, a sizable minority of the residents of Han and other 
ethnicities179 in XUAR know and use mostly conversationally the Uyghur language. In 
the rural areas of the prefectures of Aksu, Kashgar, Hotan, and Kyzylsu Kyrgyz 
Autonomous Prefecture, the lingua franca among individuals of different ethnicities 
tends to be Uyghur rather than Mandarin Chinese (Li 2015, 404).  
Urban-based ethnic Uyghurs tend to place emphasis upon bilingual skills in both Uyghur 
and Mandarin Chinese, while among the rural-based ethnic Uyghurs, Uyghur language 
dominates, where proficiency in and enthusiasm about learning Mandarin Chinese tend to 
be low. Ethnic Uyghur bilinguals are largely composed of students (both minkaohan180 
and minkaomin181), cadres, various professionals, businesspeople, and any others who 
interact with ethnic Han frequently enough to require them to know and to use Mandarin 
Chinese. The proficiency of Mandarin Chinese among younger generations of ethnic 
Uyghurs has been rising, owing to reinforced teaching of Mandarin Chinese in schools in 
terms of the training of qualified teachers, increased course hours, preparation of 
                                                          
179 Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Mongol (Oirat and Chakhar), Tajik (Pamiri), Xibe, Uzbek, Tatar, etc. 
180 Ethnic non-Han (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, etc.) who received pre-tertiary schooling mostly in Mandarin 
Chinese. 
181 Ethnic non-Han (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, etc.) who received pre-tertiary schooling mostly in titular languages 





textbooks, etc. since the 2000s (Ma 2011, 167). As of 2008, approximately 12-13%182 of 
ethnic non-Han students (ethnic Uyghurs, Kazakhs, etc.) in Xinjiang were expected to 
develop competent knowledge of Mandarin Chinese. 
If it is assumed that an education attainment no lower than graduation from senior high 
schools (Chinese: gaozhong)183 or residency in urban areas are two sufficient conditions 
for competent knowledge of Mandarin Chinese for an individual categorized as ethnic 
Uyghur, then it can be estimated that, according to the 2010 PRC population census, at 
least 12.9% of ethnic Uyghurs age six and older know competently Mandarin Chinese, 
while at least 22% of the total population of ethnic Uyghurs in PRC either know 
competently Mandarin Chinese or are expected to develop competent knowledge in 
Mandarin Chinese. In contrast with Tatarstan where an ethnic Tatar speaking Russian 
fluently is an expectation taken for granted, in Xinjiang, an ethnic Uyghur speaking 
Mandarin Chinese fluently tends to be viewed rather as a bonus, signaling either adequate 
educational attainment or urban background. 
Two mutually competing conceptions about the Uyghur-Han cultural differentiations in 
Xinjiang were collected from respondents. One is based upon a more primordial 
understanding, assuming that cultures are internally homogenous and externally bounded. 
According to such a conception, multiple epistemic communities exist in XUAR, most 
                                                          
182 As of 2008, 6.6% of all ethnic non-Han students were attending pre-tertiary education institutions 
where the major medium of instruction was Mandarin Chinese with ethnic languages taught as subjects; 
5.8% of ethnic non-Han students were attending exclusively Chinese-instructed pre-tertiary schools (Ma 
2011, 167). 
183 According to respondents’ perceptions and the author’s observations, among ethnic Uyghurs, usually 
only those who have graduated from senior high schools or those who live in urban areas are likely to 
know competently Mandarin Chinese. Otherwise, lack of motivation, mostly monolingual milieu, and 
shortage of educational resources limit the possibility of achieving competent knowledge in Mandarin 





conspicuous of which is the so-called contrast between the “Confucian” and the “Islamic” 
values. These values are perceived as overlapping with the Uyghur-Han inter-ethnic 
boundaries184. The other conception resembles a constructivist, processual understanding 
of culture, emphasizing changes and exchanges of knowledge. According to such a 
conception, history consists of cultural changes and intergroup cultural exchanges. 
Nevertheless, regardless of ethnicity, the populace tends to have limited exposure to and 
understanding of the dynamic, intersubjective, historically contingent nature of culture, 
whereas cultural elites/intellectuals/scholars may have more exposure to and 
understanding of the fluidity of culture. Respondents of such a conception advocates for 
improved proficiency in Mandarin Chinese for ethnic Uyghurs to access more, broader 
knowledge and to produce more knowledge to a broader audience185. 
Nevertheless, several respondents186 admitted that among ethnic Uyghur populace, a 
more primordial understanding of culture prevailed. They noted the persistent tendency 
among a majority of ethnic Uyghurs in XUAR not to enhance their knowledge of 
Mandarin Chinese and not to enhance their understanding of the knowledge187 that would 
be associated with ethnic Han or with other ethnic categories in China. Some 
respondents188 candidly acknowledge that “Russian” culture tends to more welcomed 
among ethnic Uyghurs than “Han” culture, since “Russian” culture is considered more 
                                                          
184 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7 of 2015, March 4 and August 13 
of 2016. 
185 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on March 3 and August 10 of 2016, March 30 
of 2017. 
186 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7, 2015, March 4, August 2, and 
August 13 of 2016, March 31 of 2017. 
187 In particular, ethnically-specific knowledge such as historical narratives, literature, or spiritual 
practices. 
188 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7, 2015, March 4, August 2, and 





“elegant” while “Han” culture is considered difficult to embrace. As a result of such 
attitude, universal teaching and knowledge among ethnic Uyghurs of Mandarin Chinese 
as well as of the Chinese characters used to be very limited “in the first fifty years” of 
XUAR’s history189. Some individuals even had to psychologically struggle to overcome 
self-esteem in order to learn Chinese, even if they are aware that Mandarin Chinese is the 
primary language used by the state authority of XUAR and in the labor market of 
Xinjiang190. 
Xinjiang boasts of diverse, heterogeneous contours of organized religions. By 2015, a 
total of around 24,000 mosques were found in XUAR, where around 20,000 state-
endorsed clerics were based191. Although Islam is usually considered the predominant 
religious identity associated with ethnic Uyghurs, boundaries of religious identities do not 
exactly overlap with ethnic boundaries, much less with linguistic boundaries. Among 
ethnic Uyghurs, there are also those who do not associate themselves with any religion 
(relatively few)192 and those who claim to be Christians. Throughout Xinjiang, Muslims 
are not necessarily ethnic Uyghurs but also include large populations of ethnic Hui, 
ethnic Kazakhs, and relatively small populations of ethnic Kyrgyz, ethnic Uzbeks, ethnic 
                                                          
189 From the 1950s till the early 2000s. 
190 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7, 2015, March 4, August 2, and 
August 13 of 2016, March 31 of 2017. 
191 Anonymous interview conducted in Beijing on August 7, 2015.  
192 A first-person narrative by an ethnic Uyghur cadre, İlham Rahim, about being Uyghur while not being 
Muslim can be found on the social platform WeChat, available at 
http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?src=11&timestamp=1516312191&ver=645&signature=xIpQvOMow9lb0hYD5
ulhkkTIHSSQvX5PGLj3iHGkgTa6YTVpRNMMfX8k1dQ48*6LbiRDCucv0BvhUBNe4z4iuu*Htli7CdjEWtj7Pe5c





Tatars, ethnic Dongxiang, ethnic Salars, etc. Notably, among ethnic Hui in Xinjiang, 
many claim to be Muslims193 while speaking Sinitic dialects as native language.  
In sum, despite the slightly lower percentage of ethnic Uyghurs in the population of 
Xinjiang than that of ethnic Tatars in the population of Tatarstan as of 2010, ethnic 
Uyghurs are linguistically significantly less Sinicized than are ethnic Tatars Russified. In 
Xinjiang, more ethnic Uyghurs know and use Uyghur than those who know and use 
Chinese, whereas bilingual Uyghurs, despite its rising number, make up only a small 
portion of the ethnic Uyghur population. 
 
Social integration among ethnic Uyghurs and in Xinjiang 
Social integration is associated with aggregating the processes of interpersonal, 
socioeconomic, and spatial interactions relevant to the economy, the polity, and the 
community among the populations of both an ethno-region’s titular ethnic category and 
the central-state’s ethnic majority category. The degree of such social integration of an 
ethnic group can be assessed according to such demographic indicators as levels of 
urbanization, educational attainments, intermarriage rates with the majority ethnic group, 
as well as residential patterns. 
According to the 2010 PRC Population Census, the overall level of urbanization in 
China194 reached 50.4%, whereas the overall level of higher education195 reached 9.5%. 
The overall level of illiteracy in China was 4.88%, while the rate of inter-ethnic 
                                                          
193 Following a variety of Sufi Madhabs (Chinese: menhuan). 
194 Percentage of urban-based population in the total population of PRC. 
195 Percentage of those who have received tertiary education in the total population of those older than 





marriages196 reached 3%. Among the total married population of ethnically non-Han 
categories in China, the percentage of those married outside their own ethnic categories 
reached a much higher level, at 21.9% as of 2010. Of the total population of those ethnic 
minority categories for whom territorially-based autonomous entities at the provincial, 
prefectural, and county-levels have been designated, 64.8% were residents in those ethno-
regions, with the rest living outside their designated ethno-regions.  
To evaluate the country-wide level of social integration for the titular population of an 
ethno-region in China, I propose the following instrument. It scores a population’s level 
of integration on each of the following five dimensions, urbanization, higher education, 
illiteracy rate, cross-ethnic marriage rate, and residential concentration within designated 
ethno-regions. The score of each dimension is assigned a weight of 1/5, generating an 
aggregate score up to 100%. The higher the score for a population, the higher the level of 
social integration for a titular ethnic population. For an ethno-region in China, the 
formula with which to calculate the country-wide level of social integration for its titular 
ethnic population, SI1, is proposed as 
SI1=(Du1×1/5+De1×1/5+Di1×1/5+Dm1×1/5+Dr1×1/5) ×100% 
For a titular population in China, the five dimensions are assessed on an ordinal scale of 
three categories. Accordingly, a population’s score on each of these dimensions will take 
one of three mutually discrete values: 
                                                          
196 Percentage of those married outside their own ethnic categories in the total population of those 





An ethnic population’s level of urbanization is assessed in relation to the national average 
level of urbanization of China according to the 2010 PRC census, by means of 
calculating the location quotient of the ethnic population’s level of urbanization divided 
by the national average level of urbanization. Location quotient is calculated using the 
following formula: LQu=u1/50.4%. The range of the quotient is (0, 1.98]. When a 
population is 100% urbanized in the 2010 census, its quotient will reach 1.98. If the 
location quotient of the population is lower than 0.75 (level of urbanization significantly 
lower than national average), then the score, Du1, will be 0.25. If the location quotient of 
the population is no lower than 0.75 but no higher than 1.25 (level of urbanization largely 
comparable to national average), then Du1 will be 0.75. If the location quotient of the 
population is higher than 1.25 but no higher than the maximum (level of urbanization 
significantly higher than national average), then Du1 will be 1.   
An ethnic population’s level of higher education is assessed in relation to the national 
average level of higher education of China according to the 2010 PRC census, by means 
of calculating the location quotient of the ethnic population’s level of higher education 
divided by the national average level of higher education. Location quotient is calculated 
using the following formula: LQe=e1/9.5%. The range of the quotient is (0, 10.5]. When 
virtually all individuals age 6 and older of an ethnic population have received tertiary 
education in the 2010 census, its quotient will reach 10.5. If the location quotient of the 
population is higher than 1.25 but no higher than the maximum (level of higher education 
significantly higher than national average), then the score, De1, will be 1. If the location 
quotient of the population is lower than 0.75 (level of higher education significantly 





population is no lower than 0.75 but no higher than 1.25 (level of higher education 
largely comparable to national average), then De1 will be 0.75.   
An ethnic population’s level of illiteracy is assessed in relation to the national average 
level of illiteracy of China according to the 2010 PRC census, by means of calculating 
the location quotient of the ethnic population’s level of illiteracy divided by the national 
average level of illiteracy. Location quotient is calculated using the following formula: 
LQi=i1/4.88%. The range of the quotient is (0, 20.4]. When virtually all individuals age 
15 and older of a population were illiterate in the 2010 census, its quotient will reach 
20.4. If the location quotient of the population is lower than 0.75 (level of illiteracy 
significantly lower than national average), then the score, Di1, will be 1. If the location 
quotient of the population is no lower than 0.75 but no higher than 1.25 (level of illiteracy 
largely comparable to national average), then Di1 will be 0.75. If the location quotient of 
the population is higher than 1.25 but no higher than the maximum (level of illiteracy 
significantly higher than national average), then Di1 will be 0.25.  
An ethnic population’s level of inter-ethnic marriages is assessed in relation to the 
national average level of inter-ethnic marriages of China according to the 2010 PRC 
census, by means of calculating the location quotient of the ethnic population’s level of 
inter-ethnic marriages divided by the national average level of inter-ethnic marriages. 
Location quotient is calculated using the following formula: LQm=m1/3%. The range of 
the quotient is (0, 33.3]. When virtually all married individuals of an ethnic population 
had a spouse whose ethnic category was different from his or hers in the 2010 census, its 
quotient will reach 33.3. If the location quotient of the population is lower than 0.25, then 





but lower than 0.75 (level of inter-ethnic marriages significantly lower than national 
average), then Dm1 will be 0.25. If the location quotient of the population is no lower 
than 0.75 but no higher than 1.25 (level of inter-ethnic marriages largely comparable to 
national average), then Dm1 will be 0.75. If the location quotient of the population is 
higher than 1.25 but no higher than the maximum (level of inter-ethnic marriages 
significantly higher than national average), then Dm1 will be 1.  
A titular ethnic population’s level of residential concentration is assessed in relation to 
the proportion of those residing in the designated ethno-regions in the total population of 
these ethnic minority populations in China according to the 2010 PRC census, by means 
of calculating the location quotient of the ethnic population’s level of concentration in the 
ethno-region designated for them divided by the national average level of residential 
concentration among ethnic minorities in their designated ethno-regions. Location 
quotient is calculated using the following formula: LQc=c1/64.8%. The range of the 
quotient is (0, 1.54]. When virtually all individuals of an ethnic population were residing 
in the ethno-region(s) designated for that ethnic category in the 2010 census, its quotient 
will reach 1.54. If the location quotient of the population is lower than 0.75 (level of 
residential concentration significantly lower than national average), then the score, Dr1, 
will be 1. If the location quotient of the population is no lower than 0.75 but no higher 
than 1.25 (level of residential concentration largely comparable to national average), then 
Dr1 will be 0.75. If the location quotient of the population is higher than 1.25 but no 
higher than the maximum (level of residential concentration significantly higher than 






Table 4.1. Key indicators of social integration for ethnic Uyghurs in China 
 2000 2010 
Total Population in the 




% of those living in urban 
areas 
19.4% (China),  
19.21% (Xinjiang alone) 
22% (China),  
21.97% (Xinjiang alone) 
 
% of those who have received 
tertiary education 
 
2.5%a (China) 6.4%b (China) 
% of those illiterate 
 
9.22%c (China) 3.44%d (China) 
% of those married to ethnic 
Han 
 
0.62% (China) 0.24% (China) 
% of those married to ethnic 
non-Uyghurs 
 
1.05% (China) 0.53% (China) 





% of those living in 
subnational-level 
administrative units other 
than Xinjiang 
<1% in Hunan, Henan, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, 
Sichuan, Beijing 
<1% in Beijing, Hunan, 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, 
Shanghai 
a b Age 6 and older. 
c d Age 15 and older. 
Sources: PRC National Bureau of Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on Nationalities of 
2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2003); PRC National Bureau of Statistics and PRC 
State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China (Beijing: Minzu 
Chubanshe, 2013). 
 





















Total score  35% 
 
As summarized in Tables 4.1. and 4.2., according to the 2010 PRC population census, the 
overall level of urbanization of ethnic Uyghurs in China was 22%, even lower than half 
of the national average of 50.4%. Therefore, ethnic Uyghurs score 0.25 on Du1. The 
overall percentage of those who had attained tertiary education among ethnic Uyghurs in 
China was 6.4%, lower than the national average of 9.5%. Thus, ethnic Uyghurs score 
0.25 on De1 as well. The overall level of illiteracy among ethnic Uyghurs in China was 
3.44%, significantly lower than the national average of 4.88%. Thus, ethnic Uyghurs 
score 1 on Di1. The overall percentage of those whose spouses were ethnically non-
Uyghur among all married ethnic Uyghurs in China was 0.53%, around one sixth of the 
national average of 3%. Thus, ethnic Uyghurs score 0 on Dm1. 99.3% of ethnic Uyghurs 
in China were residing in Xinjiang, significantly higher than the national average of 
64.8% of all ethnic minority populations in China who were residing in their designated 





Xinjiang in China to frequently interact with ethnic Uyghurs can be relatively small. 
Accordingly, ethnic Uyghurs score 0.25 on Dr1. To sum up, the calculated country-wide 
level of social integration for the total population categorized as ethnic Uyghurs in China 
is 35% as of 2010. 
Higher level of social closure among ethnic Uyghurs is confirmed, either explicitly or 
implicitly, by almost all of my respondents regardless of their ethnicity. Several of my 
respondents noted the growing residential self-segregation197 since the inter-ethnic 
clashes in 2009. Meanwhile, maintaining cross-ethnic friendship has become more 
challenging for both ethnic Uyghurs and ethnic Han alike in Xinjiang. A lack of cross-
ethnic emotional ties and of enthusiasm in reaching out to individuals “on the other side” 
at both elite and mass levels is observable among both populations alike198. Moreover, 
XUAR government’s attempts to counter segregational trends were hindered by cultural 
issues such as location of mosques as well as by occupational structures of the two 
populations199. Despite the expansion of neigaoban200 and neizhaoban201, minkaohan 
students still tended to prefer to move back to Xinjiang after completing their college 
education. Many of them had to work in informal sectors before possibly moving onto 
formal positions202. SOEs in Xinjiang tend to be less enthusiastic about recruiting ethnic 
Uyghur employees, usually citing such concerns as Uyghur-instructed education system 
                                                          
197 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7, 2015, March 4, August 2, and 
August 13 of 2016, March 31 of 2017. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Cohorts of ethnic non-Han students from Xinjiang admitted into senior high schools in other provincial-
level units of China. 
201 Cohorts of ethnic non-Han students from inside Xinjiang admitted into junior high schools in major 
cities of Xinjiang. 
202 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7, 2015, March 4, August 2, and 





considered of relatively low quality, insufficient Chinese-language skills, underdeveloped 
professional training, and potential need to accommodate religious practices203. 
Uyghur-Han marriages have never been a common phenomenon in Xinjiang and is 
becoming even rarer. In the 1950s, CCP XUAR committee once prohibited ethnic Han 
males from marrying ethnic non-Han females (Li 2015, 436). Later this policy was 
terminated, and Uyghur-Han intermarriage rate is believed to have reached a record high 
in the 1960s. Nevertheless, Uyghur-Han intermarriages became rarer and rarer since the 
1980s (436-437). While respondents of various ethnicities204 in Xinjiang pointed to the 
extreme rarity of Uyghur-Han marriages, some did mention that such marriages, even if 
having occurred, will still risk shaming from both ethnic communities or ending up in 
divorces. Several respondents205 attribute the intermarriage rarity to the possibility of 
prejudices based upon perceived phenotypical differences, instead of religious identities, 
among ethnic Uyghurs towards ethnic Han. According to them, ethnic Han tend to be 
somehow more open to marriages with ethnic Uyghurs than do Uyghurs towards 
marriages with ethnic Han206. Also notably, ethnic Uyghurs’ overall intermarriage rate 
with ethnic Han is one of the lowest of all ethnic minorities in China, which marks the 
extraordinarily conspicuous inter-ethnic distance between ethnic Uyghurs and Han. A 
significant proportion of ethnic Uyghurs married to ethnic Han spouses actually live 
                                                          
203 Ibid. 
204 Respondents of Uyghur, Han, Kazakh, Hui, Tatar, Mongol, Tajik, Xibe, Uzbek ethnicities. 







outside XUAR or are originally from other provinces such as Hunan207 and Henan208 
(433).  
Some respondents believe that the level of social closure among ethnic Uyghurs has more 
or less risen in the last one decade and that it may negatively impact in the long run 
ethnic Uyghurs’ prospect of broader participation in the China-wide labor market, of 
social mobility, and of economic development209. Other respondents, nevertheless, tend 
to treat growing economic inequality as a “cause” of growing Uyghur-Han segregation in 
Xinjiang. They pointed to the reversal of economic positions, wherein ethnic Han were 
initially worse off than ethnic Uyghurs economically but subsequently became better off, 
and economic inequality tends to be ever-growing between Uyghurs and Han. Moreover, 
they perceive SOEs based in Xinjiang as “enclaves”, over-extracting natural resources 
from the localities but not addressing the issues of local social welfare210. 
Compared to the tendency among ethnic Uyghurs towards social closure from ethnic 
Han, ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang tend to demonstrate more enthusiasm in terms of social 
integration. Mostly concentrated in the northern part of Xinjiang211, ethnic Kazakhs tend 
to be slightly more urbanized than ethnic Uyghurs, at 23.3% China-wide as of 2010. The 
                                                          
207 Hunan Province boasts of one of the largest communities of ethnic Uyghurs outside XUAR in China 
(6,716 as of 2010). It is claimed that ancestors of Hunan Uyghurs migrated from what is today’s Qumul 
(Hami) Municipality of XUAR to what is today’s Changde Municipality of Hunan Province during the Ming 
dynasty. Hunan Uyghurs speak local Sinitic dialect. 
208 Henan Uyghurs (3,035 as of 2010) are concentrated in Mianchi County (763 as of 2010), Sanmenxia 
Municipality. They speak local Sinitic dialect. It is claimed that ancestors of Mianchi Uyghurs migrated 
from Central Asia during the Yuan dynasty. 
209 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7 of 2015, March 4, August 13 of 
2016, March 30 of 2017. 
210 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on July 30 and August 13 of 2016, March 31 of 
2017. 
211 Ürümqi Municipality, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Qumul 





percentage of ethnic Kazakhs who have received higher education is also higher than that 
of ethnic Uyghurs, at 8.8% China-wide. Merely 1.12% of ethnic Kazakhs are illiterate. 
2.5% of married ethnic Kazakhs China-wide have spouses who are not ethnic Kazakh, 
five times the inter-ethnic marriage rate of ethnic Uyghurs. 79.4% of ethnic Kazakhs are 
concentrated in either the prefectural-level212 or the county-level213 ethno-regions 
designated for them. Though ethnic Kazakhs of China are eligible for Kazakhstani 
citizenship, the vast majority of them are not emigrating to Kazakhstan, reckoning better 
economic prospect in China, and the total population of ethnic Kazakhs in China rose 
from 1,250,458 as of 2000 to 1,462,588 as of 2010. Some respondents confirm that 
Kazakh-Han intermarriages tend to be more common than Uyghur-Han intermarriages. 
Alluding to ethnic Kazakhs’ emphasis upon adequate representation in state organs, one 
of the respondents gave a simplex, stereotypical juxtaposition of ethnic Kazakhs with 
ethnic Uyghurs: “Kazakhs are more politically-minded, while Uyghurs are more 
economically-minded.”214  
With regard to residential patterns, ethnic Uyghur residents and ethnic Han residents in 
Xinjiang follow drastically segregated patterns of distribution. As shown in Table 4.3, as 
of 2010, the majority of ethnic Han in XUAR, at 67.1%, were concentrated in the area 
north of the Tianshan Mountains (Chinese: Beijiang), while the majority of ethnic 
Uyghur in XUAR, at 81%, were concentrated in the area south of the Tianshan 
Mountains (Chinese: Nanjiang). 96% of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang were concentrated in 
                                                          
212 Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. 
213 Mori Kazakh Autonomous County under Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture and Barköl Kazakh 
Autonomous County under Qumul (Hami) Municipality. 





Beijiang. Only in the area east of the Tianshan Mountains (Chinese: Dongjiang), its share 
of ethnic Uyghurs in the total population of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang was largely 
comparable to its share of ethnic Han in the total population of ethnic Han in Xinjiang. In 
Beijiang, its share of ethnic Uyghurs in the total population of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang 
was approximately five times lower than its shares of ethnic Han in the total population 
of ethnic Han in Xinjiang. In Nanjiang, its share of ethnic Uyghurs in the total population 
of Uyghurs in Xinjiang was four times higher than its share of ethnic Han in the total 
population of ethnic Han in Xinjiang. From 1944 through 2010, the population share of 
those classified as ethnic Uyghurs in the total population of Xinjiang dropped from 
74.5%215 to 45.8%. The share, however, has been rising since 2010, reaching 49% as of 
2014216. Meanwhile, the population share of those classified as ethnic Han in the total 
population of Xinjiang rose from 5.5% in 1944217 to 40.5% in 2010. The share, however, 
has been falling since 2010, reaching 37.4% as of 2014. The growth of the absolute 
population of ethnic Han in Xinjiang can mostly be attributed to state-sponsored or 
voluntary in-migration from other provincial-level units of PRC since 1949, while the 
growth of the absolute of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang can mostly be attributed to 
relatively high fertility rate218. 
In Ürümqi, the capital of XUAR, ethnic Han tend to be more concentrated in the northern 
part of the city while ethnic Uyghurs tend to be more concentrated in the southern part. 
Respondents tend to agree that such residential patterns were reinforced after the violent 
                                                          
215 Around 2,988,500. (Li 2015, 49) 
216 Statistical Bureau of the XUAR, 2015 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook. 
217 Around 222,400. (Li 2015, 49) 





incidents in July 2009. As of 2010, 49.1% of ethnic Uyghurs in Ürümqi live in Tianshan 
District (southern Ürümqi). Meanwhile, only 18.2% of ethnic Han in Ürümqi live in 
Tianshan District, and their largest concentration is found in Yengisheher/Xinshi District 
(northern Ürümqi). Overall, where ethnic Uyghur floating population are more 
concentrated, there tends to smaller ethnic Han resident population (Policy Study 
Department of CCP Ürümqi Committee 2016, 28-29). Similar trends of inter-ethnic self-
segregation and intra-ethnic concentration are also discernable in other urban centers of 
XUAR such as Ghulja/Yining219, Kashgar220, Korla221, Qumul222, Kucha223, Bortala224, 
etc. 
Table 4.3. Population and distribution of ethnic Uyghurs, ethnic Han, and ethnic Kazakhs 









































                                                          
219 Ethnic Uyghurs concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the city, while ethnic Han 
concentrated in the western and southern parts. 
220 The population resident in the reconstructed Old City area is majority ethnically Uyghur. 
221 Ethnic Uyghurs concentrated around the major mosque. 
222 Ethnic Uyghurs concentrated in the Huicheng Township. The rest of the city is majority ethnically Han. 
223 Ethnic Uyghurs concentrated in the Old City area. 








































































































































































































































a These areas are under the jurisdiction of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). 
Source: PRC National Bureau of Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on Nationalities of 
2010 Population Census of China (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2013). 
 
 
Overall for the past three decades, ethnic Uyghurs both China-wide and in Xinjiang alone 
display greater tendency towards social self-segregation from ethnic Han, especially in 
terms of endogamy and concentrated living, even if the XUAR state has been rhetorically 
encouraging greater inter-ethnic socializations and cultural exchanges225. As 
demonstrated in the following discussion on psychological identification, ethno-national 
consciousness among Uyghurs tends to be self-reinforcing in everyday interactions, 
rendering the Uyghur-Han inter-ethnic distinction even thicker and more salient. 
 
Psychological identification among ethnic Uyghurs 
Psychological identification lays the micro-foundation for group consciousness at the 
individual level. This dimension is analyzed on two aspects, the degree of thickness and 
                                                          
225 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7 of 2015, March 4, August 2, and 





the salience of an ethno-region’s titular ethnic category against massive identity shift into 
the central state’s ethnic majority category226. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the major 
tendency among ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang has been that ethnic consciousness not only 
remains robust but also is growing thicker or more salient. 
Thickness   In Xinjiang, the category “Uyghur” tends to be perceived as co-extensive 
with the category “Muslim”. The major tendency tends to “require” an ethnic Uyghur to 
identify at least as a “nominal” Muslim, to speak Uyghur “like a native speaker”, and not 
to marry an ethnic Han. For party-state cadres in Xinjiang227, it occurs sometimes to find 
it difficult to separate religious practices from ethnic customs among ethnic Uyghurs, 
since a number of cultural practices/behavioral patterns such as holidays, fasting, 
circumcision, etc. can be framed in terms of either “religious norms” or “ethnic customs.” 
Meanwhile, social issues (Chinese: shehui wenti) such as poverty and income inequality, 
unemployment, high divorce rates, drug abuse, spread and control of HIV228, criminal 
activities, and so forth tend to be “ethnicized” (Wimmer 2013b, 27) and framed as 
                                                          
226 For a more detailed definition of psychological identification, see the sub-section “Components of the 
Analytical Framework” in Introduction. 
227 The rationale behind distinguishing religious norms from ethnic customs is the assumption that ethnic 
customs are something that should be protected and promoted by the state while religious norms risk 
contributing to radicalization of worldviews and should be closely monitored. Anonymous interview 
conducted on August 7, 2015. 
228 The city of Ghulja/Yining and its vicinity are considered one of the areas of the most serious concern 
for HIV-related issues in Xinjiang. Relevant public health measures are visible, especially in certain hotels, 
where Uyghur-Chinese bilingual boards on HIV prevention are prominently presented, with free 
contraceptive devices provided in each room. The majority of HIV cases in Xinjiang were reported to be 
sexually transmitted. Xia Lijuan, “By 2015, the proportion of sexually-transmitted HIV cases in Xinjiang has 
reached 85.5%,” [in Chinese] Yaxinwang, http://xj.people.com.cn/n/2015/1125/c188514-27172079.html 





“ethnic issues” (Chinese: minzu wenti)229 in XUAR if they involve individuals of non-
Han ethnic categories.  
Some respondents230 made it explicit that the tendency in Xinjiang to equate religiously-
based cleavages with ethnically-based distinctions was more or less “detrimental”231. In 
their views, religious identities can run the risk of justifying violence if they are used as 
tools for power struggles or for social controls in terms of forcing people to take sides 
between “believers” and “infidels”232. In addition, they lament the trend among both 
elites and masses regardless of ethnicity to “peculiarize” issues either related to ethnically 
non-Han populations or related to religions (Chinese: teshuhua minzu zongjiao wenti). 
For an alternative, they suggest delinking the ethnicity of those involved in such issues 
from the “nature” of such issues and integrating such issues into the jurisdiction of the 
most relevant branches of government. Concretely, they argue against leaving any issue 
that can hastily be labeled as “ethnic” or “religious” to the Ethnic Affairs Commissions 
(Chinese: minwei)233 at different administrative levels.  
Other respondents tended to look at the inter-ethnic distinction between ethnic Uyghurs 
and ethnic Han more primordially. They believed that such distinctions were marked by 
differing behavioral norms and knowledge structures. Examples include but are not 
confined to eating Halal, dressing in specific ways, speaking Uyghur with co-ethnics, 
concentrated living, distinct naming pattern, implicitly viewing ethnic Uyghurs as 
                                                          
229 Anonymous interviews conducted in Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7 of 2015, March 4, August 13 of 
2016, March 30 of 2017. 








culturally and phenotypically akin to populations of Central and Southwest Asia while 
distancing themselves from ethnic Han, who are perceived as “different” culturally and 
phenotypically, etc. The overall attractiveness of the stereotyped image about ethnic Han 
(e.g. as “hard-working”, “economically-driven”, “non-religious”, “Confucian”, or 
“Buddhist”) and about the Sinitic languages (e.g. as “alien” and “complicated”) among 
ethnic Uyghurs tends to be fairly low. As some of my respondents put, even destitute 
Uyghurs may look down upon wealthy Han simply based upon the cognition that “they 
are Han.” Outside Xinjiang, due to their perceived linguistic and cultural resemblance to 
ethnic Han, Hunan Uyghurs are less perceived as “co-ethnics” by ethnic Uyghur masses 
in XUAR than by certain ethnic Uyghur cultural or political elites (Huang 2014, 161-
175). In addition to differentiations in terms of daily behavioral norms or knowledge 
structure, a sense of crisis rose234 among Uyghurs in the process of making sense of the 
question as to “why culturally less attractive Han are becoming powerful both politically 
and economically in relation to the culturally more attractive us.” 
Moreover, there is the tendency among ethnic Uyghurs to require their ethnic identity to 
align with the linguistic identity of being a Uyghur speaker (Zang 2015). It can be 
negatively perceived by co-ethnics if an ethnic Uyghur’s first language is Mandarin 
Chinese rather than Uyghur (Finley and Zang 2015, 16), since the combination of Uyghur 
ethnicity and lack of knowledge of the Uyghur language, though increasingly common 
among minkaohan in such urban centers as Ürümqi, stands against the dominant image of 
“authenticity” (14-18) that requires ethnic Uyghurs to have overlapping ethnic and 
                                                          






linguistic identities. Will Kymlicka notes that such emphasis upon “authenticity” tends to 
be associated with self-isolation from other cultures (2001, 208-209). However, self-
isolation from which culture in this regard seems more or less selective. For instance, 
more enthusiasm in the learning of languages other than Mandarin Chinese, such as 
English, Russian, Turkish, French, etc. among certain ethnic Uyghurs (Finley and Zang 
2015, 11) can be evinced in the variety of Uyghur-language textbooks, phrasebooks, and 
dictionaries intended for the learning of “foreign languages” in the Xinhua bookstore on 
Yan’anlu, Ürümqi. 
Overall, the Uyghur-Han boundary in Xinjiang grows thicker as the simply descent-based 
cleavage increasingly overlap with perceived cultural, phenotypical, and socio-economic 
differences. The most common boundary-making strategy adopted among ethnic Uyghurs 
in Xinjiang tends to be boundary-contraction235. The discursive emphasis upon 
“authenticity”236, or overlapping dimensions of identities, remains strong. Consequently, 
one can rely upon more than one type of clues to tell ethnic Uyghurs from ethnic Han. 
For instance, in terms of type of names, ethnic Uyghurs usually bear multisyllabic given 
names and patronyms, with the given names preceding the patronyms and both parts 
distinctly transliterated into Chinese characters237. Ethnic Han, on the other hand, usually 
bear monosyllabic family names and either monosyllabic or bi-syllabic given names, 
using most of the time no more than three Chinese characters. In terms of language 
spoken and accent, ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang are presumed as knowing Uyghur while 
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pronouncing Mandarin Chinese with distinct accents238. Ethnic Han in Xinjiang, on the 
other hand, are presumed as knowing only Mandarin Chinese or a Sinitic dialect and 
rarely knowing Uyghur, Kazakh, etc. In terms of religious identities, ethnic Uyghurs are 
automatically presumed as “Muslim” even if some of them do not identify as such. 
Ethnic Han, on the other hand, are usually stereotyped as atheists, polytheists, or 
Buddhists, etc. 
Salience   Uyghur-Han boundaries in Xinjiang have been socially salient, as they matter 
in a variety of issue areas such as what language to use and when, where to live, how 
likely and in what job positions to be employed, whom to interact with and how, what 
types of education trajectory to traverse, and so forth. Concretely, Uyghur is supposed to 
be mostly used when conversations involve only ethnic Uyghurs, whereas Chinese is 
supposed to be used when conversations involve both ethnic Uyghurs and non-Uyghurs. 
Ethnic Uyghurs with relatively lower education attainments usually follow concentrated 
patterns of living in urban areas, largely self-isolated from ethnic Han. Ethnic Uyghurs 
tend to be more likely to be employed as security guards, police agents, teachers in 
bilingual elementary and secondary schools, or cadres, while ethnic Han in Xinjiang not 
only dominate positions in most of the professional sectors but also more likely to be 
employed in state-owned and private enterprises. Ethnic Uyghurs usually are expected to 
attend either Uyghur-instructed or bilingual elementary and secondary schools, while 
ethnic Han rarely attend Uyghur-instructed or bilingual elementary and secondary 
schools but mostly attend exclusively Chinese-instructed schools (Chinese: hanxiao).  
                                                          






The ethnic category marked on one’s governmentally-issued identification paper matters 
tremendously. The category “Uyghur” marked on governmentally-issued ID card often 
implies extra inspection at security checkpoints or extra wait time in passport applications 
with a longer list of “proof documents” (Chinese: zhengming wenjian) required239. If 
one’s ID card is issued by XUAR Bureau of Public Security, then regardless of ethnicity, 
he or she, if traveling in other provincial-level units of China, would be expected to 
register with local branches of public security bureau and at times face difficulty finding 
accommodations240.  
 
UYGHUR ELITES’ BARGAINING CAPACITY  
Uyghur-Han elite-level relations  
Elite-level inter-ethnic relations is analyzed on two aspects, nature of elite-level 
relationship and networks of elite-level political alliances. In Xinjiang, lower level of 
linguistic Sinicization among ethnic Uyghurs has contributed to less collusive, more 
hierarchical types of relationships between ethnic Uyghur and ethnic Han elites. 
In Xinjiang, the earliest ethnic Uyghur elites working for the government of the XUAR 
were mostly those who participated in the so-called “Three-District Revolution”241 in the 
1940s (Zhu & Wang 2015, 161). However, this group of elites were mostly purged 
                                                          
239 The procurement of such “proof documents” usually relies upon informal, personal connections in 
various governmental or social organizations, or the so-called guanxi. Anonymous interviews conducted in 
Beijing and Ürümqi on August 7 of 2015, March 4, August 13 of 2016, March 30 of 2017. 
240 If local hotels decline to accommodate the individual, then he or she usually still has the option of 
lodging in the guest house run by the XUAR representative office in the locality (Chinese: xinjiang 
banshichu). 





during consecutive political campaigns, and since the founding of the XUAR in 1955, 
Uyghur elites have been continuously underrepresented in the XUAR state organs242. 
Such underrepresentation results from two structural conditions that did not change 
significantly in the past six decades. On one hand, the XUAR government is directed by 
ethnic Han cadres of higher position ranks (both in Beijing and in Ürümqi) and its 
decision-makings are mostly conducted in Chinese. On the other hand, Uyghurs tend to 
be linguistically Sinicized to a very limited degree and perceived as such not only among 
ethnic Han but also among other ethnic minority populations in China. The percentage of 
ethnic Uyghurs who can effectively communicate in Mandarin Chinese, despite their 
rising absolute number in the recent years, has barely reached a majority threshold.  
As an implication of the low degree of linguistic Sinicization among Uyghurs, a 
dominant discursive hierarchy has formed, wherein ethnic Uyghur elites are usually 
presumed among ethnic Han elites as having limited skills in Mandarin Chinese, 
therefore as less than competent and should receive additional training to fill 
governmental positions (XASS Research Team 1991, 161-176). Starting the 1980s, there 
has been calls for greater representation of ethnically non-Han elites in the XUAR state 
organs (Chinese: minzu ganbu de bili fuhe qi renkou bili) from among ethnically non-Han 
elites in Xinjiang. This somehow alarmed certain then-incumbent ethnic Han elites in 
XUAR and prompted them to start framing such calls as “rising local nationalism and 
potential secessionist threat to the territorial integrity of China.” Ethnic Han elites lobbied 
to Deng Xiaoping, through the former military boss of XUAR and the founder of XPCC, 
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Wang Zhen243. Wang portrayed ethnic Han elites of XUAR as “stabilizing forces of 
Xinjiang” to Deng Xiaoping, who endorsed such portrayals and discouraged previous 
attempts to significantly “indigenize” XUAR government (Bovingdon 2010, 62-65; Hari, 
8-15). The emphasis upon ethnic Han elites’ control of XUAR government has become 
an informal norm ever since and was further reinforced during Wang Lequan’s tenure244 
as the CCP secretary of XUAR. Even at the prefecture or county levels, the CCP 
secretaries who wields the most decision-making power are usually ethnic Han, placed 
above the executive heads who are usually of the titular ethnic category of the localities. 
Interestingly, some ethnic Uyghur cadres were actually calling on ethnic Han cadres to 
stay in Xinjiang, citing the know-how of ethnic Han cadres as vital to the governance and 
development of XUAR. One of such cadres was Abduwahit Ulatayev245, to whom the 
conception of the famous PRC slogan “ethnic Han cannot live without ethnic minorities, 
ethnic minorities cannot live without ethnic Han” is attributed246.  
Perceptions of ethnic non-Han cadres as not sufficiently competent persist not only 
among ethnic Han elites but also are shared, to varying extent, among ethnic non-Han 
elites themselves. In Xinjiang, one cliché has been circulating and characterizing 
ethnically non-Han cadres in the ethno-regional party-state apparatuses as follows: those 
knowledgeable about state-sponsored ideologies more abundant than those 
knowledgeable about economic development, those knowledgeable about cultural 
heritages more abundant those knowledgeable about science and technology, those well-
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versed in administrative affairs more abundant than those with charisma/leadership skills, 
those conservative-minded more abundant than those innovative-minded247 (Ji 2013, 
127). Most of my respondents shared the perception that qualification profiles, leadership 
skills, language skills (in particular reading comprehension in Mandarin Chinese), and 
social embeddedness of ethnic non-Han cadres in Xinjiang were “overall still to 
improve”248. 
In terms of linguistic skills, of ethnic Uyghur cadres in Xinjiang, there tends to be a 
dearth of experts with advanced bilingual proficiency in both Uyghur and Mandarin 
Chinese. A dearth of sufficiently competent translators and interpreters has also been an 
issue for the ethno-regional state apparatuses. Candidates for such positions tended to 
feature either those with adequate Chinese-language proficiency but with inadequate 
Uyghur-language proficiency (usually minkaohan) or those with adequate Uyghur-
language proficiency but with inadequate Chinese-language proficiency (usually 
minkaomin)249. Enlarging the population among ethnic Uyghurs with competent bilingual 
knowledge, though emphasized by almost all of the respondents, was also admitted as 
something that would “take time, patience, and generations”250. Some respondents 
pointed out explicitly that Uyghur elites’ improved communication skills in Mandarin 
Chinese would be conducive for Uyghur intellectuals both to receive information, to 
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248 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on August 7 of 2015, March 2, August 10, 
August 13 of 2016, March 30, March 31, April 4 of 2017. 
249 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on August 7 of 2015, August 10 of 2016, 
March 30 of 2017. 
250 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on August 7 of 2015, March 2, August 10, 





present themselves, and to converse with a much broader audience on a China-wide or 
even global platform251. 
Lack of trust between ethnic Uyghur and ethnic Han cadres was also noted among 
respondents252. Although XUAR’s budget mostly relies upon fiscal transfer arranged by 
the central state as well as upon various “projects to aid Xinjiang” (Chinese: yuanjiang 
xiangmu) that requires all provinces to provide developmental assistance to XUAR, 
central-state elites tend to refrain from devolving power to ethnic Uyghur cadres. 
Decision-making power is monopolized by Han cadres. Ethnic cadres are mostly 
involved in implementing rather than formulating policies by using their linguistic and 
affective closeness to their co-ethnic masses253. Moreover, several respondents contend 
that Uyghur-Han popular-level relationships tend to be better than Uyghur-Han elite-level 
relationships254. Meanwhile, when the central government conduct policy consultations 
with ethnic Uyghur cadres, such elites tend to be more or less reluctant to provide 
suggestions and comments, even if more outspoken ethnic non-Han cadres may say 
something to their ethnic Han superior ranks255. In addition, ethnic Uyghur cadres are not 
necessarily well-received among ethnic Uyghur masses, while ethnic Han cadres are not 
necessarily disliked by ethnic Uyghur or ethnic Kazakh masses. For instance, at the 
township or village levels, some ethnic Han cadres can be more admired for their 
personality or charisma by predominantly ethnically non-Han villagers, whereas some 
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253 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on August 7 of 2015, August 10 of 2016, 







ethnic non-Han cadres can be perceived as “coward” towards superior ranks but 
“dictatorial” towards the masses256. 
Relationships between ethnic Kazakh and ethnic Han cadres tend to be more collusive 
than those between ethnic Uyghur and ethnic Han cadres. Some ethnic Kazakh cadres 
perceive ethnic Han cadres to be “more capable, more knowledgeable, having access to 
more information or resources”257. In addition, ethnic Kazakh elites have been able to 
lobby central-state elites to formulate customized welfare policies for ethnic Kazakh rural 
population in Xinjiang, especially in terms of animal husbandry subsidies for herders, 
three-rural insurances258 (Chinese: sannong baoxian), settlement housings (Chinese: anju 
fang) for the pastoral population, etc.259 
 
Beijing’s perception of Xinjiang and ethnic Uyghurs 
Central-state’s perception of the titular population refers to the largely consistent patterns 
in the central state’s perception of both the elites and the masses of the titular ethnic 
category. In Xinjiang, low level of social integration of ethnic Uyghurs has been a 
necessary condition for higher risk of secession and less positive image of Xinjiang as 
perceived by the central-state in Beijing. 
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PRC central-state’s lack of trust in ethnic Uyghur cadres has largely persisted since the 
early 1980s, which are considered a period of potential power devolution proposed by 
more liberal-minded central-state elites such as Hu Yaobang and Deng Yingchao. Since 
the Barin incident in 1990260, the central-state’s policy focus with regard to XUAR 
shifted from economic development to cracking down upon resistance framed in terms of 
“separatism”. It has become a conventional practice that ethnic cadres are required to 
declare position/proclaim side261. Ethnic Uyghur cadres become more likely to be viewed 
as not only “lacking Chinese-language skills” but also “not sufficiently loyal and reliable 
with fluctuating positions and preferences”262. In the meantime, ethnic Uyghur populace 
become more likely to be viewed as not sufficiently competent in terms of participating 
in the labor market. Against this backdrop, Chinese-language proficiency among Uyghur 
elites is usually considered a “plus” or some “rare” quality. 
Since the Ürümqi inter-ethnic clashes in 2009, discontent among both ethnically non-Han 
and Han cadres can be felt with regard to the growing inter-ethnic divide as well as the 
widening socio-economic inequalities not only between ethnic Uyghurs and ethnic Han 
but also between Xinjiang and the rest of China. In this regard, several respondents 
expressed their nostalgic feelings about the period under Mao Zedong, who they believe 
were admired for his charisma as well as for the more egalitarian-oriented socio-
economic order established in XUAR before Deng Xiaoping’s reforms263. By contrast, 
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after the Cultural Revolution, more emphasis upon absolute wealth accumulation than 
upon improving relative living conditions (Chinese: gaishan minsheng) is believed to 
have exacerbated socio-economic inequality in Xinjiang. 
Informed by a team of researchers specializing in “borderland studies” or “ethnic 
studies”264, central-state elites in Beijing are well aware of ethnic Uyghurs’ lack of social 
integration into the mainstream polity, economy, and culture of China. Such lack of 
integration has been associated with perceived strong consciousness of being ethnically 
distinct from ethnic Han among ethnic Uyghurs and framed as one of the “major 
challenges”265 for the governing of XUAR. Concerns about such a challenge became 
more pressing than ever after the Ürümqi inter-ethnic clashes in 2009. In response, the 
“Xinjiang Work” Forum, held in 2010 and in 2014 successively in Beijing, covered 
issues of a variety of areas, in particular economic development, bilingual education, and 
ethnic cadre training266.  
At the 2010 first “Xinjiang Work” Forum, emphasis was placed upon raising ethnic non-
Han population’s affective identification with the “Chinese nation (Chinese: zhonghua 
minzu)” and the “Chinese culture (Chinese: zhonghua wenhua)”, upon strengthening the 
“bilingual education” in Xinjiang, as well as upon the “stabilizing” role of XPCC. At the 
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264 The most famous of such researchers include Ma Dazheng at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and 
Ma Rong at Peking University. 
265 Xinhuanet, “Xinjiang Work Forum was held, where Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao delivered important 
speeches,” [in Chinese] Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-05/20/c_12125041.htm 
(accessed 28 February 2017). 
266 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on August 7 of 2015, August 10 of 2016, 





2014 second “Xinjiang Work” Forum, such emphases have become more specific. In 
addition to fostering the common identity of being members of the “Chinese nation” 
(Chinese: zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi), new objectives include “mutually 
embedded” (Chinese: qianrushi) inter-ethnic residential patterns to increase inter-ethnic 
interactions, inter-ethnic mutual understandings and mutual learnings, leadership skills of 
ethnic cadres, improved employment outcome among populations of ethnic minorities, as 
well as quality of education267. Notably, the official rhetoric of both the central state and 
XUAR government usually is careful enough not to single out “Uyghurs” as a category in 
official documents. Moreover, it is also more or less discouraged to frame social 
organizations or mass events as exclusively designated for “ethnic Uyghurs.” 
Since Chen Quanguo’s appointment as the CCP secretary of XUAR in 2016, a wave of 
“sword-exhibiting” campaign (Chinese: liangjian) has been under way, in which ethnic 
minority cadres of different administrative levels in XUAR are required to pen articles 
calling on “people of all ethnicities” to champion and to contribute to “social stability, 
inter-ethnic unity, and integrity of motherland”268. Such articles would be posted on 
social media outlets such as WeChat, Sina Weibo, etc. and widely disseminated. 
Certain articles authored by ethnic Uyghur cadres specifically appealed to the ethnic 
Uyghur population in Xinjiang. For instance, the article titled “Five questions for ethnic 
Uyghur youth” and authored by ethnic Uyghur cadres at the XUAR branch of the 
Communist Youth League of China was published in March 2017 as headline on both the 
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Chinese-language and Uyghur-language versions of Xinjiang Daily269. It explicitly used 
an inviting tone to reflect upon why the mainstream discourse in China tends to associate 
ethnic Uyghurs with “terrorism” or “religious radicalization.” It also calls on ethnic 
Uyghur youth to improve their knowledge of Mandarin Chinese, to enhance their 
educational attainment, as well as to expand their social networks beyond their own 
ethnic population. The article even explicitly refutes the claim usually made by exiled 
Uyghur dissenters that “Uyghur language and culture are being destroyed.” Overall, this 
article can be interpreted as representing a growing consensus between the top decision-
making cadres of XUAR and certain ethnic Uyghur cadres about the necessity to counter 
interpellated, usually less-than-positive stereotypes of ethnic Uyghurs and to re-establish 
a more positive image for ethnic Uyghurs in the mainstream discourse of PRC. 
 
Intra-Uyghur cleavage structure: Uyghur elites and Uyghur populace  
The dimension of intra-ethnic cleavage structure entails the political, economic, and 
cultural divides between the elites and the masses of the titular ethnic group and 
addresses the questions as regard what dimensions of cleavages exist and how salient 
they can be. In Xinjiang, despite the highly thick and salient consciousness of 
“Uyghurness” among ethnic Uyghurs, greater tendency towards social self-segregation 
from ethnic Han has been contributing to lower level of intra-Uyghur cohesion and 
Uyghur elites’ diminished capacity to mobilize. 
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As summarized in Table 4.1., according to both the 2000 and the 2010 population 
censuses, the level of urbanization for ethnic Uyghurs China-wide rose from 19.4% as of 
2000 to 22% as of 2010. In Xinjiang alone, level of urbanization for ethnic Uyghurs rose 
slightly from 19.21% as of 2000 to 21.97% as of 2010. The level of higher education for 
ethnic Uyghurs China-wide rose from 2.5% as of 2000 to 6.4% as of 2010. Of all married 
ethnic Uyghurs in China, the percentage of those with ethnically non-Uyghur spouses 
dropped from 1.05% as of 2000 to 0.53% in 2010, while the percentage of those with 
ethnic Han spouses dropped from 0.62% as of 2000 to 0.24% as of 2010. Considering 
that over 99% of ethnic Uyghurs were concentrated in XUAR according to both censuses, 
exogamy among ethnic Uyghurs both China-wide and in Xinjiang alone has been 
extremely rare.  
Simultaneously, the level of urbanization for ethnic Han China-wide reached 51.9% in 
2010, more than double the level of urbanization for ethnic Uyghurs China-wide, while 
level of urbanization for ethnic Han in Xinjiang rose significantly from 53.6% as of 2000 
to 70.3% as of 2010, more than three times the level of urbanization for ethnic Uyghurs 
in Xinjiang270. In this sense, ethnic Uyghurs’ level of urbanization both China-wide and 
in Xinjiang lags tremendously behind that of ethnic Han. The level of higher education 
for ethnic Han China-wide and in Xinjiang alone reached 9.7% and 18% respectively as 
of 2010, almost three times the level271 of higher education for ethnic Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang alone. In terms of distribution of occupational profiles within the ethnic 
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population, of all salaried ethnic Han in Xinjiang, the percentage of those working as 
cadres for either party-state apparatuses or SOEs (4.48% as of 1990, 3.99% as of 2000, 
and 3.37% as of 2010, Li and Chang 2015, 29) remained significantly higher than the 
corresponding percentage among all salaried ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang (0.87% as of 
1990, 0.83% as of 2000, and 0.45% as of 2010, 29). From 2000 through 2010, the 
percentage of ethnic Uyghurs employed in manufacturing and services sectors dropped 
from 19.39% to 17.14% (28), whereas the percentage of ethnic Han employed in those 
sectors rose from 62.68% to 67.28% (28). 
Overall, throughout the 2000s, the socio-economic stratification pattern of ethnic 
Uyghurs and ethnic Han both China-wide and in Xinjiang carried on the trend of 
becoming more and more differentiated. In Xinjiang alone, by the end of the 2000s, 
merely less than 10% of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang tended to bear similarly elevated 
socio-economic profiles272 not only to their co-ethnics but also to ethnic Han (close to 
20%). In this sense, Uyghur-Han ethnically-based cleavage tends to almost but not 
completely overlap with socio-economically-based cleavages in Xinjiang. Meanwhile, 
ethnic consciousness among ethnic Uyghurs remains thick and salient enough to guard 
against massive identity shifts into the central state’s majority. High but not total social 
self-integration translates into internally highly differentiated, highly polarized socio-
economic/cultural cleavage structure among ethnic Uyghurs. This leads to restrained 
economic, social, and cultural capitals273 (Bourdieu 2004, 168-181) among the majority 
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273 Pierre Bourdieu defines “social capital” as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
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of ethnic Uyghurs, especially those in rural areas. It also leads to muted possibility of 
upward social mobility encouraging ethnic Uyghurs from lower social strata to identify 
with or to become themselves elites, which in turn strains elite-mass relations and 
hampers intra-Uyghur cohesion and the mobilizing capacity of the socially and culturally 
more integrated ethnic Uyghur elites.  
Urban-rural cleavage remains the most acute and durable intra-Uyghur socio-economic 
cleavage in Xinjiang, as close to 80% of Uyghurs still reside in rural areas as of 2010. 
While urban-based political, economic, and cultural elites may interact with ethnic Han 
on a daily basis, rural population tend to have limited to zero knowledge of Mandarin 
Chinese and to be more susceptible to the ideas of vernacular ideologues274. The type of 
ethnic Han with whom rural Uyghurs may most often interact are the so-called “cadres 
stationed in the villages” (Chinese: zhucun ganbu). As rural Uyghurs bear highly 
differentiated education and socio-economic profiles from their urban-based elite co-
ethnics who tend to have higher degrees of formal education, such elites are sometimes 
perceived as “culturally overly Sinicized”, “sycophant of their Han superiors” by those 
more ethno-nationally-minded or as “figureheads with little real power”, or corrupt, 
“indifferent to the needs of those in the rural areas” by the more populist-minded275. 
Urban-based elites also tend to be viewed as more adept at “bragging about their merits 
or achievements” than “fulfilling duties”276. Accordingly, the prestige afforded to ethnic 
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Uyghur cadres among Uyghur populace tends to be low, which is exacerbated by a lack 
of emotional, affective ties277. Moreover, ethnic Uyghur cadres, including state-
recognized clerics, at times became the targets of violent assassination attempts by 
ideologically radicalized youths (Bovingdon 2010, 178-190). The XUAR ethno-regional 
state was concerned about party-state cadres being increasingly dissociated culturally and 
socially with the masses, and to improve the cadre-masses relationships, the XUAR 
ethno-regional state launched, during Zhang Chunxian’s tenure as the CCP XUAR 
secretary278, the campaigns of “dispatching cadres to the grass-roots level administrative 
units.” The campaign provided urban-based Uyghur cadres an opportunity to “better 
understand the condition of their rural-based co-ethnics.”279 
On the other hand, another group of respondents noted the “traditionally”280 more casual, 
less hierarchical relationships between cadres and masses. Masses are allowed to publicly 
mock cadres, for instance, at social gatherings such as Məshrəp. That said, these 
respondents also noted that certain cadres, regardless of ethnicity, would “distort or 
ignore certain promulgated rules”281. Starting 2014, road checkpoints have been 
established on the borders between townships, villages, counties, prefectures, etc. 
throughout Xinjiang. Usually ethnic Uyghur police agents would be outside the 
checkpoints conducting security checks, while ethnic Han special police agents would 
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work inside the office processing information. Respondents also noted that certain ethnic 
Uyghur Xiejing282 were recruited from youths whose communal reputation tends to be 
problematic. Some Uyghur police agents even took advantage of their authority to 
“confiscate” cellphones from individuals, giving rise to resentment among those 
undergoing security checks283. Both ethnic Uyghur and Han cadres can be found involved 
in the “greenhouse projects”284 introduced as “one-size-fits-all” poverty-reduction 
package in rural areas of Xinjiang. Some of such projects turned out to be consolidation 
of lands, with little skill-training, new products, new-market-developing elements 
integrated in them285.  
Even urban-based ethnic Uyghurs can also be divided according to their places of origin 
(or “oasis identity”, Rudelson 1997), relations to the state authority, understandings of 
their identity, educational and occupational profiles, etc. In this sense, neither can urban-
based Uyghurs nor can ethnic Uyghur cadres be treated as a coherent, homogeneous 
whole sharing uniform preferences. Such intra-ethnic regional and cultural differences 
framed in terms of geography, climate, historical trajectory, dialects, etc. tend to erode 
intra-Uyghur elite-level cohesion286. 
                                                          
282 “Assistant police agent” in Chinese. 
283 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi, Beijing, Ghulja, and Kashgar on July 28, August 5, August 
12 of 2016, March 31 of 2017. 
284 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi, Beijing, and Kashgar on August 5, August 12 of 2016, 
March 31 of 2017. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on August 7 of 2015, August 10 of 2016, 





Compared to ethnic Uyghurs, among ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang, an ethnically-specific 
way of cadre-masses interactions, Aytıs287, has been in practice. Aytıs as a type of 
holiday gathering can offer an opportunity for ordinary Kazakhs to criticize publicly 
ethnic Kazakh cadres or to raise their issues with them. Aytıs also provides an occasion to 
test the knowledge and problem-solving skills of ethnic Kazakh cadres, in which cadres 
draw lots to answer questions posed by the audience. In contrast with cadres in Southern 
Xinjiang who tend to be more corrupt and less admired by the populace, ethnic Kazakh 
cadres tend to enjoy a more positive reputation among ethnic Kazakh masses288. 
Ethnically-based collective actions were not rare in Xinjiang, but rarely did ethnic 
Uyghur cadres initiate or even participate in such activities289. Notably, such collective 
incidents often feature young college students, some of whom view ethnic Uyghur cadres 
as merely agents helping the party-state control ethnic Uyghur populace290. Ethnic 
Uyghur cadres who explicitly call on291 co-ethnics to improve their knowledge and skills 
of Mandarin Chinese and to participate more competently in the mainstream economy 
and culture of PRC would risk their reputation among the populace292. As a corollary, it 
                                                          
287 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on March 3, August 13 of 2016, April 4 of 
2017. County-level Aytıs are held once a year, prefectural-level Aytıs are held every other year, Ili Kazakh 
Autonomous Prefecture-level Aytıs are held every three years, XUAR-level Aytıs are held every four years. 
Also organized in Aytıs are quiz shows, exhibitions of handicrafts and yurts, horseraces, wrestling, etc. 
288 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on March 3, August 13 of 2016, April 4 of 
2017. 
289 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on August 7 of 2015, March 2, August 10, 
August 13 of 2016, March 30 of 2017. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Nur Bekri, “It is a matter of course for citizens of PRC to learn Mandarin Chinese,” [in Chinese] 
Huanqiu, http://china.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-03/736730.html (accessed July 31, 2017). 
292 During the author’s fieldwork 2015-2017, roughly three major types of attitudes towards the learning 
of Mandarin Chinese could be summarized among ethnic Uyghurs in China: 1) Learning of Chinese is 
necessary, but should not be made mandatory but rather conducted on voluntary basis; 2) Learning of 
Chinese means “assimilation” and destruction of “Uyghur language and culture; to stay “Uyghur”, one 






might not be overly exaggerating to contend that in Xinjiang, social capital across 
different social strata within the ethnic Uyghur population has been relatively low.  
 
Representation of Uyghur elites in the state organs and their most powerful positions of 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region  
Ethnic Uyghur elites’ less collusive, more hierarchically-oriented relations with ethnic 
Han elites, central state’s consistently less-than-positive perceptions of both ethnic 
Uyghur elites and masses, and intra-Uyghur political, economic, and cultural cleavages 
have been jointly sufficient for underrepresentation of ethnic Uyghurs in the state organs 
and their most powerful positions of the XUAR. 
In Xinjiang, although the percentage of ethnic non-Han cadres in the total number of 
cadres rose from approximately 42% in 1955 to around 52% in 2005293, the 
underrepresentation of ethnic Uyghur elites in the party-state apparatuses has remained a 
sensitive topic. Within the XUAR cadre system, it has become an informal practice to 
discourage discussion of this issue, and official data of cadre numbers are supposed to be 
listed only in two categories, Han versus minority (Chinese: shaoshuminzu ganbu) and 
not to be tabulated along ethnic lines294. Notably, by 2004, 66% of female party-state 
cadres in Xinjiang were ethnically non-Han. In this sense, within the female population 
of Xinjiang, non-Han elites were indeed becoming overrepresented (Ji 2013, 98). By 
2008, the number of ethnically non-Han cadres reached 363,169, or 51.25% of all cadres 
in XUAR (127). In certain prefectures such as Tacheng of IKAP, non-Han cadres were 
                                                          
293 Calculated according to Zhu and Wang (2015, 161-165). 





overrepresented. Starting the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the number of ethnic 
Uyghur members of the standing committee usually is four, while ethnic Han members 
have been consistently controlling the positions of the most decision-making power, such 
as the heads of the organization department, propaganda department, and the political-
legal-affairs committee. As of December 2016, in the XUAR state apparatus with the 
most decision-making power, CCP XUAR standing committee, just four of all the 14 
incumbent members were ethnic Uyghurs. The remaining were eight ethnic Han 
(including the most powerful position of CCP XUAR secretary), one ethnic Kazakh, and 
one ethnic Dongxiang.  
Ethnic Uyghur cadres are recruited and evaluated according to their political reliability, 
Chinese-language skills and leadership skills of multi-ethnic staff. Party-state cadres, 
regardless of ethnicity, are expected to dissociate themselves from any religious 
practices. An internally-fixed quota for proportional representation of major ethnic 
groups in XUAR is used in the events of electing representatives to the XUAR People’s 
Congress as well as in filling the top positions in ethno-regional party-state apparatuses, 
despite that relative population weights of different ethnic populations in XUAR are 
changing. These quotas are mostly produced by the personnel department (Chinese: 
renshi bumen) of CCP XUAR committee and the XUAR government295. For instance, 
quotas are set for ethnic Kazakh cadres in governmental apparatuses. For those reserved 
positions, only ethnic Kazakh cadres can fill them. Positions have been allocated to 
different ethnic categories according to the fixed quota. Therefore, ethnic Kazakh cadres 
do not compete with ethnic Uyghur cadres, but rather compete with fellow Kazakh cadres 
                                                          





to fill positions. Specifically, the CCP secretary of IKAP is usually ethnic Han, while the 
executive head of IKAP (Chinese: yilizhou zhouzhang) needs to be ethnic Kazakh. The 
mayor of Ghulja/Yining, the capital of IKAP, and the head of Ghulja/Yining County of 
IKAP are usually ethnic Uyghur. Although it is usually believed to be a rule for party 
secretaries to be ethnic Han, two exceptions have been made in the 2010s: Erkinjan 
Tulaghun296 worked between 2015 and 2017 as the Party secretary of Tacheng 
Prefecture, and Shalghat Akan297 was appointed in 2017 as the Party secretary of Changji 
Hui Autonomous Prefecture298. 
To assess ethnic Uyghur elites’ level of representation in the XUAR ethno-regional state 
and its most powerful positions, I calculate and weight the quotients of the 2015 
percentages of ethnic Uyghur elites in the key posts of various ethno-regional party-state 
apparatuses divided by the 2014 percentage of the population of ethnic Uyghurs in the 
total population of XUAR299. Specifically, I propose and apply an instrument, taking into 
account the distribution of decision-making power across different party-state 
apparatuses. I base my understanding of how decision-making power is distributed across 
party-state apparatuses on what is stipulated in the PRC Constitution, the LERA, and 
respondents’ perceptions. 
The largest weight, at 50%, is assigned to the key posts in the CCP XUAR committee, 
including the secretary, vice-secretary, and heads of key departments (i.e. committee of 
political and legal affairs, department of organization, department of propaganda, 
                                                          
296 Ethnic Uyghur. 
297 Ethnic Kazakh. 
298 Anonymous interview conducted in Beijing on April 4, 2017. 





committee of disciplines, and department of united front). The secretary of the CCP 
XUAR committee wields the most decision-making power300 in terms of creating and 
directing XUAR’s executive organs, legislative organs, and judiciary. Such decision-
making power derives mostly from the centralized authority in terms of personnel 
appointments, dismissals, and transfers. Within the CCP XUAR committee, the secretary 
of the Committee of Political and Legal affairs oversees the coercive organs of the 
XUAR state in terms of personnel, policy formulation and implementation. The secretary 
of the Committee of Disciplines monitors the conduct of lower-level CCP committees 
and their members. The head of the Department of Organization oversees the specific 
procedures of cadre appointments, dismissals, and transfers in largely all of the party-
state apparatuses of XUAR. The head of the Department of Propaganda oversees 
knowledge/information production and reproduction not only by the ethno-regional 
party-state organs but also under XUAR’s jurisdiction. The head of the Department of 
United Front mostly oversees both the outreach to and inclusion in the ethno-regional 
state organs of non-CCP-member political, economic, and cultural elites. 
The second largest weight, at 20%, is assigned to the key posts in the executive organ, 
including the leadership of the XUAR People’s Government. This amount of weight is 
assigned in light of the authority in terms of policy implementations and law 
enforcements wielded by the ethno-regional executive organs despite their lack of 
decision-making power in terms of policy formulations and personnel. According to the 
PRC Constitution, the ethno-regional state has the authority to conduct administrative and 
                                                          
300 Anonymous interviews conducted in Ürümqi and Beijing on August 7 of 2015, March 2, August 9, 





developmental work spanning the economy, education, science, culture, public health, 
physical culture, urban and rural development, finance, civil affairs, public security, 
ethnic affairs, family planning, etc. and can issue decisions and orders (CPRC 2004, 
Article 107). Specifically, the chairperson of XUAR People’s Government mostly plays 
the role of a coordinator of the ethno-regional executive organs, while the head of the 
Department of Public Security oversees the coercive organs, especially the police forces 
of XUAR. The head of the Department of Development and Reform wields considerable 
decision-making power in the realm of macro-economic development, for instance, in 
terms of economic planning, market regulation, price regulation, adjusting sectoral 
structures, shaping the flow of capital and labor, etc.301 The Department of Development 
and Reform is the XUAR ethno-regional branch of the PRC National Development and 
Reform Commission. 
A 15% weight is assigned to the leadership of XPCC. XPCC is a combination of 
paramilitary administrative unit and SOEs but nominally also a part of the XUAR. 
However, in terms of jurisdiction, XPCC is de facto “autonomous” of XUAR, governing 
enclaves of land and population throughout XUAR. XPCC has 14 divisions based in all 
of the prefectural-level administrative units of XUAR. Engaged in agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction, as well as service industries, XPCC functions as enterprises 
and contributes to the revenue of both the central state and the XUAR ethno-regional 
state. As of 2014, 12% of XUAR population are affiliated to XPCC, while 4.24% of the 
land mass of XUAR is under the jurisdiction of XPCC. Ethnic minority populations (e.g. 
                                                          
301 “Main functions of the National Development and Reform Commission,” [in Chinese], available at 





Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Hui, Mongols, Xibe, etc.) make up 13.9% of the total population of 
XPCC, while the majority of XPCC population are ethnically Han302. The first political 
commissioner of XPCC is usually filled by the secretary of CCP XUAR committee. 
A smaller weight of 10% is assigned to the key posts at the legislative organs. The major 
legislative organ, People’s Congress, is nominally the supreme organ of the ethno-
regional state’s power, supervising primarily the implementation of PRC Constitution, 
national-level laws, as well as ethno-regional-level regulations (CPRC 2004, Article 99). 
The Standing Committee has the authority to enact ethno-regional-level autonomy 
regulations or separate regulations (CPRC 2004, Article 100). Procedurally, the ethno-
regional People’s Government needs to report to the ethno-regional People’s Congress 
with regard to both its performance and budget. Meanwhile, People’s Political 
Consultative Conference is an advisory organ intended for formally incorporating a 
broader spectrum of political, economic, and cultural elites into the legislative processes 
of PRC and having them represented at the state level. In practice, the conference is 
heavily orchestrated by the CCP Department of United Front. 5% of weight is assigned to 
the key posts of the People’s Court and People’s Procuratorate of XUAR, considering 
that their major roles are to apply laws in civil and criminal justice, to prosecute, and to 
investigate law enforcements with very limited decision-making power303. 
 
                                                          
302 State Council Information Office of PRC, “The History and Development of the XPCC,” [in Chinese], 
available at http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2014/Document/1382598/1382598.htm (accessed July 
31, 2017). 





Table 4.4. Ethnic Uyghur elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state of Xinjiang 
(2015) 
 Number of those 
occupying the most 
powerful positions 
who are of the titular 
ethnic category 
(Uyghur) 



























8d 27 0.6 10% 
Judiciary 2 2 2 5% 
a If the quotient is higher than 0 but no higher than 1, underrepresentation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is 1, 
proportional representation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is higher than 1 but no higher than 2, 
overrepresentation of titular elites is implied (given that ethnic Uyghurs’ percentage in the total population of Xinjiang 
was 49% as of 2014). 
b In addition to those who were ethnic Uyghur and Han, there were 1 ethnic Kazakh and 1 ethnic Dongxiang. 
c In addition to those who were ethnic Uyghur and Han, there were 1 ethnic Kazakh. 
d In addition to those who were ethnic Uyghur and Han, there were 4 ethnic Kazakhs, 2 ethnic Hui, 1 ethnic Kyrgyz, 1 
ethnic Mongol (Oiratic).  
Sources: People’s Government of the XUAR. http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn (accessed July 31, 2017); People’s Daily: 
Database for Local Leaders. http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/firstPage.htm (accessed July 31, 2017); China 
Economy Net: Database for Local Leaders. http://district.ce.cn/zt/rwk/index.shtml (accessed July 31, 2017); Xinhuanet: 
Personnel for Party and Governmental Apparatuses. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/rs.htm (accessed July 31, 






Table 4.5. Those occupying the most powerful positions at the ethno-regional state of the 
XUAR (2010-present) 
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a  Shöhrət Zakir grew up in Ürümqi. He is the son of Abdullah Zakirov, who was a member of the CCP XUAR standing 
committee and vice-chair of XUAR government during the 1950s and 1960s. Zakirov participated in the Latinization of 
Uyghur and Kazakh scripts in XUAR. The Latinized scripts were officially in use from the 1960s through 1982, when 
they were officially abolished. 
Sources: People’s Government of the XUAR. http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn (accessed July 31, 2017); People’s Daily: 
Database for Local Leaders. http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/firstPage.htm (accessed July 31, 2017); China 
Economy Net: Database for Local Leaders. http://district.ce.cn/zt/rwk/index.shtml (accessed July 31, 2017); Xinhuanet: 
Personnel for Party and Governmental Apparatuses. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/rs.htm (accessed July 31, 
2017); People’s Congress of XUAR. http://www.xjpcsc.gov.cn (accessed July 31, 2017). 
 
The weighted representation-by-population quotient for ethnic Uyghur elites in Xinjiang 
as of 2015 is 0.64, which is lower than 1 and signifies underrepresentation of ethnic 
Uyghur elites in the XUAR ethno-regional state and its most powerful positions. Overall, 
as summarized in Table 4.5., of the 38 individuals who once occupied or still occupy the 
most powerful positions of XUAR from 2010 to 2017, only nine are ethnic Uyghurs, thus 
making up barely a quarter and under-represented in relation to ethnic Uyghurs’ 
population weight in the total population of XUAR for the corresponding time frame. 
Moreover, at the 19th National Congress of CCP held in 2017, only 21% (9 out of 43) 





Nevertheless, mobility of ethnic Uyghur cadres from XUAR to the central-state or even 
other provincial-level units of China has become more visible in the 2010s. Most notable 
examples include Nur Bekri who became in 2014 head of PRC’s National Energy 
Administration, Kürəsh Məxsut who was appointed in 2014 as PRC’s Vice-Minister of 
Land and Resources, and Erkin Tulaghun who became in 2017 a member of the CCP 
Standing Committee of Hubei Province and head of CCP Hubei Province Department of 
United Front. 
 
SUMMARY: LOWER INTEGRATION, LOWER AUTONOMY 
Proportionate titular control of the ethno-regional state is a defining attribute of ethnic 
territorially-based autonomy, a necessary condition for autonomy implementation, and a 
property unique to autonomy as implemented. In the case of Xinjiang, a lack of Uyghur-
Han social integration coupled with thick Uyghur-Han cultural and psychological divide 
hampers, especially since the early 2000s, the building of ethnic Uyghur elites’ 
bargaining capacity and of intra-Uyghur cohesion. As a result, ethnic Uyghur elites have 
been persistently underrepresented in the ethno-regional state organs and their most 
powerful positions, and proportionate titular control of the ethno-regional state is absent. 
Due to the lower-than-necessary level of titular representation in the ethno-regional state, 
XUAR’s ability to implement prescribed autonomy has also been very limited, which has 
led to more subdued autonomy outcome for Xinjiang. Overall, as the experiences of 
autonomy-building in Xinjiang illustrates, absent a balance between inter-ethnic 
integration and inter-ethnic differentiation, inter-ethnic segregation can be detrimental, 





long-term autonomy-building in terms of titular political participation, ethno-regional 





5. INTER-ETHNIC BOUNDARY-MAKINGS, 
TITULAR ELITES, AND AUTONOMY OUTCOME 
IN TATARSTAN 
 
In December 2010, then-incumbent President of the Russian Federation Dmitry 
Medvedev signed into effect a law requiring those ethnic republics whose executive head 
had been designated as “President” to halt using that designation and to comply by 
January 1, 2015304. The “deadline” has long passed, but Tatarstan still retains the title 
“President” for its executive head and has been the only republic in Russia able to do 
that. In July 2013, the 27th Summer Universiade was held in Kazan, the capital of 
Tatarstan, and for the first time in Russia. In the summer of 2015, the 16th World 
Aquatics Championship was held in Kazan, also for the first time in Russia. In 2018, 
Kazan will participate in Russia’s hosting of the 21st FIFA World Cup. As styled by its 
municipal government, Kazan has indeed become the “sports capital of Russia” in the 
sense of hosting international sports events.  
In December 2016, President of Tatarstan, Röstəm Mingnekhanov, openly criticized305 
the federal government for fiscally “over-extracting” from its constituent entities like RT 
                                                          
304 “State Duma approved of the ban on naming head of republics ‘president’ within the Russian 
Federation.” [in Russian] Newsru.com, http://www.newsru.com/russia/02nov2010/nomoreprez.html 
(accessed July 31, 2017). 
305 “Tatarstan not contented with Kremlin: Minnikhanov criticized the federal government for its ‘over-
drawing” from successful regions.” [in Russian] Novaya Gazeta, 






that are net contributors to the federal budget. Starting August 2017, federal government 
investigated the mandatory Tatar-language courses in RT’s pre-tertiary education system, 
which triggered heated debates both in and outside Tatarstan. Defenders of the mandatory 
Tatar courses viewed them as a manifestation not only of the status of the Tatar language 
as one of the two state languages of RT but also of state-sponsored guarantee for the 
ontological security of the Tatar language, while their opponents pointed to the limited 
usefulness of the Tatar language in professional realms as well as its “interfering” effect 
with schoolchildren’s learning of Russian. In November 2017, the RT ethno-regional 
state reached a provisional compromise306 with the federal government and curtailed the 
hours of mandatory Tatar-language courses to 2 hours a week from the first through the 
ninth grades. Tatar-language courses became elective for grades higher than the ninth. 
Moreover, the RT state requested that a federal standard be formulated for the teaching of 
both Russian and the titular language in ethnic republics. For the time being, the Tatar 
language remains mandatory for schoolchildren in Tatarstan until the tenth grade. 
Despite federal government’s repeated attempts to shore up its control over Tatarstan, RT 
remains the most autonomous ethnic republic in Russia in terms of both prescriptive 
institution and implemented outcome. Why is it the case? This chapter examines in 
details the most recent trends in Tatar-Russian inter-ethnic boundary-makings and ethnic 
Tatar elites’ bargaining capacity in Tatarstan. Based upon both primary and secondary 
data, I first demonstrate how ethnic Tatars’ high level of linguistic Russification307 tends 
                                                          
306 “Compromise: Tatar-language course as state language remains two hours per week.” [in Tatar] Azatlıq 
Radiosı, https://www.azatliq.org/a/28841747.html (accessed December 31, 2017). 






to promote Tatar elites’ capacity to build cross-ethnic political networks and more 
collusive, less hierarchical types of relationships with ethnic Russian elites. Then I 
demonstrate how ethnic Tatars’ more solid social integration tends not only to cultivate 
positive perceptions of ethnic Tatars by the RF central state but also to translate into less 
differentiated intra-ethnic socio-economic and cultural contour. Such a contour is 
conducive to upward social mobility encouraging ethnic Tatar populace to identify with 
or to become themselves elites, which in turn contributes to intra-Tatar cohesion and 
ethnic Tatar elites’ mobilizing capacity. I conclude the chapter by arguing that ethnic 
Tatar elites’ more solid relationships with both the central state and their “co-ethnics,” 
coupled with a positive image of ethnic Tatars in the eyes of the central state, have been 
jointly sufficient for the overrepresentation of ethnic Tatar elites in the RT state organs 
and their most powerful positions.  
 
TATAR-RUSSIAN INTER-ETHNIC BOUNDARY MAKINGS  
Acculturation among ethnic Tatars and in Tatarstan 
Acculturation connotes the processes of linguistic and cultural diffusions and changes 
resulting in greater linguistic and cultural similarity between populations of the titular 
ethnic category of the ethno-region and the central state’s ethnic majority category. Since 
the most fundamental marker of cultural differences can be shared languages in which 
various “societal institutions” (Kymlicka 2001) are exercised, the level of acculturation is 
operationalized mostly in terms of actual and perceived levels of fluency in the central-






Competent knowledge of Russian did not become widespread among ethnic Tatars in 
TASSR until after World War II. For instance, according to the 1926 USSR census, only 
33.4% of ethnic Tatars in TASSR308 were literate, and almost no ethnic Tatars in TASSR 
claimed Russian as their “native language” (Kondrashov 2000, 28-29). From the end of 
the World War II until the disintegration of the USSR, Tatar was largely considered a 
“low status” language often associated with the rural areas and “backwardness” (32). 
Adequate speaking, listening, reading, and writing skills in Russian was perceived as 
indispensable for upward social mobility for those who originally knew only Tatar, while 
use of Tatar in schools or in public sphere would be frowned upon and even chastised, as 
confirmed by several respondents who grew up during the Soviet periods309. Situated in 
such a socio-linguistic order, Tatar speakers tended “to forget their Tatar” (Faller 2006, 
308) and not to transmit the language to their children, and even those who did speak 
Tatar to their children mostly did that only in intimate settings. As the sole language for 
the daily conduct of state apparatuses, Russian became hegemonic in TASSR not only in 
formal settings but also in the informal space (e.g. home) traditionally associated with the 
Tatar language, which many ethnic Tatars in Kazan themselves participated in 
perpetuating by actively switching to the Russian language for personal career 
advancement (Kondrashov 2000, 40; Faller 2006, 308). The use of Tatar was reduced to 
the extent that even the ethnic Ukrainian first secretary of TASSR who was in office 
during 1957-1960, Semyon Ignat’ev, came to perceive a “lack of respect” (Russian: 
neuvazheniye k rodnomu yazyku, Gallyamova 2015, 368-369) of the Tatar language in the 
                                                          
308 Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1920-1990). 





republic and reported the underdevelopment of Tatar-language education system to the 
Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow (368). 
Such self-Russification can be associated with the Soviet practice of cadre indigenization 
(Gorenburg 2003, 46-48; Giuliano 2006b, 37-38) which placed an inherent emphasis 
upon knowledge and use of the Russian language (Giuliano 2000, 304). According to the 
micro-census conducted in 1994 immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, of 
ethnic Tatars in Russia, 11.4% claimed to know only Russian, 2.7% of them claimed 
Russian as their “native language” with Tatar as their second language, 75.9% claimed 
Tatar as their “native language” with Russian as their second language, 9.6% claimed to 
know only Tatar (Gorenburg 2006a, 288-291). Assuming that the micro-census data are 
reliable, then, in 1994, there were, by a small margin, more ethnic Tatars in Russia who 
knew Russian than those who knew Tatar.  
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the use of Tatar in Tatarstan has been 
expanding into more domains than merely the intimate spheres (Faller 2006, 316), as the 
RT state authority has been striving to promote formal use of Tatar and as the ethno-
national consciousness among Tatars has been rising. However, the overall terrain of 
language use remains characteristically asymmetric and Russian-dominated among ethnic 
Tatars both Russia-wide and in Tatarstan alone, as almost everybody knows and uses 
Russian, but only some of them know and use Tatar. Notably, the percentage of those 
who knew Tatar demonstrated a similar trend of declining throughout the 2000s among 
ethnic Tatars and Russians alike at both the national and ethno-regional levels, while the 
percentage of those who knew Russian followed an opposite trend of rising for these two 





As summarized in Table 5.1., of all ethnic Tatars in Russia who indicated their command 
of languages, the percentage of those who knew Tatar dropped from 80.8% in 2002 to 
69% in 2010, while the percentage of those who knew Russian rose from 96.1% in 2002 
to 97.8% in 2010. Of all ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan who indicated their command of 
languages, the percentage of those who knew Tatar dropped from 94.2% in 2002 to 
92.7% in 2010, while the percentage of those who knew Russian rose from 92.9% in 
2002 to 95.8% in 2010. If the census data are adequately reliable, it can be observed that 
if by 2002, more ethnic Tatars knew Tatar than they knew Russian in Tatarstan, then by 
2010, more ethnic Tatars knew Russian than they knew Tatar in Tatarstan. Similarly, of 
all ethnic Tatars in Bashkortostan310 who indicated their command of languages, the 
percentage of those who knew Tatar dropped from 86.8% in 2002 to 67% in 2010, while 
the percentage of those who knew Russian rose from 96.4% in 2002 to 98.7% in 2010. 
Meanwhile, for the same time frame, the originally low level of knowledge of Tatar 
among ethnic Russians became even lower: of all ethnic Russians in the Russian 
Federation who indicated their command of languages, the percentage of those who knew 
Tatar dropped slightly from 0.12% in 2002 to 0.1% in 2010. Of all ethnic Russians in 
Tatarstan who indicated their command of languages, the percentage of those who knew 
Tatar dropped from 4.3% in 2002 to 3.6% in 2010. Combining all ethnic populations, of 
all residents of Tatarstan who indicated their command of languages, the percentage of 
those who knew Tatar dropped from 53.3% in 2002 to 52.1% in 2010, while the 
percentage of those who knew Russian rose from 95.6% in 2002 to 97.6% in 2010. Of all 
residents of Bashkortostan, regardless of ethnicity, who indicated their command of 
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languages, the percentage of those who knew Tatar dropped from 34% in 2002 to 26.7% 
in 2010, while the percentage of those who knew Russian rose from 96.4% in 2002 to 
98.7% in 2010. 
 
Table 5.1. Knowledge of Tatar and Russian among different populations 
 2002 2010 
% of ethnic Tatars claiming to 
know Tatar (Russia) 
 
80.8 69 ↓ 
% of ethnic Russians claiming 
to know Tatar (Russia) 
 
0.12 0.1 ↓ 
% of ethnic Tatars claiming to 
know Tatar (Tatarstan) 
 
94.2 92.7 ↓ 
% of ethnic Russians claiming 
to know Tatar (Tatarstan) 
 
4.3 3.6 ↓ 
% of the total population of 
Tatarstan claiming to know 
Tatar 
 
53.3 52.1 ↓ 
% of ethnic Tatars claiming to 
know Tatar (Bashkortostan) 
 
86.8 67 ↓ 
% of the total population of 
Bashkortostan claiming to 
know Tatar 
 
34 26.7 ↓ 
% of ethnic Tatars claiming to 
know Russian (Russia) 






% of ethnic Tatars claiming to 
know Russian (Tatarstan) 
 
92.9 95.8 ↑ 
% of ethnic Russians claiming 
to know Russian (Tatarstan) 
 
99.3 99.9 ↑ 
% of the total population of 
Tatarstan claiming to know 
Russian 
 
95.6 97.6 ↑ 
% of ethnic Tatars claiming to 
know Russian (Bashkortostan) 
 
96.4 98.7 ↑ 
% of the total population of 
Bashkortostan claiming to 
know Russian 
96.4 98.7 ↑ 
Sources: Calculated from the following census publications, All Russia Population Census 2002. 
http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=28 (accessed July 31, 2017); All Russia Population Census 2010. 
http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed July 31, 2017). 
 
For decades, ethnic Tatars in the urban areas of Tatarstan have established socio-
linguistic patterns of adopting or switching to Russian, especially among younger 
generations. Even if some Tatars demand more broadened use of Tatar in government 
and in public sphere, most of them have long been an integral part of the Russian-
dominated linguistic milieu and thus are able to cope with the still-limited use of Tatar in 
those spheres. In other words, a common tendency among ethnic Tatars both in and 
outside of Tatarstan in Russia is to emphasize the necessity of Russian proficiency and to 
become as fluent in Russian as ethnic Russians. That said, what distinguishes some ethnic 





consciousness tend to stress equal fluency in both Tatar and Russian, while others tend to 
see little utility in knowing Tatar and thus are uninterested in learning Tatar. The 
tendency among ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan to grow even more fluent in Russian than in 
Tatar can also be confirmed with respondents’ perceptions. 
In urban areas of Tatarstan, the Tatar language tends to be used more “in private settings 
than in workplaces”311. Most of urban-based Tatars are able to speak Russian as “native 
speakers without accent”312. Meanwhile, they are also considered “heirs of indigenous 
cultural heritages”313. Nevertheless, ethnic Tatar children tend to develop capacity to 
understand Tatar only if their parents constantly speak the language in their presence. 
Meanwhile, Russian remains dominant due to the highly entrenched, historically-
determined linguistic landscapes314 and functions as the professional language. Russian 
tends to be the first choice for means of communication, especially for those who are 
themselves of cross-ethnic categories315 and married to somebody also of cross-ethnic 
categories. Overall, some respondents tend to view the RT state’s efforts at reviving the 
Tatar language as not so successful316, while other respondents admit that knowledge of 
Tatar is not necessary for daily survival in urban areas in Tatarstan317. 
                                                          
311 Russian: bol’she v lichnoi zhizni chem na rabote. Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on March 
30, April 15, April 27, May 17, and June 15, 2016. 
312 Russian: bez aktsenta. Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on March 30, April 15, April 27, and 
May 17, 2016. 
313 Russian: nositeli rodnoi kul’tury. Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on April 15, April 27, and 
May 17, 2016. 
314 Russian: sreda. Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on March 30, April 15, April 27, May 17, and 
June 15, 2016. 
315 Being of cross-ethnic ancestry does not necessarily translate into knowing only Russian. In fact, the 
author encountered on several occasions cross-ethnic individuals able to use Tatar. 
316 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan and Yar Challı on March 30, April 15, May 17, June 11, and 






In rural areas of Tatarstan, Russian tends to be more commonly used among younger 
generations of ethnic Tatars, whereas Tatar tends to be more featured among older 
generations of ethnic Tatars318. In villages, contingent upon the local linguistic landscape 
and the type of profession, sometimes knowledge of Tatar can be necessary for 
professionals319. However, the percentage of rural-based ethnic Russians who know 
Tatar, as put by a respondent at 2%320, is even lower than the percentage321 of those who 
knew Tatar in the total population of ethnic Russians in Tatarstan as of the 2010 
population census.  
Urban and rural areas combined, those who know Tatar in Tatarstan tend to be also 
bilingual in Russian and able to process their thinking in both Russian and Tatar, while 
approximately 50% of the Tatarstani population uses only Russian in their daily life. 
Code-switching between Tatar and Russian according to “mood”322 is widespread among 
those who are bilingual. Some respondents estimated that, among ethnic Tatars in 
Tatarstan, around one fifth323 have no functional knowledge of Tatar, which is 
significantly higher than the figure, 7.3%, as of the 2010 population census. If ethnic 
Tatar cultural elites tend to be more vocally advocating for the knowledge of Tatar to be 
developed on a par with the knowledge of Russian, ethnic Tatar working class may tend 
to be more inclined to accept the Russian language at the expense of Tatar324. Meanwhile, 
                                                          
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Anonymous interview conducted on April 15, 2016. 
321 3.6% according to the 2010 census. 
322 Russian: nastroeniye. Anonymous interviews conducted on April 15, April 27, May 17, and June 15, 
2016. 
323 Anonymous interviews conducted on April 15 and May 17, 2016. 
324 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan and Yar Challı on March 30, April 15, April 27, May 17, June 





ethnic Russians in Tatarstan rarely know the Tatar language. Even if they know, usually 
they do it at the “conversational level”325. Since Russian is hegemonic in the realm of 
broadcast media, children whose original language is Tatar tend to develop listening 
comprehension evenly in Russian and Tatar326. Considering that knowledge of Russian is 
universal in Tatarstan while knowledge of Tatar is applicable merely to about half of the 
population, Tatar is rarely used in court sessions, where Russian dominates to avoid the 
costs of interpreting or translating327. 
Concomitantly, Russian has somehow become an attribute of the Tatar ethnic identity, 
since the dissemination among ethnic Tatars of knowledge associated with other 
candidate attributes of the Tatar ethnicity (e.g. historiography, religion, folklores, cuisine, 
costumes, festivities) usually relies upon the Russian language in conjunction with Tatar. 
For instance, as the author pays visits to mosques at various locations in Tatarstan, 
Russian seemed to be the dominant language used among those who attended prayers. In 
several folkloric concerts328 either featuring or intended for ethnic Tatar children in 
Kazan, the coordinator spoke almost exclusively in Russian while the performances were 
conducted in Tatar. 
Tatarstan boasts of diverse, heterogeneous religious contours. Although Islam is usually 
considered the predominant religious identity associated with ethnic Tatars, boundaries of 
religious identities do not exactly overlap with boundaries of ethnic identities, much less 
                                                          
325 Russian: razgovornoe znaniye. Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on March 30, April 15, April 
27, and May 17, 2016. 
326 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on May 17, 2016. 
327 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on March 30, April 15, and May 17, 2016. 






with boundaries of linguistic identities. Among ethnic Tatars, there are also those who do 
not identify themselves as Muslims, those who do not associate themselves with any 
religion (e.g. atheists), those who claim to follow Tengriism329 (Tatar: Təngrechelek), 
those who claim to practice orthodox Christianity (Tatar: Kerəshennər330). In urban areas 
of Tatarstan, Muslims are not necessarily ethnic Tatars but also include those of other 
ethnicities (e.g. ethnic Uzbeks, ethnic Tajiks, ethnic Azerbaijanis, ethnic Bashkirs, and 
even ethnic Russians). The religious identity conventionally associated with ethnic 
Russians, ethnic Chuvash, ethnic Udmurts, and ethnic Mari in Tatarstan is either 
orthodox Christianity or autochthonous spiritual practices331, even though those who do 
not associate themselves with any religion or those do not practice also abound332. 
In sum, despite the slightly higher percentage of ethnic Tatars in the total population of 
RT than that of ethnic Uyghurs in the total population of XUAR, ethnic Tatars are 
linguistically tremendously more Russified than are ethnic Uyghurs Sinicized. In 
Tatarstan, more ethnic Tatars know and use fluently Russian than those who know and 
use fluently Tatar, whereas the majority of ethnic Tatars claim to be bilingual.  
 
                                                          
329 An umbrella term for autochthonous spiritual practices among mostly Turkic and Mongolic-speaking 
populations of inland Eurasia. Such spiritual practices tend to attribute “eternal” consciousness to the 
“blue sky.” 
330 Some of the Kerəshens do not consider themselves ethnic Tatars but constituting a separate ethnic 
group. 
331 Resembling Tengriism. 





Social integration among ethnic Tatars and in Tatarstan 
Social integration is associated with aggregating the processes of interpersonal, 
socioeconomic, and spatial interactions relevant to the economy, the polity, and the 
community among the populations of both an ethno-region’s titular ethnic category and 
the central state’s ethnic majority category. The degree of such social integration of an 
ethnic group can be assessed according to such demographic indicators as levels of 
urbanization, educational attainments, intermarriage rates with the majority ethnic group, 
as well as residential patterns. 
According to the 2010 All-Russia population census, the overall level of urbanization333 
reached 73.7%334, whereas the overall level of higher education335 reached 28%336. The 
overall level of illiteracy in Russia was 0.32%337, while the rate of inter-ethnic 
marriages338 reached 12%. Of the total population of those ethnic minority categories for 
whom territorially-based autonomous entities have been designated, 65.3% were 
residents in those autonomous entities, with the rest living outside their designated ethno-
regions.   
To evaluate the country-wide level of social integration for the titular population of an 
ethno-region in Russia, I propose the following instrument. It scores a population’s level 
of integration on each of the following five dimensions, urbanization, higher education, 
                                                          
333 Percentage of urban-based population in the total population of RF 
334 76.8% among ethnic Russians, 56.5% among ethnic non-Russians. 
335 Percentage of those who have received tertiary education in the total population of those age fifteen 
and older. 
336 28.9% among ethnic Russians, 29% among ethnic Russians in RT, 24% among ethnic non-Russians. 
337 0.23% among ethnic Russians, 0.65% among ethnic non-Russians. 
338 Percentage of those married outside their own ethnic categories in the total population of those 





illiteracy rate, cross-ethnic marriage rate, and residential concentration within designated 
ethno-regions. The score of each dimension is assigned a weight of 1/5, generating an 
aggregate score up to 100%. The higher the score for a population, the greater the level of 
social integration for a titular ethnic population. For an ethno-region in Russia, the 
formula with which to calculate the country-wide level of social integration for its titular 
ethnic population, SI2, is proposed as 
SI2=(Du2×1/5+De2×1/5+Di2×1/5+Dm2×1/5+Dr2×1/5) ×100% 
For a titular ethnic population in Russia, the five dimensions are assessed on an ordinal 
scale of three categories. Accordingly, a population’s score on these dimensions will take 
one of three mutually discrete values: 
An ethnic population’s level of urbanization is assessed in relation to the national average 
level of urbanization of Russia according to the 2010 All-Russia census, by means of 
calculating the location quotient of the ethnic population’s level of urbanization divided 
by the national average level of urbanization. Location quotient is calculated using the 
following formula: LQu=u2/73.7%. The range of LQu is (0, 1.36]. When a population is 
100% urbanized in the 2010 census, its quotient will reach 1.36. If the location quotient 
of the population is lower than 0.75 (level of urbanization significantly lower than 
national average), then the score, Du2, will be 0.5. If the location quotient of the 
population is no lower than 0.67339 but no higher than 1.25 (level of urbanization largely 
comparable to national average), then Du2 will be 0.75. If the location quotient of the 
                                                          





population is higher than 1.25 but no higher than the maximum (level of urbanization 
significantly higher than national average), then Du2 will be 1.   
An ethnic population’s level of higher education is assessed in relation to the national 
average level of higher education of Russia according to the 2010 All-Russia census, by 
means of calculating the location quotient of the ethnic population’s level of higher 
education divided by the national average level of higher education. Location quotient is 
calculated using the following formula: LQe=e2/28%. The range of the quotient is (0, 
3.6]. When virtually all individuals age 6 and older of an ethnic population older than 6 
have received tertiary education in the 2010 census, its quotient will reach 3.6. If the 
location quotient of the population is lower than 0.75 (level of higher education 
significantly lower than national average), then the score, De2, will be 0.25. If the 
location quotient of the population is no lower than 0.75 but no higher than 1.25 (level of 
higher education largely comparable to national average), then De2 will be 0.75. If the 
location quotient of the population is higher than 1.25 but no higher than the maximum 
(level of higher education significantly higher than national average), then De2 will be 1.  
An ethnic population’s level of illiteracy is assessed in relation to the national average 
level of illiteracy of Russia according to the 2010 All-Russia census, by means of 
calculating the location quotient of the ethnic population’s level of illiteracy divided by 
the national average level of illiteracy. Location quotient is calculated using the following 
formula: LQi=i2/0.32%. The range of the quotient is (0, 312.5]. When virtually all 
individuals of a population older than 6 were illiterate in the 2010 census, its quotient will 
reach 312.5. If the location quotient of the population is lower than 0.75 (level of 





location quotient of the population is no lower than 0.75 but no higher than 3.125 (level 
of illiteracy largely comparable to national average), then Di2 will be 0.75. If the location 
quotient of the population is higher than 3.125 but no higher than the maximum (level of 
illiteracy significantly higher than national average), then Di2 will be 0.25.  
An ethnic population’s level of inter-ethnic marriages is assessed in relation to the 
national average level of inter-ethnic marriages of Russia according to the 2010 All-
Russia census, by means of calculating the location quotient of the ethnic population’s 
level of inter-ethnic marriages divided by the national average level of inter-ethnic 
marriages. Location quotient is calculated using the following formula: LQm=m2/12%. 
The range of the quotient is (0, 8.3]. When virtually all individuals married of a 
population had spouses whose ethnic category was different from his or hers in the 2010 
census, its quotient will reach 8.3. If the location quotient of the population is lower than 
0.75 (level of inter-ethnic marriages significantly lower than national average), then the 
score, Dm2, will be 0.25. If the location quotient of the population is no lower than 0.75 
but no higher than 1.25 (level of inter-ethnic marriages largely comparable to national 
average), then Dm2 will be 0.75. If the location quotient of the population is higher than 
1.25 but no higher than the maximum (level of inter-ethnic marriages significantly higher 
than national average), then Dm2 will be 1.   
An titular ethnic population’s level of residential concentration is assessed in relation to 
the percentage of ethnic minority populations residing in their designated ethno-regions 
in the total population of these ethnic minority populations in Russia according to the 
2010 All-Russia census, by means of calculating the location quotient of the ethnic 





national average level of residential concentration among ethnic minorities in their 
designated ethno-regions. Location quotient is calculated using the following formula: 
LQr=r2/65.3%. The range of the quotient is (0, 1.53]. When virtually all individuals of a 
population were residing in the ethno-region(s) designated for that ethnic category in the 
2010 census, its quotient will reach 1.53. If the location quotient of the population is 
lower than 0.75 (level of residential concentration significantly lower than national 
average), then the score, Dr2, will be 1. If the location quotient of the population is no 
lower than 0.75 but no higher than 1.25 (level of residential concentration largely 
comparable to national average), then Dr2 will be 0.75. If the location quotient of the 
population is higher than 1.25 but no higher than the maximum (level of residential 
concentration significantly higher than national average), then Dr2 will be 0.25.  
 
Table 5.2. Key indicators of social integration for ethnic Tatars in Russia 
 2002 2010 
Total Population in the 
Russian Federation 
5,554,601 (including 24,668 
Kerəshensa) 
 
5,310,649 (including 34,822 
Kerəshens) 
% of those living in urban 
areas 
68.3% (Russia), 66.5% 
(Tatarstan) 
67.8% (Russia), 68.8% 
(Tatarstan), 61.6% (ethnic 
Tatars in Bashkortostan) 
 
% of those who have received 
tertiary education 
15.5%b (Russia) 20.1%c (Russia), 24.6%d 
(Russia), 27.2%e (Tatarstan), 
33%f (urban Tatarstan), 
23.9%g (ethnic Tatars in 
Bashkortostan), 29.3%h 







% of those illiterate 0.83% (Russia) 0.4% (Russia) 
 
% of those married to ethnic 
Russians 
n.a. 21.6% (Russia), less than 
12.9% (Tatarstan) 
 
% of those married to ethnic 
non-Tatars 
41.7% (outside Tatarstan), 
less than 14% (Tatarstan) 
31.3% (Russia, 4.9% married 
to ethnic Bashkirs), 12.9% 
(Tatarstan) 
 
% of those living in the 
Republic of Tatarstan 
36% (2,000,116, including 
18,760 Kerəshens) 
37.9% (2,012,571, including 
29,962 Kerəshens) 
 
% of those living in 
subnational-level 
administrative units other 
than Tatarstan 
17.8% in Bashkortostan, 
4.4% in Tyumen (including 
Khanty-Mansi), 3.7% in 
Chelyabinsk, 3% in the City 
of Moscow, 3% in Orenburg, 
3% in Ulyanovsk, 3% in 
Sverdlovsk, 2.5% in Perm 
19% in Bashkortostan, 4.5% 
in Tyumen (including 
Khanty-Mansi), 3.4% in 
Chelyabinsk, 2.9% in 
Orenburg, 2.8% in 
Ulyanovsk, 2.8% in the City 
of Moscow, 2.7% in 
Sverdlovsk, 2.4% in Samara 
a The Kerəshens, known for mostly practicing Orthodox Christianity while speaking Tatar, were counted as a sub-
category of Tatars in the 2002 and 2010 All-Russia population censuses. 
b Including those with partially completed tertiary education. 
c Not including those with partially completed tertiary education. 
d e f g h Including those with partially completed tertiary education. 
Sources: Calculated from the following census publications, All Russia Population Census 2002. 
http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=28 (accessed July 31, 2017); All Russia Population Census 2010. 
http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed July 31, 2017). 
 
Table 5.3. Summary of ethnic Tatars’ level of social integration in Russia (2010) 




















Total score  85% 
 
As summarized in Tables 5.2. and 5.3., according to the 2010 All-Russia population 
census, the overall level of urbanization of the total population categorized as ethnic 
Tatars in Russia was 67.8%, slightly lower than the national average of 73.7%. Therefore, 
ethnic Tatars score 0.75 on Du2. The overall percentage of those who had attained tertiary 
education among ethnic Tatars in Russia was 24.6%, slightly lower than the national 
average of 28%. Thus, ethnic Tatars score 0.75 on De2 as well. The overall level of 
illiteracy among ethnic Tatars in Russia was 0.4%, slightly higher than the national 
average of 0.32%. Thus, ethnic Tatars score also 0.75 on Di2. The overall percentage of 
those whose spouses were ethnically non-Tatar among all married ethnic Tatars in Russia 
was 31.3%, over two times higher than the national average of 12%. Thus, ethnic Tatars 
score 1 on Dm2. Only 37.9% of ethnic Tatars in Russia were residing in Tatarstan, 
significantly lower than the national average of 65.3% of all ethnic minority populations 
in Russia who were living in their designated ethno-regions. Accordingly, ethnic Tatars 
score 1 on Dr2. To sum up, the calculated country-wide level of social integration for the 





High level of social integration of ethnic Tatars were also unanimously confirmed by 
most of my respondents. As interactions between ethnic Tatars and ethnic Russians are 
more common in urban areas of Tatarstan than in rural areas, Tatar-Russian friendship 
tends to be more common in the urban areas of Tatarstan, depending upon types of 
workplace, especially in those ethnically mixed professional settings340. In rural areas, 
inter-ethnic relations can be more complicated, where communities can be more close-
knit while overlapping with inter-ethnic boundaries341. Most of my respondents claim to 
have both ethnic Tatars and Russians represented among their close friends342. Several 
respondents also claimed that ethnic Tatars were overrepresented in major universities in 
Kazan. For instance, in Kazan Federal University, over 60% of all enrolled students 
might have been ethnic Tatars or of partial ethnic Tatar ancestry343, even if ethnic Tatars 
constitute slightly more than 50% of the total population of Tatarstan. Illiteracy among 
adult-age ethnic Tatars was largely an unheard-of phenomenon during my fieldwork in 
Tatarstan. 
Tatar-Russian inter-ethnic marriages tend to be sufficiently commonplace in urban 
centers of Tatarstan, especially in Kazan344. In some cases, inter-ethnic marriages have 
spanned two to three generations, and as a result, a considerably large population of bi-
ethnic ancestry have formed in Kazan. Most individuals of cross-ethnic ancestry in Kazan 
                                                          
340 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on March 30, April 15, April 27, May 17, and June 15 of 
2016. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on March 30, April 15, April 27, May 17, and June 15, 2016. 
343 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on April 15, April 27, May 16, and June 19, 2016. 
344 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan, Yar Challı, and Ufa on April 15, April 22, April 27, May 17, 





speak Russian as their native language, and it somehow depends upon whether their 
mothers speak Tatar at home or not345 for them to grow up as Tatar speakers.  
In terms of residential patterns, ethnic Tatar population and ethnic Russian population 
follow somehow differing patterns of distribution in Tatarstan. As shown in Table 5.4, for 
the Northeastern Economic Region centering around Yar Challı/Naberezhnye Chelny, its 
share of ethnic Tatars in the total population of ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan equals its share 
of ethnic Russians in the total population of ethnic Russians in Tatarstan. In the 
Northwestern (centering around Kazan) and Zakamsky Economic Regions, their shares 
of ethnic Tatars in the total population of ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan are lower than their 
shares of ethnic Russians in the total population of ethnic Russians in Tatarstan. In the 
Southeastern (centering around Əlmət/Almetyevsk), Predkamsky, and Privolzhsky 
Economic Regions, their shares of ethnic Tatars in the total population of ethnic Tatars in 
Tatarstan are higher than their shares of ethnic Russians in the total population of ethnic 
Russians in Tatarstan. Overall, ethnic Tatars tend to be more evenly distributed across 
Tatarstan, while ethnic Russians tend to be more concentrated in urban centers and 
valleys of such rivers as Volga and Kama. Ethnic Chuvashes in Tatarstan, whose 
population was 116,252 as of 2010, constitute the third largest ethnic population of RT. 
Over 50% of ethnic Chuvashes were concentrated in the southwestern part (i.e. 
Zakamsky and Privolzhsky Economic Regions) of Tatarstan that borders Republic of 
Chuvashia and Ulyanovsk Oblast’.  






In each of the seven districts346 of Kazan, its share of ethnic Tatars in the total population 
of ethnic Tatars in Kazan is largely comparable to its share of ethnic Russians in the total 
population of ethnic Russians in Kazan. The famous neighborhood called “Old Tatar 
Settlement” (Tatar: İske Tatar Bistəse; Russian: Starotatarskaya Sloboda) in Vakhitov 
District where historically Tatars used to be concentrated during the Imperial Russia 
period now bears only symbolic rather than demographic significance. 
 












































                                                          
346 Aviatözelesh/Aviastroitel’nyi, Wakhitov/Vakhitov, Kirov, Məskəü/Moskva, Yanga Savin/Novo-




















































Source: Calculated from Ethnic Composition, Command of Languages, Citizenship: Results of the 2010 All-Russia 






To sum up, for the past three decades, ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan display greater tendency 
towards social integration with ethnic Russians. Russia-wide, ethnic Tatars have been 
tremendously more integrated into the mainstream society than have ethnic Uyghurs in 
China. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the following section, ethno-national 
consciousness among ethnic Tatars did not fade. Instead, many ethnic Tatars stick to their 
ethnic identity, even if they have switched to Russian linguistically and are socially well-
integrated.   
 
Psychological identification among ethnic Tatars 
Psychological identification lays the micro-foundation for group consciousness at the 
individual level. This dimension is analyzed into two aspects, the degree of thickness and 
the salience of an ethno-region’s titular ethnic category against massive identity shift into 
the central state’s ethnic majority category347. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the major 
tendency among ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan has been that ethnic consciousness remains 
stable and robust but nevertheless is not growing even thicker or more salient.  
Thickness   Important legacies of the Soviet institutional practices of categorizing 
populations in ethnic terms include, but are not confined to, each individual being 
assigned an ethnic category (Gorenburg 2003, 86; 2006b, 156), this category becoming a 
container of “descent-based attribute” (Chandra 2009, 377) and being transmitted348 from 
parents to children. In other words, one is ethnic Tatar because his or her parents are 
                                                          
347 For a more detailed definition of psychological identification, see the sub-section “Components of the 
Analytical Framework” in Introduction. 
348 This is by no means a primordialist understanding of ethnicity. Rather, state agency was indispensable 
in terms of institutionalizing ethnic categories. As long as such classificatory scheme remains stable, 





ethnic Tatars, which is usually distinguished through family names. As a result, at least in 
consistency with the author’s observations, most individuals in Tatarstan, even those of 
bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic ancestry, can unambiguously indicate whether he or she is 
ethnic Tatar, ethnic Russian, or at what “proportion” ethnic Tatar, ethnic Russian, or of 
other ethnicities.  
In Tatarstan, the total population of ethnic Tatars rose from 1,765,400 in 1989, to 
2,000,116 in 2002, and to 2,012,571 in 2010 (Gaisin et al. 2013, 38), which, provided that 
these numbers are reliable, can allude to a picture of Tatar ethnic consciousness not 
dwindling since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Massive shifts among the titular 
population to registering oneself as “ethnic Russians” in population censuses as observed 
in such ethnic republics as Mordovia, Mari El, etc.349 are not happening in Tatarstan. 
According to the longitudinal study conducted by Guzel Makarova et al. of all the urban-
based ethnic Tatar respondents of the study, the percentage of those responding “yes” to 
“I never forget about my ethnicity”350 rose from 49.7% in 1994 to 58.7% in 2010 (2010, 
93, 100). In the meantime, those responding “yes” to “my ethnicity and that of those 
around me have no meaning for me”351 declined from 48.7% in 1994 to 20.1% in 2010 
(93, 100). A similar study by Gulnara Gabdrakhmanova demonstrates that the percentage 
of urban ethnic Tatar respondents who responded “yes” to the question “I never forget 
about my ethnicity” raised from 50.5% in 1994 to 51.9% in 1999 to 77.6% in 2011 (2013, 
472). As was optimistically asserted by the political advisor of the former President of 
                                                          
349 The total population of ethnic Mordvins in Russia dwindled from 1,072,939 in 1989 to 744,237 in 2010 
by 30.6%; the total population of ethnic Mari in Russia dwindled from 714,833 in 1989 to 552,299 by 
22.7% (2010 All-Russia Population Census). 
350 Russian: Ya nikogda ne zabyvayu o svoei natsional’nosti. 





RT Mintimer Shəimiev, Rafael Khəkim352, even if ethnic Tatars had collectively 
switched to the Russian language and abandoned the Tatar language, the Tatar identity 
would still stay because “identity is determined neither by language nor by religion but 
by descent.”353 A more sociologically-oriented understanding of Tatar identity formation 
was provided by an ethnic Tatar historian, Damir İskhakov, who commented that 
“(shared identity of) a people does not emanate from biomass (genetic pools) but rather is 
spawned out of (shared) language, (shared) culture, and (shared) political processes”354 in 
response to certain interpretations of genetic studies indicating genetic diversity among 
the ethnic Tatar population in Russia.  
Rise of Tatar ethnic consciousness since the dissolution of the Soviet Union is also 
confirmed by other respondents. Of the Tatar-speaking ethnic Tatars with whom I 
interacted in Tatarstan, some with strong ethnic consciousness tended to perceive their 
ethnicity as coterminous with linguistically-based distinctions, especially when 
knowledge of Tatar was viewed as a convenient cognitive device distinguishing “us” 
from “them”. Meanwhile, rise of religious consciousness among both Tatars and 
Russians also leads to some ethnic Tatars or ethnic Russians requiring ethnic identity to 
overlap with religious-based identities. Concretely, for some ethnic Tatars, being 
ethnically Tatar means identifying as Muslim while speaking Tatar, whereas for some 
ethnic Russians, being ethnically Russian means identifying as Orthodox Christian while 
                                                          
352 Once the deputy head of the ideology department of TASSR oblast’-level committee of CPSU 
(Kondrashov 2000, 125-126). 
353 Russian: ne po yazyku i ne po religii, a po proiskhozhdeniyu, Rafael Khakimov, “What would happen if 
Tatars completely switched to Russian?” [in Russian] Biznes Online, https://www.business-
gazeta.ru/blog/206038 (accessed February 28, 2017). 
354 Tatar: Xalık biomassadan barlıkka kilmi. Anı tel, mədəniyət həm səyəsi protsesslar tudıra, Kərim Yaush, 
“Op-ed: We are a multi-ethnic Tatar people!” [in Tatar] Azatlıq Radiosı, 





speaking Russian. In this regard, more ethno-nationally minded Tatars would tend to 
attach varying extents of emotion to the Tatar language, to being a Muslim, or to Tatar 
folkloric music. 
However, such trends are not nearly dominant in Tatarstan. Ethnic Tatars who have no 
knowledge of the Tatar language still identify themselves as Tatars, and they are also, 
more often than not, perceived as “Tatars who have lost mother tongue” by their Tatar-
speaking “co-ethnics.” Ethnic Tatars who do not identify as Muslims still identify 
themselves as Tatars, and they are also perceived as “non-believing Tatars” (Russian: 
neveruyushchie Tatary) by their Muslim “co-ethnics.” Kerəshens, a sub-ethnic category 
of ethnic Tatars who traditionally identify as Orthodox Christians, a minority of 
Tengriists, and a tiny minority of evangelical Christians also identify themselves as 
ethnic Tatars. Among ethnic Russians, more tend not to identify with any religious 
practice than those who identify as Orthodox Christians, while there is also a really tiny 
but visible minority who identify as Muslims. Despite the variety of religiously-based 
identities, Tatars continue to identify as Tatars while Russians continue to identify as 
Russians355. Overall, Tatar identity tends to be decreasingly tied to many attributes but 
one, namely, descent, and in this sense, the extension of Tatar identity has become 
broadly encompassing but still stable by clinging to the rule-of-thumb attribute of 
descent. 
Salience   Since RF citizens’ ethnicity is no longer indicated on governmentally-issued 
identification papers, ethnic categories like “Tatar”, “Russian”, etc. no longer bear formal 
                                                          





implications in individual citizens’ receipts of governmental services, even if it remains 
technically possible to tell their ethnicity by looking at their family names or given 
names. In this sense, Tatar-Russian boundary has become increasingly “de-reified” and 
de-emphasized when it comes to governmental services, education, labor market, etc. 
Nevertheless, ethnic categories and inter-ethnic relations remain contested topics in 
Tatarstan. According to the survey-based, longitudinal research conducted by Gulnara 
Gabdrakhmanova, both ethnic Tatar (at 89.1%) and ethnic Russian respondents (at 
86.6%) in Tatarstan tend to emphasize the importance of the notion of “inter-ethnic 
equality”. However, the meaning of “inter-ethnic equality” tends to differ drastically 
across respondents of two ethnic categories. Ethnic Russian respondents emphasize 
representation in state organs of RT that is proportional to the population weight of each 
ethnic category, while ethnic Tatar respondents emphasize RT state’s measures to protect 
and to promote the cultural interests and identity of ethnic Tatars (Gabdrakhmanova 
2013, 474-475).  
 
TATAR ELITES’ BARGAINING CAPACITY  
Tatar-Russian elite-level relations  
Elite-level inter-ethnic relations is analyzed on two aspects, nature of elite-level 
relationship and networks of elite-level political alliances. In Tatarstan, higher level of 
linguistic Russification among ethnic Tatars has been a necessary condition for ethnic 
Tatar elites to build cross-group networks of political alliances as well as more collusive 





Since the late 1980s/early 1990s, incumbent ethnic Tatar elites of RT have been able to 
foster and maintain with the central-state elites in Moscow relationships that can be 
characterized as horizontally collusive. Such collusive relationships were manifested in 
the exchanges of political or economic favors between incumbent ethnic Tatar elites of 
RT and central-state elites.  
Politically, the first post-Soviet President of RT, Mintimer Shəimiev356 supported, in the 
early 1990s, Boris Yeltsin against a potential chain effect of secessionist movements in 
ethnic republics vis-à-vis the inchoate Russian Federation, which itself only recently 
declared independence from the Soviet Union. After four rounds of negotiations357 
between Boris Yeltsin’s office and RT that covered a comprehensive package of issues 
such as RT’s formal status in relation to the Russian Federation, delimitations of 
jurisdictions between the federal government and RT, control over natural resources, etc. 
(Malik 1994), RT was recognized as a “state united with the Russian Federation”358 in the 
treaty signed between RT and Moscow in 1994 (Graney 2009, 38) and was granted more 
favorable tax privileges than many other constituent entities of Russia (40). When 
Vladimir Putin tried to shore up central-state’s control over the constituent entities, 
Mintimer Shəimiev was not dilatory in terms of becoming one of the founders in 2001 of 
the United Russia (hereafter UR) party in support of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. Not 
coincidentally, the second and currently incumbent president of RT, Röstəm 
                                                          
356 Once first secretary of TASSR oblast’-level committee of the CPSU prior to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. He supported the 1991 coup d’état to preserve the USSR (Kondrashov 2000, 104-105). 
357 Boris Yeltsin’s office was represented first by Gennady Burbulis, an ethnic Lithuanian and former State 
Secretary of the RF then by Sergei Shakhrai, former deputy prime minister of the RF. RT was represented 
by Rafael Khəkim, political advisor to Mintimer Shəimiev, and İndus Tahir, an ethnic Tatar historian (Malik 
1994, 14). 





Mingnekhanov, is also a member of the UR359. While treaties reached in the 1990s 
between Moscow and other constituent entities of Russia were not renewed, the 1994 
federal-RT treaty was the sole treaty ever renewed360. Moreover, RT’s preservation of the 
title “President” alludes not only to previous elite-level collusive relationships but also to 
RT’s unique political status (Russian: osobennost’)361.  
Economically, on behalf of their republic, RT-based elites have been not only 
contributing to but also receiving362 from the federal bursar more than elites of any other 
ethnic republic in Russia363. Marat Khösnullin, an ethnic Tatar elite who was the RT 
Minister of Construction and Housing between 2001 and 2010, was able to lobby for 
major investments from the federal government in the urban development of Tatarstan. 
His connections to the central-state elites, combined with his ability to have cost-effective 
urban development programs commissioned and launched, earned him reputation. 
Starting 2010, he has been working as the deputy mayor of Moscow364 and overseeing 
massive urban development projects in RF’s capital. In sum, overall amicable 
relationships between Moscow-based and Kazan-based elites has sustained exchange of 
political support, from Tatarstan, for financial transfers, subsidies, contracts, from 
Moscow365. 
                                                          
359 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on April 15, April 27, and May 17 of 2016. 
360 In 2007. 
361 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on March 30, April 15, April 27, May 17, and June 15 of 
2016. 
362 Not just in terms of transfer payments. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Government of the City of Moscow, https://www.mos.ru/authority/person/19157093 (accessed 






Moreover, Tatar elites of RT tend to build their personal and political networks not only 
with their “co-ethnics” but also with Tatarstan’s ethnic Russian elites and populace. In 
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova’s study of how crony capitalism led to the decline of democratic 
support and rise of authoritarian legitimacy in Russia, she notes the rise of a broad-based 
elite network in Tatarstan involving Kazan-based political elites on the republic level, the 
county366-level political elites, and economic elites represented by directors of republic-
controlled major enterprises (2010, 89). This network, though led mostly by ethnic Tatar 
elites such as Mintimer Shəimiev and Röstəm Mingnekhanov, cuts across ethnicity and 
involves also ethnic Russian elites such as Vasiliy Likhachev367, Oleg Morozov368, and 
Aleksei Pesoshin369. Elites of both Tatar and Russian ethnicities involved in such 
networks have been the primary actors in terms of decision-makings at the ethno-regional 
level, preparation of cadres, planning of economy, lobbying in the Federal Council, State 
Duma, and with the President of RF for benefits, favors, or privileges370.  
Such collusive, inclusive relationships may have been predicated upon three 
characteristics of incumbent ethnic Tatar elites: competent Russian-language skills, 
which is a necessary condition, ideological adaptability, and negotiating skills 
(Sharafutdinova 2013, 516). 
As a result of decades of linguistic Russification in urban areas and cadre indigenization 
under the Soviet Union, by the time Tatarstan declared its sovereignty in 1990 (Graney 
                                                          
366 Russian: rayon. 
367 RT’s vice-president during 1991-1995. 
368 One of the two representatives of Tatarstan at the Federal Council of RF since 2014. 
369 RT’s prime minister since 2017. 






2009, 24), among both the Tatar intelligentsia and the incumbent Tatar political elites in 
the ethno-regional state apparatuses, Russian became the dominant language at work and 
in formal settings. Regardless of whether they spoke Russian or Tatar as their first 
language (Giuliano 2000, 304), what was common and remains common to almost the 
entire Tatar elites in Kazan is their native or close-to-native fluency in Russian. A 
respondent who can be classified as a member of the Tatar intelligentsia, expressed in 
Tatar his ambivalence towards ethnic Tatars’ competency in the Russian language: 
“although I am not quite satisfied with the extent to which Tatar is being used in Kazan, I 
can still proudly say that virtually all Tatars in Kazan know Russian as well as Russians 
do, sometimes even better…”371 
Equipped with solid language skills to lobby with elites based in Moscow, incumbent 
Tatar elites have also been ideologically highly resilient. In the early 1990s, the dominant 
frame centered on the themes of “self-determination” and “democratization” and allowed 
for amalgamating the goals of democracy and federalism. Rafael Khəkim, Mintimer 
Shəimiev’s political advisor, fervently argued for the link between democracy and 
federalism. Construing “democracy” as movement of national liberation (Russian: 
demokratiya kak dvizheniye natsii k svobode) while emphasizing right to self-
determination (Khakimov 2007, 61-70), Rafael Khəkim recombined the Soviet discourse 
of “national self-determination” with the post-Soviet catchword of “democracy” 
(Sharafutdinova 2013, 365). Not surprisingly, terms such as “democracy” and 
“federalism” are used interchangeably in most of Mintimer Shəimiev’s speeches (365). In 
such framings of “democracy” with “federalism”, incumbent ethnic Tatar political elites 
                                                          





tend to argue that federalism and center-periphery power-sharing should be the ways 
democracy works in a multiethnic state372. 
Moscow-based elites also promoted the notion of linking democracy with federalism. In 
his 1994 annual address, Boris Yeltsin dedicated an entire section to discussing 
federalism, positing it as a central theme on the agenda of the Russian government (366). 
This popular frame politically and discursively empowered RF’s constituent entities in 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, the discursive field shifted by the end of the 1990s, and the new 
frame introduced by Vladimir Putin focused on strengthening the state by centralizing 
power and by requiring ethno-regional-level laws and regulations to align with federal-
level ones. Such a new frame significantly reduced the leeway for ethno-regions to 
engage in claim-making or more assertive actions vis-à-vis the central-state 
(Sharafutdinova 2013, 357-358). This dramatic shift of public discourse in Russia 
occurred as a result of the 1998 financial crisis, the 1999 unrest in the North Caucasus, 
and a wave of bombings in Moscow and several other cities in Russia (368). 
As the coercive and fiscal capacity of Moscow under Vladimir Putin grew in the 2000s, 
incumbent Tatar elites represented by Mintimer Shəimiev and his successor Röstəm 
Mingnekhanov adjusted their rhetoric in such a way as to align with the catchwords of 
“modernization, innovation, and economic diversification” (Sharafutdinova 2013, 523) 
promoted by Moscow. Although up to 80% of RT’s annual tax revenue has been 
collected by Moscow under Putin373, RT political elites have been able to benefit from 
their rhetorical alignments both financially and politically (517), especially in terms of 
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attracting federal investments, winning contracts to host federally-sponsored 
projects/events374, as well as defending Tatarstan’s prerogatives within the federal 
framework.  
Notably, in the 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by RF, RT’s incumbent ethnic 
Tatar elites played an active role in terms of reaching out to the Crimean Tatar 
community and persuading them into accepting to join the RF. Immediately prior to the 
actual annexation, Röstəm Mingnekhanov flew to Simferopol’, the capital of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where he met the incumbent ethnic Russian elites of 
the republic and expressed the hope that “Crimean Tatars would support the 
referendum”375 on whether the republic should secede from Ukraine and join the RF, 
especially when it was believed that ethno-nationally-minded Crimean Tatar elites would 
oppose a potential annexation by Russia. The first President of RT, Mintimer Shəimiev, 
even led negotiation sessions in Moscow with Mustafa Dzhemilev, who was a Soviet-era 
dissident and widely considered the leader of the ethno-national movement among 
Crimean Tatars, on “promoting the relationships”376 between Kazan Tatars and Crimean 
Tatars377. 
                                                          
374 Anonymous interview conducted in Kazan on April 27, 2016. Examples of such projects/events include 
the 2013 Summer Universiade held in Kazan and the Innopolis IT Innovation Park in the Verkhneuslonskii 
County of RT.  
375 Government of the Republic of Tatarstan, “Rustam Minnikhanov takes part in special session of 
Supreme Council of the Republic of Crimea,” March 11, 2014, 
http://prav.tatarstan.ru/eng/index.htm/news/277773.htm (accessed July 31, 2017).  
376 “Mintimer Shəimiev was involved in the negotiations with Crimean Tatars.” [in Russian], 
RosBiznesKonsalting, https://rt.rbc.ru/tatarstan/12/03/2014/55928f549a794751dc833961 (accessed July 
31, 2017). 
377 Although both Kazan and Crimean Tatars are heirs of the Golden Horde, relations between the two 
populations were not consistently marked by amicability. According to historian Damir İskhakov, when 
Moscow ordered in 1944 the collective deportation of ethnic Crimean Tatars to Central Asia, many ethnic 





Moreover, incumbent Tatar elites also bother to establish an inclusive image by seeking 
popular support from ethnic Russian and other ethnic populations in Tatarstan (518). For 
example, in the 1992 Tatarstan referendum over the issue of sovereignty, incumbent 
Tatar elites represented by Mintimer Shəimiev reframed the issue of sovereignty, which 
was originally introduced by Tatar nationalists in more ethnically-specific terms, as “a 
good benefiting all residents of Tatarstan regardless of their ethnicity” (Giuliano 2000, 
303).  
Most notably, compared to titular elites of other ethnic republics of the RF, incumbent 
Tatar elites in Tatarstan have been able “to institutionalize the informal practice of 
negotiating with the federal center over thorny issues in search of compromise solutions” 
(Sharafutdinova 2013, 520). Even when the central-state was trying to intensify fiscal and 
personnel control over constituent entities in the 2000s, RT was still able to reach the 
2007 Treaty RFRT, more modestly-worded as it may sound compared to the 1994 treaty 
between Kazan and Moscow, on power-sharing with Moscow in which the recognition of 
the official status of the Tatar language in parallel to Russian is preserved (Treaty RFRT 
2007, Article 2.5). 
 
Moscow’s perception of Tatarstan and ethnic Tatars 
More solid social integration of ethnic Tatars has been a necessary condition for lower 
risk of secession and more positive image of Tatarstan as perceived by the central-state in 
Moscow. Post-Soviet incumbent political elites in Moscow tend to view Tatarstan as one 
of the most important constituent entities of the RF, owing to both its political and 





consistently been trying to present themselves as allies not only for Boris Yeltsin but also 
for Vladimir Putin, especially in the event of presidential elections, legislative elections 
and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014378. Economically, Tatarstan is 
considered vital for Russia due to its solid, industrially-based economic contours that 
feature oil extractions and refinery, soft and controlled transition to market economy, 
innovative investment policies, and trade ties both within and outside Russia. 
Symbolically, Tatarstan represents the diverse, multiethnic aspect of Russia, and its 
political stability and economic prosperity are considered pivotal in terms of setting up a 
model for other ethnic republics of Russia.   
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, linguistic Russification, augmented level of 
urbanization, increased prevalence of higher education, and relatively high intermarriage 
rates with ethnic non-Tatars have continued to characterize the demography of ethnic 
Tatars in Tatarstan. Not only has ethnic Tatar elites’ fluency in Russian been taken for 
granted, but incumbent ethnic Tatar elites of Tatarstan have also been perceived as an 
important support base for the UR (Russian: Yedinaya Rossiya) party led by Vladimir 
Putin and Dmitry Medvedev and as reliable partners in hosting capital-intensive mega-
events (e.g. 2013 Universiade, 2015 World Aquatics Championship, 2018 FIFA World 
Cup) that are considered vital to building Russia’s international image. In 2002, Vladimir 
Putin delivered a speech partially in the Tatar language at the Kurultay379 of World Tatar 
Congress held in Kazan and impressed the entire hall of audience, though by reading 
aloud prepared texts380. Between 2007 and 2011, Vladimir Putin visited Tatarstan four 
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times in his capacity of being the prime minister of RF, whereas Dmitry Medvedev 
visited Tatarstan six times both in his capacity of being the first-deputy prime minister of 
RF and later the president of RF. Most of such visits had their themes ranging from 
revival of the automobile and chemical industries, to the preparatory works for the 2013 
Kazan Universiade, to participating in the ethnic Tatar cultural events Sabantuy381. 
The current president of RT, Röstəm Mingnekhanov, can be characterized as most-of-
the-time speaking only Russian, skilled in terms of lobbying for capital investments from 
Moscow to Kazan382, and capable of having the contracted projects effectively carried out 
in Tatarstan (Sharafutdinova 2013, 526), thus setting up a “Tatarstan model” of lobbying 
with the central state in Moscow (526). In this regard, Vladimir Putin once fondly 
commented that “How can we be without the Tatars” and “it is the choice of the people 
of Tatarstan to decide whether to keep the title “President” for the republic’s head of 
state” in response to the questions posed by a correspondent from the Tatarstan-based 
electronic magazine Biznes Online383. Even if Putin expressed allusively in 2007 his 
concerns about the mandatory teaching of titular languages in certain ethnic republics, he 
did that not in Kazan but in Yoshkar-Ola, capital of Mari El, a politically and 
economically much less powerful ethnic republic to the north of Tatarstan384. 
                                                          
381 “Medvedev is coming to Tatarstan, following Putin’s itinerary,” [in Russian] Tatpressa.ru, 
http://www.tatpressa.ru/news/1460.html (accessed July 31 2017); “Medvedev gave a ride to 
Mingnekhanov,” [in Russian] Biznes Online, https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/347044 (accessed July 
31 2017). 
382 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on April 27 and May 12 of 2016. 
383 Elena Kolebakina, “Vladimir Putin: How can we be without the Tatars,” [in Russian] Biznes Online, 
https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/148209 (accessed February 28 2017). 
384 “It is not acceptable to make mandatory the teaching of languages that are not students’ mother 






Overall, since ethnic Tatars are fluent in Russian, widely dispersed throughout the 
Russian Federation, structurally well embedded in the Russian mainstream society, while 
intermarrying with ethnic Russians extensively, despite ethnic Tatars’ robust 
consciousness of their identity, the risk for Tatarstan to secede from Russia has become 
lower. The central-state not only places trust in the ability of Tatarstani elites but also 
uses Tatarstan as a model ethno-region to enhance Russia’s international image. In this 
sense, incumbent ethnic Tatar political elites, especially the bloc centered around 
Mintimer Shəimiev and Röstəm Mingnekhanov, are considered “important partners” by 
Moscow385.  
 
Intra-Tatar cleavage structure: Tatar elites and Tatar populace  
The dimension of intra-ethnic cleavage structure entails the political, economic, and 
cultural divides between the elites and the masses of the titular ethnic group and 
addresses the questions as regard what dimensions of cleavages exist and how salient 
they can be. In Tatarstan, greater tendency towards Tatar-Russian social integration 
coupled with robust self-identification as ethnically distinct among ethnic Tatars has been 
separately necessary and jointly sufficient for higher level of intra-Tatar cohesion and 
Tatar elites’ capacity to mobilize. 
According to both the 2002 and the 2010 population censuses, the level of urbanization 
for ethnic Tatars Russia-wide remained stable around 68%386. In Tatarstan alone, level of 
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386 Russian Federation Federal Statistics Service, All Russia Population Census 2002, 





urbanization for ethnic Tatars rose from 66.5% in 2002 to 68.8% in 2010387. In 
Bashkortostan, level of urbanization for ethnic Tatars reached 61.6% in 2010388. The 
level of higher education for ethnic Tatars Russia-wide rose from 15.5% in 2002 to 
24.6% in 2010389. In Tatarstan alone, level of higher education reached 27.2% in 2010 for 
ethnic Tatars and 33% for ethnic Tatars in urban areas390. In Bashkortostan, level of 
higher education for ethnic Tatars reached 23.9% in 2010391. Of all married ethnic Tatars 
in Russia, the percentage of those with ethnically non-Tatar spouses was 41.7% in 2002 
and 31.3% in 2010392. In Tatarstan alone, the percentage of ethnic Tatars whose spouses 
were ethnically non-Tatar remained stable around 13% from 2002 through 2010393, lower 
than the level of exogamy among ethnic Tatars Russia-wide.  
Simultaneously, the level of urbanization for ethnic Russians Russia-wide reached 76.8% 
in 2010, while level of urbanization for ethnic Russians in Tatarstan reached 86.8% in 
2010. In this sense, ethnic Tatars’ level of urbanization both Russia-wide and in 
Tatarstan, though still lagging behind that of ethnic Russians, was catching up. The level 
of higher education for ethnic Russians Russia-wide reached 28.9% in 2010, while level 
of higher education for ethnic Russians in Tatarstan alone reached 29% in 2010. In this 
regard, ethnic Tatars’ level of higher education, though not one of the highest of all 
                                                          













ethnic minorities of Russia, was getting closer to that of ethnic Russians both Russia-
wide and in Tatarstan.  
According to the survey-based, time-series research conducted by Gulnara 
Gabdrakhmanova in Tatarstan, among her ethnic Russian respondents, the level of trust 
tended to be placed slightly higher in their co-ethnics than in ethnic Tatars. Among her 
ethnic Tatar respondents, the level of trust tended to be placed also slightly higher in 
ethnic Russians than in their co-ethnics (2013, 480). Nevertheless, her study shows that 
level of trust placed in ethnic Russians by ethnic Tatars and level of trust placed in ethnic 
Tatars by ethnic Russians were similar, both around 90%, which can be reflective of a 
tendency towards symmetric and high level of inter-ethnic trust (480). 
Overall, throughout the 2000s, the socio-economic stratification pattern of ethnic Tatars 
and ethnic Russians both Russia-wide and in Tatarstan carried on the trend of becoming 
similar that started in the final decades of the Soviet Union. In Tatarstan alone, by the end 
of the 2000s, a significant stratum (close to 30%) of ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan tended to 
bear similarly elevated socio-economic profiles not only to their co-ethnics but also to 
ethnic Russians (also close to 30%). In this sense, the ethnically-based cleavage between 
ethnic Tatars and ethnic Russians tends to increasingly crosscut with socio-economically-
based cleavages both Russia-wide and in Tatarstan. Meanwhile, ethnic consciousness 
among ethnic Tatars remains stable and robust enough to guard against massive identity 
shifts into the central state’s majority category, and individuals in Tatarstan continue to 
interact with one another and to act socio-politically in ethnic terms. Higher degree of 
social integration translates into internally less differentiated, less polarized socio-





economic, social, and cultural capitals394 (Bourdieu 2004, 168-181) among a significant 
stratum of ethnic Tatars as well as to increased possibility of upward social mobility 
encouraging ethnic Tatars from lower social strata to identify with or to become 
themselves elites, which in turn promotes intra-ethnic cohesion and titular elites’ 
mobilizing capacity. Less differentiated intra-ethnic cleavage structure interweaves with 
more crosscutting inter-ethnic cleavage structure in Tatarstan and can even be conducive 
to incumbent Tatar elites’ capacity to reach out to ethnic Russians who reside in 
Tatarstan. 
As around 30% of ethnic Tatars in Tatarstan still reside in rural areas395, the line of the 
most durable intra-Tatar socio-economic cleavage can still be drawn between urban and 
rural Tatars. Nevertheless, considering that population flow from rural areas into urban 
centers continues and that most of the top ethnically Tatar political elites of Tatarstan hail 
from the countryside396 and maintain patron-client relationships with rural elites and 
populace (Sharafutdinova 2013, 518, 521; Giuliano 2000, 307), intra-Tatar urban-rural 
cleavage is being more or less mitigated. Instead, a significantly broad spectrum of 
mostly urban-based Tatars and a minority of rural Tatars were mobilized in the ethno-
national movement that led to RT’s declaration of sovereignty in 1990. 
                                                          
394 Pierre Bourdieu defines “social capital” as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
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objectified state, such as cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.); 
institutionalized state, most conspicuously realized through educational qualifications (169). 
395 Ibid. 





By the late 1980s, the majority of ethnic Tatars in TASSR had become urbanized (over 
63%, Kondrashov 2000, 10), with 28.6% of ethnic Tatars engaged in “mental jobs” (11). 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as more Tatars than not shared similar socio-economic 
profiles, urban-based (mostly in Kazan, Naberezhnye Chelny, and Ufa) ethnic Tatar 
intellectual/cultural elites were able to mobilize first-generation ethnic Tatar urban 
residents originally from the rural areas and some ethnic-Tatar rural teachers and doctors 
(Gorenburg 2003,183). Intellectual elites who perceive themselves as “shouldering the 
burden” of maintaining Tatar cultural and linguistic heritages formed the Tatar Public 
Centre (Russian: Tatarskii obshchestvennyi tsentr; Tatar: Tatar İctimagıy Üzəge) in 1988 
(54) and effectively cooperated with a variety of socio-political forces including the 
TASSR CPSU apparatus (55), the cross-ethnic pro-democracy movement, and the more 
radical Tatar nationalist movement (56-57). Throughout such mobilizations, one of the 
major goals activists pursued was state recognition and support of the Tatar language, and 
this goal struck a chord broadly among the urban, linguistically Russified Tatar 
population (Giuliano 2000, 305).  
Eventually, both such mobilizations and part of their ethno-nationally framed concerns 
were either co-opted or appropriated by the incumbent ethnic Tatar nomenklatura elites 
represented by Mintimer Shəimiev. For instance, the nomenklatura authorities of 
Tatarstan founded under its own umbrella the organization “World Congress of Tatars” 
(Tatar: Bötöndönya Tatar Kongressı, Kondrashov 2000, 185-187). This organization later 
developed itself into an outreach initiative connecting the government of the Republic of 
Tatarstan to ethnic Tatars throughout the world (e.g. ethnic Tatars in China, Finland, 





whose impact is still felt today, was the enacting in 1992 of the Law on the State 
Languages of the Republic of Tatarstan and Other Languages in the Republic of 
Tatarstan that stipulates formal recognition of the Tatar language in the realms of 
government, education and public sphere (Gorenburg 2003, 211-212). The instrumental 
view of ethno-nationalist mobilizations was explicitly expressed by such incumbent elites 
as former RT prime minister Möxəmmət Sabirov397 and Rafael Khəkim, who claimed to 
have learned the “technology” to call up national forces, to direct and use nationalists’ 
demonstrations, and to control them (Şahiner 2002, 271).  
Against the backdrop of the less polarized intra-Tatar cleavage structure and of the more 
crosscutting Tatar-Russian cleavage structure with class-based cleavage structure in 
Tatarstan, a “monocentric” (Sharafutdinova 2010, 84) oligarchical system under 
Mintimer Shəimiev formed in the 1990s and the 2000s, underpinned mostly by the 
informal networks led by ethnic Tatar political and economic elites who were originally 
from rural areas. In the 1990s, as some of the most significant economic assets have been 
kept under state control, the opportunities for privatization and entrepreneurship were 
open to the few individuals who have close or even familial ties to top incumbent 
political elites like Mintimer Shəimiev (87). In the meantime, these elites were carefully 
averting emergence of independent economic elites that could engage in competition for 
political power (91). The attainment of control by the Shəimiev-centered network over 
the major economic assets in Tatarstan allowed for integrating the political system, 
which, in turn, facilitated the controlled process of economic transformation aimed at 
enhancing the political legitimacy of the Shəimiev-headed regime (90-91). Most 
                                                          





significantly, the RT state was able to devise, in the 1990s and 2000s, a re-distribution 
system within the republic that permitted keeping major enterprises in operation, 
avoiding bankruptcy and securing employment for many by using resources from more 
lucrative sectors to subsidize less lucrative ones (91). 
A quintessential example of how Tatarstan’s “monocentric” oligarchical network around 
Shəimiev organizes itself can be the business conglomerate called Tatar-American 
Investments and Finances (TAIF), whose major mission is to control financial flows 
within Tatarstan398. TAIF attracts and uses private, state, and foreign capitals while 
operating in investment, petrochemistry, telecommunications, construction, and other 
sectors399. The top executive officers of TAIF have been mostly ethnic Tatars400. 
Last but not least, not all ethnic Tatar elites in Tatarstan would agree about the location or 
meaning of Tatar-Russian inter-ethnic boundaries. The mainstream boundary-making 
strategies adopted by ethnic Tatar political elites in Tatarstan include boundary-
blurring401 and boundary-expansion402, which tend to de-emphasize the Tatar-Russian 
boundaries by aspiring to create a bilingual “nation” out of the entire population of 
Tatarstan while encompassing various subgroups such as Kazan Tatars, Mishars, 
Kerəshens, Siberian Tatars, Crimean Tatars, Kasıym Tatars, etc. under one umbrella of 
                                                          
398 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on April 15, April 27, May 16, and June 19 of 2016. 
399 Bloomberg, “Company Overview of TAIF PSC,” available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=25037687 (accessed July 
31, 2017). 
400 Ibid. 
401 The strategy of boundary-blurring aims at overcoming ethnicity as a principle of categorization and 
social organization altogether. Alternative principles are promoted in order to undermine the legitimacy 
of ethnically-based boundaries (Wimmer 2008, 989). 
402 The strategy of boundary-expansion aims at creating a more encompassing boundary by grouping 
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“Tatars”. Meanwhile, other types of strategies such as boundary-contraction403 have also 
been visible on the margin.  
The strategy of boundary-blurring aims at reconciling the consciousness of the distinct 
Tatar ethnicity with the perception of Tatarstan as a multi-ethnic homeland for ethnic 
Tatars, ethnic Russians, and so forth alike. Rafael Khəkim theorizes that what makes a 
nation is shared statehood (Russian: gosudarstvennaya obshchnost’, Tatar: dəülətchelek, 
Wəliev 2011, 37) rather than shared (perceived) ethnic origin (Russian: etnicheskoe 
proiskhozhdeniye, 2007, 57). According to such a conception, the RT state is supposed to 
cultivate consciousness of a super-ethnic, common Tatarstani “national” identity among 
its population. Such a boundary-blurring, or nation-building (Wimmer 2013, 50-52) 
strategy as endorsed by the incumbent political elites of RT was criticized as “artificial” 
(Russian: iskusstvennyi) by certain cultural elites who tend to prefer not to expand so 
elastically the includable domain for the Tatar “nation”404. This group of elites also 
emphasize basing the Tatar identity upon peculiar “high culture”, or rather, upon 
producing and reproducing ethnically-specific knowledge. Even further to the periphery 
is the strategy of boundary-contraction, advocated most famously in Tatarstan by 
National Congress of the Tatar People (Tatar: Tatar Khalkınıng Milli Məclese)405, a Tatar 
nationalist organization led by Fəüziyə Bəyrəmova406. According to this strategy, ethnic 
Tatars should maintain strict cultural and social boundaries from ethnic Russians, who 
                                                          
403 The strategy of boundary-contraction aims at promoting narrower, more stringent boundaries than 
those already established in the social landscape (Wimmer 2008, 987). 
404 Damir İskhakov, “The End of the ‘Fourth Tatar Revolution’,” [in Russian] Biznes Online, 
https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/366490 (accessed December 31, 2017). 
405 The organization’s predecessor is Ittifak Firkəse, “Solidarity Party,” active in the early 1990s. 





are portrayed as “colonizers” or “occupiers” of Tatarstan407, and strengthen their ties with 
other Turkic-speaking, Muslim populations.  
 
Representation of Tatar elites in the state organs and their most powerful positions of the 
Republic of Tatarstan  
Ethnic Tatar elites’ collusive relations with central-state elites, overall positive 
perceptions of Tatarstan among Moscow-based central-state elites, and relatively high 
level of intra-Tatar cohesion in Tatarstan have been jointly sufficient for the persistent 
pattern of ethnic Tatar elites’ overrepresentation in the state organs and their most 
powerful positions of the RT. 
When the central-state in Moscow was relatively weak both financially and discursively, 
intra-Tatar cohesion bolstered incumbent Tatar elites’ mobilizational capacity. In the 
1990s, taking advantage of the fledgling federal government, Tatarstan attained more 
autonomy not only in terms of institution building but also in terms of their economic 
assets (Sharafutdinova 2010, 74) by means of mobilizing and co-opting ethno-national 
movements, declaring “sovereignty” by following what Boris Yeltsin did to the Soviet 
Union, while negotiating bilateral treaties with the federal government. For instance, by 
the end of 1980s, TASSR state authority owned only 2% of all the SOEs within its 
boundary, while 80% of them were controlled by USSR ministries and 18% by RSFSR 
ministries. However, by 1994, 65% of those SOEs had come under the control of the RT 
government (74-75). Moreover, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, RT was able to 
                                                          





follow the “soft entry into market” approach that entailed preserving subsidies in major 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors, maintaining some level of control over prices, 
and delaying the process of privatization (76). Moderate processes of marketization in 
Tatarstan laid the foundation for its more pronounced developmental outcome while 
solidifying the support base for RT’s incumbent elites.  
As the central-state in Moscow has been growing relatively strong both financially and 
discursively, collusive elite-level relations and central-state’s positive perception of 
Tatarstan have been conducive to heightened representation of ethnic Tatar elites. Despite 
Vladimir Putin’s extensive measures to strengthen the central-state vis-à-vis RF’s 
constituent entities since his coming to power, collusive relations between the Putin-led 
central-state elites and the Kazan-based ethnic Tatar elites and the perception of Tatarstan 
as an “economically prosperous ethno-region” guaranteed continued overrepresentation 
of incumbent ethnic Tatar elites in the state organs and their most powerful positions of 
RT. As incumbent Tatar elites are perceived more as “important allies” of the central 
state than as its “fungible agents,” their overrepresentation has translated into immense 
decision-making power at the ethno-regional level408.   
Under the Soviet Union, as knowledge of the Russian language became increasingly 
universalized among ethnic Tatars of TASSR and with continued training and promotion 
of ethnic Tatar cadres after the second World War, representation of ethnic Tatars in the 
ethno-regional state authority of TASSR largely shifted409 from underrepresentation to 
overrepresentation during Nikita Khrushchev’s term410 as the First Secretary of the 
                                                          
408 Anonymous interviews conducted on March 30, April 15, April 27, May 17, and June 15 of 2016. 






Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since Zinnət Moratov’s tenure411 as the first ethnic 
Tatar secretary of the TASSR oblast’-level412 committee of the CPSU, the proportion of 
ethnic Tatar cadres in the TASSR state organs had been rising steadily413, especially 
during Fikrət Tabiev’s tenure as TASSR oblast’-level committee’s first secretary414. 
According to the 1989 census, 56% of the cadres in the TASSR state organs were ethnic 
Tatars, a higher percentage than the proportion of ethnic Tatars in the total population of 
the republic of that time (Gorenburg 2003, 47). As of 1990, the Tatarstan Supreme Soviet 
was 58% Tatar (47). A majority of ethnic Tatar elites during the Soviet period hailed 
from the counties (Tatar: rayonnar) or villages (Tatar: awıllar)415. Ethnic Russian cadres 
tended to be more visible in military and technological sectors, while ethnic Tatar cadres 
tended to be more visible in medical and media sectors416.  
The pattern of titular overrepresentation in the republic-level state organs persists into the 
2010s. For instance, as of 2016, out of the 100 deputies in the State Council of RT, 64 
were ethnic Tatars, thus constituting a majority. As of 2016, most of the top positions of 
RT are filled by ethnic Tatars with decision-making powers, including the chairman of 
the State Council of RT, Fərit Mökhəmmətshin, the president of RT, Röstəm 
Mingnekhanov, the state counsellor of RT, Mintimer Shəimiev417, the prime minister of 
RT, İldar Khalikov418, the chairman of the supreme court of RT, İlgiz Gilazov, the 
                                                          
411 1944-1957, available at http://www.tassr90.ru/leaders/muratov (accessed February 28, 2017). 
412 Republic-level. 
413 Anonymous interview conducted in Kazan on May 17, 2016.  
414 1960-1979, available at http://www.tassr90.ru/leaders/tabeev (accessed February 28, 2017). 
415 Anonymous interviews conducted on April 15, April 27, May 17, and June 15, 2016. 
416 Anonymous interviews conducted on April 15, April 27, May 17, and June 15, 2016. 
417 President of RT 1991-2010, elected President in 1991, 1996, 2001, 2005. 





chairman of the constitutional court of RT, Fərkhət Khösnetdinov, the mayor of Kazan, 
İlsur Metshin, and most of the ministers of the RT government.   
To assess ethnic Tatar elites’ level of representation in the RT ethno-regional state and its 
most powerful positions, I calculate and weight the quotients of the 2015 percentages of 
ethnic Tatar elites in the key posts of various ethno-regional state apparatuses divided by 
the 2010 percentage of the population of ethnic Tatars in the total population of RT. 
Specifically, to operationalize the level of titular elites’ representation in the most 
powerful positions of the ethno-regional state in Tatarstan, I propose and apply an 
instrument, taking into account the distribution of decision-making power across different 
state apparatuses. I base my understanding of how decision-making power is distributed 
across state apparatuses on what is stipulated in the Constitution of the RT and 
respondents’ perceptions. 
The largest weight, at 35%, is assigned to the key posts in the executive organs, including 
the Presidency of the RT, Prime minister of the RT, and the Cabinet of Ministers of the 
RT. The President of the RT is not only formally the head of the Tatarstani state but also 
wielding the most decision-making power419 in terms of creating and directing the 
executive organ of the RT state, preparing state budgets (CRT 1992, Article 94), issuing 
administrative orders (Tatar/Russian: ukaz), making legislative proposals to the State 
Soviet of the RT, ensuring the implementation of the laws passed in the State Soviet and 
the administrative orders issued by the President, etc. The position of Prime minister 
(Tatar/Russian: prem’er-ministr) is formally designated in Tatarstan as the coordinator of 
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the Cabinet of Ministers. Conventionally, RT’s Prime minister is formally nominated by 
the President and approved by the State Soviet. The Cabinet of Ministers, consisting of 
usually 30-31 members such as the Prime minister, deputy prime ministers (Tatar: 
prem’er-ministr urınbasarı; Russian: zamestitel’ prem’er ministra), ministers, and heads 
of other governmental agencies, has the authority to make legislative proposals to RT’s 
State Soviet while being responsible for the formulation and implementation of specific 
policies420. 
The second largest weight, at 25%, is assigned to the key posts in the legislative organ, 
including the leadership of the State Soviet of the RT and the chairs of the seven 
lawmaking committees (Tatar/Russian: komitet) of the State Soviet of the RT. This 
amount of weight is assigned in light of the prescriptive authority wielded by the State 
Soviet despite its lack of enforcement power. According to the RT Constitution, the State 
Soviet has the authority to adopt and to amend the Constitution of the RT, to enact laws 
outside the areas of jurisdictions solely wielded by the federal state, to interpret laws, to 
approve of RT state budgets, to determine whether to hold Presidential elections, 
legislative elections, and referendums, to approve of the prime minister nominated by the 
President of the RT, to approve of the State Counselor nominated by the President of the 
RT, as well as to hold no-confidence vote for those occupying the key positions in the 
executive organs (CRT 1992, Article 75). 
A 20% weight is assigned to the leadership of the RT branch of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, since it is the major state apparatus that wields the 
                                                          





means of coercion in law enforcements of Tatarstan, even if its authority mostly rests in 
law-enforcing rather than decision-making. It is directly subordinate to the centralized 
command of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow, while maintaining a 
coordinative relationship with RT’s state apparatuses421. A 15% weight is assigned to the 
Public Prosecutor of the RT and to the heads of three courts, i.e. the RT Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court of RT, and the RT Arbitration Court. The RT Prosecutor’s 
Office serves as the highest supervisory organ conducting investigation and prosecution 
in the realm of law enforcements. It is independent of the RT’s own state organs while 
subordinate to the RF Prosecutor General’s office in Moscow. The position of RT 
Prosecutor is filled by appointment from the federal-level office in consultation with the 
President and State Soviet of the RT (CRT 1992, Article 114). The Constitutional Court 
of RT is part of the ethno-regional state of Tatarstan, whose judges are nominated by the 
President of RT and the Chair of the State Soviet of RT (CRT 1992, Article 108). It is 
responsible for adjudicating compliance with the RT Constitution. The Supreme Court of 
RT is part of the federal judicial system, subordinate to the RF Supreme Court in 
Moscow (CRT 1992, Article 110). The Arbitration Court of RT applies laws in the realm 
of economic disputes while being subordinate to the RF Supreme Arbitration Court (CRT 
1992, Article 112).  
The smallest weight, at 5%, is assigned to the key posts at the RT ethno-regional branch 
of the UR party, the incumbent party of both the RT and the RF. Those occupying such 
positions can be influential in RT’s presidential and legislative elections while bridging 
                                                          






the federal and the ethno-regional states through partisan links in addition to formal 
hierarchy between the federal and ethno-regional states422, even if they do not wield 
decision-making power in these capacities. 
 
Table 5.5. Ethnic Tatar elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state of Tatarstan 
(2015) 
 Number of those 
occupying the most 
powerful positions 
who are of the titular 
ethnic category 
(Tatar) 












26b 32 1.5 35% 
Legislative organ 
 
9 12 1.4 25% 
Tatarstan-branch 
of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
of the RF 
 
4 7 1.1 20% 
Judicial organs 
 
3 4 1.4 15% 
Tatarstan-branch 
of the UR party 
6 10 1.1 5% 
a If the quotient is higher than 0 but no higher than 1, under-representation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is 
1, proportional representation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is higher than 1 but no higher than 1.88, over-
representation of titular elites is implied (given that ethnic Tatars’ percentage in the total population of Tatarstan was 
53.2% as of 2010). 
b Between 2010 and 2017, the prime-minister of RT was İldar Khalikov, an ethnic Tatar. Starting April 2017, the 
prime-minister of RT has been Aleksei Pesoshin, an ethnic Russian. 
                                                          





Sources: President of the Republic of Tatarstan. http://president.tatarstan.ru (accessed July 31, 2017); The Cabinet of 
Ministers of RT. http://prav.tatarstan.ru/pravit.htm (accessed July 31, 2017); Committees of the State Soviet of the RT. 
http://tat.gossov.tatarstan.ru/komitet (accessed July 31, 2017); Deputies of the State Soviet of the RT. 
http://tat.gossov.tatarstan.ru/deputaty (accessed July 31, 2017); Tatarstan-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the Russian Federation: Leadership of the Ministry. http://mvd.tatarstan.ru/rus/rukov.htm (accessed July 31, 2017); 
Current composition of judges for the Constitutional Court of RT. http://ks.tatarstan.ru/rus/structure/judge.htm 
(accessed July 31, 2017); Leadership of the Supreme Court of RT. 
http://vs.tat.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=info_court&rid=7 (accessed July 31, 2017); Presidium of the RT Regional 
Political Soviet of the UR. http://tatarstan.er.ru/persons/presidium (accessed July 31, 2017).  
 
Table 5.6. Those occupying the most powerful positions at the ethno-regional state of the 
RT (2010-present) 





President Röstəm Mingnekhanov 
 
Tatar 2010- 









Chair of the State 
Soviet 
 
Fərit Mökhəmmətshin Tatar 1998- 











































Secretary of the 
Presidium of the 
RT Regional 
Political Soviet 
of the UR party 
Fərit Mökhəmmətshin Tatar As of 2016 
Sources: President of the Republic of Tatarstan. http://president.tatarstan.ru (accessed July 31, 2017); The Cabinet of 
Ministers of RT. http://prav.tatarstan.ru/pravit.htm (accessed July 31, 2017); Deputies of the State Soviet of the RT. 
http://tat.gossov.tatarstan.ru/deputaty (accessed July 31, 2017); Tatarstan-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the Russian Federation: Leadership of the Ministry. http://mvd.tatarstan.ru/rus/rukov.htm (accessed July 31, 2017); 
Current composition of judges for the Constitutional Court of RT. http://ks.tatarstan.ru/rus/structure/judge.htm 
(accessed July 31, 2017); Leadership of the Supreme Court of RT. 
http://vs.tat.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=info_court&rid=7 (accessed July 31, 2017); The Prosecutor’s Office of the 
RT. http://www.prokrt.ru (accessed July 31, 2017); Presidium of the RT Regional Political Soviet of the UR. 
http://tatarstan.er.ru/persons/presidium (accessed July 31, 2017).  
 
The weighted representation-by-population quotient for ethnic Tatar elites in Tatarstan as 
of 2015 is 1.36, which is higher than 1 and signifies overrepresentation of ethnic Tatar 
elites in the RT ethno-regional state and its most powerful positions. Moreover, at the 
legislative organ of RT, State Soviet, ethnic Tatars have consistently been 
overrepresented in the total number of deputies there since the early 1990s. At the State 
Soviet’s 1st convocation (Russian: sozyv; Tatar: chakırılısh) between 1995 and 1999, 92 
deputies out of 130 were ethnic Tatar (70.8%). At its 2nd convocation between 1999 and 
2004, 80 deputies out of 104 were ethnic Tatar (76.9%). At its 3rd convocation between 
2004 and 2009, 64 deputies out of 100 were ethnic Tatar (64%). At its 4th convocation 
between 2009 and 2014, 65 deputies out of 107 were ethnic Tatar (60.7%). Overall, as 
summarized in Table 5.6., of the thirteen individuals who once occupied or still occupy 
the most powerful positions of RT from 2010 to 2017, nine are ethnic Tatars, thus 
making up the majority and overrepresented in relation to the population share of ethnic 






SUMMARY: HIGHER INTEGRATION, HIGHER AUTONOMY 
Proportionate titular control of the ethno-regional state is a defining attribute of 
autonomy, a necessary condition for autonomy implementation, and a property unique to 
autonomy as implemented. In the case of Tatarstan, higher level of Tatar-Russian social 
integration, when combined with robust consciousness of Tatar-Russian distinction, has 
been conducive to building ethnic Tatar elites’ bargaining capacity with Moscow and to 
intra-Tatar cohesion. As a result, ethnic Tatar elites have been persistently 
overrepresented in the RT ethno-regional state organs and their most powerful positions, 
and titular control of the ethno-regional state is not only present but also heightened in 
Tatarstan. Predicated upon the high level of titular representation in the ethno-regional 
state, RT’s ability to implement prescribed autonomy has been strengthened, which has 
led to more pronounced autonomy outcome for Tatarstan. Overall, as the experiences of 
autonomy-building in Tatarstan illustrates, a balance between inter-ethnic integration and 
inter-ethnic differentiation is empirically possible. Inter-ethnic integration can be 
conducive, rather than detrimental, to the building of titular elites’ bargaining capacity 
and to the long-term autonomy-building in terms of titular political participation, ethno-






6. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES, OTHER ETHNO-REGIONS IN 
CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
In the first section of this chapter, I summarily investigate institutional constraints upon 
and opportunities for titular elites’ bargaining capacity in terms of two condition 
variables that vary at the national level, i.e. formal arrangements of center-periphery 
relations and party-state relations, with a focus upon ethno-federalism in Russia and 
Leninist423 party-state relations in China. The second section tests whether the argument 
can travel to the study of other ethno-regions in China and Russia. I succinctly evaluate 
the applicability of my argument to explaining the autonomy outcomes in Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region (NMAR) and Tibet Autonomous Region (Xizang, XAR) of China 
as well as in the Republic of Bashkortostan (RB) and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia, 
RS) of Russia.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Federal versus unitary structure of center-periphery relations 
Formal arrangement of center-periphery relations is associated with formally federal or 
unitary structures governing the relationship between the central state and various ethno-
                                                          





regions and is examined on two dimensions, political federalism or not and fiscal 
federalism or not. This variable varies significantly at the national level, as China follows 
a constitutionally unitary structure, while Russia follows a constitutionally federated 
structure. Meanwhile, both China and Russia have been practicing fiscal federalism.  
In a politically unitary system, authority, or rather the normative right to exercise political 
power, is constitutionally vested in the central-state and must be specifically delegated to 
ethno-regional-level states from the central-state. Put otherwise, various ethno-regions in 
a unitary structure are essentially extensions of the central-state, even though they are 
also formally designated to practice autonomy in specifically-defined areas of 
jurisdictions. By contrast, a politically federal system entails an institutionalized division 
of authority between the central-state and the constituent-level states, wherein each level 
of state wields decision-making power in specifically-defined areas of jurisdictions but 
cannot unilaterally alter the federated structure of center-periphery relations (Amoretti 
2004, 9). Ethno-federalism is a subtype of federal system. What distinguishes ethno-
federalism from other subtypes is that at least one constituent unit of the federation is 
formally associated with a specific ethnic category. 
In the early 1990s, many of the constituent units of the Russian Federation pushed for a 
more contractually-based federal system. In response to such demands from the 
periphery, the RF central-state installed presidential representatives at all of the 
constituent units. Executive heads of ethnic republics were designated as “presidents,” 
and executive heads of oblast’ and krai were designated as “governors”424. Moreover, a 
                                                          





set of federative agreements and a series of bilateral treaties were reached between the RF 
central-state and fewer than fifty constituent units of RF (Stoner-Weiss 2004, 308).  
Three conditions were enumerated by Kathryn Stoner-Weiss to contextualize constituent 
units’ more aggressive gesture towards the federal government in the early 1990s: 
introduction of competitive elections at the republic/oblast’ level, the interests of 
periphery elites in attaining greater discretion in terms of using local natural resources 
and in averting extreme centralization similar to that during the Soviet period, and the 
interests of Soviet-period nomenklatura elites who remained in power after the 
dissolution of the USSR in protecting their locally-based privileges despite 
democratization and marketization reforms (308).  
The 1992 federative agreements signed between Moscow and various ethnic republics, 
oblast’, krai, and AOks were meant for demarcating which areas were to be under the 
jurisdiction of Moscow, which areas were to be under shared responsibilities, and which 
areas were to be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the constituent units (311). Notably, 
Tatarstan and Chechnya did not sign the federative agreements, whereas Bashkortostan 
and Yakutia demanded more privileges to be included in the agreements with regard to 
foreign trade and natural resources (312). The bilateral treaties signed between Moscow 
and various constituent units were rife with contradictions with the constitution of the RF 
and federal laws (314-317). With the rise to power of Vladimir Putin, seven425 federal 
districts were created in 2000, each of which includes a number of constituent entities 
(republics, oblast’, krai, AOks, etc.) and has an administrative center. To each of these 
                                                          





districts, a presidential representative is appointed. In 2010, an eighth district, the North 
Caucasus Federal District, was added.  
Formal institutional contexts with overlapping jurisdictions can provide opportunities for 
actors to adjust discrete portions of formal institutions (Tsai 2007, 38). Under certain 
circumstances, institutions can even provide positive models for how to do something 
(Clemens and Cook 1999, 445-446). For ethnic Tatar elites, the institutions of ethno-
federalism (Hale 2004, 167-168) have been furnishing more opportunities than 
constraints. The outburst of ethno-national mobilizations in USSR eventually brought 
about its dissolution when its core republic, RSFSR, declared its own independence. In 
response to growing ethno-national mobilizations in Tatarstan and the transitioning 
central state in Moscow, the nomenklatura Tatar elites led the “parade of sovereignties” 
(Graney 2009, xx) in 1990, joined by many other ethnic republics in Russia. This 
compelled Moscow to seriously accommodate ethnic minority elites’ concerns by 
establishing an ethnically-based federal system. This version of ethno-federalism, despite 
Putin’s subsequent attempts to curtail republic-level privileges (e.g. tax benefits), 
promulgates as a norm the sharing of authority (Russian: polnomochiye) between 
Moscow and various ethnic republics, Tatarstan in particular.  
Over time, RT has not only established itself as the major champion of ethno-federalism 
but also attained the most political, economic, and cultural autonomy (as prescriptive 
institution) of all the ethnic republics, as is demonstrated in the Treaty RFRT renewed in 
2007 where both sides agreed to share political authority while recognizing RT’s 
“peculiarities (Russian: osobennosti)” within the RF. Even Putin’s centralization reform 





repeatedly used the very principle of federalism to negotiate with Moscow for recognition 
of its uniquely autonomous status within Russia, especially with regard to the formal 
status of the Tatar language. For instance, when a Tatarstani ethnic Russian resident 
appealed to the RF Constitutional Court in 2002, challenging the constitutionality of the 
provisions of RT’s Law on the State Languages of the Republic of Tatarstan and Other 
Languages in the Republic of Tatarstan that stipulates the mandatory teaching of both 
Tatar and Russian in equal amount of hours while arguing that RT is not a sovereign 
state, the Court found that required study of both Tatar and Russian does not contradict 
the RF constitution (Cashaback 2008, 270). Instead, such requirement, according to the 
Court rulings, agrees with the federal principles honoring the “national education” 
system. In this sense, the federal court upheld the official status of Tatar in Tatarstan 
(270). Overall, for ethno-regions with relatively strong bargaining capacity for titular 
elites and higher autonomy outcome, political federalism may provide the institutional 
framework for negotiations with the central-state over more prerogatives for the ethno-
region or concessions from the central-state. 
Fiscal federalism, on the other hand, pertains to how different levels of state should relate 
to one another in terms of their revenues and expenditures. Concretely, certain areas of 
earnings or spendings are centralized, in which either the periphery is required to turn 
over certain portions of its revenue to the center or the center needs to subsidize the 
periphery, while other areas are decentralized, in which the periphery is allowed to keep 
the surplus of its revenue. With regard to ethno-regions, the institutional order of fiscal 
federalism allows ethno-regions with strong fiscal capacity to further develop such 





On the other hand, fiscal federalism also allows the central-state to help ethno-regions 
with very limited fiscal capacity finance themselves and improve their long-term fiscal 
capacity.   
Since the early 1980s, a fiscal revenue-sharing system between two adjacent levels of 
state has been incrementally established (Montinola et al. 1995, 63) in China. Such a 
fiscal federalism features the “fiscal contracting system” (Jin et al. 2005, 1729). It 
consists of four components, i.e. central-state’s fixed revenue reliant upon tariffs and 
profits of central-state-supervised SOEs, the local revenue divided between the central 
and provincial-level states according to pre-determined sharing schemes, extra remittance 
from provincial-level states to the central-state, and additional transfer payments from the 
central-state to the provincial-level states (1731-1733). The necessity of fiscal transfers 
between different levels of governments became even more salient, as the gaps in terms 
of fiscal capacity across different provincial-level units were exacerbated by their 
participation in both the domestic and world markets (Sheng 2010, 2).  
Russia’s fiscal decentralization processes followed a more tumultuous trajectory. 
Throughout the 1990s, such processes were characterized by a lack of formal, coherent, 
consistent institutions, which was further complicated by the variety of bilateral 
arrangements reached between the federal government and constituent entities. 
Moreover, substantial political manipulation and pressure in terms of equalizing transfers 
across constituent entities, constituent entities’ soft budget constraint, weak incentives for 
building up fiscal capacity, and very few constraints for sub-national borrowing (Human 
Development Sector Unit 2011, 7) also hampered the institutionalization of fiscal 





The 2000 legislation of the RF Budget Codex426 was an important step in terms of 
institutionalizing fiscal federalism in Russia by providing more explicit assignment of 
revenues and expenditures across different levels of the state (8). In 2003, the division of 
budgetary income between the central-state and constituent entities was set at largely 
70% for the central-state and 30% for each of the constituent entities427. Meanwhile, 
transfers from the central-state to the constituent entities grow steadily. For instance, 
from 2006 through 2009, approximately one third of federal budget expenditures are 
allocated to transfers. In general, the transfers from the federal budget can be classified 
into two broad types: transfers to regions with the aim of equalizing regional differences 
and transfers to special funds (8). Throughout the 2010s, equalization grants and 
subsidies dominate the structure of inter-budgetary transfers (Russian: mezhbyudzhetnie 
transferty). Such grants are intended to mitigate the gaps in fiscal capacity across 
constituent entities. In certain constituent units concentrated in North Caucasus, Siberia, 
and Far East, equalization grants from Moscow may cover over 50% of their budgets 
(11). Meanwhile, constituent entities such as Khanty-Mansi AOk, City of Moscow, 
Yamalo-Nenets AOk, City of Sankt Petersburg, and Tatarstan are among those which 
have been contributing the most to the federal budget. Even after equalization efforts, 
significant differences across constituent units in terms of fiscal capacity remain, and 
fiscal allocations vary inversely with fiscal capacity and directly with fiscal needs, which 
                                                          
426 Russian: byudzhetnyi kodeks Rossiskoi Federatsii. 
427 Boris Vishnevskii, “All power belongs to me! How the federal government has been engaged in the 





sometimes draws the ire of such constituent entities with strong fiscal capacity as 
Tatarstan428.  
For ethno-regions in China and Russia with relatively weak bargaining capacity for titular 
elites and lower autonomy outcome, fiscal transfers may have the potential of 
perpetuating their financial reliance upon the center and hampering the building their 
fiscal capacity. For example, the proportion of Xinjiang’s budgeted expenditures covered 
by the ethno-region’s own budgeted tax or non-tax-based revenues never surpassed 50% 
in the first six years of the 2010s429, and comparable financial reliance upon the central-
state also applies to Tibet (Xizang)430. For ethno-regions with relatively strong bargaining 
capacity for titular elites and higher autonomy outcome, fiscal transfers may provide 
opportunities for the ethno-region to catch up in terms of its economic productivity if it 
remains a recipient region. For example, the proportion of Inner Mongolia’s budgeted 
expenditures covered by the ethno-region’s own budgeted tax or non-tax-based revenues 
was on average around 79% for the first six years of the 2010s431. Meanwhile, budgeted 
transfer payments from the PRC central-state to Inner Mongolia have been rising from 
￥159.490 billion for 2015, to ￥213.558 billion for 2016, and to ￥234.689 billion for 
2017432. Fiscal federalism may also prompt an ethno-region to bargain for additional 
financial transfers or investments if it is a donor region, though very few ethno-regions in 
                                                          
428 Anonymous interviews conducted in Kazan on April 27, May 17, and June 15 of 2016. 
429 Statistical Bureau of the XUAR, 2016 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook [in Chinese].  
430 China Statistics Press, 2016 Xizang Statistical Yearbook [in Chinese]. 
431 NMAR Bureau of Statistics [in Chinese], available at 
http://www.nmgtj.gov.cn/acmrdatashownmgpub/index.htm (accessed December 31, 2017). 
432 “Integrated table of budgeted fiscal returns and transfer payments from the central government to 
provincial-level units,” [in Chinese] available at 





China and Russia would be classified as donor regions except such resource-rich ethno-
regions as Khanty-Mansi AOk, Yamalo-Nenets AOk, Tatarstan, etc. For example, to host 
the 2013 Summer Universiade and the 2015 FINA World Aquatics Championships, 
Tatarstan was able to obtain enormous funds from the RF federal government.  
 
Party-state relations 
Formal arrangement of party-state relations pertains to whether the governmental 
apparatus at the ethno-regional level is formally designed to be subordinate to an 
incumbent political party directed from the central-state level in terms of personnel, 
decision-making, and ideology. Party-state relations are highly relevant to an ethno-
region’s autonomy building, as such institutional arrangements can exert formal 
constraints upon who are supposed to access the government of the ethno-region as well 
as who are expected to wield the most decision-making power in actual governance. This 
variable varies significantly at the national level, as China features a Leninist party to 
which state apparatuses are subordinate, while Russia features a combination of both 
competitive elections and an incumbent, “catch-all” party that has been in power for 
almost two decades.  
In China, governmental apparatuses of all levels and the armed forces are formally 
subordinate to the incumbent political party directed from Beijing, Chinese Communist 
Party. The 2004 PRC Constitution, in its Article 1, Chapter I, defines the People’s 





the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants,”433 which 
essentially stipulates first and foremost CCP’s formal role in terms of leading the state, 
since CCP positions itself as the “vanguards” of the working class (CCPC 2017, 
Preamble). CCP leads and controls the PRC state organs by means of cadre recruitment 
and their placement in party branches which are supposed to monitor and control state 
apparatuses, social organizations, enterprises, etc. (CCPC 2017, Preamble). CCP 
maintains a hierarchy of its branches at the central-state, provincial-level, prefectural-
level, county-level, and grass-roots level (CCPC 2017, Chapters 3, 4, 5, 9, 10). CCP’s 
supreme authority is placed nominally in its national congress, but party affairs are 
governed and supervised by the central committee of CCP when the national congress is 
not in session (CCPC 2017, Chapter 3). Most importantly, in conformity with the 
principle of democratic centrism (CCPC 2017, Preamble), decision-making power within 
CCP is vested in a collectivity of leaders who occupy the top positions in CCP’s 
Politburo and its Standing Committee (CCPC 2017, Chapter 3). Meanwhile, provincial-
level (or autonomous-region-level) CCP committee oversees the organization and control 
of lower-level party-state apparatuses, economic productions, infrastructure, mobilization 
of societal forces such as women and youth, and so forth (CCPC 2017, Chapters 4, 5, 9, 
10).  
Formal institutions can limit the range of officially permissible behaviors (Tsai 2007, 38). 
An important source of such institutional constraints upon titular elites’ agency in 
Xinjiang may derive from CCP’s monopolization of state power, access to state power, as 
                                                          
433 The NPC of PRC, Constitution of the PRC [in Chinese], available at 






well as ideologies justifying the one-party rule (Huntington 1991, 580). Monopolization 
of state power corresponds to the principle of “political leadership”434 in CCP’s official 
terminology, while monopolization of the access to state power and of ideologies 
correspond respectively to the principles of “organizational leadership”435 and “ideational 
leadership.”436 According to these principles, XUAR state organs are subordinate to the 
leadership of CCP in three institutionalized manners. Although rules and regulations, 
policies and decisions are formulated and implemented by the state organs, the party has 
the final say in terms of what can be formulated and how it will be implemented. Similar 
to the nomenklatura system in the former Soviet Union, the party determines who can 
and will fill the most powerful positions in various state organs, and such people are 
usually members of the party. In the meantime, the party establishes organizational 
branches at all levels of state organs while formulating and controlling what ideas or 
ideologies can be made official and vigorously propagated.   
 
Table 6.1. Representation of party cadres of nine ethnic minority categories in the 18th and 


























0.45% 0.79% 0.47% 0.76% 0.71% 0.65% 1.27% 0.14% 0.11% 
                                                          
434 Chinese: zhengzhi lingdao. See People’s Daily Encyclopaedia of CCP History, “The leadership roles of 
the Chinese Communist Party,” [in Chinese] People’s Daily, 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/165617/173273/10415394.html (accessed 28 February 2017). 
435 Chinese: zuzhi lingdao. 













1.2% 1.7% 1.3% 0.53% 0.4% 0.35% 0.75% 0.22% 0.13% 
Degree of 
representation 



























a b c The overrepresentation of ethnic Mongol and Tibetan delegates is in part related to the more geographically 
dispersed residential patterns of ethnic Mongols and Tibetans in China. Accordingly, ethnic Mongol and Tibetan 
delegates were drawn not only from NMAR or XAR but also from Hebei, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Sichuan, 
Yunnan, Qinghai, Gansu, XUAR, etc. Moreover, ethnic Mongol and Tibetan delegates were also more represented in 
the delegations of the central-state-level party-state apparatuses, People’s Armed Police (PAP), and PLA. Ethnic 
Uyghur delegates were drawn from XUAR and PLA. 
Sources: List of the delegates to the 19th CCP National Congress. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-
09/29/c_1121747855.htm (accessed December 31, 2017); List of the delegates to the 18th CCP National Congress. 
http://news.cntv.cn/special/18ddbxj/mingdan/index.shtml (accessed December 31, 2017). 
 
In this sense, Uyghur elites’ capacity to influence policy making and implementing can 
hinge greatly upon their standings and networks within CCP. Considering that ethnic 
Uyghur elites are still underrepresented in the CCP ranks (Table 6.1.) and that their 
assignment of duties is determined by mostly ethnic Han Chinese party members of 
higher ranks, Uyghur political elites in Xinjiang can be held accountable by the party437 
rather than by the populace. Thus, it is not surprising that Uyghur political elites in 
Xinjiang seldom voice significant objections within the party with regard to policy 
formulations or implementations, perhaps either because they supported the move or 
because they believed that their dissenting views would backlash against their own 
                                                          
437 One of the respondents, who can be classified as an “ethnic cadre,” told the author that all a cadre is 





standings in the party. Had Uyghur elites been more represented and more able to build 
horizontally collusive coalitions across ethnic lines in the party, some of their dissenting 
views, if there are any, would have more chances of having an impact upon policy 
formulations or implementations. In that scenario, subordination to the incumbent 
political party might be turned into more an institutional opportunity than constraint.  
As argued by Yumin Sheng, centralized incumbent political parties such as CCP may 
actually be conducive to fiscal extraction from economically more developed provincial-
level units to those less developed ones for interregional redistribution (2010, 4), since 
central-state leaders in the face of fissiparous challenges of economic openness and 
marketization may resort to exercising tighter political control over the personnel at the 
government of economically more prosperous provincial-level units in order to ensure the 
extraction of revenue, to redress cross-regional disparity, and to bolster the legitimacy of 
the incumbent party’s rule (4). This may somehow provide opportunities for 
economically lagging-behind ethno-regions to rely upon financing from the central-state 
to facilitate investments in infrastructure, physical capital, human capital, to provide 
social protection, and even to achieve a “late developer miracle” in terms of GDP per 
capita, as manifested in the example of Inner Mongolia of China.  
In Russia, governmental apparatus at different levels of state is by no means formally 
subordinate to an incumbent political party. Competitive legislative and presidential 
elections are held in Russia, wherein a variety of political parties participate. However, 
the incumbent United Russia (UR) party has been in power since the legislative election 
in 2003 and the presidential election in 2004, and there has not been change of incumbent 





(Golosov 2004, 29-30) for the expansion and consolidation of Vladimir Putin’s 
presidential power by providing the executive organs of the RF federal government with 
certain levels of legislative support in the RF Federal Assembly (29-30). UR has long 
dominated the State Duma, the lower chamber of the RF Federal Assembly, while 
maintaining party branches in each of Russia’s constituent entities (Konitzer and Wegren 
2006, 504).  
UR’s dominant status can be attributed to the growing fiscal capacity of Moscow that 
significantly altered budgetary flows (511), changes to electoral laws requiring a portion 
of the ethno-regional legislatures to be elected through proportional representation (512) 
resulting in powerful UR blocs at the ethno-regional level (512-514), and support from 
rural-based voters (514-517). Elections can be engineered by incumbent UR elites 
through such formal or informal mechanisms as candidate-filtering, providing pro-regime 
candidates with campaigning advantages, creating obstacles for opposition candidates to 
mobilize support, purposefully adjusting rules, borders, or thresholds, installing “virtual” 
parties that pretend to diversify voices, and ballotbox fraud or indirect elections (Petrov et 
al. 2014, 4). 
The expansion and consolidation of UR party structures in the constituent entities of RF, 
in particular, prompted titular political elites of various ethno-regions to align with UR in 
order to maintain a fuller use of their administrative resources, to appropriate support 
from their ethno-region’s UR party structures, and to rely on additional support through 
federally-maintained infrastructures and media outlets (509). Examples of powerful 
political elites of titular categories of ethno-regions joining the UR party abound: the 





Röstəm Mingnekhanov, the former president of Bashkortostan, Mortaza Rəkhimov, the 
incumbent president of Bashkortostan, Röstəm Khəmitov, the incumbent president of 
Yakutia, Yegor Borisov, etc.   
In sum, for ethno-regions with relatively weak bargaining capacity for titular elites and 
lower autonomy outcome, a Leninist party like CCP may constitute an institutional 
constraint. For ethno-regions with relatively strong bargaining capacity for titular elites 
and higher autonomy outcome, an overarching party may provide opportunities for titular 
elites’ coalition-buildings and fast-track promotions438, amplifying the impact of titular 
elites’ bargaining capacity upon actually exercised autonomy outcome.  
 
EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT TO MORE ETHNO-REGIONS 
This section succinctly tests the ability of my argument to explain or to predict autonomy 
as implemented outcome in four other ethno-regions, i.e. Tibet Autonomous Region 
(Chinese: Xizang, XAR) and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Chinese: Neimenggu, 
or Nei Mongol, NMAR) of China as well as Republic of Bashkortostan (RB) and 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia, RS) of Russia. These four ethno-regions are selected not out 
of the principle of “most similar” cases, but rather in light of their distinctive 
demographic, geographic, or historical significances. Accordingly, I am not conducting a 
controlled comparison of these ethno-regions in addition to Xinjiang and Tatarstan. 
Instead, I use the congruence method (George and Bennett 2005, 181-204). Concretely, 
for each of the four ethno-regions, I first assess the value of the explanatory variable, or 
                                                          
438 For instance, Yang Jing, an ethnic Mongol cadre from Inner Mongolia, was promoted from the chair of 





rather, level of inter-ethnic integration, then proceed to asking what prediction about the 
value of the intervening variable, or rather, titular elites’ capacity, should follow 
according to my argument (181). Then I proceed to asking what prediction about the 
value of the response variable, or rather, autonomy as implemented outcome, should 
follow according to my argument (181). If the empirically observed values in terms of an 
ethno-region’s titular elites’ capacity and autonomy as implemented outcome are 
consistent with my argument’s predictions, then a possibility of causal link between inter-
ethnic boundary makings and implemented autonomy outcome in various ethno-regions 
can be more strongly asserted. If the argument travels neatly to more ethno-regions based 
upon deductions, it can also be contended that my argument possesses ample explanatory 
potential in terms of accounting for varying autonomy outcomes of different ethno-
regions. Nevertheless, although such preliminary congruity between observed and 
predicted outcomes would need to be further substantiated with tracing the process of 
how the explanatory variable leads to the response variable, I will save process-tracing in 
the four shadow cases for future research, as that may require data-gathering fieldwork.   
 
China: Inter-ethnic relations, titular elites, and autonomy outcomes in Inner Mongolia 
and Tibet 
Nei Mongol Autonomous Region (NMAR, or Inner Mongolia) is the first ethnic 
territorially-based autonomous entity established under CCP. It also has the distinction of 





percentage439 of its titular ethnic population in the total population of the ethno-region. 
Meanwhile, ethnic Han have been constituting the absolute majority of the ethno-regional 
population since the expansion of NMAR in the 1950s from initially western Manchuria 
into its present-day territorial shape. NMAR has also gained fame by being the only 
provincial-level administrative unit in PRC where individuals from three generations of 
one family440 have served discontinuously as the chair of the ethno-regional government. 
Moreover, prior to the 2018 annual session of the PRC National People’s Congress, CCP 
general secretary Xi Jinping was “elected”441 a representative of NMAR to the annual 
NPC convention in Beijing, which was covered in numerous media outlets. 
According to the 2010 population census, of the total population categorized as ethnic 
Mongols in China, 70.7% were residing in NMAR, among whom at least 13.7%442 would 
claim a Sinitic dialect443 as their mother tongue while having no knowledge of either 
various Mongolic dialects or the Huihu (ancient Uyghur) script444. Meanwhile, 20.1% of 
the total population of ethnic Mongols in China as of 2010 were concentrated in the 
provinces (municipalities) of Liaoning (11%), Hebei (3%), Jilin (2.4%), Heilongjiang 
(2.1%), and Beijing (1.3%). Ethnic Mongols in these provinces/municipalities were either 
bilingual in both Sinitic and Mongolic dialects445 or monolingual in a Sinitic dialect. 
                                                          
439 The percentage has never surpassed 20% since the ethnic classification in the 1940s and 1950s. 
440 Wulanfu (Uılaaxüü, Yun Ze), Buhe (Büxee), and Bu Xiaolin from the Yun family. 
441 “Why Xi Jinping decided to run for election in Nei Mongol? Let’s listen to his justifications,” [in Chinese] 
Xinhuanet, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/06/c_1122493442.htm (accessed March 
6, 2018). 
442 Summing up the populations of ethnic Mongols in county-level administrative units where they 
traditionally know and use only Sinitic dialects. 
443 Such as Northeastern Mandarin, Jin, Beijing Mandarin, etc. 
444 A vertically, alphabetically-based writing system that traces its origin to Sogdian, Syriac, and Aramaic 
alphabets. 





Xizang Autonomous Region (XAR, or Tibet in a narrow sense) is the “youngest” 
provincial-level ethnic territorially-based autonomous entity established in PRC. It also 
has the distinction of being the provincial-level ethno-region in China persistently with 
the highest percentage446 of its titular ethnic population in the total population of the 
ethno-region. Moreover, it continues to be the provincial-level ethno-region in China 
with the smallest population. According to the 2010 population census, of the total 
population categorized as ethnic Tibetans in China, only 43.3% were residents in XAR, 
with the remaining 57.7% residing mostly in the provinces of Sichuan (23.8%), Qinghai 
(21.9%), Gansu (7.8%), and Yunnan (2.3%). Ethnic Tibetans living in the provinces of 
Sichuan and Yunnan who have graduated from senior high schools are usually bilingual 
in Tibetic447/Qiangic448 and Sinitic449 dialects, since the language of instruction in schools 
for ethnic Tibetans in Sichuan and Yunnan has primarily been Mandarin Chinese.  
Calculated according to the instrument proposed in Chapter 4450, as of 2010, the China-
wide level of social integration for the total population categorized as ethnic Mongols is 
90% (Table 6.2.), which is tremendously higher compared to the level of social 
integration as of 2010 for ethnic Uyghurs, the titular ethnic population of Xinjiang. 
According to my argument that the higher the level of social integration for the titular 
population, the higher the bargaining capacity for titular elites for the ethno-region, the 
higher the level of implemented autonomy outcome for the ethno-region, the predicted 
level of representation of ethnic Mongol elites in the NMAR ethno-regional state and its 
                                                          
446 Around 90%. 
447 Various vernaculars of the Kham or Amdo dialects. 
448 Such as the Gyalrong language and the Horpa language spoken in the Ganzi and Aba Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefectures of Sichuan Province. 
449 Mostly Southwestern Mandarin and Beijing Mandarin. 





most powerful positions should be higher than the observed level of representation of 
ethnic Uyghur elites in the XUAR ethno-regional state. Moreover, the predicted level of 
implemented autonomy outcome for NMAR for the first six years of the 2010s should 
also be higher than that for Xinjiang. 
Based upon the instrument proposed in Chapter 4451, the weighted representation-by-
population quotient for ethnic Mongols in NMAR as of 2015 is 2.12 (Table 6.3.), which 
signifies overrepresentation of ethnic Mongol elites in the NMAR ethno-regional state 
and its most powerful positions. Based upon the instrument proposed in Chapter 3452, the 
calculated degree of actually exercised autonomy for NMAR for the first six years of the 
2010s is 78.7%. The observed level of representation of titular elites and implemented 
autonomy outcome for NMAR are both significantly higher than those for XUAR453. In 
other words, the empirically observed values of both the intervening and response 
variables are consistent with their predicted levels for the case of Inner Mongolia. 
To briefly disaggregate Inner Mongolia (Nei Mongol)’s implemented autonomy outcome 
(as tabulated in Table 6.8.), for the first six years of the 2010s, what distinguishes NMAR 
from XUAR in terms of titular political participation is the overrepresentation of ethnic 
Mongol representatives in the total number of representatives at the NMAR People’s 
Congress, the overrepresentation of ethnic Mongol cadres in the total number of cadres 
working for the NMAR CCP and state apparatuses, as well as the overrepresentation of 
ethnic Mongol chairs and vice-chairs in the total number of chairs and vice-chairs at the 
                                                          
451 See the subsection “Representation of Uyghur elites in the state organs and their most powerful 
positions of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” in Chapter 4; instrument slightly adjusted by 
removing the XPCC. 
452 See the section “Measuring Autonomy: Autonomy as Implemented Outcome” in Chapter 3. 





NMAR People’s Congress. In terms of ethno-regional economic development, for the 
first six years of the 2010s, NMAR differs from XUAR on the following dimensions: 
NMAR’s GDP per capita was consistently higher than the PRC national average, while 
the 2010-2015 average annual proportion of NMAR’s expenditures covered by its own 
revenues is approximately 79%, signifying a much higher financial sufficiency of NMAR 
as compared to XUAR. NMAR’s comparative advantages have mostly been concentrated 
in the sectors of mining454, energy, dairy processing455, agriculture456, and forestry. With 
regard to titular cultural promotion, Mandarin Chinese has been dominant in both formal 
and informal conducts of the NMAR ethno-regional government. Formal use of the 
literary Mongolian language has been present in academic institutions, print media, 
radio/TV, and internet, while informal, conversational use of Mongolic dialects has been 
noticeable but not ubiquitous in public sphere. In education, the literary Mongolian 
language is used as medium of instruction for some students, and NMAR is the only 
provincial-level ethno-region457 in PRC that boasts of a full-package titular-language-
instructed education system spanning kindergarten, elementary, secondary, tertiary, and 
even postgraduate educations. Unlike in XUAR, NMAR has been regulating mostly the 
forms and interpretations of religious practices while not strictly regulating about who are 
allowed to practice and who are not.  
 
                                                          
454 Especially in terms of rare earth, non-ferrous metal, coal, and uranium. 
455 PRC’s two leading dairy-processing SOEs, Yili Group and Mengiu Group, are based in NMAR. 
456 Animal husbandry and crop production. 
457 Another ethno-region with a full-package titular-language-instructed education system in China is 





Table 6.2. Summary of ethnic Mongols’ level of social integration in China (2010) 
















Total score  90% 
Sources: Calculated from PRC National Bureau of Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on 
Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2013). 
 
Table 6.3. Ethnic Mongol elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state of Nei Mongol 
(2015) 
 Number of those 
occupying the most 
powerful positions who 
are of the titular ethnic 
category (Mongol) 






















7 20 1.8 10% 
Judiciary 1 2 2.6 5% 
a If the quotient is higher than 0 but no higher than 1, underrepresentation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is 1, 
proportional representation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is higher than 1 but no higher than 5.36, 
overrepresentation of titular elites is implied (given that ethnic Mongols’ percentage in the total population of Nei 
Mongol was 18.65% as of 2014). 
Sources: People’s Government of NMAR. http://www.nmg.gov.cn (accessed December 31, 2017); People’s Daily: 
Database for Local Leaders. http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/firstPage.htm (accessed December 31, 2017); China 
Economy Net: Database for Local Leaders. http://district.ce.cn/zt/rwk/index.shtml (accessed December 31, 2017); 





December 31, 2017); NMAR Office of the Committee on the Compilations of Local Chronicles: Regional Information 
of Nei Mongol. http://www.nmqq.gov.cn/index.html (accessed December 31, 2017). 
 
Table 6.4. Those occupying the most powerful positions at the ethno-regional state of the 
NMAR (2010-present) 
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Sources: People’s Government of NMAR. http://www.nmg.gov.cn (accessed December 31, 2017); People’s Daily: 
Database for Local Leaders. http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/firstPage.htm (accessed December 31, 2017); China 
Economy Net: Database for Local Leaders. http://district.ce.cn/zt/rwk/index.shtml (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Xinhuanet: Personnel for Party and Governmental Apparatuses. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/rs.htm (accessed 
December 31, 2017); NMAR Office of the Committee on the Compilations of Local Chronicles: Regional Information 
of Nei Mongol. http://www.nmqq.gov.cn/index.html (accessed December 31, 2017). 
 
Calculated according to the instrument proposed in Chapter 4458, as of 2010, the China-
wide level of social integration for the total population categorized as ethnic Tibetans is 
                                                          





40% (Table 6.5.). This score is, slightly higher as it is, largely comparable to the China-
wide level of social integration as of 2010 for ethnic Uyghurs459. According to my 
argument, the predicted level of representation of ethnic Tibetan elites in the XAR ethno-
regional state and its most powerful positions should be largely comparable to the 
observed level of representation of ethnic Uyghur elites in the XUAR ethno-regional 
state. Moreover, the predicted level of implemented autonomy outcome for XAR for the 
first six years of the 2010s should also be largely comparable to that for Xinjiang. 
Based upon the instrument proposed in Chapter 4460, the weighted representation-by-
population quotient for ethnic Tibetans in XAR as of 2015 is 0.56 (Table 6.6.), which 
signifies underrepresentation of titular elites in the XAR ethno-regional state and its most 
powerful positions. Based upon the instrument proposed in Chapter 3461, the calculated 
degree of actually exercised autonomy for XAR for the first six years of the 2010s is 
62.4%. The observed level of representation of titular elites and implemented autonomy 
outcome for XAR are both even lower than those for XUAR462 (0.64 and 67.9% for the 
two variables). In other words, the empirically observed values on both the intervening 
and response variables may have turned out to be even lower than their predicted levels 
for the case of Tibet (Xizang), despite that ethnic Tibetans score slightly higher than 
ethnic Uyghurs in terms of social integration. Nevertheless, lower-than-predicted titular 
representation and autonomy outcome for XAR does not contradict but rather 
substantiates my argument, since a level of social integration at 40%, a level of titular 
                                                          
459 35%. 
460 See the subsection “Representation of Uyghur elites in the state organs and their most powerful 
positions of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” in Chapter 4; instrument slightly adjusted by 
removing the XPCC. 
461 See the section “Measuring Autonomy: Autonomy as Implemented Outcome” in Chapter 3. 





elites’ representation at 0.56, and a level of actually exercised autonomy at 62.4% are low 
whatsoever. 
To briefly disaggregate Tibet (Xizang)’s implemented autonomy outcome (as tabulated in 
Table 6.8.), for the first six years of the 2010s, XAR largely attained comparable level of 
titular political participation to that in XUAR. In terms of ethno-regional economic 
development, for the first six years of the 2010s, XAR differs from XUAR on the 
following dimensions. The ratio of PRC central state’s transfer to XAR’s own tax and 
non-tax-based revenue was consistently higher than 1, which signified XAR’s high 
financial reliance upon the central state. XAR’s comparative advantages are mostly 
concentrated in the sectors of tourism and hydroelectric energy rather than in agricultural 
or mining sectors. XAR largely attained comparable level of titular cultural promotion to 
that in XUAR except that Mandarin Chinese has been dominant in both formal and 
informal conducts of the XAR ethno-regional government.  
 
Table 6.5. Summary of ethnic Tibetans’ level of social integration in China (2010) 
















Total score  40% 
Sources: Calculated from PRC National Bureau of Statistics and PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Tabulation on 






Table 6.6. Ethnic Tibetan elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state of Xizang 
(2015) 
 Number of those 
occupying the most 
powerful positions who 
are of the titular ethnic 
category (Tibetan) 






















21 32 0.7 10% 
Judiciary 1 2 0.6 5% 
a If the quotient is higher than 0 but no higher than 1, underrepresentation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is 1, 
proportional representation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is higher than 1 but no higher than 1.1, 
overrepresentation of titular elites is implied (given that ethnic Tibetans’ percentage in the total population of XAR was 
90.5% as of 2014). 
Sources: People’s Government of XAR. http://www.xizang.gov.cn (accessed December 31, 2017); People’s Daily: 
Database for Local Leaders. http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/firstPage.htm (accessed December 31, 2017); China 
Economy Net: Database for Local Leaders. http://district.ce.cn/zt/rwk/index.shtml (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Xinhuanet: Personnel for Party and Governmental Apparatuses. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/rs.htm (accessed 
December 31, 2017). 
 
Table 6.7. Those occupying the most powerful positions at the ethno-regional state of the 
XAR (2010-present) 
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XAR Department 
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Sources: People’s Government of XAR. http://www.xizang.gov.cn (accessed December 31, 2017); People’s Daily: 
Database for Local Leaders. http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/firstPage.htm (accessed December 31, 2017); China 
Economy Net: Database for Local Leaders. http://district.ce.cn/zt/rwk/index.shtml (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Xinhuanet: Personnel for Party and Governmental Apparatuses. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/rs.htm (accessed 
December 31, 2017). 
 
Table 6.8. Xinjiang, Nei Mongol (Inner Mongolia), and Xizang (Tibet) in China 
compared in terms of autonomy as implemented outcome (2010s) 












(Has there been 
incidence of central-
state’s mandates 
formally claimed as 
not suiting the 
ethno-region’s 




0.5 0.5 0.5 
P2 
(Has there been 
systematic training 
of ethnic minority 
cadres or not?) 
 
1 1 1 
P3 
(Has there been 
formal consultation 
with representatives 
of various ethnic 
populations or not?) 







(Is the Chair of the 
ethno-region of 
titular category or 
not?) 
 
1 1 1 
P5 
(Has there been 
practice of 
preferential 




apparatus or in state-
owned enterprises?) 
 





ever been enacted or 
not?) 
 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
P7 
(Representation of 





0.5 1 0.5 
P8 
(Proportionality of 
titular cadres to 
titular population) 
 

















(Is the ethno-region 
a “donor” region or 
not?) 
 
0.5 0.5 0.5 





(Have there been 
special funds set up 




(Have fiscal transfer 
payments been 
increasing or not?) 
 







1 1 0.5 
E5 
(GDP per capita of 
the ethno-region) 
 
0.5 1 0.5 
E6 
(Unemployment rate 
of the ethno-region) 
 






0.5 0.5 0 
E8 
(The proportion of 
an ethno-region’s 
expenditures 















(Use of the titular 





0.75 0.5 0.5 
C2 
(Use of the titular 
language and scripts 
in public sphere) 
 
1 0.5 1 





(Has the official 







regional state been 
regulating individual 
citizens’ practices of 
religion or not?) 
 
0.5 1 0.5 
C5 
(Has there been 
preferential 
treatment of the 
titular population in 
terms of 
matriculating 
students or not?) 
 
1 1 1 
C6 
(Use of the titular 
language and scripts 
in education) 
 







A1 67.9% 78.7% 62.4% 
Sources: Central People’s Government of PRC, “Xizang: The number of ethnic cadres has increased by a factor of 13 
since 50 years ago,” http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-10/10/content_2762294.htm (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Information on Mongolic studies, “A study of legislating autonomy regulations in autonomous regions: example of Nei 
Mongol,” http://www.surag.net/?p=9821 (accessed December 31, 2017); Xinhuanet, “A sketch of the building of inter-
ethnic unity in Nei Mongol,” http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-08/01/c_1121411747.htm (accessed December 31, 
2017); People’s Congress of NMAR, http://www.nmgrd.gov.cn (accessed December 31, 2017); People’s Congress of 
XAR, http://www.xizangrd.gov.cn (accessed December 31, 2017); NMAR Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www.nmgtj.gov.cn/acmrdatashownmgpub/index.htm (accessed December 31, 2017); 2014 China Population & 
Employment Statistics Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2014); 2015 China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: 
China Statistics Press, 2015); 2016 China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2016); PRC Ministry of 
Finances, “Integrated table of budgeted fiscal returns and transfer payments from the central government to provincial-
level units,” http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2015czys/201503/t20150324_1206398.html (accessed December 31, 2017); 2016 
Xizang Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2016); Ma, Rong, 2011, “Social Development and 
Bilingual Education in XAR,” China Tibetology 96; PRC Ministry of Finance, http://www.mof.gov.cn/index.htm 
(accessed December 31, 2017). 
 
Notably, many of the ethnic Mongol or ethnic Tibetan elites who once occupied or still 





XAR are originally from localities either where ethnic Mongols or ethnic Tibetans have 
completely switched linguistically to Sinitic dialects or where ethnic Mongols or ethnic 
Tibetans live in close proximity with ethnic Han and tend to be bilingual. In NMAR, 
almost all of the elites listed in Table 6.4. are originally from such localities. Many of 
them bear Han-style names, which consist of a monosyllabic family name and given 
name either monosyllabic or bi-syllabic and are a common naming pattern among 
arguably a majority of ethnic Mongols in China463. For instance, Bu Xiaolin, incumbent 
chair of NMAR government, who is a granddaughter of NMAR’s founding chair, 
Wulanfu (Yun Ze), and the daughter of NMAR’s former chair, Buhe, hails from the 
western Tümet464 tribal federation based in the vicinity of present-day Höhhot. 
Population affiliated to this tribal federation completely switched to the Jin dialect by the 
end of the Qing Dynasty and speak that dialect as mother tongue. Baatır465, former chair 
of NMAR and incumbent head of PRC’s SEAC, hails from the eastern Tümet466 tribal 
federation based in the northwestern part of present-day Liaoning Province. Population 
affiliated to this tribal federation are mostly bilingual in Mongolic and Sinitic dialects. 
Yang Jing, former chair of NMAR and incumbent secretary of PRC’s State Council467, 
hails from the eastern part of present-day Ordos Municipality of NMAR, where the local 
population regardless of ethnicity speak the Jin dialect of Chinese as mother tongue. In 
XAR, the most recent three chairs of ethno-regional government, Padma Chöling, Losang 
                                                          
463 Han-style naming pattern has been common among ethnic Mongols living in Tongliao Municipality, 
southern part of Chifeng Municipality, Xing’an Leangue, Höhhot Municipality, eastern part of Ordos 
Municipality of NMAR, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Hebei provinces.  
464 Chinese: Xi Tumote, Mongolic: Baruun Tümd. 
465 Chinese: Bate’er.  
466 Chinese: Dong Tumote, Mongolic: Cüün Tümd. 





Jamtsan, and Qizhala, all hail from localities inhabited by Kham Tibetans468. Such 
localities were either once nominally governed by the Xikang Province during the 
Republic of China period or are governed at present under either the Yunnan Province or 
the Sichuan Province. 
 
Russia: Inter-ethnic relations, titular elites, and autonomy outcomes in Bashkortostan 
and Yakutia 
Republic of Bashkortostan (RB) is the first ethnic territorially-based autonomous entity 
established under the auspices of the Bolsheviks within the boundary of present-day 
Russian Federation (RF). It also has the distinctions of being the ethno-region in RF with 
the largest population as well as of the relatively low percentage469 of its titular ethnic 
population in the total population of the ethno-region. 
Nonetheless, what indeed distinguishes Bashkortostan from other ethno-regions in Russia 
is the blurred, ambiguous inter-ethnic boundaries between ethnic Bashkirs, the titular 
ethnic population of RB, and ethnic Tatars, the third largest ethnic population of RB. 
Such fuzzy Bashkir-Tatar boundaries have been salient particularly in the northwestern 
counties of RB (Gorenburg 2000, 558-559). Across consecutive population censuses 
during both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, individuals switched en masse either 
between “Bashkir” and “Tatar” as categories of the ethno-regional state’s classification or 
                                                          
468 Those categorized ethnically as Tibetans and traditionally speaking Kham dialects as mother tongue. 
Kham Tibetans in Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces are usually bilingual in both Kham and Sinitic dialects. 
469 Ethnic Bashkirs constituted roughly 29.5% of the total population of RB according to the 2010 census. 
However, of the total population categorized as ethnic Bashkirs in Russia, as of 2010, 74% were residing in 
RB, with the rest found in Chelyabinsk (10.3%), Orenburg (3%), Tyumen (2.9%), Perm (2.1%), Sverdlovsk 





between “Bashkir” and “Tatar” as categories of self-identification. In other words, for 
some individuals, they changed only their ethnic categories marked on governmentally-
issued papers but retained their previously identified categories in private, while for 
others, they not only changed their ethnic categories marked on formal documents but 
also changed their self-identification. Consequently, under the Soviet Union, two periods 
saw significant changes in terms of the proportions of ethnic Tatars and ethnic Bashkirs 
in the total population of BASSR: from 1897 through 1939, when the proportion of 
Bashkirs fell and the proportion of Tatars rose, and from 1979-1989, when the proportion 
of Bashkirs fell again and the proportion of Tatars rose again (557). Dmitry Gorenburg 
attributes such demographic fluctuations and massive identify shifts to institutional or 
policy factors, such as the granting and abolition of estate-based470 privileges, affirmation 
actions favoring individuals of the titular category, language policy, education policy, 
census policy, etc. (562-567, 570-574). After the dissolution of the USSR, the proportion 
of ethnic Tatars, again, rose from 24.1% in 2002 to 25.4% in 2010, while the proportion 
of ethnic Bashkirs, again, fell from 29.8% in 2002 to 29.5% in 2010, though only 
slightly. Taking into account that the literary and colloquial Tatar471 and Bashkir 
languages are mutually completely intelligible and almost identical472, that both ethnic 
                                                          
470 Prior to the 1865 land reform in Imperial Russia, only those classified under the category “Bashkir” 
were allowed to own land in what is today’s Bashkortostan. After the 1865 land reform, more people 
became entitled to land ownership, and many of those who had previously identified themselves as 
“Mishar” or “Teptiar” started identifying themselves as “Bashkir”. After the Bolsheviks came to power, 
categories such as “Mishar” and “Teptiar” were gradually removed from governmental censuses, and 
individuals were required to identify either as “Bashkir” or “Tatar” (Gorenburg 2000, 562-567). 
471 Tatar used to be one of the three official languages of Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
(BASSR) until 1978, when the official status of the Tatar language was removed from the 1978 BASSR 
Constitution (572). 
472 The Tatar language and the Bashkir language can be viewed as each other’s closest “dialect”. In a 
sense, it is arguable that the Soviet Union’s ethnic classification resulted in originally more territorially and 






Bashkirs and ethnic Tatars are traditionally mostly Muslims, and that it can be really 
tricky to tell who is Bashkir or who is Tatar, I treat ethnic Bashkirs and ethnic Tatar 
combined as the “titular” population of RB. In other words, I view the “Bashkir” and 
“Tatar” as two categories artificially imposed during the Soviet period upon a shared 
landscape of cultural continuum. 
Similar to the linguistic demographics among ethnic Tatars, there are more ethnic 
Bashkirs in Russia who know Russian than those who know Bashkir. According to the 
2010 All-Russia population census, 97.5% of ethnic Bashkirs Russia-wide claimed to 
know Russian. By contrast, merely 62% of ethnic Bashkirs Russian-wide claimed to 
know Bashkir, while, notably, 23.4% of ethnic Bashkirs Russia-wide claimed to know 
Tatar. In Bashkortostan alone, 96.9% of ethnic Bashkirs claimed to know Russian, while 
only 67.8% of ethnic Bashkirs claimed to know Bashkir and 27.1% claimed to know 
Tatar. Of the total population of Bashkortostan, 98.7% claimed to know Russian, while 
23.5% claimed to know Bashkir and 26.7% claimed to know Tatar. Despite high level of 
linguistic Russification among ethnic Bashkirs and ethnic Tatars alike in Bashkortostan, 
consciousness of being ethnically Bashkir or Tatar remains robust, as the percentage of 
ethnic Bashkirs and Tatars combined in the total population of RB rose from 53.9% as of 
2002 to 55% as of 2010. Moreover, Bashkir-Tatar intermarriages are not uncommon: as 
of 2010, 4.9% of ethnic Tatars had ethnic Bashkir spouses, whereas 16.4% of ethnic 
Bashkirs had ethnic Tatar spouses. 
Republic of Sakha (RS, or Yakutia) is the ethno-region with the largest area in RF. It also 
has the distinction of being the largest ethnic territorially-based autonomous entity of the 





who know Russian than those who know the Yakut language. According to the 2010 
census, 90.6% of ethnic Yakuts Russia-wide claimed to know Russian, while a lower 
proportion of them, at 85.9%, claimed to know Yakut. In Yakutia alone, 90.4% of ethnic 
Yakuts claimed to know Russian, while 87% of ethnic Yakuts claimed to know Yakut. 
Since the population ratio of those who identified themselves as Bashkir to those who 
identified themselves as Tatar in RB in the 2010 census is 1.16:1, to calculate a 
“combined” Russia-wide level of social integration for ethnic Bashkirs and Tatars 
together, I assign a weight of 1.16 out of 2.16 to ethnic Bashkirs’ Russia-wide score of 
social integration and a weight of 1 out of 2.16 to ethnic Tatars’ Russia-wide score of 
social integration. Calculated according to the instrument proposed in Chapter 5473, the 
Russia-wide level of social integration for the total population categorized as ethnic 
Bashkirs is 65% as of 2010 (Table 6.9.). Given that the Russia-wide level of social 
integration for the total population categorized as ethnic Tatars is 85% as of 2010, the 
weighted Russia-wide level of social integration for ethnic Bashkirs and Tatars combined 
as of 2010 is largely 74%. This combined score is lower compared to the level of social 
integration as of 2010 for ethnic Tatars, the titular ethnic population of Tatarstan. 
According to my argument that the lower the level of social integration for the titular 
population, the lower the bargaining capacity for titular elites for the ethno-region, the 
lower the level of implemented autonomy outcome for the ethno-region, then the 
predicted level of representation of ethnic Bashkir and Tatar elites combined in the RB 
ethno-regional state and its most powerful positions should be lower than that of ethnic 
Tatar elites in the case of Tatarstan. Moreover, the predicted level of implemented 
                                                          





autonomy outcome for RB for the first six years of the 2010s should also be lower than 
that for Tatarstan. 
Based upon the instrument proposed in Chapter 5474, the weighted representation-by-
population quotient for ethnic Bashkirs and Tatars combined in RB as of 2015 is 1.02 
(Table 6.10.), which signifies proportional representation of ethnic Bashkir and Tatar 
elites combined in the RB ethno-regional state and its most powerful positions. Based 
upon the instrument proposed in Chapter 3475, the calculated degree of actually exercised 
autonomy for RB for the first six years of the 2010s is 74.7%. The observed level of 
representation of titular elites and implemented autonomy outcome for RB are both lower 
than those for RT476. In other words, the empirically observed values on both the 
intervening and response variables are consistent with their predicted levels for the case 
of Bashkortostan. 
To briefly disaggregate Bashkortostan’s implemented autonomy outcome (as tabulated in 
Table 6.15.), for the first six years of the 2010s, Bashkortostan largely attained 
comparable level of titular political participation to that in Tatarstan except that no 
representative office of RB has been opened outside the border of Russia. In terms of 
ethno-regional economic development, for the first six years of the 2010s, Bashkortostan 
differs from Tatarstan on the following dimensions. RB’s proportion of expenditures 
covered by its own revenues for 2010-2015 was on average around 78% (Federal 
Statistical Service of the Russian Federation 2017), which is even higher than that of 
                                                          
474 See the subsection “Representation of Tatar elites in the state organs and their most powerful 
positions of the Republic of Tatarstan” in Chapter 5. 
475 See the section “Measuring Autonomy: Autonomy as Implemented Outcome” in Chapter 3. 





Tatarstan and signifies a high level of financial self-sufficiency. Despite that, RB has 
been consistently a recipient region rather than a donor region, and its GDP per capita 
was consistently lower than the RF national average, while its unemployment rate was 
consistently higher than the national average. Nevertheless, Bashkortostan boasts of one 
of the most477 diverse economy of all ethnic republics in Russia. Aside from taking the 
lead in Russia in terms of the ability to refine crude oil, Bashkortostan has solid 
foundations in such sectors as manufacturing (petrochemical, machinery, etc.), mining478, 
and energy, while tourism in the Ural Mountains remains underdeveloped despite huge 
potential. Notably, Bashkortostan also has been trying to emulate Tatarstan in terms of 
innovative investment policies. Relatedly, Ufa, the capital of RB, hosted the 7th BRICS 
summit in 2015. With regard to titular cultural promotion, Russian has been the dominant 
language used in the RB ethno-regional-level government. Formal use of Bashkir has 
been present in academic institutions, print media, radio/TV, and internet, while informal, 
conversational use of Bashkir has been noticeable but not ubiquitous in public sphere. 
Bashkir has been used as medium of instruction for some subjects only or taught as a 
subject in pre-tertiary education but is barely used in higher education in RB. The official 
historiography in RB on the “ethno-genesis” of ethnic Bashkirs treats them as an 
“ancient, autonomous people” with a stable, primordial “core”479, thus more or less 
dismissing debates about the history of the consciousness of “being Bashkir.” 
                                                          
477 Second only to Tatarstan in terms of sectoral diversity, infrastructure, and productive potential. 
478 RB is the core region of what used to be called “Second Baku” during the Soviet period. 
479 This core, according to RB’s official historiography, is a tribal federation consisting of seven major 
tribes (Böryən, Üsərgən, Tüngəwer, Kıpsak, Katay, Tabın, Meng), who have been engaged in perennial 
struggle to maintain political autonomy from such state powers as Tujue (Turkic) Khaganate, Khazar 
Khaganate, Volga Bulgaria, the Golden Horde, Imperial Russia, etc. See “Republic of Bashkortostan: 






Table 6.9. Summary of ethnic Bashkirs’ level of social integration in Russia (2010) 
















Total score  65% 
Sources: Calculated from All Russia Population Census 2010. http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed July 31, 2017). 
 
Table 6.10. Ethnic Bashkir and Tatar elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state of 
Bashkortostan (2015) 
 Number of those 
occupying the most 
powerful positions 
who are of the titular 
ethnic category 
(Bashkir and Tatar) 












25 36 1.3 35% 
Legislative organ 
 
7 12 1.1 25% 
Bashkortostan-
branch of the 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of the RF 
 
3 8 0.7 20% 
Judicial organs 
 
1 4 0.5 15% 
Bashkortostan-
branch of the UR 
party 
12 16 1.4 5% 
a If the quotient is higher than 0 but no higher than 1, under-representation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is 





representation of titular elites is implied (given that ethnic Bashkirs’ and ethnic Tatars’ combined percentage in the 
total population of Bashkortostan was 54.9% as of 2010). 
Sources: Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan. https://glavarb.ru/rus (accessed December 31, 2017); Government of 
the RB. https://www.pravitelstvorb.ru/ru (accessed December 31, 2017); State Assembly-Kurultay of the RB. 
http://gsrb.ru/ru (accessed December 31, 2017); Bashkortostan-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the 
Russian Federation. http://02.мвд.рф (accessed December 31, 2017); Constitutional Court of the RB. http://www.ks-
rb.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); Supreme Court of the RB. http://vs.bkr.sudrf.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Presidium of the RB Regional Political Soviet of United Russia Party. https://bashkortostan.er.ru/persons/presidium 
(accessed December 31, 2017); Constitution of the Republic of Bashkortostan. http://www.ks-
rb.ru/normative/constitution (in Bashkir, accessed December 31, 2017). 
 
Table 6.11. Those occupying the most powerful positions at the ethno-regional state of the 
RB (2010-present) 

























































Chair of the 
Supreme Court 
 
Mikhail Tarasenko Russian 2007- 
Prosecutor 
 
Andrei Nazarov Russian 2013- 
Incumbent party 
apparatus 
Secretary of the 
Presidium of the 
Konstantin 
Tolkachev 







of the UR party 
Sources: Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan. https://glavarb.ru/rus (accessed December 31, 2017); Government of 
the RB. https://www.pravitelstvorb.ru/ru (accessed December 31, 2017); State Assembly-Kurultay of the RB. 
http://gsrb.ru/ru (accessed December 31, 2017); Bashkortostan-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the 
Russian Federation. http://02.мвд.рф (accessed December 31, 2017); Constitutional Court of the RB. http://www.ks-
rb.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); Supreme Court of the RB. http://vs.bkr.sudrf.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Presidium of the RB Regional Political Soviet of United Russia Party. https://bashkortostan.er.ru/persons/presidium 
(accessed December 31, 2017); Constitution of the Republic of Bashkortostan. http://www.ks-
rb.ru/normative/constitution (in Bashkir, accessed December 31, 2017). 
 
Calculated according to the instrument proposed in Chapter 5480, the Russia-wide level of 
social integration for the total population categorized as ethnic Yakuts as of 2010 is 60% 
(Table 6.12.), which is significantly lower compared to the level of social integration as of 
2010 for ethnic Tatars. According to my argument that the lower the level of social 
integration for the titular population, the lower titular elites’ bargaining capacity for the 
ethno-region, the lower the level of implemented autonomy outcome for the ethno-
region, then the predicted level of representation of ethnic Yakut elites in the RS ethno-
regional state and its most powerful positions should be lower than the observed level of 
representation of ethnic Tatar elites in the case of Tatarstan. Moreover, the predicted 
level of implemented autonomy outcome for RS for the first six years of the 2010s should 
also be lower than that for Tatarstan. 
Based upon the instrument proposed in Chapter 5481, the weighted representation-by-
population quotient for ethnic Yakuts in RS as of 2015 is 1.34 (Table 6.13.), which 
signifies overrepresentation of titular elites in the RS ethno-regional state and its most 
                                                          
480 See the subsection “Social integration among ethnic Tatars and in Tatarstan” in Chapter 5. 
481 See the subsection “Representation of Tatar elites in the state organs and their most powerful 





powerful positions. Based upon the instrument proposed in Chapter 3482, the calculated 
degree of actually exercised autonomy for RS for the first six years of the 2010s is 70%. 
Intriguingly, although the implemented autonomy outcome for RS is significantly lower 
than that for RT483, the observed level of representation of titular elites for RS is not 
significantly lower than that for RT484 and even higher than that for RB485. In other 
words, while the empirically observed value on the response variable is consistent with 
the predicted level for the case of Yakutia, the observed value on the intervening variable 
may have turned out to be higher than predicted. Despite the relatively low level of social 
integration for ethnic Yakuts Russia-wide compared to ethnic Tatars and ethnic Bashkirs, 
the overrepresentation of ethnic Yakut elites in the RS ethno-regional state may require 
an in-depth case study of autonomy-building in Yakutia. That said, despite titular elites’ 
overrepresentation, the degree of implemented autonomy outcome for RS is lower than 
that for RB, which substantiates the hypothesis that sufficiently high titular representation 
is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for higher degree of autonomy 
outcome. Agency of both the central and ethno-regional states in their actual governances 
matters in this regard. 
To briefly disaggregate Yakutia’s implemented autonomy outcome (as tabulated in Table 
6.15.), for the first six years of the 2010s, Yakutia attained lower level of titular political 
participation than Tatarstan on the following dimensions. RS was not maintaining any 
                                                          








representative office486 outside the borders of Russia, nor did RS enter into any treaty or 
agreement with other constituent entities of RF. In addition, RS was not sponsoring 
specific organizations that reaches out to ethnic Yakuts outside the ethno-region487. In 
terms of ethno-regional economic development, for the first six years of the 2010s, 
Yakutia differs from Tatarstan on the following dimensions. RS has consistently been a 
recipient region rather than a donor region and heavily reliant upon budget transfers from 
the federal government. Although its GDP per capita was consistently much higher than 
the RF national average, its unemployment rate was also consistently higher than the RF 
national average. Moreover, RB’s proportion of expenditures covered by its own 
revenues was on average approximately 58% for 2010-2015 (Federal Statistical Service 
of the Russian Federation 2017), signifying an intermediate level of financial self-
sufficiency. RS’s comparative advantages are mostly concentrated in the sectors of 
mining488 and energy. With regard to titular cultural promotion, Yakutia is distinguished 
from Tatarstan on the following dimensions. The literary Yakut language has been used 
as medium of instruction for some subjects only or taught as a subject in pre-tertiary 
education but is barely used in higher education in RS. That said, the 1990s marked the 
beginning of a series of initiatives aimed at reviving and improving knowledge of the 
Yakut language among ethnic Yakuts, which turned out to be more far-reaching489 than in 
                                                          
486 RS aims at expanding its trade relations with PRC and is interested in promoting a “Made in Yakutia” 
brand in China, “Executive head of Yakutia: to promote the brand “Made in Yakutia” in China,” [in 
Chinese] Sputnik, http://sputniknews.cn/opinion/201707181023143516 (accessed December 31, 2017). 
487 This may need to be contextualized in terms of the relatively small population of ethnic Yakuts outside 
Yakutia. 
488 Yakutia is the seat of the Russian diamond industry (Stoner-Weiss 2004, 319). 
489 Such initiatives include re-introducing the Yakut language to pre-tertiary schools while upgrading and 
expanding the system of higher education in RS (Chevalier 2017, 614). The most recent federally-initiated 
education program called “Federal State Educational Standard”, while aimed at building a more 





other ethno-regions in the Asian part of Russia (Chevalier 2017, 614). The official 
historiography in RS on the “ethno-genesis” of ethnic Yakuts treats them as an “ancient, 
indigenous people” with a stable, distinct “core,” thus more or less dismissing debates 
about the history of the consciousness of “being Yakut.” 
 
Table 6.12. Summary of ethnic Yakuts’ level of social integration in Russia (2010) 
















Total score  60% 
Sources: Calculated from All Russia Population Census 2010. http://www.perepis-2010.ru (accessed July 31, 2017). 
 
Table 6.13. Ethnic Yakut elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state of Yakutia 
(2015) 
 Number of those 
occupying the most 
powerful positions 
who are of the titular 
ethnic category 
(Yakut) 












6 8 1.5 35% 
Legislative organ 
 
14 17 1.6 25% 
                                                          
number of hours that can be assigned to the teaching of non-Russian languages (624) in ethno-regions 






of the Ministry 
of Internal 
Affairs of the RF 
 
2 4 1 20% 
Judicial organs 
 
2 4 1 15% 
Yakutia-branch 
of the UR party 
9 14 1.3 5% 
a If the quotient is higher than 0 but no higher than 1, under-representation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is 
1, proportional representation of titular elites is implied; if the quotient is higher than 1 but no higher than 2, over-
representation of titular elites is implied (given that ethnic Yakuts’ percentage in the total population of Republic of 
Sakha/Yakutia was 49.9% as of 2010). 
Sources: Head of the Republic of Sakha/Yakutia. https://glava.sakha.gov.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Government of the RS. https://prav.sakha.gov.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); State Assembly-İl Tümən of the RS. 
http://iltumen.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); Yakutia-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian 
Federation. http://14.мвд.рф (accessed December 31, 2017); Constitutional Court of the RS. https://ks.sakha.gov.ru 
(accessed December 31, 2017); Supreme Court of the RS. http://vs.jak.sudrf.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Presidium of the RS Regional Political Soviet of United Russia Party. https://yakut.er.ru/persons/presidium (accessed 
December 31, 2017). 
 
Table 6.14. Those occupying the most powerful positions at the ethno-regional state of the 
RS (2010-present) 








Yegor Borisov Yakut 2010- 
























Vladimir Prokopenko Russian 2014- 




Aleksandr Kim-Kimen Yakut 2014- 
Chair of the 
Supreme Court 























Secretary of the 
Presidium of the 
RS Regional 
Political Soviet 
of the UR party 
Aleksandr Nogovitsyn Russian 2015- 
Sources: Head of the Republic of Sakha/Yakutia. https://glava.sakha.gov.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Government of the RS. https://prav.sakha.gov.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); State Assembly-İl Tümən of the RS. 
http://iltumen.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); Yakutia-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian 
Federation. http://14.мвд.рф (accessed December 31, 2017); Constitutional Court of the RS. https://ks.sakha.gov.ru 
(accessed December 31, 2017); Supreme Court of the RS. http://vs.jak.sudrf.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); 
Presidium of the RS Regional Political Soviet of United Russia Party. https://yakut.er.ru/persons/presidium (accessed 
December 31, 2017). 
 
Table 6.15. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia in Russia compared in terms of 
autonomy as implemented outcome (2010s) 









(Has there been 
separate system of 
state organs in the 
ethno-region from the 
federal one?) 
 
1 1 1 
P2 
(Has there been 
formal separation of 
legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers 
or not?) 
 
1 1 1 
P3 
(Does the incumbent 
president/executive 
head of the ethno-
region meet the 
eligibilities defined in 
the legally binding 
documents or not?) 
 
1 1 1 






region have its own 
normative rules and 






under President of RF 
or not?) 
 





office(s) outside the 
border of RF?) 
 
1 0.5 0.5 
P7 
(Does the ethno-
region have treaties 
or agreements with 
other constituent 
entities of RF?) 
 








1 1 0.5 
P9 
(Representation of 
the titular population 
in the legislative 
organ of the ethno-
region) 
 
1 1 1 
P10 
(Representation of 
the titular population 
in the executive 
organ of the ethno-
region) 
 








(Is the ethno-region a 
“donor” region or 
not?) 
 











1 1 1 
E3 
(GDP per capita of 
the ethno-region) 
 
1 0.5 1 
E4 
(Unemployment rate 
of the ethno-region) 
 






0.75 0.75 0.5 
E6 
(The proportion of an 
ethno-region’s 
expenditures covered 
by the ethno-region’s 
own revenues) 
 










(Use of the titular 




0.5 0.5 0.5 
C2 
(Use of the titular 
language and scripts 
in public sphere) 
 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
C3 
(Has the official 
historiography of the 
ethno-region been 
promoting debates or 
not?) 
 
1 0 0 
C4 
(Has the ethno-
regional state been 
regulating individual 
citizens’ practices of 
religion or not?) 
 









symbols been broadly 
used or not?) 
 
1 1 1 
C6 
(Use of the titular 
language and scripts 
in education) 
 







A2 93% 74.7% 70% 
Sources: “GDP per capita by constituent units of the Russian Federation 1998-2015,” 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/# (Federal Statistical Service of the 
Russian Federation, accessed July 31, 2017); Regions of Russia: Socio-economic Indicators 2017 (Moscow: Federal 
Statistical Service of the Russian Federation, 2017); Labor and Employment in Russia 2015 (Moscow: Federal 
Statistical Service of the Russian Federation, 2015); “Annual average levels of unemployment of the population of 
constituent units of the Russian Federation” (Moscow: Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Federation, April 4, 
2017); Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan. https://glavarb.ru/rus (accessed December 31, 2017); Government of the 
RB. https://www.pravitelstvorb.ru/ru (accessed December 31, 2017); State Assembly-Kurultay of the RB. 
http://gsrb.ru/ru (accessed December 31, 2017); Head of the Republic of Sakha/Yakutia. https://glava.sakha.gov.ru 
(accessed December 31, 2017); Government of the RS. https://prav.sakha.gov.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); State 
Assembly-İl Tümən of the RS. http://iltumen.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); World Kurultay of Bashkir People, 
http://kurultay-ufa.ru/ba (accessed December 31, 2017); Constitution of the Republic of Bashkortostan, http://www.ks-
rb.ru/normative/constitution, (in Bashkir, accessed December 31, 2017); Constitution of the Republic of Sakha, 
https://glava.sakha.gov.ru/status-i-polnomochija/konstitutsija-osnovnoj-zakon-respubliki-saha-jakutija, (accessed 
December 31, 2017); Electronic Database of Legal and Normative-Technical Documents, http://docs.cntd.ru, (accessed 
December 31, 2017); Ministry of Education of RB, https://education.bashkortostan.ru (accessed December 31, 2017); 
RF Ministry of Finance, https://www.minfin.ru/ru (accessed December 31, 2017). 
 
SUMMARY 
With respect to formal arrangements of center-periphery relations, China follows a 
constitutionally unitary structure, while Russia follows a constitutionally federated 
structure. Meanwhile, both China and Russia have been practicing fiscal federalism. For 
ethno-regions with weak bargaining capacity for titular elites and lower autonomy 
outcome, fiscal transfers may have the potential of furthering their financial reliance upon 





bargaining capacity for titular elites and higher autonomy outcome, fiscal transfers may 
provide opportunities for the ethno-region to catch up economically if it remains a 
recipient region or prompt the ethno-region to bargain for additional financial transfers or 
investments if it is a donor region.  
With respect to formal arrangements of party-state relations, China features a Leninist 
party to which state apparatuses are subordinate, while Russia features an incumbent 
party that has been in power for almost two decades. For ethno-regions with weak 
bargaining capacity for titular elites and lower autonomy outcome, a Leninist party may 
constitute an institutional constraint. For ethno-regions with strong bargaining capacity 
for titular elites and higher autonomy outcome, an overarching party may provide 
opportunities for titular elites’ coalition-buildings and fast-track promotions.  
Based upon the congruence method, my argument has been able to predict the levels of 
implemented autonomy outcome for four additional ethno-regions in China and Russia 
on the basis of the level of social integration for the titular populations of these ethno-
regions. In China, as compared to Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia features higher level of 
social integration for the titular population, stronger bargaining capacity for the titular 
elites, and higher level of implemented autonomy outcome, whereas Tibet features low 
level of social integration for the titular population, weaker bargaining capacity for the 
titular elites, and lower level of implemented autonomy outcome. In Russia, as compared 
to Tatarstan, both Bashkortostan and Yakutia feature lower level of social integration for 
the titular population, less strong bargaining capacity for the titular elites, and lower level 







“Yao zhengque renshi woguo minzu guanxi de zhuliu, shanyu tuanjie qunzhong, zhengqu renxin, jiaqiang 
ge minzu jiaowang jiaoliu jiaorong, chuangxin zaiti he fangshi, yong falü lai baozhang minzu tuanjie, 
jianjue fandui dahanzu zhuyi he xia’ai minzu zhuyi, rang ge minzu zai zhonghua minzu dajiating zhong 
shouzuxiangqin, shouwangxiangzhu.” 
“It is necessary to correctly understand the mainstream pattern of inter-ethnic relations in our country, to 
become adept at uniting with the masses, winning their hearts, to strengthen interactions, communications, 
and amalgamations across all ethnic groups, to be creative in terms of finding new instruments and 
approaches, to ensure inter-ethnic unity through laws, to firmly oppose Han chauvinism and narrow-
minded nationalism, in order for all ethnic groups to live in fraternity as well as to assist one another in the 
big family of the Chinese nation.” 
Xi Jinping, September 2014490 
“Net nikakoi straty v sfere ‘natsional’nyi…vopros’…Nuzhno obespechit’ lyudyam vozmozhnost’ 
izucheniya rodnogo yazyka, ne tol’ko u tatarskogo, u mariskogo, tam u chechenskogo, i kak u yakutskogo. 
U nas, slava bogu, ogromnoe raznoobraziye takikh yazykov. Eto nashi gordosti, i eto nashi bogatstva. 
Kul’turno-yazykovoe raznoobraziye, eto bezuslovno dolzhno byt’ podderzhano.” 
“There has been no stratification in the sphere of ‘nationality question’…It behooves us to ensure people 
the opportunity to study their mother tongues, not only (to study) Tatar, Mari, Chechen, but also Yakut. 
Thank Goodness! We have got huge diversity out of these languages. (Such diversity) is a source of our 
pride, our richness. Cultural and linguistic diversity must be supported unconditionally.” 
                                                          
490 Reflections on “strengthening inter-ethnic interactions, communications, and amalgamations,” 
available at http://www.seac.gov.cn/art/2017/8/3/art_7198_286355.html (accessed December 31, 2017); 





Vladimir Putin, December 2017491 
 
GROUPNESS AS ENDOGENOUS ITERATIVELY TO STRUCTURE 
AND AGENCY IN ETHNO-REGIONS OF CHINA AND RUSSIA 
Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) can be 
characterized as authoritarian regimes, in which either competitive elections or change of 
incumbent political party have been absent. However, China and Russia are also both 
constitutionally multi-ethnic states, and their respective paramount leaders are clearly 
aware of that. Both China and Russia have been actively reifying ethnic categories and 
officially categorizing their respective populations in ethnic terms in censuses. More 
significantly, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China pioneered, compared 
to the rest of the world, in terms of establishing ethnic territorially-based autonomy for a 
number of their respective ethnic minorities. The present-day Russian Federation 
inherited the institutional legacies of ethno-federalism from the Soviet Union. In such 
formally autonomous ethno-regions, the ethnic category for whom autonomy is 
designated is considered “titular” to the ethno-region, and elites of such titular categories 
are supposed to have guaranteed representation in the ethno-regional state apparatuses, 
regardless of the demographic weight of the titular population in the total ethno-regional 
population. Indeed, the Soviet Union even constitutionally granted right to secede to its 
“union” republics, which fatefully laid the institutional foundations for USSR’s 
disintegration in the early 1990s. Worried about the scenario of territorial dissolution, 
                                                          
491 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuSMHRHbtug (accessed December 31, 2017); transcribed 





PRC did not follow at its early stage the Soviet model of ethno-federalism and embarked 
on a unitary structure complemented by tiers of ethnic territorially-based autonomous 
entities. 
Ideally, ethnic territorially-based autonomy is meant for a type of ethnic institution that 
favors proportional representation over majoritarian rule. It provides ethnic minorities 
with the formal opportunities of participating in state affairs despite their numerically 
minoritarian status, especially in their eponymous ethno-regions. These ethnic minorities 
are recognized usually either due to robust self-consciousness of their distinct identity, or 
due to state’s categorization, or due to a little of both. Such formal opportunities have 
been formally promulgated in the constitutions of PRC and RF, in the Law of Regional 
Ethnic Autonomy of PRC, in the constitutions of various ethnic republics of RF, and in 
the treaties reached between specific ethnic republics and the federal government of RF. 
In some of such ethno-regions, the titular ethnic population constitutes the absolute 
majority of the total population (e.g. Xizang/Tibet Autonomous Region of China, 
Republic of Chechnya of Russia). In some ethno-regions, the titular population comprises 
a plurality of the total population (e.g. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, 
Republic of Tatarstan of Russia). In other ethno-regions, the titular population comprises 
an absolute minority of the total population (e.g. Nei Mongol Autonomous Region of 
China, Republic of Bashkortostan of Russia). Intriguingly, an ethno-region’s actual 
capacity to implement promulgated autonomy and its implemented autonomy outcome 
are neither directly nor inversely proportional to the demographic weight of the titular 
population. Certain ethno-regions where the titular population makes up only a minority 





degree of actually exercised autonomy than those ethno-regions where the titular 
population has consistently been the majority of the total population. In this sense, 
although autonomy as prescriptive institution applies to all of the ethno-regions, 
autonomy as implemented outcome varies conspicuously across different ethno-regions, 
as demonstrated in Figure 7.1492. This alludes to a pattern of asymmetric distribution in 
China and Russia respectively of both the capacity for ethno-regions to be autonomous 
and their autonomy outcomes.  
 
Figure 7.1. Autonomy outcome of six ethno-regions in China and Russia 
 
 
                                                          
492 Calculated according to the instrument introduced in the section “Measuring Autonomy: Autonomy as 





















Why has there been such an asymmetric distribution of implemented autonomy outcomes 
across different ethno-regions in China and Russia? In response to this question, I have 
developed an analytical framework that may constitute an example of the groupness as 
endogenous iteratively to structure and agency approach. The analytical framework 
consists of a response variable, a major explanatory variable, a major intervening 
variable, and two condition variables.  
The response variable is an ethno-region’s actually exercised autonomy outcome, which I 
define in terms of how much of what is prescribed in the legally binding covenant 
establishing the formal autonomy for the ethno-region has been empirically implemented 
in compliance. The major explanatory variable is inter-ethnic boundary-makings of an 
ethno-region, which I define as processes in which actors of both the ethno-region’s 
titular category and the central state’s majority category relate to existing boundaries by 
trying either to maintain them or to change them, either to reinforce them or to de-
emphasize them in a historical context shaped by previous processes of ethnic group 
formation. The major intervening variable is titular elites’ bargaining capacity, which I 
define as their ability to employ both material and discursive resources to participate in 
and to influence decision-makings at both the central and ethno-regional states. The two 
condition variables are formal arrangements of center-periphery relations and party-state 
relations.   
Rather than assume primordially-based groupness behind ethnicity, my dissertation treats 
ethnicity as a cognitive device while delving into three aspects of inter-ethnic boundary-
making processes, acculturation, social integration, and psychological identification. 





capacity, i.e. elite-level inter-ethnic relations, central state’s perception of the titular 
population, and intra-ethnic cleavage structure, which jointly shape a fourth aspect of 
titular elites’ capacity, their representation in the ethno-regional state’s most powerful 
positions. In such processes, the key to effective building of autonomy capacity in ethno-
regions is to strike the balance between the mutually competing but not necessarily 
irreconcilable tendencies towards inter-ethnic differentiation and inter-ethnic integration. 
Put otherwise, the size of an ethno-region’s titular ethnic population does not 
automatically translate into autonomy capacity. What can translate into such capacity is 
titular population’s ability to evenhandedly achieve social integration while maintaining 
distinct identity. 
I argue that greater inter-ethnic integration, when combined with robust consciousness of 
inter-ethnic distinction, is conducive to building the capacity both for elites of the titular 
ethnic category to bargain with the central state and for intra-ethnic cohesion, which in 
turn can lead to greater autonomy outcome for the ethno-region. Inversely, a lack of inter-
ethnic integration, coupled with sticky inter-ethnic divide, can be detrimental to building 
the capacity both for elites of the titular ethnic category to bargain with the central state 
and for intra-ethnic cohesion, which in turn can lead to more subdued autonomy outcome 
for the ethno-region. Simply put, the higher/lower the level of social integration for 
the titular population, the higher/lower titular elites’ bargaining capacity for the 
ethno-region, the higher/lower the level of implemented autonomy outcome for the 
ethno-region. I trace the process of how differing patterns of inter-ethnic integration 
since the early 2000s may have led to differing autonomy outcomes by comparing two 





2010s, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China and the Republic of 
Tatarstan (RT) of Russia. 
The titular populations for whom the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China is 
designated are ethnic Uyghurs. Overall, ethnic Uyghurs’ low level of linguistic 
Sinicization tends to hamper ethnic Uyghur elites’ capacity to build cross-ethnic political 
networks and more collusive, less hierarchical types of relationships with ethnic Han 
elites (of the multi-ethnic state’s majority category). Meanwhile, ethnic Uyghurs’ lack of 
social integration tends not only to exacerbate perceptions of ethnic Uyghurs by the PRC 
central-state but also to translate into internally more differentiated, more polarized intra-
ethnic socio-economic and cultural contour. Such a contour can obstruct upward social 
mobility encouraging ethnic Uyghur populace to identify with or to become themselves 
elites, which in turn undermines intra-Uyghur cohesion and ethnic Uyghur elites’ 
mobilizing capacity. Ethnic Uyghur elites’ less solid relationships with both the central-
state and their co-ethnics, coupled with a less-than-positive image of ethnic Uyghurs in 
the eyes of the central state, have been jointly sufficient for underrepresentation of 
Uyghur elites in the XUAR state organs and their most powerful positions. Absent 
proportionate titular control of the ethno-regional state, Xinjiang lacks the necessary 
condition for effective autonomy implementation.  
The titular populations for whom the Republic of Tatarstan of Russia is designated are 
ethnic Tatars. Overall, ethnic Tatars’ high level of linguistic Russification tends to 
promote Tatar elites’ capacity to build cross-ethnic political networks and more collusive, 
less hierarchical types of relationships with ethnic Russian elites (of the multi-ethnic 





not only to cultivate positive perceptions of ethnic Tatars by the RF central state but also 
to translate into internally less differentiated, less polarized intra-ethnic socio-economic 
and cultural contour. Such a contour is conducive to upward social mobility encouraging 
ethnic Tatar populace to identify with or to become themselves elites, which in turn 
contributes to intra-Tatar cohesion and ethnic Tatar elites’ mobilizing capacity. Ethnic 
Tatar elites’ more solid relationships with both the central-state and their co-ethnics, 
coupled with a positive image of ethnic Tatars in the eyes of the central state, have been 
jointly sufficient for heightened representation of Tatar elites in the RT state organs and 
their most powerful positions. Along with more-than-proportionate titular control of the 
ethno-regional state, Tatarstan is equipped with the necessary condition for effective 
autonomy implementation.  
As demonstrated in the scatterplot in Figure 7.2., for the six ethno-regions in China and 
Russia, there appears to be a trend of correlation between inter-ethnic integration and 
implemented autonomy outcome. However, the statistical significance of such correlation 
awaits testing in future research that will use a much larger sample size and control not 
only structural and agential variables other than inter-ethnic integration but also 
institutional constraints and opportunities. While this dissertation traces the process of 
how differing patterns of inter-ethnic integration can lead to differing autonomy 
outcomes by conducting a controlled comparison of two “most similar” cases, future 
regression analyses would possess the potential of yielding more findings about the 
extent to which my argument is capable of explaining varying autonomy outcomes for as 






Figure 7.2. Integration and autonomy outcome: six ethno-regions in China and Russia  
 
 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom in comparative politics that tends to assume inter-
ethnic integration and inter-ethnic differentiation as mutually conflictual processes, the 
findings of my dissertation inform that, in authoritarian settings, on one hand, an 
integration-distinction balance is attainable for ethnic minority populations. On the 
other hand, inter-ethnic integration can be conducive to the long-term maintaining of 
distinct identities by the intermediary of ethnic minority elites, since higher level of 
inter-ethnic integration can strengthen the capacity of ethnic minority elites to 
negotiate their distinct political, economic, and cultural interests with the central 
state. In this regard, inter-ethnic integration facilitates a two-way process that increases 
the legibility not only of ethnic minority populations to the central state but also of the 

























REVISITING THE CAVEATS 
Caveat I   The two condition variables of my framework, formal arrangements of center-
periphery relations and party-state relations are national-level rather than subnational-
level institutional arrangements. In other words, they vary across countries but not within 
a country across different ethno-regions. That said, even the same institutional 
arrangement can exert different impact upon ethno-regions with differing levels of titular 
elite capacity within the same country. For instance, in China since the early 2000s, 
ethnic Mongol elites have tended to be more capable of taking advantage of the 
apparatuses of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for coalition-buildings or fast-track 
promotions than ethnic Uyghur elites. In Russia, Tatarstan has been more capable than 
any other ethno-region of maintaining financial self-sufficiency while procuring, under 
the framework of fiscal federalism, additional funding from the central-state to host 
mega-events.  
Notably, such institutional constraints and opportunities may themselves be sculpted by 
elite-level compromises at certain historical junctures, for instance, in the context of the 
RF federal and Tatarstani states interactively molding ethno-federal institutions in the 
early 1990s. Such endogeneity between certain institutions and elite agency has been left 
out of the purview of this dissertation. Despite that, to study such endogeneity, future 
research could take the form of a comparative historical study, focusing upon the very 
processes of interactive decision-makings that led to the differing institutional 
arrangements of center-periphery relations between China and Russia. Such research 





central-state elites and ethno-regionally-based elites as well as between those elites who 
favor unitary arrangement and those who favor ethno-federalism. 
Caveat II   The major explanatory variable, inter-ethnic boundary-makings, captures 
population-level, ethno-regional-level structural characteristics rather than individual-
level ones, and there can be multiple concurrent types of boundary-making strategies 
deployed within a titular ethnic population. Over time, as individuals shift their 
boundary-making strategies and as certain strategies replace other ones as more 
predominant, it is possible for there to be improved integration or improved elite-level 
relationship for previously less integrated groups. In this sense, for the population of the 
titular ethnic category of an ethno-region, level of integration can change. Titular elites’ 
bargaining capacity and the ethno-region’s autonomy outcome can also grow. Although 
the dissertation does not directly address such changes, future research could combine 
diachronic within-case variations and synchronic cross-case variations. The diachronic 
aspect of such research would examine whether growing or dwindling levels of 
integration over time have contributed to growing or dwindling levels of titular elites’ 
bargaining capacity as well as growing or dwindling levels of an ethno-region’s 
autonomy outcomes over time. The synchronic cross-case aspect of such research would 
investigate whether the pattern of changing levels of integration leading to changing 
levels of autonomy outcome applies to more than one ethno-region. For instance, 
considering that the levels of linguistic acculturation and social integration incrementally 
increase among ethnic Uyghurs in China, such research would shed light upon whether 
there is the prospect of increasing titular bargaining capacity and improved autonomy 





Another direction for future research is to explore the impact of autonomy outcome upon 
inter-ethnic relations. In such research, the intervening variable could pertain to how 
titular elites tend to shape the discourse about where the boundary between the ethno-
region’s titular ethnic minority and the central-state’s ethnic majority should be drawn. 
Titular elites constitute the key actors in terms of shaping inter-ethnic relations, since 
they play the crucial role of producing and reproducing knowledge about the location and 
meaning of the titular ethnic minority’s boundaries with other ethnic groups. Two 
hypotheses could be tested, the first of which posits that greater autonomy outcome can 
lead to more blurred inter-ethnic boundaries and more cooperative inter-ethnic relations, 
while the second one posits that more subdued autonomy outcome can lead to more rigid 
inter-ethnic boundaries and more divisive inter-ethnic relations. If degrees of autonomy 
outcome and patterns of inter-ethnic relations tend to be mutually reinforcing, then for an 
ethno-region to break out of such self-reinforcing cycles of “alienation,” a shift of 
boundary-making strategies towards more inclusive ones among titular elites can be 
pivotal. 
Caveat III   Prior patterns of titular elites of certain ethno-regions wielding more 
bargaining capacity vis-à-vis the central state than titular elites of other ethno-regions can 
somehow exercise constraints upon the emergence of previously more disadvantaged 
elites, even if the previously less integrated population becomes more integrated into the 
mainstream society. In this regard, future research on uneven distribution of bargaining 
capacity across titular elites of different ethno-regions could also combine diachronic 
within-case variations and synchronic cross-case variations. Such research could examine 





subdued autonomy outcome stalls despite growing level of integration for the titular 
ethnic population. This is particularly salient in China, where elite representation can be 
most meaningful if realized through the CCP. Further growing level of integration for the 
titular ethnic population of an ethno-region with already heightened bargaining capacity 
for its titular elites might also perpetuate their overrepresentation in party-state 
apparatuses and more collusive relationships with certain central-state elites. In other 
words, the building of more collusive relationships between emerging elites and central-
state elites may be more contingent upon the agency of specific elites. 
 
SOME THOUGHTS ON POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although China and Russia can both be classified as authoritarian regimes, the ways they 
are authoritarian differ significantly. In Russia, ethno-federalism has been practiced, 
entailing varying degrees of formal power-sharing between the federal government and 
ethnic republics. In addition, although the UR party has been in power for an extended 
period of time, state organs are not formally subordinate to the control by UR. Overall, 
Russia features more negotiation-based relationships between central-state elites and 
ethno-regional elites, and ethnic republics are entitled to designate their own state 
symbols such as flags, coats of arms, anthems, etc. In China, by contrast, ethno-regions 
are organized unitarily with the central-state, and state organs are formally subordinate to 
the incumbent Chinese Communist Party. Overall, China features more hierarchically-





In other words, the structures of institutional opportunities and constraints does differ 
across China and Russia, even if they alone cannot adequately account for within-country 
variations of autonomy as implemented outcome across different ethno-regions. Such 
differences would not have been in place, absent the linkages and clusterings of 
nationalist mobilizations (Beissinger 2002) and the uncanny collapse of the USSR. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union took the form of union republics declaring independence, 
and the central-state of the post-Soviet Russian Federation remained weak throughout the 
1990s due to the turmoils of simultaneously building new political and economic 
institutions such as democracy, private property, market economy, and ethno-federalism. 
Of these new institutions, only ethno-federalism was a legacy, though re-adapted, from 
the Soviet-period. The brief weakening of the central-state in post-Soviet Russia provided 
opportunities for ethnic republics with strong titular elite capacity to actively reshape 
their power relations vis-à-vis Moscow and to redefine ethno-federalism in Russia in such 
a way that a negotiation-based flavor has been added to the traditionally more 
hierarchically-based relationships between central-state and ethno-regional elites.  
Minority group rights (Kymlicka 1996, 22-30) is a relevant discourse. However, this 
discourse originates completely from Western-based liberalism that requires the state to 
honor individual rights, and its applicability to the political contexts of present-day China 
and Russia is moot. Most strikingly, the discourse does not address the question as 
regards how to cultivate, in the contexts of China and Russia, the capacity for actors of 
ethnic minority categories to effectively interact with the state authorities in order to 
commit them to enforcing such rights. Moreover, the discourse of minority group rights 





have become fixed, which are in reality more fluid and malleable than one would think. 
Even if one assumes fixed majority-minority boundaries, to use rights discourse as a tool 
to negotiate with the central-state requires the titular populations, titular elites in 
particular, to be fluent in the multi-ethnic state’s lingua franca, more integrated with the 
multi-ethnic state’s mainstream society, and increasingly knowledgeable about not only 
the rights discourse but also the fundamental institutional contexts of the multi-ethnic 
states, the demographic and cultural landscapes of the multi-ethnic states, etc. It can be 
meaningless to propagate the idea of “group rights” without reflecting upon how such 
rights can be enforced in certain contexts as well as how capability to practice such rights 
can be fostered. 
Building upon the findings and explanations in this dissertation, I lay out some tentative 
suggestions for each of the major types of actors involved in the autonomy-building 
processes of ethno-regions. Idealistic as they may sound, these suggestions can be worth 
reflecting upon with regard to boosting, in the long run, titular elites’ capacity to exercise 
formally prescribed autonomy for an ethno-region, to promoting inter-ethnic 
cooperations, and to reconciling distinct, entrenched ethnic identities with the multi-
ethnic state’s territorial integrity. 
For the central-state, while continuing to recognize and respect ethnically-based 
identities, it could also devise creative formal or informal measures in terms of 
encouraging and facilitating cross-ethnic friendships, raising awareness of one another’s 
ethnically-based identities and ethnically-specific knowledge, signaling explicitly that 
cross-ethnic marriages are endorsed and supported by the state, and reminding citizens of 





more interested in developing comprehensive discourses, based upon the current ones, 
that would promote historiography that delineates cross-ethnic cultural exchanges, 
complex multi-origin processes of “ethno-genesis” in the historical trajectories of each of 
the ethnic categories, and the overlappings of such trajectories. Concomitantly with 
regard to historiography, the central-state could be more tolerant or even encouraging of 
further academically-based research and debates on the history of shared consciousness 
of various ethnic populations. As regards human capital building, the central-state could 
devise, based upon the current ones, creative programs that train systematically highly 
competent professionals of those ethnic minority categories underrepresented in such 
professions, STEM and social sciences in particular. This could more effectively be done 
less by means of affirmative action programs than by means of developing a full-package 
education system in which teachers and researchers of ethnic minority categories would 
be represented in all levels and disciplines, not only in ethno-regions but also in localities 
demographically dominated by the ethnic majority. Meanwhile, the central-state could 
encourage and facilitate ethnic minority professionals to settle down in economically 
more developed areas of the multi-ethnic state. Last but not least, the central state would 
be interested in promoting more dialogue-based portrayal of certain ethno-regions in its 
sponsored broadcast and print media both by admitting existing issues and by calling on 
reflections, discussions, or suggestions. Country-wide informally discriminatory practices 
such as limitations on hotel stays, extra security inspections, etc. should be dropped. 
For the ethno-regional state(s), in the event of using coercive measures, it (they) could 
employ them in a more cautious and more focused fashion. Coercive measures would be 





non-violent, non-regime-challenging dissents. The ethno-regional state could work on 
devising creative programs to attract highly competent professionals of all ethnic 
categories, the titular category in particular, back to the ethno-region, to place them in as 
many state-sponsored positions as possible, or to help them start up business. The ethno-
regional state would also be interested in training a large number of teachers able to 
teach, at all levels of the education system, bilingually in both the multi-ethnic state’s 
lingua franca and the language associated with the titular ethnic category of the ethno-
region. “Bilingual education” would be more effective and empowering, should it not 
entail merely the “teaching of two languages in one educational institution”, should it be 
reliant upon a competent team of bilingual teachers drawn from both the ethno-region’s 
titular category and the multi-ethnic state’s majority category, and should it ensure 
students their option to learn the language/script associated with their ethnic categories. 
On the other hand, voluntary self-assimilation should be respected. The ethno-regional 
state should take measures to protect individuals who do not fit into the “authenticity” 
images of their registered ethnic category against being ostracized by their “co-ethnics.” 
It also could tolerate or even encourage academically-based research and debates about 
the history of shared consciousness of different ethnic populations inhabiting that ethno-
region. Last but not least, if the titular elites have been underrepresented in the ethno-
regional state apparatuses, then the ethno-regional state could work towards gradually 
augmenting their representation. Ethno-region-wide informally discriminatory practices 
such as limitations on hotel stays, extra security inspections, etc. should also be dropped. 
For the elites of both ethnic majority and ethnic minority categories, they could become 





addressing their concerns. They would be interested in reaching out to their colleagues of 
ethnic categories other than their own, becoming more aware of one another’s ethnically-
specific knowledge, and building their networks beyond their own ethnic category. Such 
elites could be more tolerant and supportive of cross-ethnic marriages. They could 
promote discourses that emphasize commonality, historiography of amicable, cooperative 
inter-ethnic relations over differences and historiography of hostile, conflict-laden 
relations. They could also engage with the assumption that groupness is not product of 
genetically-based, essential, unchanging differences but rather product of historically, 
politically, socially, and culturally contingent, divergent, and mutually interactive 
processes. Ethnic minority elites would be interested in presenting their ethnically-
specific knowledge in the multi-ethnic state’s lingua franca to a much broader audience, 
which state authority would want to endorse and support. If elites are able to see ethnicity 
beyond groupness, it would be more likely for them to adopt more inclusive boundary-
making strategies. Nevertheless, emphasis upon non-ethnically-based cleavages should 
not be conflated with the diminishing of ethnic consciousness. Quite to the contrary, they 
are conducive to “recruiting” more members into an ethnic “club”, to enlisting support 
from individuals who have been fluctuating/swinging across inter-ethnic boundaries, to 
building support base among the multi-ethnic state’s majority ethnic population for both 
the titular population and the ethno-region, as well as to establishing the pride among the 
titular population that “our culture is attractive.” Particularly with regard to titular elites, 
they could improve their skills at framing their concerns or suggestions in more nuanced 
ways when it comes to policy formulations or implementations. Titular elites should be 





effectively channel criticism if through the incumbent party or elite networks rather than 
through the public sphere and if as specific as possible when describing their concerns. 
Moreover, elites regardless of ethnicity would want to refrain from framing hastily their 
concerns in terms of “ethnic issue.” Instead, socio-economic concerns should be delinked 
from ethnicity to the extent possible. 
For the populace of both ethnic majority and ethnic minority categories, they could 
become more active in terms of building friendship with their co-citizens of other ethnic 
categories and more aware of one another’s ethnically-specific knowledge. They would 
be interested in learning one another’s languages and using them informally in daily life 
if they happen to live in ethnically mixed, linguistically diverse neighborhoods. The 
populace could try to find more cross-ethnic ties of commonality than areas of 
differences while adjusting their value systems in such a way as to be more welcoming of 
cross-ethnic marriages. For those individuals whose first language is not the multi-ethnic 
state’s lingua franca, it could only help them more if they were able to improve skills in 
that lingua franca and became more knowledgeable about relevant policies, laws, 
regulations, etc. formulated by the central and ethno-regional states. The populace of 
ethnic minority categories also could be more encouraging of their children to pursue 
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